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The sources on which this dissertation is based could 
not have been assembled without the assistance, or even 
indulgence, of very many people. This is most true of 
the Zulu oral and written sources. Regarding the former, 
Colin Shum and Judith Shier (coordinators of the Oral 
History Project, University of Natal, Durban) keenly 
supported my quest to interview members of the Zulu 
royal family and Zulu oral historians. My father, 
Trevor Cope (Professor of Zulu Language and Literature, 
University of Natal, Durban), provided invaluable advice 
and practical assistance in locating Zulu interviewees; 
and both he and Eileen Krige (Emeritus Professor of 
Social Anthropology, University of Natal, Durban) suggested 
fruitful avenues of enquiry. 
In Zululand, members and employees of the KwaZulu Government 
lent the project their support in both official and 
personal capacities. Mr J.E. Ndlovu (Secretary of Education 
and Culture) not only provided me with generous hospitality 
at his home in Ulundi during my visits to Zululand, but 
also arranged for ~1r J .K. Dladla ( Cultural Affairs Organiser) 
to act as my guide and interpreter. 'J.K.' proved to be 
an informative guide, a sensitive interpreter, and a 
tirelessly enthusiastic companion. Dr A. Gumede (rhnister 
of Health, who has a special interest in Zulu history) 
also offered advice a nd encouragement; while Mrs Sybil 
Mohlaka and Mrs Dot Dhlomo offered further friendship and 
hospitality at Ulundi. I am indebted to Mr E. Ngubane 
(private secretary to the Chief Minister) and Chief Gatsha 
Buthelezi (Chief Minister and president of Inkatha) for 
arranging the interview with Princess Magogo kaDinuzulu. 
Every interviewee, moreover, wil l in gly gave of their time 
to speak about Zulu history. The task of translating and' 
transcribing the Zulu language int erviews was accurately 
performed by Mr E.R. Dahle (translator, Oral History 
Project). 
iv 
Regarding Zulu written sources, Mr C.D. Zondi (librarian, 
University of Zululand, Empangeni) gave me some useful 
references to Zulu-language books and newspapers which 
contained information of Solomon's period. Mr J.K. Dladla, 
on the other hand, made available to me some transcripts 
of addresses given at KwaZulu Government historical or 
commemorative functions. The bulk of the manuscript and 
printed Zulu-language sources I collected were translated 
by Mrs G. Shozi (secretary, Department of Zulu Language 
and Literature, University of Natal, Durban) - a daunting 
job which was efficiently accomplished. My father was an 
invaluable help with the smaller tracts, and with specific 
linguistic queries. 
Although the search for the documentary records of the Zulu 
royal family during Solomon's period was not rewarded, I am 
grateful to those who, at various stages of the search, 
offered their advice: Mr J.K. Dladla, Mr Kanyi (private 
secretary to the late King Cyprian kaSolomon, Nongoma), 
Mr Z. Mahaye (Zulu oral historian, Hluhluwe), Mr Mkhize 
(private secretary to King Goodwill Zwelithini kaCyprian, 
Nongoma), Mr J. Mienie (deputy-chief archivist, Central 
Archives Depot, Pretoria), Professor M.W. Swanson (an 
authority on the various A.W.G. Champion manuscript 
collections - Mr Kanyi believed that Champion had 
'inherited' Solomon's papers), and Mrs J. Van der Poel (an 
authority on Gen. J. Smuts' archival records - Mr Mahaye 
held that the Zulu regent, Mshiyeni kaDinuzulu, had given 
Solomon's papers to Smuts in the late-1930s). 
The counter staff of the library of the University of 
Natal, Durban, efficiently handled all my requests for 
secondary sources. Special thanks are due to the archivists 
at the Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban, and the 
Natal Archives Depot, Pi etermari tzburg, who guide'd me 
through their collections during the many months that I 
haunted their reading rooms. At the State Archives Pre t oria , , 
I must acknowledge the cooperation of Mr G. Reynecke (chief 
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archivist, Central Archives Depot) in supporting my 
applications to Mr J. Basson (director of administration, 
Department of Cooperation and Development, Pretoria) to 
consult the important Native Affairs Department file 
'Nkata ka Zulu, 1923-1931'. The latter had been withdrawn 
from the archives by the Department of Cooperation and 
Development before it became 'derestricted' under the 
terms of the fifty-year rule, and had never previously 
been made available for public consultation. The staffs 
of the Documentation Centre for African Studies (Univers-
ity of South Africa, Pretoria); Don Africana Library, 
Durban; Department of Historical and Literary Papers 
(University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg); and, 
while I was in London, the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies (University of London); Royal Commonwealth 
Society; and the British Newspaper Library at Colindale 
were all of assistance at various stages of my research. 
The Sugar Milling Research Institute, Durban, allowed me 
to consult material in its private library, for which I 
am very grateful. Similarly, Mr J.F. A'Bear (secretary, 
Zululand Diocese, Church of the Province of South Africa) 
allowed me into the basement 'strong room' of historical 
records at the Diocesan Offices, Eshowe - which proved to 
be an enlightening cavern. Mr N.P. Greenham (secretary, 
Natal Diocese, Church of the Province of South Africa) 
also assisted my search for church sources; and it was he 
who put me in touch with Mr F.B. Oscroft, son of the 
Rev. L.E. Os croft who was Solomon's closest 'European 
adviser'. Mr F.B. Os croft thereafter corresponded with 
me, reminiscing about his childhood days spent in Chief 
Solomon's ward in the Nongoma district. I am also grateful 
to Lesley Reeves, a fellow history res~arch student at the 
University of Natal, who photocopied for me various 
relevant documents at the Institute of Contemporary 
History (University of the Orange Free State, Bloemfontein). 
At an academic level, I am indebted to Dr Paul Maylam, who 
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undertook to supervise the preparation of this dissertation 
under difficult circumstances. Not only had I not done 
any of the research under his guidance, but, since I 
was no longer living in South Africa, supervision of 
the writing-up stage had to be conducted through the 
rather cumbersome medium of long-distance correspondence. 
Throughout what has been a long and arduous task, Paul 
has been an unfailing source of encouragement and sound 
interpretative and technical advice; and he provided 
practical help in the presentation of the final typescript 
to the University authorities - work which is not usually 
the resposibility of a supervisor. In England, I am 
grateful to Dr Shula Marks (Director, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies) who similarly was an important 
source of advice, and who never failed to show a very 
encouraging interest in my work. 
On a more material level, a bursary from the South African 
Human Sciences Research Council and a Graduate Assistantship 
from the University of Natal funded this dissertation's 
research. A large part of this dissertation was completed 
at the Cheshire home of Dr W.A. and Mrs J. Pollitt, without 
whose kindness and hospitality over a period of some eight 
months I could not have set about focussing my attention 
on the writing of Zulu history. I am moreover indebted 
to both of my parents who were, in many ways, a constant 
source of encouragement and support; and they also freely 
gave of their time in the proof-reading and correcting of 
the final typescript. Two close Natal friends in London, 
Rodney Bolt and Hans Nicolai, assisted in the proof-
reading as well. The dissertation was typed with great 
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Before the declaration of Union in 1910, the institution 
of Zulu kingship repeatedly acted as a rallying point for 
Zulu taking up arms against the prospect or practice of 
white overrule. The political roles played by Cetshwayo 
kaMpande during the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879, and Dinuzulu 
kaCetshwayo during both the Zulu civil war which persisted 
until 1888 and the 'Zulu rebellion' of 1906, are illustrative 
in this respect. After each of these periods of violent 
confrontation between the Zulu and the forces of imperialism 
or colonialism, white authorities responded by banishing 
the head of the Zulu royal family from Zululand. The 
imprisonment and exile of Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo after the 
1906 rebellion, however, was the third and last occasion on 
which the head of the head of the Zulu royal family was 
banished from Zululand. 
Since Dinuzulu's death in exile in 1913, the heirs to the 
Zulu royal house have been domiciled in Zululand without 
interruption: Solomon Nkayishana kaDinuzulu (1913 to 1933); 
Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon (1948 to 1968 - Mshiyeni Arthur 
kaDinuzulu acted as regent during Cyprian's long minority); 
and Goodwill Zwelithini kaCyprian (1971 to date - after a 
brief regency period under Isreal Mcwayizeni kaSolomon). 
Their political influence has remained a central theme in 
Zulu history throughout the post-Union period. But their 
political role has become increasingly distanced from the 
politics of protest and rebellion, and closer to the politics 
of compromise and collaboration. 
In the early 1950s, while the 'Congress Alliance' (primarily 
comprising the African National Con gress and the South 
African Indian Congress) was co-ordinating the un precedentedly 
unit ed and broad-based 'Defiance Campaign ' against the 
policies of th e apartheid re gime, Cyprian was provin ~ himself 
x 
to be amenable to the evolving state policy of 'separat e 
deve]opment' and the 1951 'Bantu Ltriba17 Authorities 
Act' which was its cornerstone. In 1953, the South African 
Government for the first time recognised the head of the 
Zulu royal family as 'paramount chief' of the 'Zulu nation', 
in response to the ideological imperatives of the Verwoerdian 
era. Following the inauguration of the KwaZulu Territorial 
Authority in 1970 and, subsequently, under the terms of 
the 1971 'Bantu Homelands Constitution Act', the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly, Zwelithini and his royal council 
played the leading role in a series of Pretoria-
sponsored attempts to dislodge the 'rebel' Chief Gatsha 
Buthelezi from control over Zulu politics. It was partly 
in response to the backstairs intrigues between 'king' s 
parties' (of which the 'Zulu National Party' and the 
'Umkhonto kaShaka Party' were examples) and South African 
state officials that members of the KwaZulu Legislative 
Assembly, under Buthelezi's leadership, resuscitated in 
1975 the Zulu 'Inkatha' organisation that had existed during 
the 1920s. 
Having established its h~gemony in Zulu politics, the present 
Inkatha has determinedly relegated Zwelithini to the role 
of a 'non-political' constitutional monarch, and rejected 
Pretoria's attempts to force KwaZulu to secede from 'white 
South Africa' by accepting formal independence as a Zulu 
homeland or nation-state. Inkatha has been the most 
outspoken critic of South African Government policy to 
emerge from within the structure of apartheid . But because 
Inkatha appeals to a somewhat belligerently exclusive Zulu 
nationalism (revealed most clearly in its reverence for 
the institution of Zulu kingship, a symbol of Zulu tradition, 
historic national unity and independence) and combines the 
politics of protest an d compromise , it has been a matt er for 
controversy whether the organisation, i n the words of one 
analyst, "undermines or underpins the whi te stat e ".1 In the 
Xl 
l i e;ht of lnka tha 's rol e durinr, t he cu rren t (1 981~ - 1985) 
r esurgence ann expansion of an ti-aparthe id polit ico ] Gcti on 
in South Africa, howevr r, it would s eem that lnkat ha at .. 
present undermines apartheid's opponents far more than it 
undermines apartheid itself. The stance that Inkatha has 
adopted a gainst the banned but influential African National 
Congress, the United Democratic Front and the recently-formed 
(November 1985) Congress of South African Trade Unions is 
illustrative in this respect. 
The changing and problematical political role that the 
Zulu royal family and Zulu nationalism has played in the 
post-Union period, in the contexts of both Zulu politics 
and wider South African white and black politics, has not 
received the scholarly attention that it would seem to 
deserve. 2 The notable and only exception, which focusses 
on the early post-Union period, is Shula Marks' pioneering 
article entitled "Natal, the Zulu Royal Family and the 
Ideology of Segregation".3 In that article, Marks offers 
a penetrating overview of the interconnections between the 
Natal African petty bourgeoisie an d the Zulu royal family, 
which were embodied in the Inkatha of the 1920s, as well as 
the interconnections between the early Inkatha and the 
development of segregationist thinking at state level. 
This dissertation sets out to examine thoroughly the 
political role of the Zulu royal fami l y an d Zulu nationalism 
during the first two decades after the Act of Union, du r:i ng 
whi ch period Solomon ka Di nuzulu was t he hearl of the Zulu 
royal family. For t he se cond half of the 1920s, the focus 
necessarily falls not on Solomon bu t on I nkatha: the 
organi sat ion had become the lead in g exponent of Zulu 
na t i onali sm, and , being primari ly a Vp h i cle f or the 1::1 spj ratj on s 
of th e ZuJu -speaking petty bourgeoisie , had succeeded ln 
seizin ~ the political initi ative fro m th e Zulu tribal e Jit e 
and defining Sol omon ' s role as that of a constitutional 
X l ] 
mon a rch . An es se nt i a J ob j ect i ve i s to e s tablish a 
na rrati ve fr ampwork of Zu lu roy al a nd nat i ona J ist poli ti ca l 
h i story dur i n ~ t he ea r l y pos t - Uni on pe r i ?d, since, ind ee d, 
none already exis t s. Howev er, ~ecognising that developments 
in the sphere of Zulu politics cannot be understood in 
isolation from chan ges a t t he socia l and economi c l eve ls, 
as in the hi story of every human social formation, th i s 
dissertation doe s not simply or exclusively focus on Zulu 
'politics'. For t he Zulu people of Zululand and Northern 
Natal (the lands of the 'old Zulu kin gdom'), and also the 
Zulu-speakin g people of Natal proper (the territory of the 
ori~inal Colony of Natal, on the southern borders of the , 
Zulu kingdom), the first two decades of Union was a period 
of accelerated socio-economic chan ge. This was largely a 
consequence of their becomin g increasingly enmeshed, as a 
subordinant people, in a wider South African economy and 
society. Moreover, because the pace and impact of indus t -
rialisation and acculturation was not equally experienced 
throughout Zulu society, new forms of social stratification 
developed amon g the Zulu. I n the process, the roles of 
'traditional' Zu l u political authorities (which i ncluded 
the institution of Zulu kin gshi p as well as the lesser 
tribal authorities which h ad been incorpora ted into the 
colonial system of 'indirect rule'), together with the 
ideologies with which they were associated (which included 
Zulu nationalism), themselves underwent substantial change . 
Wh i le attemptin g to situate the changin g political role of 
Zul u royalty und Zulu nati onal i sm i n a broader social con t ext, 
and in part icular to 'look beneath t he ski n' of Zulu 
nat ionaJ.ism t o i den tify t he s ocia l forc e s which shaped i t , 
th i s di ssertati on thu s broaden s its fo cus to include Zu l u 
socia l ch an ~e and cla s s for mation . As wi th Zu l u politi ca l 
hi s tory , no acc ount of Zul u s ocial h i st or y for th ~ earl y 
. !-l-po s t - Uni on per i od al r e 8dy eXl s t s . 
Th is di sser tation f ollows o!} f r om Je ff Guy ' s The dest r uc: U O ll 
of the ZuJ u I< i ngd om (f i rst publ i shed j n 1979 ) , vrllj eh fo cusse s 
xii i 
on t he post-coTl (}ue s t 6 U] U civil vJD r, nnd Shula Marks' 
Reluctant Reb e llion (publ ished in 1970 ), wh i ch focuss e s 
on t he 1906 r ebel lion. 5 Guy' s an d Marks' thorou gh and 9 
stjmulating histories, togeth er with th eir subsequently-
published articles,6 have not only acted as sources of 
inspiration but also as essential reference works in the 
preparation of this dissertation. The following reconstruction 
of Zulu history durin g th e early post-Union period, however, 
is based almost exclusively on primary research materials. 
This dissertation's concern is with the history of the Zulu 
people in particular. The processes of change which it 
identifies takin g place amon g the Zulu ouring the early 
post-Union period, however, were to a certain extent mirrored 
in African societies elsewhere in southern Africa. Both 
for this r eason, and because i t addresses certain topics and 
ventures into various analytical domains which represent 
undeveloped areas in South African historio graphy, the study 
could be of value to rese archers whose int erests do not lie 
particularly or exclusively in Zulu history . Indeed, this 
s tudy has itself drawn on other studi e s whose fo cus falls on 
Afri can societi e s beyond the borders of the province of 
Natal. 7 
Twentieth century South African rural history represents an 
especially severely undeveloped area in South African 
historiography. Even thou gh Col i n Bundy' s work does no t 
proceed much further than the fir st de cade of the twent ie th 
century , his pion eering study en t it l ed The Ri s e ano Fal l of 
the South African Peasan t r y is an exception in th i s r egard8 -
and has proved useful in the pr epar ation of this d i sser tati on . 
So t oo have Sl at er' s and Guy ' s arti c les , which 
la t e nineteenth centur y in the Nata ] re gion . 9 
the e~ rly twent~eth century , He l en Br adfo r d ' s 
f ocus on t he 
I n r egard t o 
work on the 
l CU i n Na t al prope r ha s beer) both stimul atin~ Gnd informative 10 
~ . 
.. 
)( ] V 
Althou r.;h th e Ge o ~T(-J1)hic;lJ nIl'! chron olo (':ic c~J SC o pfC~ of this 
di G~;e rt Cltj o n is cOl1 siric rCJbJ;y bro;.:de r th an i3r udford , ~~ arbcle, 
like Bradford' s work it ad dresses both African and white 
rural history. This dissertation c.ould also mak e a 
contribution to the historio graphy of South African state 
racial policy, particularly since it hi ghlights the contacts 
between Natal's leading white 'native policy' le gislators, 
who are recognised to have played an important role in the 
development of state segre gationism in the 1920s and early 
1930s,11 and Zulu nationaljst poJiticians. In co ntrast to 
other analyses, with the exception of Marks' "Ideology of 
Segregation", it describes the interconnections between 
African politics (as expressed in the Zulu nationalist 
context) and white segregationist thinking at state level. 
Considerable advances have been made within the last decarle 
in the field of South African 'Africanist' historiography, 
largely as a consequence of the growth of the 'revisionist' 
school of South African historiography.12 Many lacunae 
nonetheless remain. When the extant literature on African 
history during the post-Union period does r efer to triba l 
authorities, for example, it does so often only to dismiss 
them as inert 'traditionalists' or as stat e employees and 
therefore collaborators. 13 This dissertation, by contrast, 
pays special attention to the development and political 
role of tribal authorities - the 'chiefly stratum' - as a 
class. For the earlier period, it draws on Guy's "Destruction 
and reconstruction of Zulu society", and , to a lesser ext ent , 
Patrick Harries ' stud,,/ of labour mi Gr at ion fro m til';: l)e la G;oa 
Bay hinterland until th e close of the nineteenth centu ry. 14 
Whi le there is an import ant and gro win g body of literature 
on t he African petty bourgeoi si e , with the notab Je exception 
of Bundy's Peasantry s tudies have tAnded to focus on th R 
African pet ty bo ur geoj s :i e as an urban phen O!III:::10r, . FUJ't h0.I':1Jor.::' , 
w:i. th the notable excep iO:1 of Phillip Bonl1 e r ' ~; ;" . ': ::.- ,J.! 
the AI r icc.n pett y bc.uf',;:e ci ~i " i i' Jollo.nnpsbuT'f" l, , ' t\'J8811 1 ':"'-1 
.. 
xv 
ClrJ·l 19?0 , studj c~~ iJ' ! V( tellC! .,! to l'O('I JS OTI tnt ' [ ,r ""' - !Jnj on 
, [Af .. . 15 " . .] ] hlstory 0 tn (:~ . r jc',n pctt.y ~) OurC'e Olsle . ""J.ml Gr y , 
t he r e is a dearth of secondary mat erjal re (.~3I:d:in[j the 
African 'underclass' in the rural areas (whi ch this 
(lissertation describes as the 'rank-and-file', to avoid 
the specific connotations which attach to the t e rm 'workin g 
class') during the post-Union period, althou gh Bradford's 
study of the leU in Natal proper makes a significant 
contribution to the redress of this lacuna. 16 
In accordance with University requirements, I hereby state 
that, unless specifically indeicated to the contrary ln the 
text or footnot es, this dissertation is ny own ori ginal 
work. 
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Sir Theophilus Shepstone and 'Shepstonism' in Natal 
No account of the role of Zulu chiefs in general, or the 
Zulu royal family in particular, during the period covered 
by this thesis is possible without an appraisal of the 
policy of indirect rule known as 'Shepstonism' - so named 
1 after Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Although it had developed 
in Natal as a means of dealing with the African population, 
it subsequently informed official policy in Zululand after 
the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879. The theory and practice of 
indirect rule in Natal, however, was not Shepstone's 
brainchild. The groundwork had been laid long before 
Shepstone took charge as Diplomatic Agent to the Native 
Tribes in 1846; moreover, Shepstone himself was initially 
one of its staunchest critics. 
One of the two foundations of Shepstonism - the recognition 
of existing African authorities, 
central to an agreement that Sir 
chiefs in the Port Natal region 





customs - was 
D'Urban made with 
as 1833. Whilst 
of the king of 
England and were to abide by the "general laws of the 
Colony", Colonial law " ••• would not interfere with the 
domestic and internal regulations of the Chiefs for their 
tribes ••• nor with their customs."2 The other foundation 
was imp~icit in this agreement: the African chiefs and 
their followers would retain their access to land and could 
continue to exploit it and distribute it among themselves 
in accordance with their own laws and customs. Both 
D'Urban's annexation of the territory and the above 
agreement were soon annulled; at that stage London saw 
no reason for the extension of British BOvereignity over 
the area. When Britain did annex Natal in 1845, she did 
2 
so for objectives that were essentially negative. She did 
not want an independent Afrikaner republic on the South 
African coast, nor did she want Afrikaner settlers to 
displace a large African population to the south of Natal, 
where they might further complicate matters on the Cape 
Colony's explosive frontier. 3 As far as the Colonial 
Office was concerned, the intrinsic value of the Colony 
of Natal was negligible and, accordingly, the amount spent 
on her governance should be minimal. 
In a memorandum drawn up during the sitting of the 1846 
Natal Natives Location Commission, Shepstone had proposed 
a policy which envisaged an African population assimilated 
to European law, under the direct supervision of European 
magistrates, and the encouragement of an educational 
and 'civilising' endeavour. 4 However, the Colonial Office 
was not prepared to embark on a costly programme of social 
and economic reform, even if this might forge a self-
supporting colony with African peasant cultivators contributing 
to the Imperial economy both a supply of raw materials and 
5 a market for British manufactured goods. More acceptable 
was a colony paying for its own administration through the 
extraction of surplus from extant African homestead pro-
duction in the form of tax. 6 British capital, too, was not 
intent on developing new patterns of production; it was 
more interested in land speculation.? The policy of indirect 
rule in Natal was borne of expediency and parsimony. 
The Location Commission had recommended the establishment 
of what were to become Natal's African reserves. The 
administrative policy laid down by Royal Instructions 
issued in 1848, embodied the thinking of the Colonial 
Office rather than of colonial officials. Within the 
overarching control of British authority, which could 
intervene at its pleasure, African customary law was 
3 
recognised and chiefs were to continue to exercise 
authority over their 'tribes' in accordance with this law. 
Shepstone initially raised strong objections, particularly 
to the wide powers accorded to chiefs
8 
whom he was inclined 
to characterise as despots. Shepstone also sympathised 
with white colonists' opposition to the Location policy 
and indirect rule on the grounds that it perpetuated 
'barbarism' and independent homestead production, thereby 
'locking up' labour that the colonists urgently needed. 
However, he realised that the Natal African population, 
whatever its weaknesses was still strong enough to resist 
a frontal attack on its independent way of life. 9 Given 
no alternative, Shepstone gradually began to see merit 
in the policy of indirect rule. He embraced it and left 
his personal stamp on it. 
The 'Shepstone system' was a policy of legal, political 
and territorial segregation, under an umbrella of white 
dominance. At the apex of Shepstonism was the office of 
Supreme Chief, an office which vested in the Governor 
of Natal the powers that an African paramount chief was 
presumed to wield. In the hands of the Supreme Chief 
were to rest all executive, political and judicial power, 
to be delegated as he wished through the Secretary of 
Native Affairs in Natal, the magistrates beneath him, and, 
in turn, the chiefs and headmen beneath them. It was a 
prerogative that exceeded the traditional powers of a 
paramount chief - and anyway there had never been one in 
Natal. 
It was, however, in the lowest reaches of the hierarchy 
that the essence of indirect rule lay. Shepstonism imposed 
two duties on chiefs. On the one hand chiefs were to 
function as cheap civil servants who were ultimately 
4 
responsible to the Supreme Chief; on the other they were 
to act out their traditional role in presiding over, guiding 
and coordinating the activities of their 'tribes' in 
accordance with customary law and usage. Though the 
Supreme Chief could intervene where and whenever he 
thought it necessary, in the daily running of affairs 
the chiefs had a large measure of independence 0 
The whole system was set within the matrix of African 
customary law which was to be administered through the 
medium of white officials and African chiefs, with 
1 h h ' f 10 S' Af' the right of appea to t e Supreme C le • lnce rlcan 
customary law was so vital a component of African 
administration, great efforts were made to codify ~t and 
commit it to paper after the European fashion. The Natal 
'Code of Native Law' was first gazetted in 1878, and was 
periodically amended thereafter. ll The Code not only 
entrended the judicial and legal aspects of segregation in 
Natali as Natal's Chief Native Commissioner appreciatively 
reflected forty-seven years later, it also "embraces the 
administrative, social and moral aspects of native life.,,12 
Exceptions to the operation of customary law were made 
where it was deemed to be "repugnant to the general 
principles of humanity observed throughout the civilized 
~ world".13 Furthermore in 1846, provision was made for 
------African individuals to be exempted from customary law and 
to fall under the purview of European law. 14 In practice, 
few attained the educational and 'civilized' standards 
laid down as qualifications for exemption. Nevertheless, 
'exempted natives' were to become an important African 
social group. 
The system contained within it the seeds of its own 
breakdown. Alongside each of the roles of a Shepstonist 
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chief lay two separate sets of responsibilities and 
loyalties, and it was frequently impossible to fulfill 
both simultaneously. Shepstone believed it to be an 
"axiom" that 
it is impossible to govern effectively a Zulu 
population, such as either that of Natal or 
Zululand, without the aid of their own institutions15 at the head of which are their Chiefs and Headmen. 
However, Shepstone was in no doubt where the primary 
responsibilities of chiefs should lie whenever the interests 
of government and people conflicted. Indeed, he would 
ideally have weeded out hereditary chiefs and supplanted 
them with government appointees, who, dependent directly 
on the government for their office, would act as more 
quiescent servants. 16 He employed hereditary chiefs 
because it was impossible to eliminate their influence 
immediately, but he foresaw their gradual elimination~7 
Furthermore, he encouraged the fissiparous tendencies 
inherent in the Nguni socio-political system18 with a 
view to forging new "government tribes", under appointed 
chiefs, from the resultant fragments. 19 
In Natal, where Shepstone's ideas had evolved, the African 
population comprised separate tribal groups. Furthermore, 
here Shepstone was often dealing with tribal groups which 
had been disrupted by raiders from the Zulu kingdom or 
disturbed by an influx of refugees from Zulu rule. 20 The 
Natal African population was somewhat malleable - and 
Shepstone's ideas of 'government tribes' under 'appointed 
chiefs' could therefore be more readily implemented in 
Natal than in Zululand. The Zulu had a strong tradition 
of centralised rule and national unity, and their independent 
spirit had been vividly manifested in the way in which 
they had confronted British imperial might in 1879. The 
deportation of their king after the Anglo-Zulu war did 
6 
not simply erase the Zulu political heritage. However, 
Shepstone's ideas dominated official thinking when it 
came to devising British policy in Zululand after the war. 
Shepstonism in Zulu land 
On 1 Septembe~ 1879, Sir Garnet Wolsel~y, General Officer 
in command of the British troops and now vested with 
civil authority to effect a settlement in Zululand, 
addressed the :. Zulu people through . the medium of John 
Shepstone, Acting Secretary of Native Affairs for Natal 
and brother of Sir Theophilus. 
"Only yesterday you yourselves have seen LCetshwayqJ 
carried away a prisoner, never", he emphasized, 
"to return again to Zululand • ••• His country is now 
to be divided up into different chieftainships, 
and I hope his fate will be a warning to all chiefs 
not to follow in his footsteps, but to act 
according to the commands and terms given by the 
British Queen, who will most surely punish any 
who do not do so. • •• Zululand now belongs to the 
Queen of England. She has, however, already 
enough land in Africa, and so has, --through me as 
her representative, appointed certain chiefs to 
rule over the districts which I shall presently 
name, ••• i!ollowing th~ laws and customs LEhatl 
held good before Chaka."21 
Thus were Shepstonist principles, in -the form of Wolseley's 
'settlement', ushered into Zululand. A dec~de of disastrous 
civil wars ensued, which, as Jeff Guy has demonstrated, 
proved more devastating to the Zulu people than the Zulu 
war itself. 22 Of crucial significance were the particular 
chiefs whom Wolseley had appointed, the groups of people 
and districts they were to administer, and the policy 
that had been adopted towards the Zulu royal family and 
their closest adherents, the Usuthu. In all these matters 
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Wolseley had been closely influenced by Shepstone and 
"the Shepstone clique,,23 - as had Melmoth Osborn, the 
British Resident that Wolseley appointed in Zululand. 
If Shepstone was apprehensive of the independent powers 
of hereditary chiefs in Natal, suspecting them to be likely 
sources of dissent, his fears were compounded when faced 
with the Zulu royal family. Shepstone and Shepstonists 
characterised the Zulu royal family as a fearsome and 
disruptive remnant of a "pure military despotism", 
unequivocally "opposed to the quiet of the country and 
the happiness of the peopleo,,24 Shepstone himself regarded 
monarchical authority within a unitary political structure 
as an imposition on the Zulu people, who, "composed 
originally of conquered and incorporated tribes", yearned 
for their "ancient and separate existence, relieved of 
the terrible incubus 'of the Zulu royal family!,25 Given 
the freedom and official encouragement to do so, he reasoned 
these divisive 'yearnings' would place the Zulu royal 
family in check. Thus the aim of the British administrators 
was, on the one hand, to demolish the Zulu state and i mpress 
upon the Zulu that the powers and pretentions of the Zulu 
royal family had permanently expired, and, on the other, to 
replace the rule of the Zulu king with that of a number 
of independent chiefs appointed over resuscitated pre-
Shakan chiefdoms. 
In practice, the majority of the thirteen chiefs appointed 
by Wolseley bore no links with any pre-Shakan arrangement. 
Furthermore, the boundaries of their 'chiefdoms' cut 
indiscriminately across social and political groupings 
- in some cases chiefs did not even live in the districts 
over which they were to rule. 26 Two chiefs were aliens: 
the Englishman John Dunn who had turned against his friend 
and patron, Cetshwayo, during the war, and Hlubi, a Sotho 
chief, who had served as a mercenary with the British 
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forces o27 More significant was the appointment of zibhebhu 
and Hamu, two restless members of the Zulu royal lineage 
who had exploited the events of 1879 to pursue their own 
separate ambitions. Both had been closely connected with 
the colonial world before the war through the media of 
trade, labour recruiting, and European advisors, and 
after the war were eager to collaborate with the victors 
to consolidate their positions. 28 The cultivation of 
such a group of collaborating 'new men' who were indebted 
to British intervention for their status was the mainspring 
of British policy. 
The royalist cause was dealt its heaviest blow by the 
appointment of the royal collaborators, Hamu and Zibhebhu, 
to rule over its northern territories. Hamu was assigned 
a large territory in the north-west that included his own 
followers, the Ngenetsheni, the staunchly royalistQulusi, 
and a large part of the Buthelezi, incl~ding the 
personal homestead of their lineage head, Mnyamana, who 
had been Cetshwayo's chief counsellor. 29 To the east of 
Hamu, Zibhebhu was awarded extensive territory which 
included the core of the Usuthu,including Cetshwayo's son 
and heir-apparent, Dinuzulu, and Ndabuko and Ziwedu 
who were Cetshwayo's most powerful brothers. 30 It was 
one of the vagaries of the settlement, however, that not 
all of Zibhebhu's direct followers, the Mandlakazi, were 
included in his 'chiefdom'. 
Hamu and particularly Zibhebhu immediately scrambled to 
consolidate and exploit their positions, turning on the 
Usuthu and royalist adherents to do so. In the chaos 
arising out of the Usuthu backlash, the British Resident, 
Melmo th Osborn, showed his "true Shepstonian colours,,31 
in throwing his weight behind the collaborators against the 
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usuthu. No cure for anarchy was found, and by 1883 the 
British Government saw no alternative but to restore to 
Cetshwayo to zululand. He returned to rule over Central 
Zululand, excluding Zibhebhu and Hamu's lands to the 
north, and also excluding a newly proclaimed Reserve 
Territory which was to act as a buffer to the south. 
This arrangement did not end the disturbances, but rather 
resulted in a full-scale civil war. 
Within a year, Cetshwayo had died, the Usuthu having 
been thoroughly defeated in a series of clashes with the 
Mandlakazi. Dinuzulu pursued the royalist cause with 
the help of new found allies - the Boers. Zibhebhu was 
routed and fled to the Reserve Territory. The vast 
territorial claims of the Boers, as reward for their 
services, brought about British intervention and arbitration 
between Boer and Zulu - in response to zulu appeals and 
in defence of British strategic interests. The new 
'settlement' was reached in 1887: the partition of 
Zululand between Britain and the Boers. In the north-west 
the Boers were rewarded approximately one third of Zulu-
land, including the best grazing land. The Ngenetsheni, 
the Qulusi, and important sections of the Buthelezi and the 
usuthu now found themselves subjects of the Boer 'New 
Republic'. In addition, an adjoining area designated 
'Proviso B' was set aside for European settlement. 
The rest of the country was annexed directly to the 
.. h 32 Brltls Crown. 
Shepstonist principles of administration were not only 
confirmed in British Zululand, but carried a stage 
further by the appointment of the Governor of Natal, 
Sir Arthur Havelock, as Special Commissioner and Supreme -
Chief of Zululand. liThe House of Shaka is a thing of 
the pastil, he announced, "it is like water spilt on the 
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ground".33 Both Dinuzulu and Zibhebhu were recognised 
as chiefs under the new authority. British policy had 
not departed from its prejudice against the Zulu royal 
family: the prescription for administrative success 
was still seen to lie in the appointment of collaborators 
34 as a counter balance to royal power. The restoration 
of Zibhebhu resulted in the displacement of five thousand 
Usuthu from their homes. Osborn, now Resident Commissioner 
in Zululand, saw Zibhebhu's loyalty to the Crown since 
1879 as a strong contrast to usuthu disaffection.
35 
The Usuthu resisted the partition of Zululand and the 
restoration of Zibhebhu - and the colonial order that the 
latter, together with the hut tax that was imposed in 
36 1887, represented. The annexation had, however, 
succeeded in fracturing unity among the royalist group. 
Dinuzulu initially refused to accept copies of Havelock's 
proclamation of the annexation or a stipend from the 
government; but Mnyamana, the Buthelezi leader,did,37 
thus initiating a rift between the Usuthu and the Buthelezi 
that was to linger for over two decades. 38 FinallY,after 
violence had erupted once again between the Usuthu and 
the Mandlakazi in 1888, Dinuzulu and his uncles, Ndabuko 
and Shingana, were arrested and tried for high treason. 
Foundy guilty, they were exiled to st. Helena. As with 
the exile of Cetshwayo in 1879, the influence of the Zulu 
royal family could not so easily be eliminated in Zululand 
- as British policy makers were now beginn~ng to realize. 
The 'Basutolandization' alternative 
The prospect of a basic change in policy came in 1893. In 
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that year, Shepstone died,and Osborn and Sir Charles Mitchell, 
Governor of Natal and Zululand, retired simultaneously. 
Lord Ripon, Secretary of State for Colonies in the 
newly elected Liberal Government in Britain, strongly 
disapproved of past policy in Zululand and therefore 
appointed Sir Marshal Clarke as new Resident Commissioner 
precisely because he had not been brought up in the 
Shepstonist mould. 39 Whilst British Resident in Basutoland 
(1884 - 1893), Clarke had successfully put into practiee 
a form of indirect rule that was very different to 
the Shepstonist model that had been applied in 
Zululando Both the Southern Sotho under Moshweshwe and 
the Zulu under Cetshwayo had been politically centralised 
kingdoms wh~n they fell under British jurisdiction, but 
whilst British administrators in Zululand had made every 
effort to destroy all vestiges of monarchical authority, 
Clarke in Basutoland had merely superimposed British 
overrule on top of it. Once in Zululand, Clarke swiftly 
perceived the principle of 'divide and rule' and excessive 
European intervention to be root causes of the disorder 
there. 40 Clarke aimed to discourage rathe~ than encourage 
the fissiparous tendencies in zulu society, and to rule 
through hereditary chiefs so far as that was possible. For 
this scheme he gained the support of the Colonial Office 
and the new Governor of Natal and Zululand, Sir Walter 
Hely-Hutchinson. 
As a priority, Clarke set out . to revitalize customary law 
by securing greater uniformlty in its administration, and 
by granting hereditary chiefs larger judicial powers. Of 
special significance, whereas previously chiefs had 
jurisdiction only in cases involving members of their own 
wards, certain chiefs were now to be also granted jurisdiction 
in cases (including certain criminal cases) arising within 
their wards where those involved were individuals from other 
wards. The discrete administrative and legal jurisdiction granted 
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to the existing eighty-seven petty chiefs had become 
"practically inoperative", he observed,41 and had done 
great damage to the traditions of Zulu law and custom 
, , h dIn" t' d d d 42 upon which the Br1t1s a 1n1stra 10n epen e • 
Instead of splitting the natives up into factions 
and undermining the power of the hereditary chiefs, 
and attempting to get the natives by degrees to 
look to the magistrates instead of the chiefs 
in all matters of more than trifling importance, 
certain hereditary chiefs and certain others ••• 
are to be endowed with considerable powers, and 
the natives are to be taught to look to them in 
the first instance and through them to the Resident 
Commissioner. 43 
To this end the 'Laws and Regulations for the Government 
of Zululand' 44 were amended by Zululand Proclamation 
No.VI of 1894. 
Simultaneously Clarke turned his attention to preventing 
the recurrence o~5civil disturbances in Zululand. Much 
of the "tension", as he described the bloodbath of the 
last fourteen years, he attributed to the policy adopted 
towards the Usuthu. His remedy was to recommend "clemency 
d b I ' , "f th U th ' I 46 d th ' " an 0 1V10n or e su u eX1 es an e1r repatr1at10n 
to Zululand. The Basutoland model was not, however, entirely 
applicable because the. "policy, pursued in Zululand ••• has 
had the result of exaggerating intertribal differences, and 
any attempt to impose upon the people a native head would 
be unfair, [ancfJ would lead to marked opposition ••• " ~ 7 
Nonetheless, he advocated that Dinuzulu be appointed 
"Government induna and adviser"48 in recognition of the 
realities of his 
Hely-Hutchinson 
the rationale of 
extaordinary status among zulu chiefs. 
strongly supported Clarke, and encapsulated 
the proposed pOlicy: though Dinuzulu 
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was not to return as paramount chief, his special appointment 
would enable the government to "maintain Llt~ influence over 
Dinuzulu, making use of whatever power or influence he may 
possess, or obtain for consolidating the power of the local 
administration. ,,49 
However, sUbstantial change in British policy in Zululand 
could not be arranged by the Colonial Office and its local 
officials alone. Since responsible government was granted 
to Natal in 1893, the Natal Government was dominated by 
expansionist colonist 
Zululand into Natal. 
interests intent on incorporating 
As details of Clarke's policy proposals 
unfolded, colonists' fears that Zululand was being turned 
into a 'native location' offering "neither room nor scope 
for the enterprise of white colonists" increased accordingly.50 
The prospect of Dinzulu's repatriation, however, was of even 
greater weight in mobilising a colonist population who had 
long regarded the Zulu royal family with fervent 
and fearful antipathy.51 In the event Natal succeeded in 
making the repatriation of Dinuzulu conditional upon the 
incorporation of Zululand into Natal. 52 In 1898, Dinuzulu 
did return to Zululand as chief of the Usuthu and Jgovern-
ment induna' with a liberal stipend of five hundred pounds 
a year, but much to his chagrin he returned to a Zululand 
under the jurisdiction of Natal rather than the Colonial 
Office. In practice, Clarke's stipulation that Dinuzulu 
occupy some sort of central position in close contact with 
the government was ignored by the Natal Government53 -
Shepstonist principles still obtained. Natal was not prepared to 
give Dinuzulu a chance to prove himself in a new role. 
It was because of these attitudes that Clarke terminated 
his work in zululand. 54 Eight years la~er there was to 
be another Zulu rebellion - this time levelled directly 
against the colonial establishment rather than its African 
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collaborators - followed by more treason trials. 
British policy in Zululand between 1879 and 1893 had been 
dominated by Natal colonial officials and colonist opinion. 
Through them it ha~ been imbued with a Shepstonist vision of 
'native' administration and a deep-seated prejudice against 
the Zulu royal family. Almost all the policy makers and 
administrators in Zululand had issued from the ranks of 
Natal's'native'administrators - and those who had been 
appointed from outside the fold soon fell under the influence 
of the ideas and prejudices of their colleagues.
55 
Clarke, 
however, was an exception. His transfer from Basutoland to 
Zululand represented an attempt by the Colonial Office to 
surmount or by-pass local white preconceptions with a view 
to implementing administrative reform. However, by success-
fully linking the issue of Dinuzulu's repatriation to the 
transfer of the jurisdiction over Zululand from the Colonial 
Office to Natal, the local ideas and prejudices prevailed 
in 1897 - and they were to overflow to the post-Union 
period. 
From self-governing colony to province of the Union: 
official postures and the Zulu royal family 
The above overview of the administration of Zululand, 
focusing on the handling of the Zulu royal family, 
provides an essential background to official attitudes to 
Dinuzulu's successor, Solomon. In the first place, some 
were to see any recognition of Solomon's special position 
as inimical to the political stability of Natal and 
Zululand, and sought to eradicate the influence of the 
Zulu royal family. Others sought to recognise Solomon's 
special position and co-opt him as part of the administrative 
machinery. These two positions respectively approximate 
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to what have been described as 'Shepstonist principles' and 
the ideas of Clarke. In the second place, one may discern 
that the Natal officials of the Union Native Affairs Department 
,hereafter.NAD) tended to adopt the former .view, and the central 
authorities tended to adopt the latter, following the trends 
set by their predecessors in the pre-Union period. In 
other words, the Natal NAD tended to take over the role of 
the defunct Natal Government and its Native Affairs 
Department, whilst certain officials of the NAD head office 
in Pretoria and certain Union Statesmen tended to take 
over the role of the Colonial Office. · 
The position and .status of the Zulu royal family during the 
period of Natal Colonial rule (1897-1910) was uncertain. 
The Natal Government, which wielded ultimate authority, 
repeatedly denied or denounced the fact of Dinuzulu's 
influence over Africans outside his Usuthu 'tribe', and 
attempted to prevent any situations arising when that 
influence might be manifested or consolidated. Nevertheless, 
on occasion Dinuzulu found that he was called upon to 
exercise the influence that he was at all other times called 
upon to renounce~ On the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer 
war, the imperial forces approached Dinuzulu to provide 
zulu 'scouts' or 'spies' to infiltrate Boer military 
encampments in the Vryheid district which, since 1884, 
had been Boer territory - firstly as part of the New 
Republic and subsequently of the South African (Transvaal) 
bl ' 56 . 1 Repu lC. Dlnuzu u agreed, and Zulu spies subsequently 
played ·a vital role in that theatre of war, ferrying 
information of Boer numerical strength and logistics to 
the British lines. 57 Furthermore, Dinuzulu was asked to 
"exercise his influence ll over Zulu in the Vryheid district 
during the Boer war to persuade them not to do the same 
for the Boers.
58 
However, after the end of the war and 
the transfer of the territory of the defunct New Republic 
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to Katal (this territory became 'Northern Natal', 
comprising the districts of Vrybeid, including Babanango 
sub-district, Ngotsbe, Paulpietersburg and Utrecht), the 
Natal Government responded to evidence of contact 
betvleen Dinuzulu and Vryheid headmen by instructing 
Dinuzulu that he had "no political influence over that 
district" and that he had "nothing whatever to do with 
Vryheid natives". 59 
Although the Natal Government's attitud~ towards Dinuzulu 
was consistently antipathetic, its policy towards him was 
not wholly consistent. This was clear during the 1906 
'Zulu' rebellion which erupted in Natal proper (which 
distinguishes the territory of the original Colony of 
Natal from the subsequently included territories of 
Zululand and Northern Natal) and spread to Zululand after 
Natal rebels took refuge in Zululand. The Natal Government 
regarded it as Dinuzulu's duty to use his influence to 
halt the rebellion, and was keenly aware how hostilities 
throughout the colony would escalate should he do otherwise. 
It was therefore appreciative of his "openly expressed 
attitude" against the rebellion, and the Governor happily 
noted this attitude had had "good effect" well outside 
h ' ward.60 At th t' h th t 1S own e same 1me, owever, e g overr.men 
refused to be seen to recognise or give sanction to 
Dinuzulu's influence beyond the Usuthu, on the grounds 
that this would strengthen his status among the Zulu 
as paramount chief. For this reason it declined Dinuzulu's 
offer to raise an impi to assist the government forces 
against rebels in various parts of Natal - although it 
accepted similar offers from other chiefs in Zululand. 6l 
Natalls paranoia for the Zulu royal family, even when 
evidence of its 'loyalty' was abundant, was clearly 
illustrated in 1907. On the grounds of scarce and incoherent 
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evidence of his disloyalty during the 1906 rebellion, 
the Natal Government was injudiciously eager to secure 
Dinuzulu's conviction on a charge of high treason for 
complicity with the rebels. 62 
These Natal colonial attitudes persisted after Union 
and exercised considerable influence on policy towards 
the Zulu royal family. When Union was declared in 
1910, officials of the Natal colonial Department of 
Native Affairs continued in their posts as employees 
of the newly established Union NAD. Even after Union, 
the Natal NAD was continually infused with members of Natal 
families which had been closely associated with 'native' 
matters - whether as administrators, missionaries or 
educators. Within the Natal NAD - and among interested 
white Natalians - there was a solid phalanx which could, 
with some justification, claim to 'know best', and which 
jealously guarded what was seen as a Natal tradition 
in 'native' administration. As the 'men on the spot', 
Natal officials perceived themselves as the ones who 
were in touch with the 'realities' of the situation. 
Significantly, at Union the Natal NAD was treated as a 
special case, and was allowed a certain independence 
which was anomalous to the "ultimate objective" of the 
NAD to "coordinate and harmonize the divergent and 
disparate systems of Native administration previously 
operative in the various Provinces of the Union •••• ,,63 
In pursuit of this objective, the Union Governor-General-
in-Council was vested with all powers previously 
exercised by the various colonial Governors where the 
African population was concerned (in Natal he became 
Supreme Chief), and a single Native Affairs Department 
was established under a permanent head - the Union 
secretary of Native Affairs (hereafter SNA) - who was 
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responsible to the Minister of Native Affairs.
64 
At the 
same time a commission was appointed to study the internal 
organisation of the NAD and recommend changes where 
65 necessary. The commission reported that 
The Native Administration of the four colonies 
is now centralized in Pretoria ••• in Natal, 
however, considerable local administrative 
functions have been vested in the Chief Native 
Commissioner and this arrangement has required 
the retention in that province of a proportion 
of the Natal headquarters staff. 66 
It also recommended the retention of the post of District 
Native Commissioner (hereafter DNC) of Zulu1and, created 
by the Natal Government, "in view of the character of 
the population and the latent possibilities of unrest.,,67 
These arrangements were unique to Natal, and provided 
institutional sanction andseope for the independent -
mindedness of Natal officials. Significantly, the first 
person to serve as Chief Native Commissioner in Natal 
(hereafter CNC) was D. J. Shepstone, previously Natal 
Secretary of Native Affairs~8 who himself noted the 
great value of the "personal factor" in 'native' 
administration and that 'natives' had "invariably" 
expressed their satisfaction that a "son of Somtseu" 
had been appointed their permanent head. 69 On his death 
in 1912 he was succeeded by R. H. (Dick) - Addison who 
had begun his career in the Natal Native Affairs 
Department in 1876. Addison had been Resident Magistrate 
in the '.' Ndwandwe District of Zululand during the 
disturbances of 1888 - and he considered the Usuthu 
attack on the Mandlakazi that occurred within one 
thousand yards of his magistracy to have been intended 
for his magistracy itse1f. 70 During the course of the 
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subsequent treason trial, Addison was revealed to be 
culpable of "extreme partiality" and "startling 
. ., . 1 . t th U th " 71 acts of 1lleg1tLmate V10 ence aga1ns e su u. 
As DNC of Zululand immediately prior to his appointment 
72 
as CNC, he proved that his attitudes had not changed. 
Addison's undoubted arrogance, intransigence and violence 
was not typical of the Natal NAD as a whole. Natal 
officials'outlooks were certainly coloured by Social 
Darwinist ideology, but it is important that many had 
clearly made their careers in 'native' administration 
to take up the philanthropic responsibilities that this 
ideology placed on the 'more evolved' race: to protect, 
uplift, and administer justice. However, they were also 
influenced by the more naked racism of white settler 
society - whose priorities were more exploitative than 
philanthropic. Moreover, as the intermediaries between 
dominant white and subordinate black in the province 
that housed the Zulu people (whose military history 
inspired fear and respect73 ) and in which the numerical 
ratio of black to white far exceeded any other in the 
union74 , they were subject to a nagging apprehension 
of the fragility of white rule. In practice this was 
translated into opposition to any change in established 
modes of interaction and administrative controi?5 An 
important facet of this mental inertia was expressed in 
their attitude to the Zulu royal family. Even this 
generalization needs qualificationiC.A. Wheelwright, 
CNC for the larger part of Solomon's chieftainship . , 
was. by no means intransigent on the subject of official 
policy towards the Zulu royal family - and his popularity 
in white Natal suffered accordingly.76 
While on the one hand the course of the 1906 rebellion 
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and the subsequent treason trial illustrate colonial 
Natal's antipathy to the Zulu royal family, on the 
other they illustrate the less excitable and even 
sympathetic stance of both the British Government and 
h f . l' 77 politicians in the other Sout A r~can co on~es -
some of whom were soon to become the leading statesmen 
of the Union. Natal's actions incurred widespread 
criticism - perhaps most significantly from Generals 
Botha and Smuts who were to be the first and second 
Prime Ministers of the Union of South Africa. Botha 
and Dinuzulu had fought alongside one another during 
the Boer-Zulu alliance of IBB4 against Zibhebhu, and 
subsequently Botha was said to look upon Dinuzulu as 
a "personal friend" and "a sort of foster brother."7B 
He in particular was convinced Dinuzulu was not a rebel. 
A representative of the Transvaal Government observed 
that it was "to the credit of the Boer members of our 
ministry that they think the L'Nata17 Government action 
to be horrible •••• Something must be done to save Natal 
from herself:' 79 
Indeed there was also a feeling among South African 
statesmen who were currently negotiating the forthcoming 
Act of Union, that South Africa needed to be saved from 
Natal: her unjust and heavy - handed actions might 
cause unwelcome imperial intervention or provoke an 
African backlash that would threaten the security of 
the whole of South Africa. For John X. Merriman 
(Prime Ministe~Cape Colony) in particular, the prospect 
of watching over Natal's 'native' policy and intervening 
where necessary, was one of the attractions of Union. BO 
Botha and Smuts, moreover, had a personal interest in 
the Zulu royal family - an interest that was reflected 
in its changed fortunes immediately after the Act of Union. 
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The significance of the 1906 rebellion 
Beneath the" official condemnations, justifications 
and recriminations, the 1906 rebellion revealed that 
there was in progress considerable ferment and change 
in African politics in Natal proper and Zululand - a 
change that white authorities recognized only partially 
and comprehended even less. An aspect of change was the 
new political significance of the Zulu royal family. 
Although there is little evidence of Zulu royalty 
deliberately and of their own accord involving them-
selves in the rebellion8l , there is no doubt that the 
Zulu royal family did playa role, even if that role 
was an uninvited and unwelcome imposition from the 
rebels themselves. For the rebels, the Zulu royal 
family was a living reminder of a powerful and independent 
African past - what has been described as the "golden 
age" of traditional African life.
82 
Rebels throughout 
Natal proper and Zululand used Dinuzulu's name and 
royal symbols as morale - boosters and rallying points. 
Unsubstantiated rumours that Dinuzulu was preparing 
for rebellion and that he expected others to do like-
wise had been rife among the African population 
immediately prior to hostilities. 83 During the disturbances, 
the royal war cry 'usuthu' was used, and the traditional 
war emblem, the tshokobesi, was worn by rebel fighters. 
Importantly, the bulk of the rebels were Natal Africans 
- the people whom the Zulu kingdom had raided with 
devastating effect when at the zenith of its power and 
whom the Zulu contemptuously referred to as 'amakhafula' 
('those who have been "spat out 1 ).84 In 1906, however, 
the Zulu royal family became a source of inspiration 
d f f . 85 . . ~n a ocus or un~ty. It was s~gn~ficant too that 
the social base of the rebellion, which took place in 
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the rural districts, was not restricted to 'tribal' 
Africans. 86 First,considerable numbers of wage labourers 
deserted their employment in urban areas to supplement 
rebels in the rural areas. 8? Second, Natal kholwa 
Africans (literally Christian Africans, but also 
connoting educated and 'civilized'), who had hitherto 
tended to identify with the colonial order and distance 
themselves from tribal society, were clearly ambiguous 
about the rebellion. The division between Christian 
and non-Christian Africans was less clear cut in 
1906: many Christians forebore to condemn the rebels 
and some went so far as to join them. Moreover, Dinuzulu's 
treatment by the Natal Government in the aftermath of 
the rebellion drew strong condemnation from the African 
press. The 1906 rebellion thus was not merely an 
instance of 'primary resistance', but reflected the 
early development of African nationalism in a modern 
sense - which was simultaneously being reflect~d in 
the Separatist church movement of which the Ethiopian 
88 churches were exaruples. The undercurrents that 
briefly broke through to the surface in 1906 revealed that 
the Zulu royal family had a wider base of potential 
support - both territorially and socially - than it 
had had in 1879. 
These political developments must be understood in 
their socio-economic context. As Slater has demon-
strated for Natal,89 and Guy for zululand,90 the 
imposition of white overrule and the demands of an 
expanding capitalist economy during the nineteenth 
century had caused severe social dislocation and ultimately 
increasing impoverishment among the African population. 
In Natal the twin pressures of tax and declining African 
access to land were intensified at the turn of the 
~3 
century. Hut tax in the reserves was increased 
dramatically between 1902 and 1905, a new £3 tax was 
levied on the inhabitants of mission reserves in 1903, 
and in the same year the rent payable by tenants on 
Crown lands was raised from £1 to £2. 91 On top of 
this, in 1905 a poll tax was imposed on all African 
males who did not pay hut tax - this provided the 
immediate spark for the 1906 rebellion. At the same 
time, the rapid commercialization of white agriculture 
stimulated by the new markets and wealth generated 
on the gold fields from the 188~s onwards caused a 
sharp rise in land values. For many African tenants 
on white land holdings, this meant either increased 
rent or eviction by white landlords now anxious to 
exploit the land themselves. 92 The overall effect was 
that fewer Africans were able to pursue a relatively 
independent existence either as subsistence producers 
or as peasants, and so were forced off the land to 
seek wage labour - itself one of the motivations of 
white tax and land policy. 
These trends were mirrored in Zululand, although their 
effect was more delayed in comparison to neighbouring 
Natal. Large - scale labour m~gration from Zululand, 
Guy argues, can be dated from 1888, as a consequence 
of the imposition of hut tax in British Zululand in 
that year.93 After the incorporation of British zulu-
land into Natal in 1897, taxes levied in Natal proper 
were similarly levied in Zululand. One of the conditions 
of the incorporation of British Zululand was that no 
alienation of land should occur for five years, after 
which time a Commission could be appointed with authority 
to set aside areas for alienation by purchase. 94 The 
report of the Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission 
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of 1904 set aside more than 40% of what remained of 
zululand to be so alienated - and it transpired that this 
95 
was for white purchase only. For the inhabitants of 
the north-wes~ern expanse of the original Zululand 
- which was now Northern Natal - the pressures were 
considerably greater. Here, no lands had been set 
aside for African occupation: all inhabitants summarily 
became tenants of white landlords and were required to 
, f th "1 96 render labour serV1ce or rent or -e pr1v1 ege. 
These arrangements have remained a special source of 
grievance throughout the twentieth century. 
Added to these burdens came a devastating series of 
ostensibly natural disasters that wrought their greatest 
havoc in African agriculture. First carne the locust 
plague in 1896,97 followed by rinderpest in 1897 which 
destroyed six-sevenths of all African owned cattle. 98 
This was in turn followed by a lingering cattle disease 
in the form of east coast fever. Furthermore, several 
years of poor rains culminated in the drought of 1903. 
Immediately before the rebellion, therefore, many were 
faced with a spectre of severe poverty, and proportionately 
more Africans were forced onto the labour market in 
order to provide subsistence for their families. 
The social and economic hardship and ferment occasioned 
by this cumulation of factors were reflected in the evehts 
of 1906. Their pervasiveness had the effect of instilling 
a sense of unity where previously there was none. In 
casting about for a central figure, these early pan-
Natal African nationalist sentiments focussed on the 
zulu royal family as a source of inspiration and 
leadership. Whilst some chiefs might have become identi-
, 99 
f1ed as government servants and oppressors, this was 
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not so in the case of the Zulu royal family. That it 
too had been 'maltreated' by colonial rulers was certainly 
a reason for its uninvited and unexpected mass support 
in 1906. Perhaps not surprisin~ly in the light of the 
Natal Government's past attitude t6 the Zulu royal 
family, this nicety was not recognised in 1906; it 
certainly did not inform subsequent policy. 
The transition to Union: administrative arrangements 
Prior to the treason trial, Dinuzulu had been deprived 
of his chieftainship of the Usuthu. The judgement, 
made in 1908, exonerated him on eighteen and a half 
of the original twenty-three charges made against him, 
but found him guilty of harbouring rebels at various 
stages of the rebellion. 100 For this he was incarcerated 
in Pietermaritzburg gaol in 1909. Mankulumana, Dinuzulu's 
chief counsellor, was also imprisoned, aDd on his release 
just before Union was prohibited by order of the Supreme 
Chief from returning to Zululand.101 Shingana, Dinuzulu's 
uncle, adviser and guardian during his minority, was 
banished to an area south of Durban where he was shortly 
to die.102 Once again the Usuthu were left chiefless. 
In making administrative arrangements for the Usuthu, 
the Natal Government redoubled its efforts to apply 
the dictum of 'divide and rule'. In early 1910, R. H. 
Addison (then Natal's DNC for Zululand) "abolished" 
the Usuthu103 and parcelled out its members among 
four local chiefs - only one of wh0m was a member of 
the Zulu royal family proper, and all .of whom had in 
some way seceded from the royal cause. Indeed, one 
was a Mandlakazi, and another was a Buthelezi.104 Only 
once previously had this rash expedient been attempted 
(in the post w~r settlement of 1879), and then its 
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impracticality had forced its abandonment by 1883. 
On the other side of the coin, one of the first acts of 
the newly constituted Union Cabinet of 1910 was to 
order the release of Dinuzulu from prison. Although 
Harriette Colenso's long standing campaign for justice 
105 
and sympathy for Zulu royalty undoubtedly had had effect , 
it was Louis Botha himself who was primarily responsible 
for this action. 106 Presumably wishing to avoid a political 
crisis, Botha arranged for a farm in the Transvaal to 
be set aside for Dinuzulu and his immediate retinue rather 
than suggest his return to Zululand. Mankulumana was 
, 1 107 D' 1 allowed to accompany Dl.nuzu u. Even sO,as l.nuzu u 
left Newcastle gaol for the relative freedom of the 
Transvaal, Natal officials forced him to sign a declaration 
stating that he would never return to Natal. He refused, 
108 and only signed when Botha wired him asking him to comply. 
Dinuzulu was settled on the farm 'Rietfontein' in the 
Middelburg district, and his annual stipend of five 
h d d d t d t h ' 109 Af ' , , un re poun s was res ore 0 l.m. rl.can opl.nl.on 
110 allover the province of Natal and beyond applauded 
the action of the Un~on Government, though significantly 
there were isolated official reports that in Zululand 
Africans 'loyal' to the Government were concerned that 
Dinuzulu might be repatriated. lll Indeed, rumours that 
Dinuzulu was to return were strong in Zulu land which in 
themselves indicated that the Usuthu and other royalist 
groups were not quiescent. 112 
The release of Dinuzulu attracted widespread news cover-
age. Apart from the major British dailies reports even 
found their way into regional British newspapers such as 
the Bristol Times, Cork Examiner, Glasgow News and Manchester 
Courier - all of which applauded the action of the Union 
27 
Government and very often explicitly condemned Natal"s 
f · 1 113 treatment 0 D~nuzu uo 
In general, the release of Dinuzulu was not a great issue 
in the minds of Natal's whites - after all, he was being 
sent further away from Zululand than Newcastle gaol. 
Perhaps, as the Plymouth News perceptively reasoned, 
because Natal was now no longer "alone" but part of a 
united white bloc in southern Africa, she could afford to 
be less paranoiac about the Zulu royal family.114 The 
death of Dinuzulu three years later whilst in exile in 
the Transvaal caused greater consternation in white Natal, 
for it raised the questions of whether Dinuzulu would be 
allowed to be buried in Zululand and whether his heir 
would be allowed to live there. 115 
Two developments are notable at this stage regarding 
future official policy towards the iulu royal family. 
First, the Act of Union had vested a completely new body 
with paramount authority in 'native affairs', with which 
it could - as it soon did - -override, Natal officials of 
the NAD in forging a new 'settlement' in Zululand. 
Second, , the death of Dinuzulu on the 18 October 1913 
provided this body with the opportunity to 'wipe the 
state clean' and review official policy towards Dinuzulu's 
heir. Indeed, Solomon had signed no 'self denying 
ordinance' as had Dinuzulu. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ZULU ROYAL F~1ILY AND ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT 
AT ~HE TIME OF SOLOMON'S SUCCESSION 
Dinuzulu's funeral procession 
On news of DiBuzulu's death, the Union Government immediately 
extended its condolences and sympathy to the bereaved family 
through the magistrate at Middleburg, Mr Herold. The 
government went on to offer Herold's services "for the sake 
of Dinuzulu's memory" to help make arrangements for the 
settlement of Dinuzulu's financial affairs and the welfare 
of his dependants at KwaThengisa
l 
- the name by which his 
Transvaal residence in exile was known, abbreviated from 
'KwaThengisangaye' meaning 'the place where he was sold,.2 
If the total of Dinuzulu's debts was "reasonable", the SNA 
assured Mankulumana that he would recommend that the 
3 government settle them; furthermore, the government would 
pay for the education of Dinuzulu's two eldest sons, Solomon 
4 Nkayishana Maphumuzana and David Nyawana, at Lovedale College. 
The question of whether it was permissable to return Dinuzulu's 
body to Zululand for burial was not even raised. For the Zulu 
royal family it was never a question. Barely a day after 
his death, Dinuzulu's body was being transported by train to 
Vryheid station - en route to the ancestral heartland of royal 
Zululand, Emakhosini, 'the place of the kings', where the heads 
of the House of Zulu had been buried since the turn of the 
5 seventeenth century. 
The Natal NAD had no time to raise objections. The personal 
influence of General Botha, whom Dinuzulu had regarded as his 
"best friend in the government",6 was evident in all these 
developments. When Dinuzulu died, there are some suggestions 
that Botha and Harriette Colenso were making secret arrangements 
for the repatriation of Dinuzulu to Zululand, contrary to the 
document that Natal had forced Dinuzulu to sign in 1910. 7 
29 
News of Dinuzulu's death was brought to the royal family in 
Zululand by Ndabankulu kaLukhwazi Ntombela, an aged chief and 
one of Dinuzulu's izinduna8 who had been an aggressive Usuthu 
supporter since the civil wars between Cetshwayo and Zibhebhu.
9 
Mnyaiza kaNdabuko Zulu (Ndabuko kaMpande Zulu, Dinuzulu's 
uncle, had been Dinuzulu's guardian and advisor) sent 
messengers out into the country to report the news to Zulu 
chiefs and dignitaries. 10 He further notified them that the 
funeral was shortly to take place at Nobamba - the historic royal 
homestead established three generations before Shaka and 
situated in the midst of Emakhosini.
ll 
Thus when the train 
bearing Dinuzulu's body arrived at Vryheid station, a large 
concourse of Zulu mourners had arrived to meet it. These 
mainly comprised members of the Qulusi, Mdlalose and Ntombela 
sections which now fell in the Vryheid district. 12 They 
accosted the magistrate of Vryheid, Mr Colenbrander, and 
spoke "very disparagingly of the Government", accusing it 
of causing Dinuzulu's death and ruin. 13 
At Vryheid, Dinuzulu's body was placed on a wagon for the 
journey to Nobamba.
14 
There were many signs that Dinuzulu's 
body was returning to a Zululand substantially different to 
the Zululand in which he was born. The body had . arrived in 
a European-style coffin and was conveyed by train - a 
symbol of industrialisation and, to many local Zulu, the 
vehicle which transported sons and daughters away to distant 
labour centres and townships, perhaps ·never to return. This 
translation of the izibongo - praise poem - of "The European 
Railway Train" recorded by James Stuart, presumably between 
1910 and 1920, vividly encapsulates the train~s image and 
effect. 
Go thou metal of the white people! 
Take them and transport them. 
It is long since you deserted them. 
• • • 
Go wltn them and put them out of sight yonder far! 
Loose woman that causes people to wander 
Who takes women and men and sends them to Johannesburg, 
When they get there they will be swallowed by the dumps. 
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Drive them that they may go, 
And make for a far-away land. 
Let them go to where ploughing is no longer done 
Beans are no longer planted 
And the one at home will wait awhile 
Until the tears rain down; 
Because it takes them and captures them 
And sends them where it is far away.1S 
Heading the large funeral procession en route to Nobamba was 
an entourage of dignitaries whose presence reflects how the 
beliefs and values of European civilization,together with 
its dynamic - capitalist production - had penetrated Zulu 
life. An African cleric, Reverend Twala, had arrived from 
Pretoria. Despite the scant enthusiasm that the royal family 
- Dinuzulu in particular - had shown for Christianity, Rev. 
Twala was to attend the funeral to intervene and officiate 
where necessary and so ensure that the ceremony also satisfied 
Christian belief. 16 In a wagon directly behind the one bearing 
the coffin sat Harriette Colenso or 'Musihelu',17 - the 
missionary, educationalist, philanthropist, watchdog on 
government policy, and the most trusted white friend and advisor 
to the Zulu royal family. At one stage her visits to Dinuzulu's 
residence had become so frequent and prolonged that the Zulu 
royal family had expected her to settle permanently with 
them.
18 
Next to Harriette Colenso sat two white labour agents 
from Johannesburg known to the Zulu as 'Muhle' and 'Zithulele,.19 
Both were employed by Transvaal mining houses to secure a supply 
of African labour for the goldfields, and were primarily 
interested in the Zulu as wage labourers. One was J. S. 
Marwick who had earned his name 'Muhle' (the good one) when, 
as Zululand Native Agent and Transvaal representative of ~he 
Nata l Native Affairs Department at the outbreak of the Anglo-
Boer war, he had organized the evacuation of an estimated seven 
thousand Zulu labourers from the Johannesburg gold mines back 
to their homes.
20 
Since 1907 he had been employed by the Farrar 
Group of Mines with a particular brief to secure labour from 
31 
Zululand and Swaziland. 2l Although positive identification 
is unavailable, it is likely that 'Zithulele' was Lt. Col. 
Morris, longstanding Transvaal labour agent and associate 
of Marwick's.22 
Members of the Zulu royal family who were themselves employed 
on the mines when Dinuzulu died had travelled to Vryheid with 
Marwick and his colleague; they, together with Dinuzulu's 
h . f 11 d h on foot.
23 Am wives from KwaT eng~sa, 0 owe t e wagons ong 
them, too, were Dinuzulu's children who had been at KwaThengisa 
when he died, including David Nyawana and Arthur Edward Mshiyeni. 24 
The funeral procession took three days to reach Nobamba. On 
the third d~y it was joined by many Zulu who had set out from 
b rob . h 1 k' h 25 h No a a to meet ~t, among w om was So omon N ay~s ana. W en 
the procession arrived at Nobamba, the chiefs and headmen who 
together represented the core of traditional and royal Zululand 
were re-united. Apart from Mankulumana kaSomaphunga Ndwandwe 
and Ndabankulu kaLukhwazi Ntombela, there was Zidunge (lineage 
head of the Khoza, son and heir of Ntshingwayo who had died 
leading Cetshwayo's army against Zibhebhu); Masimba kaNokhokhela 
Buthelezi (the great headman of Nobamba); Mbuzini and Zin·zo 
(sons of Ntuzwa and nephews of Sekethwayo of the Mdlalose, both 
leading Usuthu since 1879), and many other "great men of the 
nation".26 Also present were Dinuzulu's personal attendants: 
Lokothwayo kaZembe Mangadini, Mvingana kaNompanda Manzimeleni 
and Nobiyana kaMholo Ma n zimeleni.27 Notable members of the 
zulu royal family - all of Dinuzulu's generation, the 
grandsons of Mpande - were Mnyaiza kaNdabuko, Mgixo, Mpikanina 
and Citekana kaZiwedu, Mkebeni, Franz (France or Flansi) and 
Mdumela kaDabulamanzi and Dotela (Dokotela) kaMgidlana. 28 The 
traditional status of these men, however, belied the strong 
links that some had established with precisely those social 
forces that had undermined Zulu independence. Mnyaiza, for 
examp le, was employed by Colonel Royston (an independent labour 
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agent who also attended the funeral) to recruit labourers for 
the gold mines. 29 Similarly, Franz was employed on the 
gold mines as a labour supervisor, eventually to hold the 
position of "Head Induna of Brakpan compound".30 
After the main body of mourners had arrived with the funeral 
procession, latecomers continued to pour into Nobamba. It 
might seem incongruous that certain of these latecomers had 
travelled such distances to attend a display of Zulu tradition 
and past monarchical grandeur. One was Pixley Seme, born to 
a Natal kholwa family and brought up by American missionaries. 
Having trained in law at the universities of Columbia (New 
York) and Oxford, he returned to South Africa to be accepted 
as an attorney of the Supreme Court and to establish a 
31 
practice in Johannesburg. There he became the driving 
force behind the formation of the South African Native 
National Congress (SANNC, later the African National Congress). 
He also established links with Swazi and zulu royalty. During 
Dinuzulu's final illness, Seme had brought a Johannesburg 
doctor to attend to him, and had also established a fund 
32 to send Dinuzulu to Europe for treatment. A small group 
of local officials had also arrived to be "the eye of the 
government", including a few Nongqai mounted policemen from 
Eshowe, even though it was official policy in Natal to pretend 
that the Zulu kingship was defunct. 33 The funeral party was 
said to number seven thousand. 34 
The variety of individuals present at the funeral ceremony 
provides an insight into the variety of social forces at work 
among the Zulu and exposes the dangers .of assigning to the 
Zulu royal family in the twentieth century the image that it 
had earned in the nineteenth. Moreover, they disclose the 
need to identify changes that had occurred in the economic 
and social life of the Zulu, for it is only in these contexts 
that developments in their political life can be more fully 
understood. 
33 
The social context of Solomon's succession: land tenure 
At approximately the same time as Dinuzu1u's funeral, Sir 
Rider Haggard was touring Zu1u1and in the company of J.Y. 
Gibson (DNC of Zulu1and) and James Stuart (previously Assistant 
SNA for Natal), b~th accomplished scholars of Zulu history.35 
In the course of an unusually perceptive letter Haggard set 
out his impressions of the country and its people, comparing 
it to the Zu1u1and he knew when he had last visited there 
in 1876. 36 Whilst the observations he made on economic 
pressure and the development of new social divisions are 
brief and need further development, they form a useful starting 




written a poem entitled "The White Man's 
exalted British imperial expansion and 
Britain's civilizing mission among the "new caught,sullen 
peoples, half-devil and half-child" of the Empire. 37 But his 
visit to Zululand persuaded him that there the 'burden of 
the white man' had fallen more heavily on those whom it was 
supposed to benefit. "We are left orphaned and owe our 
existence to the fact that England is ~~e. exist~", he was 
told by a Zulu chief at an indaba. 40 Alluding to Haggard himself, 
another said "It is good that we should find friends among 
the people to whom we have given our loyalty, for we need 
them".39 
"Since the year 1879", wrote Haggard in 1914, "the history 
of the Zulus has been a long tale of misfortune". However, 
he drew a sharp distinction between the policies of the 
Colonial Office and Colonial Government. His reasons for 
doing so - which have some justification - were that the latter 
had been responsible for alienating 40 per cent of British 
Zululand for white ownership (following the 1902-4 Zululand 
Lands Delimitation Commission) and for imposing the £1 poll 
34 
tax in 1905. 
Lin 18927 Zululand and its people were handed 
over to Natal instead of being allowed to 
remain under the direct control of the Imperial 
Government like Basutoland, which, of course, 
they would have preferred, as it is a matter 
of common knowledge that self-governing colonies 
look at their responsibilities to native races 
from a very different standpoint to that which 
has always been adopted by the Home Government. 40 
Haggard was concerned that, since he had first known the Zulu, 
"about two thirQs of Liul'll territory ••• including many of 
the best lands", had passed into "the hands of white men, Boers 
and English together". He then referred to the latest piece 
of l and legislation - The 1913 Natives Land Act. This was 
particularly onerous to those Zulu whose lands had passed 
into the private ownership of white men, he argued, because 
it laid down that in future all tenants on 'white land' would 
have to provide labour service for the landowner, and that 
all other terms of African tenancy on white owned land be 
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phased out. These other forms of tenancy to which Haggard 
alluded fall under the generic term 'squatting'. There were 
two main forms: first, that in which the tenant paid his 
landlord a cash rent and, secondly, that in which the tenant's 
payment took the form of agricultural produce (sharecropping) .42 
As the Union Government's first step towards a uniform South 
African "n.ative policy", the 1913 Act established the principle 
of territorial segregation. The mainspring of the 1913 Act 
was not, however, to eliminate the mingling of black and white 
in the rural areas, but to reduce the ability of Africans 
to maintain economic independence and so force them to enter 
labour contracts either on white farms or in the urban areas 
(primarily the gold mines). Of the two most influential capitalist 
sectors of the South African economy - agriculture and gold 
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mining - it was the former which had become the implacable 
enemy of squatting (or 'Kaffir farming') and African land 
purchase, since they locked up labour and denied it. to 
white farms. 43 John Dube, President of the SANNC and a 
political figure of especial influence in Natal and zululand, 
perceptively observed that 
it is abundantly clear to us •.• that the authorities 
know perfectly well that the natives cannot 
leave private lands entirely .•• the Bill simply 
aims at compelling the natives to say they will 
rather remain on the farms and live under those 
irksome conditions than to leave the farms and 
go and live in distant places ••• 44 
The 1913 Act aimed to eliminate both African purchase of 
land outside the existing reserves and the practice of African 
squatting on white owned land, and to create a supply of 
'tenant-labourers' for white farmers. 45 In return for the 
labour service labour tenants performed, they received 
grazing rights for a few head of cattle or goats, a small 
area of arable land, some rations and sometimes a small cash 
compensation. As a general rule, however, what the labour 
tenant received for his labour service was not sufficient to 
cover his and his dependants'- subsistence needs and tax obligations 
to the state. Thus, labour tenancy also imposed on the labour 
tenant the need to supplement his subsistence with cash earned 
through labour migrancy during the non-service period. 46 
In pursuit of its objective to ensure that Africans on white 
land were henceforth farm labourers, the 1913 Act made efforts 
to ensure that each landowner kept only as many tenants as 
his need for labour warranted - all 'surplus' tenants he 
11 d . 47 . was ca e upon to eVlct. It was envlsaged that these 
ejected tenants would remove to the African 'reserve' areas 
in which land was held by the state for inalienable and exclusive 
African use. The 1913 Act confirmed the existing reserve areas 
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and envisaged their future enlargement. It did not, however, 
have immediate nor uniform Union-wide effect. Correspondingly, 
its social and economic consequences for the African 
population were neither simultaneously nor uniformly felt. 
This was particularly true within the Zulu population. 
The Zulu may be divided into two main categories in terms 
of land tenure. First,there were those who had access to 
land within the reserves. The latter was held, distributed 
and administered by chiefs on the basis of communal tribal 
tenure. Since the 1913 Act confirmed the existing boundaries 
and arrangements within the Zululand reserves, as established 
by the 1902-4 Zululand Lands Delimitation commission,48 it 
did not have direct significance for this group. However, its 
effects were felt insofar as reserve dwellers would henceforth 
be far less able to gain access to more extensive or fertile 
land outside the reserves either by purchase or rental. But 
most important, the number of evictions from white-owned land 
greatly increased after the 1913 Act resulting in an influx 
of evicted squatters into the reserves. In 1914, chiefs in 
the Zululand reserves represented that their land was becoming 
congested: Chief Mfungelwa concisely observed that "natives 
have been turned off private farms and we are now overcrowded." 
More graphically, Headman Nfuzewa stated that "the LZullij' 
country is being taken up by farms. We are living on the 
edge of Cll'ffs".49 C l' t ' 11 t ' th omp aln s were especla y s rong ln e 
Eshowe, Nkandhla and Emtonjaneni reserves which were soaking 
up evictions from both the expanding sugar estates on the 
coast and the white farms in Northern Natal. 50 As the reserves 
became increasingly more congested, they became increasingly 
unable to provide for the subsistence needs of their 
inhabitants. Consequently Zulu in the reserves became more 
dependent on outside sources of income - primarily money earned 
b ' t 1 b th 1 d' 51 Y mlgran a ourers on e go mlnes. 
Zulu living on land outside the reserves form the second main 
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category of Zulu landholder. This group was primarily located 
in the large ex-Republican districts of Northern Natal where 
no African reserves had been allocated. The overwhelming 
majority had become tenants on white-owned land, paying 
for their tenure either in cash, produce or labour. Because 
of the latter payments, the cost of land tenure in Northern 
Natal compared unfavourably with the adjacent reserves. This 
higher 'cost' was reflected socially in the lower masculinity 
rates (ie. proportion of male to female inhabitants) in 
Northern Natal, reflecting a higher rate of labour migration.
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Labour tenants (ie. after they had served their contractual 
six month term of free service for their landlords) and 
squatters in Northern Natal, like the zulu in the reserves, 
as a rule did not take up waged work on local farms to earn 
their cash requirements; wages were better in the urban centres, 
the Natal collieries and the gold mines. The Northern Natal 
district of Vryheid and the Zululand district of Ndwandwe 
(renamed Nongoma district after Union) shared an extensive 
boundary, were ecologically similar53 and were equally remote 
from employment centres. However, shortly after the turn of 
the century, the masculinity rate in Vryheid was less than half 
that in Ndwandwe.
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Prior to the 1913 Land Act, squatters' tenure in Northern Natal 
was becoming increasingly less secure and more expensive. 
These developments paralleled those in Natal proper. As has 
already been noted, rural capital in Natal during the nineteenth 
century had been more interested in land speculation than 
in the development of commercial agriculture. Large tracts 
of land had fallen into the hands of land speculators who 
rented their holdings out to African squatters in order to 
gain a return on their investments, rather than working the 
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land themselves. The relationship between African access 
to land in the reserves, or as squatters on crown land or 
private land, and their ability to resist farm work was not 
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lost on Natal's white commercial farmers. The latter were 
generally undercapitalized and their production processes 
were labour intensive - they could not afford to compete 
with the wages offered by the gold mines. Hence they were 
dependent on labour tenants for a labour supply, and their 
policy was to attempt to undermine African options to labour 
tenancy. 56 Whilst Natal's commercial farmers opposed the 
reserve policy because it 'locked up' potential labour tenants, 
they identified absentee landlords or 'Kaffir farmers' as 
their sworn enemies.
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Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, political and economic developments had begun to 
swing in their favour. The complex set of factors that 
brought about this change in the political economy of Natal 
may be reduced to two fundamental changes. First, the 
development of the mining industry and new urban centres 
generated a quantitively and qualitatively different market 
for agricultural produce. Second, the granting of responsible 
government to Natal in 1893, with an electoral system that 
favoured the rural areas, afforded the white farming lobby 
a measure of power that it so far had lacked. 58 These 
developments also took effect in the ex-Republican districts 
of Northern Natal after they had been incorporated into Natal 
subsequent to the Anglo-Boer war. 
The change from 'Kaffir farming' to commercial agricultural 
production in Northern Natal was, however, neither abruptly 
nor uniformly carried out. Correspondingly, the move against 
rent-paying squatters, either by evicting them or by trans-
forming them into labour tenants, was an uneven process. 
Renting out rather than directly working the land remained 
an attractive option for many Northern Natal landholders - and 
objections to the 1913 Act were raised for this reason. The 
DNC of Northern Natal reported in 1910 that squatters were 
paying up to the "exhorbitant- rate of £5 per hut (hut tax in 
the reserves was 14/-) as rental on white farms. 59 Thus, as 
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the magistrate of Vryheid observed in 1915, certain land-
owners "really do not want the rent-payers to turn to 
labourers".60 It is significant that w. H. Beaumont, the 
only Natalian on the Natives Lands Commission (appointed to 
finalize the delimitation of the African reserves and to 
report on the operation of the 1913 Act in general) submitted 
a minority report in 1916, stating that there had been "no 
LUnanimou~ demand in Natal for the enforcement of a Squatters 
Act or for any further segregation of the natives ••• "~o This 
statement indicates the continued strength of rentier interests 
- which were especially strong in Northern Natal. 
However, the pressure on land in Northern Natal(in the complete 
absence of reserves) was such that those landowners who wished 
to produce for the expanding market for agricultural produce 
were able to engage Zulu labour tenants long before the 
anti-squatting provisions of the 1913 Act. By 1910, the 
"majority" of tenants in Northern Natal were already supplying 
62 labour service as a part of their tenancy payments. In 
contrast to the concurrent situation in Natal proper, aspiring 
commercial farmers in Northern Natal barely complained of 
labour shortage. Even after the 1913 Act, the latter often 
exacted less than maximum labour service from their tenants, 
. h f h" d ., 63 ln exc ange or a cas conSl eratlon • However, as white 
commercial agriculture expanded in Northern Natal in the 
period 1910 to 1920, white farmers made increasing labour 
demands on their tenants. Those tenants who were determined 
to avoid the constraints of labour service obligations were 
subject to increasing rents - or eviction. The 1913 Act 
accelerated these processes. Indeed, it imposed the state 
hut tax on squatters (previously exempt) on top of their 
rental committments~ this alone undermined Zulu alternatives 
64 to labour tenancy. 
In the wake of the 1913 Act, the Natal NAD became concerned 
40 
about the insecurity of Zulu tenure on white farms - particularly 
in regard to its employees, the chiefs. The status and 
influence of tenant chiefs among their wards was threatened 
by the frequently unsympathetic - and in effect degrading -
authority of their respective landlords.
65 
The NAD sometimes 
felt compelled to intervene. Because Chief Kambi ~aHamu Zulu 
of the Ngenetsheni, the "biggest chief" in the Ngotshe 
district whose ward included 1250 homesteads, was -being 
harassed by his landlord", the NAD stepped in and provided 
him with a section of government land on which to live.
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Similarly, the two important royal homes Nobamba and Zibindini 
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were situated on the farm 'Koningsdal' owned by S. B. Buys. 
The Zulu royal family (including Solomon himself after 1913) 
and Buys were continually at odds with one another. During 
1915 Buys complained to the local magistrate that Solomon had 
not built a cattle dipping tank despite repeated requests to 
do so. To this the magistrate correctly reminded him that 
Solomon was a rent-paying tenant and was not required to 
68 supply labour. Indeed, it was the issue of rent - for these 
homesteads that came to be an ongoing cause for 
disagreement and litigation during Solomon's chieftainship. 
In 1916, Buys issued Solomon with a final notice to vacate 
the twenty-seven huts that comprised Nobamba and Zibindini, 
and a court order for the sum of £100 which allegedly had 
accrued as unpaid rent. 69 While the Zulu royal -family had 
70 fallen behind in rental payments, Buys' additional reason 
for the eviction order reveals that he either misunderstood 
Solomon's rights as a rent-paying tenant or chose to disregard 
them: he complained that he could neither "get labour from these 
kraals ~no~ use Lthe lang? for grazing ••. therefore he is 
obliged to hire farms for grazing every year."71 
By the time the case carne to court a year later, the NAD had 
appointed Solomon as chief of the Usuthu. When the judgement 
was made against him and he was ordered to pay Buys £60 in 
41 
72 rental arrears, the CNC and SNA quickly arranged for the 
government to settle this amount on Solomon's behalf and 
73 
to pay a further E60 to cover the costs of the case. 
Furthermore, the NAD had prevailed on Buys to withdraw his 
notice of eviction, sign a written agreement with Solomon 
defining the terms of his tenure, and even to reduce the 
74 
rent from £3 to £2 per hut per annum. 
The Zulu royal family's altercations with Buys represent only 
one example of its problems with land tenure in the Vryheid 
district. It rented land on other nearby farms for the 
purposes of cultivation and grazing. In January 1917, Anton 
Potgieter petitioned General Botha personally to induce the 
Zulu royal family to pay for the use of part of 'Welgekozen' 
- a farm adjoining Koningsdal and owned by Potgieter's wife.
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The farm had been ploughed without payment, he complained, 
adding that he was a "poor man and should like to live as a 
white man".76 It is evident that Potgieter's complaints were 
in part fabrications designed to induce the government to 
buy Welgekozen for the use of the Zulu royal family - for a 
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sum that his wife could not get on the open market. Indeed, 
in response to the administrative disruption caused by such 
problems of tenure experienced by one of their chiefs, the 
NAD was making arrangements for the purchase of a number of 
farms on which to settle Solomon and his dependants. These 
farms included Buys' 'Koningsdal', Potgieter's 'Welgekozen' 
and also F. P. Duminy's 'welverdiend,.70 In the eyes of the 
NAD, however, this project was problematical because of the 
special status of the Zulu royal family. Solomon had been 
recognized as chief of the Usuthu, but the NAD reasoned that 
if it was seen to make special efforts to settle him securely 
(as it had done in the case of Kambi), the Zulu would construe 
this as "tangible recognition on the part of the government 
of the position of Paramount Chief which though not openly he 
LSolomou] practically claims today". 79 
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On the other hand, the CNC argued that if the government 
did not purchase land for Solomon's use, "tribal collections" 
to enable Solomon himself to do so might ensue. These might 
similarly strengthen allegiance to Solomon as the "unofficial 
head of the Zulus".80 Ultimately these problems faded when 
Solomon took up permanent residence at Mahashini, one of 
Dinuzulu's old 110mes that lay in reserve land in the 
Ndwandwe (hereafter Nongoma) district. 81 
These examples of NAD intervention on behalf of chiefs testify 
to the financially draining, insecure and exploitable nature 
of Zulu tenure on white farms. For Zulu commoners, on whose 
behalf the NAD was less inclined to intervene, the position 
was worse. They were subject to a variety of obligations: 
the payment of hut tax to the state, and labour service, 
agricultural produce and rentals for huts, arable and grazing 
land to the landlord. But the increasing insecurity of tenure 
itself was yet more disruptive than the increasing costs of 
tenure. In 1914 Chief NkantinikaSitheku Zulu, a grandson 
of Mpande who lived in reserve lands in the Emtonjaneni district, 
reported that some of his ward 
live on what is known as Proviso 'B' ~abanango 
sub-district]. We are troubled because we are 
on private lands. We who are in charge of 
tribes do not know what to do with our natives 
because they are turned off one private farm and 
not allowed to go to another. Having been 
conquered we are as the Government's fowls and 
we therefore look to the Government 10 give us 
a piece of land on which we can go.8 
For those who remained as labour tenants, the quality of life 
deteriorated. Shortly after the 1913 Act, the Babanango sub-
district became known as 'Ekuhlupekeni' - the place of 
83 
trouble. At a meeting with the CNC in 1920, every chief's 
representative in this area complained of the conditions of 
tenure on white farms. One Dhludhla observed that the 
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"Natives [areJ loyal - they pay taxes" but was dismayed that 
they also had to make payments to their landlords for their 
huts. Chief Zombode's representative lamented that landlords 
were "turning people off farms, not being satisfied with 
work and rents rendered to them by tenants". "We shall never 
get accustomed to tenure on farms, Sir", another said. "Our 
children work and are not paid. Even our chiefs are in the 
same position". Another added "we cry continually, trusting 
ever in our rulers". To these lamentations the CNC "responded 
suitably" and uemphasized the need for adherence to contracts".84 
Among the Zulu living outside the reserves, there was a minute 
sub-category of zulu who owned the land on which they lived. 
African land purchase had begun in Natal proper as long ago 
as the 1860s, and developed as a key means by which some could 
produce independently for the market and avoid entering labour 
relationships.8S The significance of African land purchase, 
however, extended beyond purely material considerations: it 
was originally fostered in mission locations, and was designed 
to instil both the religious and secular values of 'civilization • 
Thus, whilst those on mission locations imbibed Christianity, 
they simultaneously tended to discard their ancestors' secular 
values, material culture, technology, production techniques 
and economic practices in favour of those of European 
civilization. Hoes gave way to oxen and ploughs, round huts , 
to rectangular upright houses, subsistence agriculture to 
agriculture geared to the production of a marketable surplus, 
and the communal ethos of a redistributive economy gave way to 
one of individual accumulation. Wagons were purchased, European 
clothes were worn, and some individuals earned their livings 
as skilled tradesmen - as builders, carpenters, brickmakers, 
masons and thatchers. 86 
These small groups of proprietors represented an emerging 
African petty bourgeoisie which was distinguishable from the 
rest of the African population, as Colin Bundy argues, "both 
in material standards of life and in their cultural and 
d " 1 Af ' , t " 87 ideological distance from tra ltlona rlcan SOCle y • 
Although not all land purchased by Africans in Natal was on 
an individual basis - some was bought by communal subscription 
- and not all purchasers were directly associated with a 
particular mission station, there was a strong correlation 
between land purchase and social, cultural, economic, and 
political adaptation. 
When the 1902-4 Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission divided 
Zululand into areas of reserved land and areas wherein land 
could be alienated by purchase, it did so on the understanding 
that Zulu 
in common with other British subjects will be 
allowed to purchase if they wish to do so, and 
considers that the fact of their being landowners 
would be a guarantee of their loyalty and a 
safeguard against future disturbances: indeed in 
view of the pledges given from time to time by 
Her Majesty's Government •.• we do not see how they 
can in common fairness be prohibited from purchasing 
land, notwithstanding the fact that reserves are 
now being delimited for their occupation. 88 
These wishes of the Commissioners were not put into practice, 
and consequently opportunities for the Zulu to purchase land 
in Zululand barely existed. This became a source of grievance. 
Thus two hundred Zulu from the Emtonjaneni district, "many 
from the Mission Station", met to declar~ their displeasure 
at the 1913 Act's provisions against African land purchase 
89 outside the reserves. And as early as 1910, the "amakholwa" 
at Eshowe had inaugurated a "closer settlement" scheme -
which envisaged the development of a 'respectable' African 
township of landowners. 90 
After the north-western districts of original Zululand were 
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incorporated into Natal as Northern Natal after the Anglo-Boer 
war , Zulu were able to purchase land there on the same terms 
as anyone else. By 1905 there was a growing settlement of 
Zulu landowners three miles to the east of Vryheid, all of 
whom held their land on an individual basis and by freehold 
d . 91 I h tenure - and had ti~le dee s to prove ~t. t seems t at a 
group had formed a syndicate to raise sufficient capital 
to buy property, and had thereafter divided it up among 
themselves as individual allotments .92 
The fact of individual land ownership was in itself a significant 
ind i cation of social change. In preconquest Zululand, all 
land in theory belonged to the Zulu king (representing the 
state) and he allowed the use of specific districts to 
respective sections of his subjects, and delegated land 
distribution and administration to his local representatives. 
Although individuals had rights to certain pieces of land, 
these rights had been given by the local chief who also had 
the authority to revoke them. Thus while theoretically all 
land belonged to the king, at a local level and in practice 
land was held by the local inhabitants, represented by their 
chief, on the basis of communal tenure. These notions of 
land tenure and administration continued to operate in the 
Zulu1and reserves under indirect rule. The notion of individual 
and private ownership was a European one - and this was by no 
means the only European notion that distinguished the people 
of 'Vryheid East Township' from the Zulu rank and file. 
Since the turn of the century, a small but assertive Zulu petty 
bourgeoisie had grown rapidly in Northern Natal. The DNe of 
Northern Natal reported in 1910 that "this class has adopted 
European clothing, and they live in square houses, divided 
into rooms and suitably furnished .•• they have separated them-
selves as much as possible from the raw native".93 In the same 
year, 12 per cent of all Zulu marriages in the Vryheid" district 
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94 'h' b Ch 't' 't were Christian marriages. The relat~ons ~p etween r~s ~an~ y, 
'westernization' and land ownership was strongly evident in 
the Vryheid East Township. William Washington Ndhlovu, a 
founder member of the township in 1903, was a 'kholwa' and 
'exempted Native' (ie. exempted from customary law and 
assimilated to European law under Natal's'exemption clause'of 
1864 - an exemption rarely given). He explicitly argued that 
the system of " individual tenure"was essential if the 
"progressive native" was to reap all the benefits that were 
due to him. 95 In 1915 he gave an illuminating description 
of the settlement: 
I think it is a good thing for the native people 
to have such a place in which we can make our 
homes. We have planted trees and put up 
respectable houses to live in, and we have 
tried to improve our holdings in every possible 
way •.•• Most of us work in the town. We have one 
Lutheran Church, which was erected some two 
years ago. The Wesleyan Methodist Church are 
also putting up a small church for the use of 
their adherents •••• We have been thinking that 
self government may be allowed to us on the 
same principle perhaps as the Council in the 
Transkeian Territories, or a Village Management 
Board •••• The majority are Christians and hardly 
without exception they are Zulus. 96 
Some of the residents were cash-crop cultivators. 97 
The social and ideological distance that separated this group 
from the 'tribal' chiefs of the 'tribal' Zulu did not preclude 
considerable social and ideological interchange at a more 
subtle level, nor the possibility of political alliance. W. W. 
Ndhlovu himself had been a personal secretary (umbali -
literally a writer) to Dinuzulu since about 1905 until Dinuzulu's 
death in exile,98 and in the 1920s he was to be an influential 
political ally of the Zulu royal family under Solomon. 99 In 
part, the origins of the formal alliance between the petty 
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bourgeois and tribal elites in the 1920s lay in the process 
in which petty bourgeois 'civilized' and 'progressive' 
aspirations were repressed in the years after Union. 
African land purchase had been strongly opposed by white 
commercial farming interests in Natal - as it had been else-
where in the Union - and this too was reflected in provisions 
of the 1913 Act. It was a means by which Africans could 
free themselves from both labour and rental obligations to 
white landowners. Moreover, African cash-crop production 
competed with white farmers in the market place. The use of 
new technology and means of transport (eg. the plough and wagons) , 
the extensive use of family labour rather than hired labour, 
and a less consumer-orientated lifestyle together had enabled 
a Natal African peasantry to produce a considerable marketable 
surplus at a price with which white farmers found difficulty 
in competing. lOO Furthermore, the act of African land purchase 
. If fl" 101 f' ltse was a cause or co onlst uneaSlness. A rlcans 
successfully competing with whites in an open land market 
on the one hand, and the consequent geographical incursions 
they made into rural colonial society on the other, both 
threatened the social relations upon which colonist society 
was based. These ideological and emotional considerations lie 
behind the following seemingly illogical statement made by a 
Natal farmer before the Natal Lands Committee in 1917: before the 
1913 Act, he said, he was in "fear of being forced off his land 
by powerful Native Syndicates who were committed to buying up 
as much land as possible". Such 'encroachment' had led him 
to consider "yielding" and leaving the country.l02 These 
sentiments were evidently especially strong among the settlers 
of Dutch descent in Northern Natal. l03 
The 1913 Act prohibited Africans from purchasing land in 'white' 
rural areas except from another African. Otherwise, 
appl i cations for African land purchase could only be granted 
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by the Governor-General-in-council and such permission was 
not readily granted. When the Natives Lands Commission's 
recommendations for the extension of African areas (both 
reserves and 'neutral' areas where Africans may purchase) 
were not approved by parliament, as an interim measure the 
government proposed to allow 
of up to five individuals to 
Leading Kholwa such as W. W. 
Chief Stephen Mini (Edendale 
African individuals or syndicates 
h 1 d
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purc ase an ~n certa~n areas. 
Ndhlovu{Vryheid East Township), 
Community), Rev. John Dube (Durban 
and urban environs), Chief Martin Luthuli (Groutville) and 
Rev. Abner Mtimkulu (Pietermaritzburg) forcefully argued that 
these explicitly racial provisions were an unjust attack on 
their previous rights to buy (theoretically) anywhere and the 
limitation of syndicates to five made the raising of sufficient 
capital for land purchase almost impossible. lOS 
The cl~mpdown on Zulu land purchase in Northern Natal after 
the 1913 Act, coupled with the increasing tendency among 
farmers to enforce labour obligations on their tenants, tended 
to stifle the further development of the Zulu petty bourgeoisie. 
Whilst those who had already bought land, or had entered 
'respectable' professions in education or the church, remained 
relatively secure, the next generation found difficulty in 
rea l izing the ambitions a miss~on education had inspired. 
The political consequences of petty bourgeois frustrations 
run threadlike through Natal African and Zulu politics in 
the 1920s. 
The social context of Solomon's succession: cattle and 'social 
disintegration' 
In his essay on the state of Zululand, Haggard was struck by 
the paucity of cattle in Zululand. "The great herds are no 
more ", he observed. 106 ThO h °b d t 0 ~s e ascr~ e 0 two success~ve 
scourges: herds had had only six years in which to recover from 
49 
the devastation of rinderpest (1897-1898) before east coast 
fever swept Natal and Zululand and lingered until after Union. 
Moreover, Zululand had been struck by a severe drought in 
1912. 107 
At the time of Union, the DNC of Zululand reported that the 
"deadly course" of east coast fever had left Zululand 
108 h 1 0 01 1 "pitifully denuded", and the DNC of Nort ern Nata Slml ar y 
reported that his region was "almost depleted of its cattle".109 
Local magistrates and the Zulu held that the disease was a 
consequence of the game laws which prohibited the hunting of 
wild game. 110 In the low-lying regions of Zululand, which 
had been densely populated during the nineteenth century, the 
spread of east coast fever had been accompanied by the spread 
of malaria; the latter was becoming endemic on the coast as 
III 
the sugar plantations expanded there. The twin impact of 
east coast fever and malaria caused an efflux of Zulu from the 
stricken areas to the healthier uplands. This, coupled with 
the influx of evicted tenants, exacerbated land congestion 
in t he early years of Union. Explaining the high rate of 
human and livestock mortality and homestead removals within 
his district, the magistrate of Mahlabatini told the Natives 
Lands Commission in 1915 that the lower reaches of Mahlabatini 
"had gradually become uninhabitable". "First of all it is the 
loss of their cattle, and then they get the fever one after 
112 another." 
Zulu homestead production was based on three staple resources: 
access to sufficient land for grazing and cultivation, the 
labour power of the family, and a supply of cattle. 113 Apart 
from their purely economic importance, cattle played a vital 
social role. Through their transfer from one group to another, 
society was knitted together, its reproduction ensured, new 
homesteads were forged and relations between homesteads were 
regulated. As will be argued below, the relationship between 
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the economic and social roles of cattle was one of such 
interdependence that to separate the two roles is almost 
impossible. 
The loss of large numbers of cattle had pervasive consequences. 
Haggard referred to two of these. First, the prevalence of 
"considerable infant mortality" on account of the diminishing 
f 'lk 1 ' 114 hId ava i lability 0 ml - a stap e nutrlment. T e acce erate 
rate of infant mortality had concerned local officials for 
some years before Haggard's visit in 1914. Whilst they agreed 
that cattle loss and malnutrition was primarily responsible, 
they identified another cause which deserves incidental mention 
here: venereal disease. As labour migration from Zululand and 
Northern Natal accelerated after the last years of the nine-
teenth century, syphilis spread through the countryside 
"caused principally by natives who have been working on the 
115 mines in Johannesburg". The Zul~ term isimpantsholo, 
describing venereal disorders, dates from the first years of 
the twentieth century.116 In 1910, syphilis in Zululand and 
Northern Natal had reached "epidemic" proportions - and 
toddlers were already suffering the consequences of secondary 
, f t' 117 L 1 ff' ' 1 1 'd h ln ec lone oca 0 lCla s a so pOlnte to anot er 
directly economic consequence of the loss of cattle: some 
homesteads were no longer able to plough, and could not 
cultivate the same acreage as efficiently by hand with hoes. 
On account of lesser crop yields, zulu wage earnings were 
being stretched to buy food from local trading stores as well 
118 as the payment of rents and taxes. Money could not cover 
the deficiencies of zulu homestead production during the 
drought of 1912. The government responded by allowing 
homestead heads in the worst-hit districts to kill a quota 
of game each week for the subsistence of their dependants. 119 
Secondly, Haggard reported that lobolo(marriage gift or bride-
price) was now being exchanged in the form of money rather 
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than cattle. This new development, he observed, was detrimental 
to the Zulu economy: money was liable to be spent, whereas 
cattle were a more permanent form of wealth.
120 
The transfer 
of lobolo from the groom's family to that of the bride was 
only confirmed and concluded when the wife had borne children 
for her husband. In hard terms of property exchange, lobolo 
was a consideration for the bride's potential to produce 
children rather than for the bride herself. If the marriage 
broke up or the wife proved to be infertile, lobolo was 
refundable. Haggard recounted the situation in which his 
personal servant, Mazooku, found himself when his daughter's 
marriage dissolved. Being in difficulties following the death 
of his cattle from .east c.oast fever, Mazooku had spent the 
£10 he had received as lobolo, and was unable to repay it. 
He was on the point of being imprisoned under the provisions 
of the Native Code, as applied through the courts, when 
d . d 121 Haggar ~ntervene. 
In the hands of the overwhelming majority of the Zulu, money 
was only useful as a medium of exchange. By contrast - and 
apart from their role as a medium of exchange - cattle produced 
valuable by-products (milk, dung for fertilizer) ., could be 
used for ploughing, and could be slaughtered for food. 
Moreover, cattle could reproduce themselves and thus they 
were a potentially generative form of wealth. Money, to 
the Zulu, was not: capitalist enterprise was extraneous to 
Zulu cultural traditions. The change in the form of lobolo 
from cattle to cash (a gradual and uneven process) exacerbated 
the economic difficulties in which its origins lay. It 
simultaneously reflected the decline of the homestead economy 
and a greater Zulu dependence on monetary wealth; furthermore, 
since some young men were now having to earn money in order 
to marry, a greater need was imposed upon them to divert 
the i r labour to the industrial and commercial sectors of the 
economy. The outlook for independent production in Zululand 
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at the time of Union was bleak. 
The economic effects of the change in the form of lobolo 
describe only part of its impact on Zulu society. At a 
deeper and more subtle level, the consequences were neither 
solely economic nor uniformly experienced throughout Zulu 
society. H. C. Lugg, veteran Native Commissioner, zulu 
linguist and scholar, emphasized that the custom of lobolo 
was not the mere exchange of property: "the Natives have 
always appreciated the wider implications of the term LIobolq7, 
and, to avoid confusion, refer to the cattle actually handed 
122 over as amabeka." As the more visible features of the 
lobolo custom changed, so too did its 'wider implications'. 
The changing social significance of lobolo both reflected 
the existence of important social changes and promoted their 
further development. In an attempt to specify the nature 
and import of these social changes, it will be first necessary 
to examine the significance of cattle and lobolo in 
'traditional' or preconquest Zulu society.123 
The importance that the Zulu attached to cattle was represented 
cul t urally in the rituals associated with their care, their 
sacrificial uses, and the pride with which they were held. 124 
The roots of their importance, however, lay in the close 
relationship between the possession of cattle and material 
power: in exchange for cattle as lobolo, a man could establish 
his economic independence by taking a wife, having children, 
and establishing his own homestead and lineage. A man already 
married (umnumzana - homestead head) could increase the number 
of his wives and children, the size of the lineage and the 
number of its homesteads. 125 The production of cereals and 
dairy products, which formed the basis of the Zulu diet, was 
dependent on the labour power of wives and children. Wives 
and children represented productive labour and homesteads 
represented the productive units upon which Zulu life was based. 
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Cattle, as lobolo, were the way in which this labour and 
these productive units were materialised. 
Simultaneously, the exchange of cattle as lobolo established 
important social relationships. Each wife ana her offspring 
constituted a new segment of her husband's lineage, and the 
number of cattle exchanged for each wife (which depended 
largely on the status of the bride's father) related directly 
to how her segment was ranked in relation to other segments 
, 126, f ff' l' t' d of the 11neage group. Tles 0 a 1 la 10n an 
cooperation were also established between the husband's and 
the wife's father's lineages. The husband was referred to 
as the isiqodo - the" stump upon which the father could lean 
127 for support. The number of cattle owned by an individual 
was a clear indication of his status and political power -
the exchange of cattle between 'patron' and'client' under-
pinned the political hierarchy, and since the daughters of men 
commanded more cattle than those of commoners, the material 
f d ' f h' 1" 1 d ' d 128 oun atl0ns 0 t elr po ltlca omlnance were perpetuate . 
After the annexation of Zululand, the demands that the colonial 
state placed on homestead production (primarily through 
the need to raise a monetary surplus to pay hut tax) and 
the reduction of the number of cattle available to the Zulu 
as a whole (primarily as a result of the livestock diseases 
of the 1890s) were developments that necessitated considerable 
social adjustment. The changes that took place in the Zulu 
social structure relate directly to the changes that took 
place within and around a social custom that lay at its 
heart: lobolo. 
In preconquest Zululand, young men had laboured in their 
fathers' homesteads, and when the time came for them to 
marry it was their fathers who supplied the lobolo for them 
to do so. When hut tax was imposed, increasing numbers of 
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young men sought wage labour to earn wages to pay their 
fathers'hut tax, whilst their fathers fulfilled their side 
of the obligation by raising lobolo for their sons. However, 
in the decade after annexation, the lobolo transaction 
became increasingly expensive and difficult to fulfil. 
Because of cattle losses, fathers found difficulty in 
providing lobolo for their sons. Consequently, young men 
began to prolong their periods of wage labour in order to 
earn sufficient money to buy their own cattle. This develop-
ment alone suggests that the social ramifications which 
surrounded the lobolo transaction were already being corroded. 
Moreover, the Natal Code (which was applied through the 
magistrates' courts in Zululand after annexation) laid down 
a maximum figure (ten) for the number of cattle that could 
be demanded as lobolo, and allowed claims arising from lobolo 
transactions to be heard before the courts. This maximum 
figure soon became the standard rate. 129 
During the l890s, the custom of lobolo gradually changed 
in three important ways. First, the tendency developed for 
the father to demand a fixed number of cattle whereas 
previously the matter was subject to negotiation. Second, 
these cattle were payable before the marriage took place, 
whereas the transfer of cattle had previously taken place 
over an extended period of time. Third, the number of cattle 
demanded doubled or even trebled. In the words of Guy, these 
changes signify an "increasing concern for individual 
accumulation and a shift from a practice based on reciprocal 
obligations to one based on direct exchange ll ; and they had the 
effect · of ~har~ening th~ di~ision between Zulu with property 
(cattle and daughters) and those without.130 
It was in 1914 that Haggard observed the substitution of 
money for cattle in the lobolo transaction. This represented 
a further development of the changes identifiable in the 
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1890s. First, it suggests that the lobolo was being supplied 
by the migrant labourer himself rather than by his father 
- and hence that the lobolo transaction no longer depended 
on the existence of the reciprocal obligations between the 
generations of father and son. Furthermore, given the social 
implications that attached particularly to the transfer of 
cattle, it suggests that the laterally integrative functions 
of the custom - the establishment of ties of reciprocal 
obligation between two lineages - were weakening. Generally, 
it both reflected and promoted the decay of social integration 
and the established ethic of communal responsibility. Second, 
the payment of lobolo in cash rather than cattle was testimony 
to the incursions made by the cash economy into Zulu society 
and to Zulu acculturation generally. 
The change in the purpose and significance of the lobolo 
transactions was to become increasingly marked in the period 
covered by this thesis. Although cattle were usually to be 
regarded as a necessary component of the property that changed 
hands as lobolo - particularly after cattle herds had recovered 
from the scourges of the period 1890-1910 - this did not 
signify a reversion to the original essence of the custom. 
Increasing emphasis was placed on the material value of the 
property that was exchanged, even at the cost of estranging 
rather than enjoining the lineages between which the marriage 
was taking place. Such developments so concerned one NAD 
official in Zululand that, in 1927, he published an article 
contrasting the "real Zulu customs" with innovations in the 
practice of lobolo. H. P. Braatvedt, the author of the 
article, was born the son of a Zululand missionary in the 
1880s and had lived and worked among the Zulu all his life. 
He referred to a new practice which required a young man to 
present a beast to each of the prospective bride's parents 
at the time when the marriage proposal was made. Thereafter, 
the groom was required to send the bride numerous small presents, 
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named izibizo ('things by which to call/summons') and "mostly 
cash", in order to 'call' her to his home for the wedding 
ceremony. These izibizo, which amounted to as much as £10, 
ultimately went to the bride's father over and above the 
lobolo payment. These practices, Braatvedt argued, "are 
utterly foreign to the real Zulu custom and are resented 
, f Z 1 " 131 Th ' tIn t by the great major1ty 0 u us. 1S resen en arose 
because ,the value of the 'social contract' in the lobolo 
custom was being subordinated to the value of the property 
that was exchanged (daughters for cattle and cash). More 
specifically, it seems that the generation of fathers 
increasingly regarded the lobolo custom as a means whereby 
they could extract wealth from the generation of sons. 
It was primarily the young men of Zululand who proceeded to 
distant labour centres to earn money. The periods that they 
served at these centres not only imparted a material basis 
for a certain independence, but also served to instil a new 
set of social values and aspirations derived from a different 
economy and a different society. The fissure that had developed 
between age and youth was expressed in the complaints made 
about the breakdown of morality and the lack of respect among 
youth for the authority and customs of the older generation. 132 
Something of a 'youth subculture' was developing in the reserves 
of Zululand. In 1910, the magistrate of Nongoma complained 
of "beer-drinking parties" held by young men and women; this 
was an -evil practicen , he believed, since it lessened the 
th 't f b d ' d f l' I' 133 au or1 y 0 men over oys an 1ncrease ema e 1mmora 1ty. 
In 1914, Haggard was struck by the desire "among the young" 
in Zululand for European education - or "the knowledge of 
how to make use of the resources of civilization". This 
aspiration, he argued, had been inspired "by observation in 
Johannesburg and other cities". Haggard continued: 
Of course this is not the view of the older men 
who served under Cetywayo and perhaps under 
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Panda. Indeed, one of these amused me much by 
a remark he made at an indaba I attended, which 
I quote as representative of the opinions of his 
generation. "Our children try to be white", 
he said, alluding to the young Zulus and their 
aping of the garments and manners of the English, 
"but they will never be".134 
The older generation was concerned not only by the social 
distance that they saw developing between their own gen-
eration and that of their sons, but complained that young 
men were disregarding their obligations to their fathers 
and dependants at home and were treating the money that they 
135 earned as their personal property. Labour migrants, 
Vilakazi observes, entered into employment contracts and 
earned money 
as individuals rather than as members of families 
or tribes. This insidious individualism which 
was being insinuated into their lives far away 
from the tribal setting and the close kinship 
of family group, began the destruction of the 
strongsense of social solidarity ••• There 
developed a new class of Africans called 
abaqafi ••• characterised by his absolute lack 
of respect for old traditions. 136 
The ' individualism' and 'lack of respect' that characterised 
the abaqafi was a form of resistance to the demands of the 
homestead in its need to pay hut tax or, on white owned land, 
to pay rents or provide labour. This resistance sometimes 
took a more radical form: the cutting of links with 'home' 
and permanent residence at the place of work. The dissatisfaction 
of youth was particularly evident among labour tenants. The 
tenancy contract was made with the homestead head who was 
required to bind his sons to labour service. As a Northern 
Natal missionary commented, "a boy deserts and gives up his 
home largely because he does not see that he has any chance 
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••• because he is not working directly for himself •••• " Because 
the desertion of a son constituted a breach of the tenancy 
h d b . d 137 contract, it sometimes caused the omestea to e eV1cte . 
Chiefs, homestead heads and their dependants on the one 
hand, and the state on the other, had common ground in 
opposing this new class - the abaqafi - since money lost to 
the homestead was also lost to state revenue. The abaqafi 
exacerbated economic fragility in the rural areas. In the 
drought year of 1912, during which homestead production over 
practically the whole of Zululand failed to provide for basic 
nutritional requirements, the DNC for Zululand lamented the 
"growing tendency on the part of the Zulus proceeding to 
distant labour centres to entirely forget the claims of those 
dependent upon them at their homes ••• jand t~ waste their 
substance to the detriment of their dependants."138 As 
representative of the Natal ' Native Affairs Department and 
Zululand Native Agent at the turn of the century, it was 
J. S. Marwick's job to ensure that wages were safely remitted 
back to Natal and Zululand, and to trace tax defaulters. 
Between 1895 and 1899, the system he devised - described as 
a "system of Native thrift" - reportedly secured the remittance 
139 of an average of £30,000 per annum to Natal. Significantly, 
Marwick was assisted by Sikonyela,previously induna to 
Mnyamana, chief of the Buthele~i.140 
Marwick's later career contains further evidence of links 
between the Zulu 'establishment', labour agents and the state. 
When he evacuated Zulu labourers from Johannesburg an the 
outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war, he was assisted by Hlobeni 
Buthelezi who described himself as a descendant of Masiphula, 
chief counsellor to Mpande, and as "well known to all the 
141 
Zulus". In 1916, as newly appointed manager of the Durban 
Municipal Native Affairs Department, in charge of large numbers 
of migrant labourers, Marwick was assisted by Pika kaSiteku Zulu, 
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grandson of Mpande, who had been amongst those evacuated 
from Johannesburg by Marwick in 1899.
142 
Similarly, in 
1908 Colonel H. F. Trew of the Johannesburg police had in 
his employ a grandson of Mpande, known to him as 'Stephen 
Matambo', an authoritarian, violent and complex character, 
who had previously been employed as a personal attendant 
to Lord Selborne on the High Commissioner's train. Matambo 
was specifically enlisted to assist in the destruction of a 
Zulu 'amalaita gang' in Pretoria whose "speciality" was the 
robbery of mineworkers returning from the goldmines. This 
he did with such brutal efficiency that the police were 
d 11 d d · . h' 143 shortly afterwar s compe e to 1sm1ss 1m. 
During the early twentieth century, Zululand and Northern 
Natal were becoming increasingly enmeshed as a dependent 
periphery in an expanding capitalist economy. With homestead 
production undermined by cattle disease, drought, rising cash 
needs and, most important, land alienation, the Zulu were 
cor r espondingly more dependent · upon money for survival. None-
theless, the process of underdevelopment was not linear. The 
period between the declaration of Union and the end of the 
first world war was a time of particular hardship for the Zulu. 
But in the years following the war, conditions were to improve. 
Moreover, as has been emphasized, the consequences were 
unevenly felt through Zulu society. 
Dur i ng his tour of Zululand, Haggard attended a number of 
meetings between administrators and Zulu chiefs. His 
impression was that " ••. the people are crushed and bewildered". 
He reported chiefs saying that they "wander and wander" and 
"have no head".144 In preconquest Zululand, it had been the 
Zulu king who was the Zulu 'head'. The king stood at the apex 
of the social and political structure, symbolised the unity 
of the zulu people and the ancestral land upon which they 
lived, ensured their spiritual wellbeing and acted as father 
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and redistributor. 145 Although the death of Dinuzulu had 
now in effect restored the heir to the Zulu royal house 
to zululand, the heir was no longer the Zulu king and 
Zululand could no longer naturally look to a single 'head'. 
Even among the tribal Zulu deep in the reserves, the image 
of the Zulu king had suffered in the prolonged series of 
civil wars between the Usuthu of Dinuzulu and the 
Mandlakazi of Zibhebhu. Furthermore, Zulu society was now 
being corroded by economic hardship and the evolution of new 
social divisions - developments which were transforming the 
role of trib~l leaders themselves. There was the small, 
repressed, yet important petty bourgeoisie. And there was a 
tendency among youth to become 'detribalized' and 'selfish'. 
Rather than having no 'head', one could suggest that the Zulu 
now had many heads: it was just that to the older and more 
conservative Zulu these 'heads' were neither as visible as 
the Zulu king had been nor represented anything with which 
they could identify. 
Many of these social contradictions were expressed at Dinuzulu's 
funeral ceremony. A variety of individuals and representatives 
of social groups, both black and white, mixed together to 
pay their respects to the dead king and observe the succession 
of his heir. Particularly significant were individuals like 
Mnyaiza and Franz: whilst both were entrenched in the Zulu 
establishment by birth, they were also trading with and 
controlling Zulu labourers for the gold mines. Although many 
representatives of the old Zulu establishment still held positions 
of authority in Zululand as chiefs and izinduna, the 
continuities in form belied the shifts that had occurred in 
practice. This was subtly revealed in the case of the Zulu 
royal family by a rumour that was in circulation at the time. 
When speaking of Dinuzulu's funeral, one Madikana revealed 
what expectations some zulu held about the political role 
of his successor. He referred to the 1913 Act and reported 
that 
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he had heard that the Government had given out 
that there would be a territorial separation of 
the two races, the white and the black ••• Lang7 
that there would be a competition between the 
white inhabitants of Natal and the Zulus as to 
who should purchase the ground. 
In order that they may purchase land, he said, "two muid 
sacks" had been set aside and "the black race was to fill 
these with money". The Zulu royal family would transfer to 
these sacks all "those contributions which were given as 
condolences" on Dinuzulu's death.
146 
There is a basis of 
truth in this rumour: the architects of the 1913 Act had 
envisaged that competitive buying between black and white 
would be permitted in certain'released areas,147 (sometimes 
referred to as 'neutral areas'), and the collections made by 
the Zulu royal family on Dinuzulu's death were associated 
with a project to buy land. But the Zulu royal family had 
no intention of contributing this money to a communal fund 
for the benefit of the 'black race' nor redistributing the 
land it bought, as Madikana and others imagined. It was 
intended to buy ground in the Vryheid district for the personal 
use of Solomon and his dependants to free Solomon from the 
burdens and insecurities that he - like many other Zulu -
suffered as a tenant on a white farm. 148 
Nevertheless, the pomp and splendour of the funeral ceremony 
and the expressions of sympathy and loyalty made at it were 
by no means hollow. For many Zulu, the Zulu royal family 
still had a very positive role to play in instilling a sense 
of continuity, identity and unity at a time when social 
realities did not. 
The succession of Solomon 
As the dead king's great induna (induna enkulu), Mankulumana 
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was in charge of proceedings at the funeral. While it was 
not essential that the heir be announced before the burial 
took place, it was customary that if the heir had already 
been nominated, he should symbolise his succession by taking 
his father's spear and with it turning the first sod of his 
149 father's grave. Right from the outset the funeral was 
held up because the heir had not been nominated, and there 
were fears on the part of the Usuthu that if they did not do 
so quickly "the Government would raise Kambi, the son of Hamu, 
to the position".lSO The turning of the first sod was thus 
a vital issue - and for two days Dinuzulu's body lay in his 
principal hut at Nobamba whilst outside the succession dispute 
raged. 
Since Dinuzulu had left no name with his advisors, Mankulumana 
sought the advice of Dinuzulu's -itinceku (sing. inceku - personal 
attendant), Lokothwayo, Mvingana and Nobiyana, whom the king 
had relied upon as loyal and discreet confidantes. lSI They 
all reported that when Dinuzulu had been seriously ill and 
thought he was dying prior to his exile to KwaThengisa, he 
had confided that the heir was David Nyawana. Mankulumana 
announced this to the assembly and, after other 'great men 
of the nation', including Ndabankulu and Zidunge had announced 
that there was no reason to doubt the words of Dinuzulu's 
servants, the assembly rose and praised their new king with 
the salutation 'bayede,.lS2 
Even as the thunder of praises subsided, dissenting voices 
were heard from the central cluster of dignitaries. "You, 
son of Samaphunga LMankuluman~, is the family of the King 
always to be spoilt by headmen?", accused Mbuzini Mdlalose, 
brother of Solomon's mother. Others, including Dotela kaMgidlana 
and Mnyaiza voiced their disapproval. IS3 During the discussion 
and deadlock that ensued, white clergymen measured off the 
grave and, when this was done, the izinduna took the unusual 
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decision of authorising David's full sister, Victoria 
1S4 
~patshana, to turn the first sod on the grave. The digging 
of the grave was started as the dispute continued. Harriette 
Co1enso intervened and took David by her right hand and Solomon 
h b b huts.
1SS 
by her left, and took them back to t e No am a 
As dusk fell, Mnyaiza announced that ~ meeting of Mpande's 
grandsons (Dinuzu1u's generation), Dinuzu1u's izinduna and 
his servants was to decide the matter in the morning; he also 
announced that Harriette Co1enso and Pixley Seme would be 
called in because they had seen Dinuzu1u's letters, in which 
. h h d h ' 1S6 he m1g t ave name an e1r. 
There were many who argued that Dinuzu1u had subsequently 
cancelled his nomination of David. Dinuzu1u's wishes were 
not the only consideration: it was plain that the majority 
of those in the inner circle and those commoners who knew 
David did not want him to succeed. Apart from the testimony 
of Dinuzu1u's servants, David's claim rested on his being 
the eldest of Dinuzu1u's sons. 1S7 Further, Dinuzu1u had 
named him Nyawana - "the feet that will walk for me".lS8 
By all accounts, however, David had developed into an 
unpl easant character. Reports received by the CNC suggested 
that he was "of violent morose temperament, and addicted to 
d . k" h . 1 t S 1 II d t b d' 11 . II 1S 9 r1n ,w 1 S 0 omon was mo es , so er an 1nte 1gent. 
Oral tradition similarly emphasizes the importance of Solomon's 
h t . d .. h' . 160 c arac er 1n eterm1n1ng 1S succeSS1on. 
During the night Solomon was reported to have produced a letter 
from Dinuzu1u nominating him as heir, and to have given it 
H · 1 161 h f to arr1ette Co enso. T e ollowing morning, Mnyaiza 
addressed the meeting and reprimanded Manku1umana for making 
David's succession public without first referring to all the 
izikhulu (great men of the nation) and izinduna. 162 He then 
summoned Seme and Colenso. Seme had no specific evidence 
but said that he had understood Solomon to be the heir. 
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Harriette Colenso reported that she had evidence of Dinuzulu's 
wishes but, no doubt wary of a possible furore should David 
be deposed, refused to divulge the information until Dinuzulu 
b . d 163 had been url.e. 
Thus royal cattle were slaughtered and Dinuzulu was placed 
in his grave. After the Assistant Magistrate of Babanango 
had expressed the government's condolences, it fell to 
Mankulumana to make a reply. 
It is you [meaning the Government} who killed 
the one we have now buried. You killed his 
father, and killed him. We did not invade your 
country, but you invaded ours .•• The one whom we 
now mourn did no wrong. There is no bone that 
will not decay. What we now ask is, as you have 
killed the father, to take care of the children. 164 
Whilst this was a cause for great consternation in administrative 
circles, it was how Mankulumana ended his speech that caused 
uproar among the Zulu. "Oh! Here I have buried the son of 
the King. Now I die with him as I died with him yesterday", 
he said, deeply upset by the succession dispute. "I am now 
going away ..• back to my Ndwandwe people". 165 "And with whom 
are you leaving your mistakes?", he was asked - and once more 
the ceremony was brought to a standstill as various izikhulu 
and izinduna insisted that the heir should be established, 
for it was he who should be the first to put a stone into 
Dinuzulu's grave. Mankulumana referred the whole matter to 
Harriette Colenso. Discreetly, she told the keeper of the 
royal homesteads, Mandlenyatha kaNobetha Zulu, to take 
Solomon's hand and let him select a stone and place it on 
the coffin. This was done in front of the whole assembly. 
No letter was ever produced - at least in public. David was 
then led to the grave to do the same; after him followed all 
the other men of importance, and the grave was presently filled. 16E 
Thereafter, Rev. Twala of Pretoria conducted a Christian funeral 
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service which was immediately followed by the traditional 
Zulu counterpart. Songs were sung, Dinuzulu's praises 
were intoned, and lastly "Cetshwayo's song" was sung, as 
it h ad been when he was buried at Nkandla. Mankulumana then 
rose to announce that it was Solomon Maphumuzana ('the shelter', 
'the giver of rest') "who will be our comfort", at which the whole 
assembly roared 'bayede' "as if the whole world shook with 
h 
. . ,,167 
t el.r pral.se. 
In h is report to the funeral ceremony, the magistrate of 
Vryh eid outlined three"outstanding features". He wa-s struck 
by the "lavish attention, pecuniarly and otherwise personally 
bestowed on the funeral party and mourners by all sections 
of the Native Labour Recruiting Agencies". He proceeded 
that the spectacle was " ••• undesirable and unedifying", and 
"one might aptly apply Verse 28, Chapter 24, St. Matthew", 
which reads "For wheresoever the carcase is, there will be 
eagles gathered together". Another feature was the sympathy 
shown by the "rank and file of natives", some 7000 attending 
the funeral. But in contrast to this, he noted a third 
fea t ure: the reluctance on the part of certain chiefs and 
headmen in both Natal and Zululand to attend. While the rank 
and file regarded Dinuzulu as "King and Leader", he said, 
chiefs and headmen were mostly government appointees and were 
therefore afraid that expressions of sympaehy would weaken 
h 
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Tribal divisions within the Zulu 
The division between those 'loyal' to the government and those 
'loyal' to the royal house was very clear. Socwatsha and 
Nong ejeni, who compiled for the NAD the reports from which 
much of this account is taken, were too afraid to visit a 
royal homestead even though they were unknown in Zululand and 
had visited many other homesteads without a qualm. 169 This was 
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especially well illustrated in the case of Chief Mpikanina 
kaZiwedu Zulu, who was one of the four chiefs to accept 
jurisdiction over members of the Usuthu when they were 
divided up by the Natal Government. He had been despised -
especially as he was a grandson of Mpande - for accepting 
this appointment, and had proceeded to attract other 'traitors' 
to him. Nobiyana, who had once been a trusted servant of 
Dinuzulu's but who had been discovered conveying information 
about matters at the Usuthu homesteads to government officials 
'k . 170 during the 1906 rebellion, was now an induna to Mpl anlna. 
Dinuzulu's children had uverbally set upon" Nobiyana when he 
visited the royal homestead, Nsindeni, in 1911; he was 
correctly called a "spy for the Government" and was told that 
he had no business on the property since he now "belonged to 
Mpikanina".171 Although Mpikanina arrived to attend the 
funeral, he stood "quite alone", and after a remonstration 
with Mankulumana on the subject of the 1906 rebellion, he 
172 became afraid and fled before the ceremony was completed. 
So too in the case of Acting Chief Muzimubi of the Buthelezi, 
who had also accepted jurisdiction over a portion of the 
truncated Usuthu. He chose not to attend, though he did 
send some men to express condolences, and "a beast in the 
form of money". He alluded to the estrangement that had come 
about between the Usuthu and Buthelezi, by complaining that 
in the old days the Zulu royal house would not have nominated 
a successor without the presence of the Buthelezi. 173 
There were other examples. Chief Zambode, who had recently been 
appointed in the place of a deposed chief, was waved away 
from the mourners before Mankulumana intervened. l74 Despite 
Mankulumana and Mnyaiza's efforts to unite as many people as 
possible in the mourning, Natal NAD spies reported that 
"Dinuzulu's cousins and relatives never spoke to any of the 
people who came to mourn who were known to be loyal to the 
Government. They only addressed people who they knew were still 
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h "175 supporters of the Usut u cause. 
The tension between Mandlakazi and Usuthu, however, showed 
signs of repair. There had been moves towards a reconciliation 
on the part of the Usuthu for some time; soon after his 
return from St. Helena, Dinuzulu had visited Zibhebhu and 
" . . "176 F 11 . said that he wished to forget past anlmoslty • 0 oWlng 
the death of Zibhebhu in 1905, the Mandlakazi had dissipated 
some of the energy and unity in a succession dispute. A 
commission of inquiry, presided over by Sir Charles Saunders, 
decided that Bokwe was the heir and set aside the claim 
of Msenteli. Because Msenteli had a large following and civil 
war was imminent, he and some of his leading supporters were 
removed to Eshowe and Nkandla districts. Bokwe was still very 
young, and Mciteki (another son of Zibhebhu) was appointed 
as Mandlakazi regent and chief during Bokwe's minority.18l 
Despite Mnyaiza-'s invitation to attend the funeral, Mciteki 
himself refused to do so. He did nonetheless send a few of 
his izinduna - some of whom did not go personally but merely 
sent representatives. When the Mandlakazi representatives 
arri ved, they were brusquely asked why they had brought no 
beast with which to mourn - but Mankulumana was quick to 
soo t he by expressing particular thanks that the Mandlakazi 
had sent mourners. The mere fact that the Usuthu and the 
Mandlakazi representatives came together and mixed was a cause 
178 for especial comment by observers. 
The dispute now lived on mainly in the minds of those who could 
recall the tragedies of the l880s - and in the minds of people 
like Mciteki who, even in 1917, could proclaim that 
My father gave orders that we had to meet the 
Usuthu only at stores and at the Court House. 
I know it is the intention to bring about a 
reconciliation ••. that will never be. We must 
clean our guns. I have as many men as there are 
Rheibucks and bushes and the paths will soon run 
red with blood if we are forced to a reconciliation. 179 
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Although such violence lurked beneath the surface, in practice 
the animosity henceforth waned - soothed as much by time and 
the diplomatic approaches of the Usuthu as by the awareness 
that the exigencies of the twentieth century left little 
space for a family squabble that had outlived those circum-
stances that had sustained the civil war. 
This was also true of the split between the Ngenetsheni and 
the Usuthu. An urgency had been imparted to the succession 
dispute because the Usuthu feared that the government would 
find in Kambi, Hamu's heir, a collaborative tool foolhardy 
enough to accept appointment as Dinuzulu's successor. In 
the event, however, Kambi sent mourners to the funeral,and 
there was no mention of animosity.180 Overall, however, the 
funeral reflected that there was still much animosity against 
chiefs and sections regarded as government collaborators. 
The succession of Solomon had also brought to light new 
divi sions within the zulu royal family itself. These were 
to be an annoyance for the first few years of Solomon's 
chieftainship, but, in comparison! with the ruptures during 
Dinuzulu's time, they were to be of trifling importance. 
Most worrysome was the truculence of David, who had been 'king' 
for a day. His uncharacteristically meek acceptance of the 
cancellation of his appointment in itself indicated that he knew 
that he did not have the support for a showdown. However, when 
the izikhulu met shortly after the funeral to set the internal 
affairs of the zulu royal family in order, an attempt was made 
to placate David by awarding him the Nobamba homestead and 
the care of both sections of the traditionally royalist Qulusi 
people, under the royal izinduna Mnyaiza Mth-ethwa and Ba l i Md lalose. 
For the time being, Solomon's principal homestead was to 
be Zibindini in the Babanango district, where his mother had 
been placed by Dinuzulu. Solomon was also awarded the now 
dilapidated Mahashini homestead in the Nongoma district, in the 
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ward of Chief Moya Ndwandwe who was one of the chiefs 
appointed over the Usuthu.
181 
Mankulumana, who made these 
arrangements, earned widespread censure because the Qulusi 
had been personally administered by the king since Shaka 
had incorporated them; and Nobarnba had been the property of 
182 
the king since the time of Ndaba, Shaka's great-grandfather. 
Nobarnba and Zibindini were not more than three hundred yards 
distant from each other, and the tension that existed between 
them is recorded in the izibongo of Solomon's mother ('oka-
Ntuzwa' - the daughter of Ntuzwa of the Mdlalose, Silomo): 
Wild person that is barked at by the Nobarnba dogs 
Likewise those of Zibindini greet her 
They say 'Good day daughter of the King' 
'You must turn your back on those who reject you 
Since those who love you are facing them~ 
and of Solomon himself: 
The hare that outdistanced the dogs of Ondini 
The matter was started by the men of Nobamba 
It was started by Mankul.wnana son of Somaphunga 
It was begun by Ndabankulu son of Lukhwazi 
It was promoted by Lokhotwayo son of Zernbe 
It was urged by Mvingana son of Nompanda 
They took the cattle of the Mahashini kraal 
And mixed them with those of Nobamba 
Our own eater-up from Zibindini 
The honeybird that drinks from deep pools 
If he drank from shallow pools his beak would be muddied 
Tuft of soft hair he speaks not, neither has heavy words, 
He is like unto one who is surrounded by the shields of 
warriors. 183 
The other division within the Zulu royal family was a consequence 
of the succession dispute that followed the death of Cetshwayo 
in 1884. Manzolwandle's claim had been passed over in favour 
of Dinuzulu - who was the son of a low-ranking wife of 
Cetshwayo. Manzolwandle had thereafter been Ita wanderer, shunned 
70 
by nearly all his old relatives and therefore practically 
an orphan dependent on the Supreme Chief." In 1907 he 
was appointed as chief to a ward in the Nqutu division - which 
evidently annoyed Dinuzulu - and was given a hundred head 
of cattle by the Natal Government "to enable him to maintain 
the prestige and dignity attaching to the position to which 
. d "184 he had been appolnte • 
On news of Dinuzulu's death, Manzolwandle and his mother, 
okaQethukc,reopened the question of his claim to the estate 
of Cetshwayo. Hence he claimed part of Dinuzulu's estate and 
also began a compaign to claim the unpaid lobolo for six 
daughters of Cetshwayo who had been married after Cetshwayo's 
death. Furthermore, he demanded lobolo for women of 
Cetshwayo~s isigodlo . ('harem') who had been subsequently 
married, and for the return of cattle his late father had 
. d . h h k . 185 MIdI lent out ln accor ance Wlt t e u USlsa custom. anzo wan e 
also took the case to Sir Charles Saunders when Dinuzulu 
died. The government, however, refused to act on his behalf 
because, it argued, all Cetshwayo's property (including all 
his cattle and women) had become the government's property 
186 
after the Anglo-Zulu war. Thus it was up to the government 
to decide whether to pursue the return of Cetshwayo's 
'sisa'd' cattle or the payment of lobolo for his daughters 
and isigodlo women. Moreover, the government reminded him 
that it was a condition of his appointment as chief in 1907 
187 that he renounce all claims as heir to Cetshwayo, Despite 
Manzowandle's futile but divisive rurnblings,Mankulurnana 
telegraphed him three times informing him of Dinuzulu's 
188 
funeral - another example of the conciliatory stance 
adopted by the Usuthu leadership. Manzolwandle did not attend. 
At Nobamba, it was said that "Manzolwandle had been unable 
to attend the funeral as his trap had broken down. Then he 
had got onto a horse, and it, also, broke down, but the people 
were still expecting him".189 
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These were some of the tensions that faced the new head of 
the Zulu royal house. In the space of one week, Solomon had 
had to endure the death of his father, the trauma of a 
succession dispute, the jealousies of his siblings and uncles, 
the lurking antagonism of the enemies of his father and 
grandfather, a break in the trust which had obtained between 
Dinuzulu and his chief counsellor, Mankulumana, the attentions 
of a wide range of courtiers, and the pressures imposed by 
a great multitude of people who had felt his succession to 
be an ev.ent of both public and deeply personal importance. 
He also had succeeded to the particular loyalty of a section 
of the Zulu people, the Usuthu, who were still administratively 
divided among four separate chiefs. Their recognition of 
Solomon as Dinuzulu's successor had taken place regardless of 
the administrative arrangements imposed by the Natal NAD, 
and the contradictions so generated made Solomon's position 
yet more complex. 
Solomon had also inherited the attentions of the many creditors 
of Dinuzulu's estate. Although he was allowed a £100 stipend 
19C from the government to care for Dinuzulu's widows and dependants 
(of which £5 per annum was paid directly to Potgieter for 
the lease of 20 acres of 'Welgekozen') ,191 this was nowhere 
near sufficient. Apart from any other expenses, Solomon 
was obliged to pay about £60 per annum for hut rentals on 
Buys' 'Koningsdal' alone, apart from dues for grazing and 
arable land. 192 
Influences on Solomon's early life 
As may be expected of a child of Dinuzulu, Solomon had not 
had a secure childhood. He was born sometime between 1891 
and 1893 on the island of St. Helena whilst Dinuzulu was in 
'1 h 193 , eXl e t ere. Dlnuzulu had taken two wives with him to St. 
Helena: Indlunkulu
194 
Silomo, daughter of Ntuzwa Mdlalose, 
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and Indlunkulu Zihlazile, daughter of Q.etbuka Magwaza. 
OkaNtuzwa's195 first child died, but while at St. Helena she 
bore two sons, Solomon Nkayishana Maphumuzana and Arthur 
Edward Mshiyeni. 196 OkaQethuka bore two sons and a daughter 
197 
- David Nyawana, Samuel Bhekelendoda and Victoria Mphaphu. 
Life on St. Helena was easy. The children "roamed" and 
"played" - and it was said that they soon lost their milk 
teeth on account of the number of sweets given to them by 
whites on the island. 198 More importantly, strong European 
influence was brought to bear on their upbringing through 
the media of elementary education and the Church. After 
Dinuzulu was sent into exile,Harriette Colenso arranged for 
Bubi Mthuli to go to St. Helena to educate Dinuzulu and the 
royal youngsters. When Mthuli fell out with the interpreter, 
Colenso sought a replacement from among those who had been 
educated at the school of her father, Bishop Colenso. Magema 
Magwaza Fuze was selected and went out to St. Helena to relieve 
Mthuli and join Rev. Barraclbugh in teaching the Zulu royal 
f . 1 199 amJ. y. 
Dinuzulu was given instruction in speaking, reading and 
writing of English. The youngsters' education, however, was 
informal. They were instructed to be literate only in Zulu, 
and did not achieve any great proficiency. Nonetheless, 
they were educated in a broader sense through the Church 
which infused into them the habits and beliefs of European 
life. As Magogo kaDinuzulu related, Solomon and the other 
youngsters were 
... never educated. L$olomou7 never went to school. 
They merely learnt to read a little Zulu. In 
our home ..• , from the beginning we were educated 
for the Lord, so that we may be able to read the 
Bible .•.• We were not concerned with education 
for speech. We were being educated to 
Christianity. 200 
73 
Every Sunday they attended church where they heard services 
conducted by Bishop Welby and Rev. Barraclough. It was in 
this church that they were all baptised, and received their 
intriguing blend of British royal and old testament first 
names. 201 They also learnt such skills as horse-riding. 
Zulu interviewees all emphasized that Solomon was 'Christian' 
and 'civilized' - the fact that he was brought ~p in 
European clothes and not in a beshu (loin skin) was regarded 
o 0 0 d f thO 202 as suff1c1ent eV1 ence 0 1S. 
After the Zulu royal family returned to Zululand in 1898, 
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Solomon moved back and forth between Osuthu and the European-
style house Dinuzulu had constructed near the magistracy at 
Eshowe, where the Natal Government had obliged him to live. 
There followed two periods of major upheaval: the Anglo-Boer 
war and the 1906 rebellion. This latter was far more disruptive. 
As white hostility to Dinuzulu mounted, rumours spread that 
the boy princes would be "singled out and transfixed on poles 
in the ground". They were thus taken into hiding.
204 
After 
the long treason trial, Dinuzulu's imprisonment and subsequent 
exile to the Transvaal, the royal youngsters spent their time 
alternately at their respective mothers' homesteads near 
Nongomaand Babanango, or with their father at KwaThengisa. 
It was at KwaThengisa that Solomon met Pixley Seme, who was 
to be a strong influence on him immediately after his 
succession. During this time, Solomon was also duly enrolled 
as a member of the Vukayibambe ibutho (age set or 'regiment') , 
by Dinuzulu, which established in him and his peers a sense of 
identity and common citizenship fired by the traditions of 
the amabutho in preconquest zululand. 205 Despite - or perhaps 
because of - the insecurities and complexities of his 
upbringing, all sources affirm Solomon's humility, sense of 
social concern and justice, open nature and ready sense of 
humour. 
Overall, the western influences on Solomon had sunk deep. The 
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following description made by an American journalist who 
conducted a series of interviews with Solomon's first wife 
during the early 1930 s, 206 refers to Solomon a few years 
after his succession: 
He wore underwear, shoes, military uniforms, 
and cocked hats; his riding breeches and boots 
were made to order. He preferred the soft outlines 
of a chair, to rest on a mattress, sit at a table 
for meals, have a light cast upon him after night 
fall; to cover himself with ample blankets rather 
than skins, and lie between clean sheets; to use 
warm water, and soft towels to dry with, and the 
feel of a sponge after riding. 207 
It itself, Solomon's personal hut at Zibindini illustrates 
the distinction that must be made between form and content 
when conceptualising the Zulu royal family in the early 
twentieth century. Although it was a traditional Zulu hut, 
surrounded by a finely built reed stockade, it contained a 
"brass bed, with its hand embroidered spread, some chairs, 
an open cupboard with brightly patterned china, and a table 
covered with a gleaming patterned oilcloth. ,,20B 
On his succession, Solomon immediately fell under a number 
of d ifferent - or even contradictory - influences. One was 
the result of the initiative of a local African priest of the 
(Anglican) Church of the Province of South Africa (hereafter 
CPSA) , William Afrikander. Within a couple of months of 
Solomon's succession, Afrikander had "converted" Solomon and 
David, and in February 1914 Solomon was confirmed by the Bishop 
of Zululand, Wilmot vyvyan~09 In a fund-raising appeal published 
in The Net, Rev. L. E. Oscroft (then stationed at Etaleni in 
central Zululand) emphasized that the church initiative should 
not end there: 
I was at Afrikander's station .D:mtonjaneny 
a fortnight ago and had several talks with 
Solomon and his brother David (older than 
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Solomon but not chosen by the people). One of the 
chief Royal Kraals is at a place called KwaNobamba 
in the midst of a large heathen population. At 
present we have no station there, but we are hoping 
to start there within the next three months. It 
will be a great task - there is strong heathen 
opposition to meet, especially from the boy King's 
advisors ...• Think what it means to the Church. 
The head of the Zulu nation, worshipping in his 
own church, at or near his own home .•.. Afrikander 
has great influence over Solomon and David, and 
I know from their own mouths that they look to him 
for guidance. We must not fail them .... despite 
many disappointments, there does seem at the 
present time a special movement towards Light 
taking place amongst the Zulu people. We have 2l0 
created their hunger - now we must satisfy it. 
Another influence issued from the stratum of mission educated 
African churchmen, teachers and clerks. For some among 
them, Solomon's succession was an event of significance not 
only beyond Zululand, but beyond the borders of Natal: 
it rekindled those nascent African nationalist sentiments 
that had briefly flared under the Ethiopianist banner at the 
turn of the century and subsided after the 1906 rebellion. 
Amos NXUmalo, a landowner of a "Kholwa house" in Pieter-
maritzburg, held that Solomon "has been crowned as King and 
elevated to that position ... " and argued " ... you must under-
stand that he has been made King of all us black people -
the whole black race.,,2ll The 'black people' were not as 
much in need of leadership to provide political direction as 
identity, pride and inspiration. Their interest in Solomon 
was not a passive one. If Solomon was to provide the image 
that was required of him he would have to symbolise more than 
blackness, power, independence and romanticised tradition; 
he would also need to conform to their petty bourgeois 
social , cultural, and political aspirations. It was a matter 
of concern that Solomon should not transpire to be a 'backward' 
Zulu tribal chief. 
The views expressed by a leading mission-published Zulu language 
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newspaper, Izindaba Zabantu, are especially illuminating. 
It is alone significant that the editor speaks b6th as 
a 'Zulu' himself and to a 'Zulu' readership, whereas Natal 
Africans had not long previously been despised as the 
amakhafula of esilungwini (literally 'the place of the whites' 
- Natal) by the Zulus of Zululand. 
LDinuzuly] once held the position of King, but 
he was misled by his elders and fought with the 
English Government. The kingdom was taken away 
from him ••• What was left with him was just the 
dignity with which he was born •••• With the Zulus 
Dinuzulu was their King until he died. His son, 
Solomon,will be recognized as King even if he is 
nothing to the Government and white people's 
eyes. 
It's that dignity and power which Solomon 
will have among Africans that we want to talk 
about today. Is this power and dignity to be 
just nothing at all, of no use to its owner and 
his people? We think there is plenty he can do 
that is wise. We don't think he will ever see 
the Kingdom of Zululand, no! That Kingdom is 
dead and will never be again. There is another 
good position he can take for his people •.. the 
position of leading his people to Light. This 
position can be the same as a King's position 
indeed, because of its dignity, because of its 
help to the Zulus. Here is the position that 
can suit this son from the Royal Family, Solomon. 
Le~s not mean for the Kingdom that is of no use 
•.•. Let something which is useful be desired for 
these days we are living in ••.• 
If our hopes and other people's hopes ar'e 
to come true with this child, it will depend on 
how he is guided ..•• lt is up to the relatives 
to narrate the mistakes LOf Dinuzul~ to this 
son who is taking up this high position •••• 
He must be taken away from foolish people ..• 
and be brought up in a westernized respectable 
manner which is correct for a King these days ••• 
We are aware that Mankulumana and Mnyaiza are 
men in high positions in the Royal family, but 
even so they are still raw, they are still in 
a dark pit and they don't want to go out of it 
so that they can see the light. If you want to 
see good from Solomon, these are not the people 
to lead him and teach him.2l2 
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Izindaba Zabantu then provided information on how other 
sons of kings of African nations had been brought up. In 
Uganda, it says, the young heir was kept under the observation 
of a white advisor and was taught only what was 'correct'. 
In Tanganyika the heir was taken to a school in England 
for education, while "in our country" the son of Lewanika 
of the Rotse had been taken to Lovedale "so that he may 
be enlightened there". The article concluded by giving notice 
of Solomon's forthcoming meeting with the people of Johannesburg, 
arranged by Seme. "Bring some money", it urged, "so that 
the child of Senzangakhona does not starve in the presence 
of his father's people."2l3 
In a leading article eighteen months later, the same newspaper 
expressed both dismay that its earlier advice had not been 
well heeded and displeasure with Solomon's advisors. "There 
are people who have asked us when we are to hear that our 
King Solomon is being taught the way of light .••• lf all 
that we hear is truth, then it is obvious that he will follow 
his father's footsteps. Where his father went you all 
know."214 The paper in fact had no cause to be so despondent. 
Apart from the initiatives of William Afrikander, which were 
soon to be followed up by a vigorous CPSA backup, the 'raw' 
and 'unenlightened' influence of Mankulumana and Mnyaiza 
was being balanced by the attentions of leading petty bourgeois 
individuals. Although his influence was to be more pronounced 
later, John Dube was quick to show interest in Solomon. 
Dube had been born of a Natal Kholwa family in 1871, and 
was educated at Inanda and Amanzimtoti Theological College 
before furthering his studies at Oberlin College in 
. 215 . b . 
Amer J.ca. In AmerJ.ca, Du "e raJ.sed the funds that enabled 
him to establish the 'Zulu Christian Industrial School' at 
Ohlange (in the Inanda district, near Durban) in 1901. Dube's 
Christian beliefs and concern for education and "social 
progress" (in western terms) were intimately intertwined. 
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Inspired by the American Negro educationist and political 
theorist Booker T. Washington, Dube at least initially felt 
that Christianity and education took priority over political 
action in terms of both short and long term benefits. He 
told a white audience: "Christianity will usher in a new 
civilization and the'Dark Continent' will be transformed 
into a land of commerce and Christian institutions. Then 
. . "216 shall Africa take her place as a natl0n among natlons. 
In Natal, Dube's optimism was misplaced; white colonists 
were especially distrustful of the attempts of the kholwa 
to master the beliefs and practices of European life, and 
erected barriers against their progress. Shortly after the 
turn of the century, Dube became politically active through 
Ilanga Lase Natal, a Zulu-English newspaper, and the Natal 
Native Congress. The latter were both primarily vehicles 
for the aspirations of the westernized kholwa elite, and both 
tended to express disdain for the 'backwardness' and 'stagnancy' 
of 'unimproved kraal life,.217 Nonetheless, with his 
"recollections of pride in the Zulu past", Dube had campaigned 
on Dinuzulu's behalf during the treason trial that followed 
the 1906 rebellion. 218 In 1912 he became the first president 
of the SANNC, and one of his first actions in this capacity 
testifies to his desire to garner the support of the very 
tribal Africans whose beliefs and customs he largely rejected. 
At a meeting with the Zulu at Eshowe in November 1912, he made 
an impassioned appeal for black political unity and "beneficial 
representation" in view of the forthcoming segregationist 
legislation. He further spoke glowingly of white industriousness 
and disparagingly of black laziness and sensual gratification 
(beer, women and food) and urged his audience to educate them-
selves and their children. Mtonga kaMpande was present, 
219 and he agreed to support Dube. 
Shortly after Solomon's succession, Dube was concerned about 
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the way in which Solomon was being guided by his advisors. 
When, in December 1913, Harriette Colenso intended to 
present Solomon to Botha for recognition (presumably as 
successor to Dinuzulu's one-time position as chief of the 
Usuthu), Dube denounced the idea on the grounds that it was 
improper so soon after Dinuzulu's death - the customary period 
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of mourning had not yet been observed. This period of 
mourning was approximately one year in length, at the end 
of which an ihlambo was held: a ceremonial meeting of the 
amabutho and a ritual hunt (inqina) during which the spears 
of the nation were cleansed in the blood of the prey. That 
Dube was anxious for the mourning period to be correctly 
observed reflected his ambiguity about the customs and 
traditions of the Zulu; this was especially marked when it 
came to royal traditions. Harriette Colenso wrote a 
deferential letter to Dube, agreeing with his views and adding 
tha t Mankulumana had been of the same opinion. She noted, 
incidentally, that she and Seme were presently at KwaThengisa, 
attempting to sort out Dinuzulu's financial affairs. 221 
It seems that soon afterwards Dube contacted Solomon to secure 
Solomon's support for a fund-raising scheme to send a 
deputation to England. This was to protest against the 1913 
Act . The Native Commissioner at Piet Retief saw links between 
Dube's activities and collections that were currently being 
made for the Zulu royal family: 
I claim that it is not unre.asonable LSiW to 
suppose and to assume that such educated and 
enlightened natives as Mr John Dube and Mr P. 
ka L. Seme Lsi~ are labouring quietly and 
diplomatically amongst the Zulu speaking peoples 
with the object of achieving a complete reunion 
of the Zulu Nation and thereby a resuscitation 
and revival of the zulu Royal House and power.222 
It was Seme who came to be the greatest 'outside' influence on 
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Solomon immediately after his succession. The basis of Seme's 
association with the Zulu royal family at this stage was 
in a professional capacity. He assisted in settling the 
claims of Dinuzulu's creditors and reviving the financial 
fortunes of the Zulu royal family. Describing himself as 
"legal advisor to the late Chief Dinuzulu" and as acting 
in that capacity "on behalf of his heir Solomonfl , Seme 
wrote to the prime minister's office requesting permission 
for Solomon to proceed to Johannesburg to receive "voluntary 
gifts" to settle Dinuzulu's estate. 223 Seme's request was 
not granted. Four days after Seme's request, the SNA similarly 
instructed Mankulumana that no-one was to "exploit Solomon 
for the purpose of settling debts".224 Nevertheless, a 
massive tribute-collecting campaign was launched by Seme 
and Mnyaiza, during which Solomon was made well aware that 
of all the people who were willing to pay tribute to him, it 
was urban dwellers and migrant workers who could most readily 
do so. Thus he gained an insight into the 'political economy' 
of his 'kingship'. 
The royal tribute-collectors did not confine their attentions 
to urban areas: they were also at work deep in the rural 
districts. Here, their activities threw light on two factors 
that were important for the political fortunes of the royal 
house. In the first place, the rural districts constituted 
the numerical core of Solomon's political constituency. 
Their response to the royal tribute~collectors showed that 
past divisions were breaking down and a sense of unity was 
fast being established under the figure of Solomon. In the 
second place, the reaction of the NAD to these developments 
was negative; a sense of political unity among the inhabitants 
of the rural districts was anomalous to an administration 
which was based on the existence of tribal and sectional divisions. 
In the Piet Retief district, despite the opposition of the local 
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Native Commissioner, Chief Tunzi had collected £20 from his 
ward (numbering only 200 tax payers - adult males - who were 
labour tenants and squatters) and had handed this to Seme 
and Mnyaiza for transmission to Solomon. In a state of 
consternation, the Native Commissioner reported that Chief 
Tunzi and his ward were the descendants of a small section 
which had been expelled from Zululand by Cetshwayo after an 
altercation, but 
today they are contributing to a fund for the 
benefit of the heir to the Zulu Royal House, 
against which they actively bore arms in the 
Anglo-Zulu war of 1879. Though Tunzi and his 
small following may only be an infinitesimal unit 
there are other tribes in which the feeling of 
resentment against the Zulu Royal House is dying 
out ..• 225 
The magistrate of Nongoma similarly reported that Solomon was 
receiving presents from "allover Zululand, both in money and 
in kind". Contributions from individuals had been as high as 
£10, and Mnyaiza had collected a "considerable amount" for 
Solomon when he stopped off at Charlestown on his way between 
KwaThengisa and Zululand. Tribute was pouring into the royal 
homesteads in Zululand,and Phikisile, one of Solomon's 
sisters, had been instructed to keep an account of the money 
received. The magistrate concluded with a plea to the CNC 
that Solomon should not be allowed to reside in the locality, 
as Solomon's being "paraded about as a chief of great standing" 
had "considerably unsettled"his district. 226 
In response to such reports, the CNC summoned Mnyaiza to his 
office. "Where are you leading this boy fSolomoll7?", he asked, 
and proceeded, "Look here, you know what these lawyers are. 
This man Seme is a Natal man. I know his father who lives 
at Richmond. Lawyers want money only. They will end by leaving 
you in the lurch.,,227 Mnyaiza replied that "the people" 
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wanted to see Solomon, and that he had indeed gone about to 
solicit money even though he knew the government had forbidden 
it. In the face of this unabashed defiance, the CNC merely 
asked Mnyaiza whether he ever visited Chief Mpikanina, under 
whose jurisdiction Mnyaiza fell - a question which reflected 
how the present administrative arra~gements for the Usuthu 
were not proving viable. Mnyaiza answered by referring to 
his duties as a labour recruiter which, he said, kept him 
away from home. There was little the CNC could do. He 
could barely forbid Mnyaiza himself to move about the country 
since he was committing no wrong in doing so, and he could 
f 
barely forbid the collection of subscriptions that were by 
all accounts voluntarily given. All he could do was to 
reiterate that "Dinuzulu's children LhavEJ been given away 
to others !appointed chief~ and it is wrong to act as you 
h b . 11 228 ave een actlng. 
As the CNC related to the SNA, the activities of Seme and 
Mnyaiza, and of Solomon, were posing a grave danger to the 
administration of not only the Usuthu, but of Zululand. "I 
am anxious therefore to prevent Solomon as far as possible 
from acquiring a following. If any indication in this 
direction is not nipped in the bud, I forsee that the 
Government will have the same trouble with him as experienced 
with his late father.,,229 
Solomon soon began organising 'progressions' and collections 
on his own. His application for a pass to visit the Transvaal 
was refused when it was discovered that he intended to visit 
Franz at the Brakpan mine and "collect money from natives in 
compounds to enable him to pay his LSieV debts.,,230 It is 
sign ificant that NAD officials regarded the influence of 
Solomon's 'non-tribal' associates with especial disfavour. 
The CNC held that Solomon "may confidently be expected to lead 
a quiet life, unless led away by the headmen and agitators, 
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231 such as John Dube, Seme and others", and he referred to 
Mnyaiza and Franz as "perhaps the most disloyal people in 
232 
Zululand". 
The traditional context and the ihlambo (the washing of the spears 
Apart from the influence of kholwa courtiers, the Church and 
his more worldly royal associates like Mnyaiza and Franz, 
Solomon was the central figure in the world of Zulu 
traditionalism. Although, as has been argued, the 'tradition-
alism' was one of form rather than content,the niche that 
Solomon occupied in this context was of immense social and 
political importance. Ultimately it was the entire basis of 
his status. As the administration was only too painfully 
aware, Solomon had a huge groundswell of support in the rural 
districts, and for them Solomon was 'king,.233 
That Solomon inherited from Dinuzulu a large number of royal 
homesteads dotted about the core of the Zulu country 
undoubtedly made his presence and influence more widely felt. 
Apart from Zibindini and Nobamba in the Vryheid district 
(although David had been given Nobamba for his personal use, 
it was ultimately the property of the king), there were the 
Gqikazi, Sikalenisenyoka, Mahashini and Ekubuseni royal 
homesteads in the Nongoma district, and Nsindeni in the 
Mahlabatinidistrict. Not surprisingly, the Natal NAD saw 
234 this scatter of royal homesteads as a problem. The 
cluster of royal graves (Emakhosini) in the Vryheid district 
were also of great significance. Dinuzulu had recently been 
buried on the farm'Koningsdal'. Jama and Senzangakhona were 
buried on neighbouring 'Welgekozen', Ndaba and Mageba on 
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Pandasgraf,and Punga on 'Heelgoed'. The gravesites were 
held to be the sacred preserve of the Zulu people, and it 
was one of Solomon's first political preoccupations to get 
them out of the hands of white landowners and into his own, as 
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the representative of the Zulu nation. Harriette Colenso 
strongly supported Solomon in this matter, and although he 
was not successful, his campaign itself did much to establish 
his status as national figurehead.
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In Zululand, Solomon surrounded himself with izinduna and 
izinceku who were all men of especial rank and who had 
his t oric claims to positions of responsibility in the royal 
house. Virtually all were men who had either themselves 
held positions under past zulu kings or were descendants of 
such men. As sons of Cetshwayo's powerful brothers Ndabuko 
and Dabulamanzi, Mnyaiza and Franz filled this bill. Since 
they were close members of the Zulu royal family, however, 
they could not act as izinduna but only as informal advisors 
or ' assistants,.237 Solomon's great izinduna were Mankulumana 
and Gilbert 'kaNcgongcwana Zulu. Although there is evidence 
of some tension between Solomon and Mankulumana soon after 
Solomon's succession238 (which was probably related to 
Mankulumana's role in the succession dispute), Mankulumana 
was soon securely back in his role of respected and powerful 
royal advisor. Gilbert was a member of a collateral branch 
of the Zulu royal family which traced its descent back to 
239 
Jama. Gilbert's father, Ngoongcwana, had been an adviser 
who accompanied Cetshwayo to London for an audience with 
Queen Victoria shortly after the Anglo-Zulu war. Subsequently, 
back in Zululand, he was killed by the Mandlakazi in 1883. 240 
In the earlier part of Solomon's chieftainship, it was 
Mankulumana who was the most influential'iDduna of the nation', 
but as time went on and he grew more aged, Gilbert gradually 
assumed more responsibility. Gilbert never rose to such 
great status as Mankulumana, because Solomon came to rely 
increasingly on petty bourgeois individuals for advice. 
Moreover, in the early 1920s, Solomon was to revive the 
trad ition, which had fallen into disuse after the Usuthu/ 
Buthelezi disagreement of 1888, whereby the head of the Buthelezi 
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acted as prime minister and chief counsellor to the Zulu 
kingship.241 Shortly after the NAD recognized him as chief 
of the Usuthu, Solomon made formal application for the 
appointment of Mankulumana and Gilbert - together with Nkunzi 
Buthelezi - as Usuthu izinduna with authority to try civil 
242 
cases arising in his ward. 
Maphelu kaMkhosana was Solomon's chief personal bodyguard 
and personal attendant orinceku. He had acted in a similar 
capacity to Dinuzulu and had been implicated in the 1906 
rebellion. However, perhaps because of his age, his extensive 
knowledge of history and custom, and his status as a loyal 
servant of Dinuzulu who had shared many of his late master's 
trials, Maphelu had an influence that exceeded the usual 
powers of an inceku. 2A3 Although he held no public position, 
he had So19ffion'S confidence and ear at all times; and in 
practice his advice was sought on matters beyond the royal 
homesteads -which worried those white administrators who 
remembered the 1906 rebellion all too vividly.244 
Lastly, among those who were consistently close to Solomon 
was Zazeni kaLokhotwayo of the Mngadi section. Lokhotwayo 
had been inceku to Dinuzulu, and Zazeni succeeded his father 
. k d b d t (. . 1 ) h Ok ~ 245 h as ~nce u an 0 y servan ~ns~ a to t e ~ng. T e term 
insila also refers to the 'spiritual essence' of a person, 
which is held to attach to his body matter (sweat, hair, skin, 
urine) and property. If such fell into the wrong hands, its 
owner's health and security would be at risk. As Solomon's 
insila, Zazeni was thus in a position of some responsibility.246 
One year after Dinuzulu's death, the occasion of Dinuzulu's 
ihlambo ceremony illustrated Solomon's role within the world 
of Zulu traditionalism, and simultaneously revealed what a 
danger he posed to the existing administrative arrangements 
in Zululand. For many reasons, the NAD was appalled by the 
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prospect of large numbers of Zulu gathering together as 
a nation to pay final respects to Dinuzulu and to perform 
the requisite rites to complete the period of mourning. 
Most obviously, the ihlambo would free Solomon from the 
fetters of mourning that had so far inhibited his political 
activities. Moreover, it would be a national festival, 
presided over by Solomon. The NAD considered that such a 
demonstration would pose a threat to the white population 
not only by eroding the operation of indirect rule in 
Zululand: there were also fears that there was to be another 
Zulu rebellion. Long before the ihlambo, there was persistent 
and widespread consternation that, contrary to emphatic 
instructions, Solomon was inviting men from allover the 
country to attend the ceremony. Writing to the SNA, the 
CNC (Addison) stated that it was clear that the ihlambo 
would not be a "local matter", and that the 1I1oyal Mandlakazi 
tribe" might be attacked. He proceeded to outline how the 
ihlambo, the World War and the 'Dutch' rebellion against South 
Africa's participation in it on the side of Britain, were all 
linked together. The Boers in Northern Natal, intelligence 
reports indicated, had informed the Zulu that they would be 
better off under German rule. 247 B. Colenbrander, magistrate 
of Vryheid, who was normally a calm and sympathetic official, 
similarly expressed "great apprehension" at the prospect of 
the ihlambo "in view of the present rebellion LDutcQ? in the 
Union." Despite instructions, large numbers of zulu were 
already proceeding to Nobamba, and already rumours of an 
imminent 'native uprising' were spreading among whites. He 
fel t certain that when the ihlambo took place "we will have a 
panic in this district". He felt it was·perhaps more than a 
coincidence" that the Boer rebelli'on and the ihlambo were taking 
248 
place concurrently. The CNC arranged for a military 
detachment - the 'Vryheid Commando' - to remain in the vicinity 
of Nobamba during the ihlambo. 249 
These fears say much more about the Natal NAD and the local 
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white population than about the intentions of the Zulu 
royal family. The ihlambo was a peaceful and highly 
disciplined ceremony, and there was no hint that something 
sinister lay behind it. The ihlambo did prove, however, 
that the NAD's present application of indirect rule was 
severely threatened. Furthermore, by lifting the veil of 
mourning from Solomon and his advisors, it inaugurated the 
'reign' of Solomon. Soon the NAD found that their present 
administrative arrangements were absolutely unworkable. 
Solomon and Mankulumana had indeed sent for people from all 
over Zululand and Northern Natal to attend the ihlambo. It 
was a pedantically traditional ceremony; Mkhosana kaZangwana 
of the Zungu, who had been an adviser to Cetshwayo and had 
accompanied him to London after the Anglo-Zulu war, was 
especially fetched from the Mhlabatini district to preside 
h . h . 250 over t e ceremony, Slnce e was an expert on anClent custom. 
Because he was aged and frail, Solomon sent Mankulumana with 
a wagon to fetch him. A number of royal cattle were slaughtered 
to provide food for the assembly. Whilst the meat was being 
prepared, the izinyanga (medicine men) prepared ritual medicines 
for the purification of Solomon at Dinuzulu's grave, and for 
the amabutho, numbering some five thousand men, who crowded 
into the cattle kraal.
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Once they had expressed their 
final devotions and praises to Dinuzulu, the Assistant 
Magistrate of Babanango addressed the gathering and emphasized 
the government's goodwill to the Zulu, as shown by its gift 
of 15 head of cattle. In order of rank, he named the 
"friends of the zulus" in the government: J. Y. Gibson (DNC, 
Zululand), R. H. Addison (CNC, Natal), E. Dower (SNA) , and 
General Botha (Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs). 
He concluded by reminding the chiefs present that it was 
their duty "to see that Solomon does not get into trouble by 
keeping your men in hand, whom you have brought here ••• ".252 
In accordance with the ihlambo custom, there was to follow a 
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ritual hunt (inqina) to 'wash the spears'of the nation. The 
NAD had already forbidden this, but, faced with the question 
at the ihlambo itself, the Assistant Magistrate of Babanango 
felt that "tact" was called for and allowed the hunt to 
proceed. 253 At sunrise the following morning the hunt began. 
Solomon cut a dashing figure among the amabutho, riding a 
horse and carrying a rifle. He personally,with his royal 
dogs/were responsible for many 6f the slain buck that were 
br0t:lght back to Nobamba at sunset,., carried on the shoulders 
of those of the various amabatho as they sung "great songs 
of Zulu kings".254 Before the amabutho dispersed, they 
constructed a cattle kraal for Solomon at Zibindini. The 
reign of the new king was well and truly under way. 
The ihlambo was the first traditional national ceremony that 
Solomon presided over. The adherence to custom that was 
such a feature of the ceremony had been arranged by Solomon 
himself when he summoned Mkhosana to prescribe proceedings. 
Solomon, together with the zulu royal family as a whole, 
represented continuity with the past, national unity, and 
a sense of independent identity. Solomon's role as an embodiment 
of tradition was vital in establishing his social and political 
status. At ceremonies such as the ihlambo, men were drawn 
together from all sections of the zulu people and grouped 
themselves together not in the 'tribal' units that the NAD 
prescribed, but in their amabutho - wherein the criterion 
for membership was age rather than lineage or territorial 
origin. The activities of the amabutho at the ihlambo focussed 
on t he Zulu royal family and in so doing, made strong appeals 
to nationalist sentiments. In such contexts of tradition 
and custom, Solomon was undeniably the king of the zulu. 255 
In this light, Solomon's baptism into the Church by the Bishop 
of Zululand in February 1914 and his appearance a few months 
later in his late father's cattle kraal, virtually naked 
whilst being washed down with ritual medicines, were not 
contradictory. The function of the ihlambo was not only to 
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complete the period of mourning for Dinuzulu: as the burning 
of bones after the feast in Dinuzulu's cattle kraal and the 
work of the amabutho in building a cattle kraal for Solomon 
symbolized, Solomon was now no longer the nation's 'comfort' 
for the loss of Dinuzulu, but was its new leader. 
It was precisely this fact that appalled the Natal NAD. As 
the magistrate of Entonjaneni reported of the ihlambo, 
large numbers of Zulu were drawn together from 
every centre of Zululand, and that these ignorant 
people now, naturally, looked on the youthful 
son Solomon Zulu, alias Nkaitshana, as the successor 
to his father Dinuzulu, and not merely as the 
simple heir to his estate, and that Solomon 
himself believes that the mantle of King or 
chieftain worn by his late father new clothes 
him, ~there isJ promise of further ~rouble 
in the near future .•• 256 
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CHAPTER 3 
ZULULAND'S NEW 'KING' AND THE 
NATIVE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT,1914-1920 
The administration of Zululand and the Zulu royal family, 1914-1916 
The policy that the NAD adopted towards Solomon until 1920 
falls into two periods. The retirement of Dick Addison as 
CNC in early 1916 and his replacement by Charles Wheelwright 
marks the change in policy. Addison was dog~atically opposed 
to the influence of the Zulu royal family. Under his 
administration, the Usuthu remained divided among four chiefs 
and Solomon was officially treated as a private individual. 
In public he ignored Solomon as far as possible, but Addison's 
frantic scribblings to his departmental subordinates and 
superiors reflected that he was obsessed by Solomon's influence. 
The major crisis of Addison's administration in Zululand 
came in early 1916, on the eve of his retirement, when Solomon 
enrolled the first ibutho of his 'reign'. Wheelwright 
inherited a Zululand administration which was in a state of 
panic. Although he regarded Solomon as a thorn in his side, 
he was prepared to consider coming to terms with Solomon 
in order to restore order to the administration. Wheelwright 
soon came to realize that since Solomon could not be beaten 
he would have to be joined, and the NAD set out to use Solomon's 
influence rather than to repress it. 
On t h e succession of Solomon, the Usuthu had in practice 
reconstituted itself around him in defiance of their official 
partition. Four months before the ihlambo, this threat to 
the administration led Addison to instruct Gibson, DNC of 
Zululand, to compile a report on the matter. In this report, 
the case of Mankulumana was also to be considered - the Natal 
NAD was piqued that NAD head office in Pretoria had unilaterally 
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sanctioned his return to Zululand from exile at KwaTh~ngisa. 
After a detailed overview of the role of the Zulu royal 
family in Zululand since 1879, Gibson dwelt on the existing 
position of the royal house and the administrative arrange-
ments made for the Usuthu. Referring to Mankulumana, Gibson 
suggested that he be regarded as no more than a private 
individual and be separated from the royal house by removal 
to a magisterial district distant from the royal epicentre.
l 
Turning to the Usuthu, Gibson felt that the four appointed 
chiefs over the Usuthu - Mpikanina Zulu, Muzimubi Buthelezi, 
Mciteki Zulu and Moya Ndwandwe - could not be relied upon to 
defend their positions against "any recrudescence of Royal 
pretensions". Chief Moya, he stated, "has been habituated 
since childhood to be defential to the Royal family", and 
further it "might naturally be supposed that his uncle 
Mankulumana could dominate him.,,2 
Apart from Chief Moya, the other chiefs found that their 
authority was simply being disregarded. The NAD, in turn, 
found that it could exert very little control over the Usuthu 
through these chiefs. Referring to the Usuthu people under 
Chief Muzimubi, the magistrate of Mahlabatini complained that 
There is a tendency on the part of these natives 
to regard Dinuzulu's second son as the lawful 
heir .•. he pays periodical visits to the district 
and invariably the chiefs disapprove of this 
very strongly; they say their influence is 
being taken away by 'the boy', who always gets 
a large following from the tribes ..•• 3 
Chi ef Mpikanina had virtually no control over the Usuthu 
in his ward, and his complaints on this matter were frequent. 
So l omon never visited Mpikanina and did not keep in touch 
with 'his chief' even by messenger,4 whilst Mnyaiza, who was 
"a member of his LMpikanina'v tribe", repeatedly disobeyed 
him and refused to visit him when summoned to do so.5 The only 
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chief upon whom the NAD felt it could rely to counter the 
influence of Solomon was Chief Mciteki of the Mandlakazii 
but the NAD realized that to back the Mandlakazi as a 
counter-weight to the Usuthu in the present political climate 
in zululand would not only be futile but could provoke another 
civil war. 
The administrative disruption Solomon was deemed to be causing 
in Zululand was by no means confined to those chiefs appointed 
over the Usuthu. Solomon's "roaming about" was reportedly 
causing chiefs to lose control of their followers who were 
"declaring their allegiance to Solomon".6 In an attempt to 
minimise disruption, the CNC instructed the DNC of Zululand 
to inform chiefs 
in unmistakable terms that Solomon holds no 
official position in Zululand or elsewhere, 
and he has no right to summon them to any 
meetings, and they must not attend, but if 
contributions are called for by him, it is 
purely a personal matter for themselves whether 
they contribute or not. 7 
Since Solomon held no official position, the NAD was almost 
powerless to take disciplinary action against him. Instead, 
the Natal NAD took out their frustrations on Mankulumana, 
whose actions had been the least 'troublesome' of all the 
royal advisers since the death of Dinuzulu. On no pretext 
whatsoever, the NAD ruled that Mankulumana could not reside 
in Nongoma or Mahlabatini districts, and had to live in Eshowe 
district. Mankulumana was deeply upset that he would no 
longer be able to act as the guardian of Dinuzulu's children, 
and repeatedly requested to know what wrong he had committed. 8 
Addison replied that Mankulumana should look upon "his being 
allowed to reside in Zululand at all as a distinct concession".9 
Since the NAD refused officially to acknowledge his status, 
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solomon was understandably truculent. When the magistrate 
of Nongoma was attempting to draw up a list of Dinuzulu's 
dependants so that the government allowance for their 
welfare might be fairly distributed, he first asked 
Mankulumana and Mnyaiza and only then did he approach 
Solomon for assistance. Solomon refused to help on the 
grounds that the magistrate should have referred to him and 
no-one else in the first instance. 10 When, in 1916, the 
Governor-General visited Eshowe, Solomon was not personally 
:invi ted to the indaba that was held - which especially upset 
. h d'" 11 S 1 th 1 . d zulu 1n t e Nongoma 1str1ct. 0 omon none e ess arr1ve 
on horseback and instructed the induna attached to the 
magistrate's office at Eshowe, Sijulu Tabete, to interrupt 
the proceedings in order to introduce him personally to the 
Governor-General. When Sijulu refused, Solomon rode off in 
a temper, causing some disturbance. Sijulu reported that the 
prevailing opinion among the zulu at the indaba was that he 
"did wrong in refusing to introduce The Child L'Princv".12 
Solomon's response to officialdom was not merely to adopt 
a t r uculent posture. He put considerable pressure on Addison's 
administration for permission to visit General Botha in 
pre t oria. 13 Soon after the ihlambo, in January 1915, the 
Natal NAD was thrown into consternation by Solomon's request 
to gather forty-one representatives of the royal family and 
of zulu chiefs and headmen from districts allover the zulu 
country (Zululand and Northern Natal) to proceed to Pretoria 
to simultaneously interview General Botha, the SNA, the CNC 
and all Zululand magistrates. 14 The scale of the request 
and the evidence that the whole matter had been carefully 
planne~ suggested that Solomon had concrete proposals to make 
during his prospective interview. What further alarmed the 
Natal NAD was that the list of proposed "delegates" to 
Pretoria (which Solomon had submitted to the NAD) included 
men whom the NAD had regarded as leading opponents of the 
93 
Usuthu. Manzolwandle was named, as were the existing 
'Usuthu' chiefs, Mpikanina and Muzimubi. Also on the list 
was Msenteli kaZibhebhu of the Mandlakazi, Chief Mciteki's 
powerful brother, Karnbi kaHamu of the Ngenetsheni, and 
Mtonga kaMpande who had defected to Natal prior to the Anglo-
15 
Zulu war. 
The Natal NAD, with some justification, concluded that a 
deputation of this scope was not necessary to discuss the 
topics which Solomon had outlined: the education of himself and 
David, the dispersal of Dinuzulu's property at KwaThengisa, 
and matters concerning his dependants, and, ominously, 
"any other matters". In a printed circular to all magistrates 
in Natal and Northern Natal, the CNC declared that the 
request was not granted and that Solomon had no right to 
h ' f 'h' 16 h ' , summon c 1e s 1n t 1S manner. In t e meant1me, Mnya1za 
was forging ahead, sending instructions to all the proposed 
delegates to attend Solomon since the interview with General 
17 Botha was arranged. Recriminations were made within the 
Natal· NAD; for instance, that the government should not have 
given a gift of cattle at the ihlambo ceremony/as this 
pandered to the royal house's pretensions. The statement of 
the magistrate at Melmoth was representative of the general 
Natal NAD attitude. 
The whole movement should most unmistakably be 
nipped in the bud •••• No further communications 
as to deputations should be entered into, but 
Solomon should be sent for at once ••• and be 
informed that his future position (status) is 
that of a commoner and the Government is 
determined for all time never to place any 
of Dinuzulu's descendants in charge of any 
tribe or section thereof. If "His Excellency's" 
claim to greatness is pandered to or in any 
way sanctioned, it is sure to lead to further 
trouble in the future. 18 
After the deputation crisis had faded, Solomon's activities 
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were still constantly featured in NAD correspondence. The 
CNC and DNC Zululand continually exchanged information 
h b ·· 1 . ,,19 to "correct any false rumours t at may e ln Clrcu atlon • 
To them, evidence suggested that Solomon's influence was 
increasing. In April 1915, Solomon visited the paramount 
chief of Pondoland, and came away with one of the latter's 
daughters as a prospective wife. This was a perturbing contact, 
for tribalism in Pondoland was still very strong as in 
Zululand, and unlike Zululand, Pondoland had a paramount 
chief. More directly disturbing to the NAD was that en 
route to Pondoland, Solomon had called at Durban for the 
first time and established his support in the city. He was 
given "quite a royal reception, the Natives contributing coins 
20 
for his support". These actions, the magistrate of 
Nkandla argued, were designed to induce Africans to regard 
Solomon as their "paramount head, instead of merely an 
ordinary person".21 Indeed, Solomon's status was already 
such that it was highly profitable to impersonate him. By 
doing so, one 'Bhekumteto' had received large tributes from 
Africans in Johannesburg and elsewhere.
22 
There were similar 
instances in the Natal midlands.23 
If evidence of Solomon's influence was disquieting enough, 
much worse was the spread of rumours that Solomon was now 
to use the influence that the NAD refused to accommodate 
for seditious purposes. Not long after the passage of the 1913 
Act, Britain and her overseas dominions had been plunged into 
the first world war. Rumours abounded that Africans in 
Natal and Zululand - particularly those on white farms who 
were the most affected by the Act - were to take advantage 
of the war to throw off the burden of white rule. Although 
not endemic, these rumours were widespread. Reports received 
by the Union Defence Force at Dundee in late 1914 held that 
"certain natives" were at work in the rural districts saying, 
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for example, that 
now the English are at war ••• you have a good chance 
to fight against them, and England cannot send 
men to assist. Why should you forever be under 
contract to a white man in order that you may 
be allowed to sit on his farm? What are you to 
do? The ·locations Lreserve~7 are now full and 
youre fsicJ chance to ease your burdens is to 
fight the white man and get your country back. 24 
In Northern Natal, reports were received that certain Europeans 
"chiefly of Dutch descent" were encouraging these nbtions 
of rebellion. As the magistrate of Nkandla reported of 
the Babanango sub-district, It ••• these persons indulge in 
sedlEious talk with the Natives,and tell them that Germany 
is sure to win ••• the Natives must join with them and 
overthrow the British power." As a counter-measure, he 
urged the recruitment of zulu spies to locate the source of 
these rumours, and a corps of Zulu scouts to serve against 
the Germans in East Africa. A member of the Zulu royal 
family, he suggested, should be appointed to recruit and 
lead these scouts.
25 
It was the role of the zulu royal family in the context of 
these rumours of revolt that caused greatest consternation. 
The large gathering that Solomon summoned in early 1916 
ostensibly to hold a hunt, amplified this consternation to 
hysteria. In fact, Solomon had called the gathering for 
the purpose of enrolling the first ibutho of his 'reign', and 
since it was a practice expressly forbidden by the NAD, he had 
requested permission merely for a hunt (the inqina was an 
integral part of the ukubuthwa or enrolment ceremony) in the 
hope of screening his real intentions. Although permission 
was refused, Solomon went ahead with arrangements for the 
26 
event. Invitations were issued to the districts of 
Mahlabatini, Nongoma, Vryheid and Ngotshe,to gather at Solomon's 
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Sikalenisenyoka homestead. Following the pattern that 
had already been established, NAD officials scrambled to 
countermand Solomon's 'invitations', making particular 
efforts to prevent members of the wards of Chiefs Moya, 
. . f d' 27 Mpikanina, Muzimubi and Mc~tek~ rom atten ~ng. 
Solomon's attempt to screen his activities were near futile, 
given the NAD's and Defence Force's network of 'intelligence 
messengers' in the countryside. When it was reported that 
numbers of young men were gathering at the Sikalenisenyoka 
homestead in January 1916, a police patrol was sent to 
investigate. It discovered about 200 Zulu "giyaing" (ukugiya -
to perform competitive and demonstrative dancing displays) 
in front of Solomon. The conclusion that Solomon was 
in the process of forming a new "regiment" was confirmed by 
reports that the young men not only intended to join the 
hunt but to reap Solomon's fields - an important aspect of 
the activities of the ukubuthwa custom. The new ibutho 
was to be called the"Nqabakucetshwangabesizw~- "the-will-not 
-be-betrayed-by-foreigners".28 Although administrative 
intervention evidently prevented the inqina from taking 
place, Solomon did succeed in enrolling a new ibutho in 
. small 'batches' during January and February 1916 under the 
noses of the local officials. J. Y. Gibson, DNC of Zululand 
- one of the most calm of Zululand officials - identified 
the significance of the event for both the administration 
and for Solomon. As can only be expected, he expressed it 
from the point of view of the administration: 
A great deal of harm has been done. The act 
amounted to an exercise of authority over tribes 
in various parts of Zululand and the Vryheid 
District. It amounted to the exercise of 
superior authority over Chiefs in charge of 
these tribes. The response has amounted to 
a recognition of such authority. 29 
From Solomon's point of view, such traditional national 
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c~~nies were a central means of establishing his political 
pc.~. because the Zulu regarded his authority to summon 
LnCi~~duals to take part in them as legitimate. 
Ie essence, indirect rule is a method of overrule rather 
~~ ~ule - and depends on an element of consensus 
bE~.~~ rulers and the ruled. In order that the Zulu 
~~~~ t ake on a large part of the duties of their own 
a~~-~ stration, the NAD was required to incorporate into its 
ow-= £~ucture and administrative practice those leaders 
W=~ ~e Zulu perceived as leaders of particular social 
a=~ ~~ iitical standing. As events during the past two years 
L= ~~uland, Natal proper, the eastern Transvaal and 
J~~~esburg had emphasized, Solomon's social status and 
pc ~~~cal authority was widely recognized to be legitimate. 
SC ~~3 had no official position, and when he succeeded 
D~~ u he had had virtually no personal wealth. All the 
sc =~~ status and political authority he had now had been 
~~~~rily accorded him from below. That Solomon exercised 
~~ ~luence from a position that was outside the ranks 
0= ~ administration, and that he was not interested in 
cc==~ating with the administration precisely because it 
W~~ ~stile, were the root causes of the administrative 
b==;~~~wn. Gibson had in effect identified that the Zululand 
a :=- - - :: s tration was being undercut so long as Solomon was not 
i=~_?~rated into it. Gibson and Colenbrander , Magistrate 
0= 7_~~eid, were the only officials in the Zululand admin-
i£~~on, however, who had the capacity to speak of the 
Z~=- ::::-:)yal family in an unemotional and pragmatic manner. 
I:: -_~ Addison as CNC and .the magist r ates of Nongoma, 
~~==~tini, Emtonjaneni , and Nkandl a w~o . expressed the d ominant 
~2. -= - ~~AD views on the Zulu royal famil y . In 1916 they found 
~:~~~~l cause to do so since there was ev idence that the 
i~==. = = the 'hunt' was a front for something far larger . than 
ar:.. ~=-~ __ thwa ceremony and more directly threatening. 
Do==--== the 'hunt crisis', a rumou r in circulation held that 
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Africans as far afield as Basut.oland and Swaziland had been 
notified of the event, and that the intention was to "hunt 
down the Black Umfolosi LiiverJ and there they would meet 
the Germans who would hand Dinuzulu back to them". 
30 Such 
rumours gave those so inclined ample cause to reawaken vivid 
memories of the 1906 rebellion. In fact they were justified 
in doing so. In 1916, Zululand was indeed in a state of 
ferment and a rebellion was imminent. As in the case of 
Dinuzulu in 1906, there was no evidence in 1916 that Solomon 
had in some way associated himself with the prospect of a 
rebellion. However, the high incidence of rumours 
implicating the Zulu royal family in a 'plot' to liberate 
the Zulu from the yoke of white rule was not meaningless: 
it was a clear index to the existence of civil unrest as 
it had been in the months preceding the 1906 rebellion. I~ 
has already been demonstrated that socio-economic conditions 
among the Zulu in 1916 provided ample cause for civil unrest. 
It is significant that in January 1916, whilst Solomon 
was conducting the ukubuthwa ceremony, the CNC telegrammed 
magistrates in Zululand and Natal: 
Am informed that number telegrams sen~ from 
different places this Province by Natives 
recalling friends and relatives working 
Johannesburg and other Transvaal labour centres 
on pretext of illness or death in family. 
Please keep watch on exit and ingress Natives 
from and to your Division and report anything 
unusual. Also endeavour ascertain significance 
of such action. 31 
As Addison knew only too well, this pattern had existed 
immediately before and during the 1906 rebellion, when 
relatives were recalled from urban areas to assist in a rural 
32 
revolt. The Natal NAD's reaction to the rumours must be 
seen in the context of a real threat of rebellion. 
The situation was doubly alarming because the state's military 
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forces were distracted by the war effort and because of the 
threat of incitement on the part of 'Dutch' partisans. 
Indeed, the magistrate of Nkandla reported rumours that 
Germans at St Lucia Bay intended to "conquer this country 
and assist the Natives by restoring the Royal House of 
Zululand"; he believed that the Zulu royal family was 
plotting to restore the institution of kingship in Zululand, 
and were "being assisted by certain disloyal persons of 
Dutch descent in Babanango and Melmoth fl!:mtonjaneniJ districts". 32 
Whilst emphasizing the "gravity of the situation", he urged 
that the whole Zulu royal family "be deported to the Cape 
(not the Transkei) or the Free State, where they would be 
comparatively innocuous", and that an "Intelligence 
34 
Department" be created for Zululand. 
In a lengthy memorandum to the SNA on Solomon's activities, 
particularly in regard to the 'hunt', Addison did not mince 
words. 
Solomon ••. holds no responsible position under the 
Government, and I hope he never will. He is 
a menace to tfie peace of the country and it 
is time that measures were taken against him 
which will be sufficiently severe to have a 
salutory effect on his ideas and aspirations. 
He advocated "swift punishment", and particularly since he 
was vacating his office in the near future, he urged that this 
be dealt out by the highest possible authority: the Governor-
General as Supreme Chief. No criminal charge could be brought 
against Solomon, hence Addison recommended that the Governor-
General use his autocratic powers to inflict a "heavy fine" 
on Solomon and to detain him in Pretoria until it was paid. 35 
These were Addison's parting shots to the Zulu royal family. 
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The appointment of Wheelwright as Chief Native Commissioner 
(1916) and of Solomon as Chief of the Usuthu (1917) 
Wheelwright, Addison's replacement as CNC, in effect 
dismissed the whole 'hunt' affair by me~ely reprimanding 
Solomon and emphasizing that he should ensure he had 
authority for holding meetings in the future. In his final 
judgement, in fact, he told the SNA that Solomon "might 
reasonably" have been inadequately informed of the result 
of his initial application for a large hunt, and he 
apportioned some blame on the magistrate of Mahlabatini for 
h ' 36 t 1S reason. 
As soon after his appointment as possible, Wheelwright 
summoned a huge meeting at the Nongoma magistrate's office. 
The Acting DNC for Zululand and the magistrates at Nongoma, 
Mah l abatini, Vryheid and Ngotshe, attended/together with 
most of . the chiefs in these districts, and Solomon. 
Despite the NAD's attempts to restrict the number of 
'commoners' who attended, some three hundred or more 
congregated outside the magistrate's office. 37 
The whole spirit in which the new CNC approached the meeting 
contrasted with the pedagogic and r~pressive approach of 
his predecessor. He carefully explained the governmental 
changes that the declaration of Union had brought about: 
Zululand was now an "integral part of the Union" which had 
one government, the administrative centre being in Pretoria 
and the legislative centre being in Cape Town - apparently 
this had not been done before. Having reprimanded Solomon 
for attempting to hold a hunt after it had been refused, 
the CNC assured the chiefs whose authority had been overridden 
by Solomon's calling the hunt/that they had the support .of 
the government. His address then broke into two sections: 
firs t he read the 'message of the government' and second he 
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gave his personal views. 
The message of the government, as read by the CNC, expressed 
"the Government's displeasure at the attitude LSolomo~7 
was assuming", and warned that it had the power to keep 
him out of harm's way ••• if his conduct does not shew 
improvement". It also stressed that "the Government has 
not at any time recognised Solomon as chief": "the question 
of his relations with the Government must depend on the 
manner in which he behaves himself.,,38 Despite the CNC~s 
claim, the message was patently not the precise words of 
the government. The CNC had expressed the message in a 
way to emphasize that General Botha was at the head of the 
Union Government, and that he, the CNC, was BothA's induna 
over the Zulu people. The message had begun: "General Botha 
directs that you [the CN~ •.• " These subtleties of approach 
were a consistent feature of the address. 
Similarly, the CNC's personal address set out to appeal 
to his audience's sense of reason - in a most revealing way 
- to persuade them that Solomon's activities were inappropriate 
and dangerous. It was no longer necessary for the Zulu to 
form 'regiments', he said, because the government was 
prepared to keep the peace, and moreover, because the "whole 
aspect"of Zululand had changed. 
We now have railways, mines, sugar industries 
and numerous other indications of a different 
aspect which formerly did not exist .•. The object 
of the people today is to attend to work and to 
peaceful methods of living. They have to earn 
money to pay taxes, to buy clothing, to feed 
themselves •••. And yet in the same breath we hear 
of the formation of a new regiment by Solomon. 
Who is this regiment to be used against? What 
is its purpose? 
He concluded by reminding the present generation that the Zulu 
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39 
had been defeated at the zenith of their power. 
As the CNC wrote in his personal report of the meeting, 
Solomon and all chiefs present "expressed their gratitude 
at the manner in which the Government had seen fit to treat 
this matter". He was also correct in identifying that "there 
was a pretty general feeling of sympathy on the part of 
. 40 
all the Chlefs present towards Solomon". 
Solomon initially tried to deny that his invitations to the 
'hunt' had been as widespread as the NAD alleged. As regards 
the 'regiment', Solomon stated that he had formed one, 
but not with the object of war: "I was just gathering the 
men together". The statements of various chiefs expressed 
thanks tofue CNC for the warning he had given to Solomon. 
As Headman Nkunzi of Nongoma put it, "when we slip the 
Government assists us and picks us up. fSolomonJ has slipped 
and the Government today picks him up." Several attributed 
the 'lapse' to the fact that "he has no elders to advis~ 
himll. An aside on the gradual healing of the rift between 
the Usuthu and MandJakazi is reflected in these statements: 
l'-1nyaiza stated that neither Mciteki nor "those who had been 
placed under him by the Government" had been called to the 
hunt, but, as Mciteki related, "My people armed and went to 
41 the hunt and I was very angryll. Part of the alarm that 
had surrounded the whole affair was because it had been 
suspected that Solomon's intention was to gather an impi 
(military force, comprising amabutho) to attack the 
Mandlakazi. The undignified and groundless fears of both 
Mciteki and the Natal NAD in the face of Solomon's power are 
celebrated in Solomon's izibongo. 
Tree-fern that overcame the judges at Nongoma 
On the day the Royal One made them sit on one log 
Like hadadaws contending for worms. 
Starer whose eyes are red, 
Who looks at a person as if he is angry, 
Looking at the authorities in Nongoma, 
The buttocks of the authorities trembled. 
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The Royal One armed as he betook himself to the forest 
And the bowels of the judges were excited; 
Mciteki's became excited, 
He was born of Zibhebhu, 
Whereas the Royal One 
Had quarrelled with no-one, 
He was going to hunt the game 
On the hill where the lion lived, 
Even the weather feared the storm. 
Black darkness of Phung a and Mageba 
which was seen by Mthusheyana who said "The Royal One 
is making an attack!" 
Whereas he was merely going to hunt game. 42 
For the NAD, the public conclusion of the 'hunt' saga was 
by no means the end of the 'Solomon question'. The hunt, 
indeed, had thrown into relief many of the aspects of the 
more general problem. It had been associated with the 
rumours of imminent revolt. It had revealed the influence 
that Solomon had over even those Zulu who lived in distant 
districts and under chiefs unsympathetic to the royal cause, 
and the potential havoc that Solomon could wreak on the 
administration of Zululand and Northern Natal. Moreover, 
it had shown how little control the NAD could exert over 
Solomon, precisely because he was shunned by the NAD. 
All these issues confronted Wheelwright when he assumed office 
in March 1916. From the first week of his period of duty 
he was concerned with two aspects of the 'Solomon question'. 
First, to provide for Solomon a domicile more permanent 
and secure than the present Zibindini which fell on whi te-
owned land: Wheelwright wanted to stop him 'wandering' about 
the country as if he had no home. Second, to officially 
define Solomon's'status' within the structure of indirect rule 
in Natal. In both these endeavours he had been prompted 
by Solomon himself. In a letter carefully timed to arrive 
on the CNC's desk precisely when the CNC assumed duty, Solomon 
• 
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made two requests. He noted that as Dinuzulu and all his 
ancestors had been chiefs and kings of the Zulu, he had 
hoped he would also be so. He had thus far been disappointed 
but now wished to be "relieved of the suspense" and be 
informed if he can hope for a chieftainship. Second, he 
requested that the land on which Nobamba and Zibindini lay, 
presently white-owned, be given to himself and his people 
as it was their "old home" and where their kings were 
b . d 43 ur~e • 
It is important to realise that the CNC's negotiations with 
the SNA to find a solution to these 'problems' were conducted 
against a background of increasingly alarming rumours. By 
mid 1916, now six months after the ukubuthwa ceremony, it 
was being put about that Solomon was in league with the 
Germans and that the Zulu would not begin to hoe before the 
Germans arrived to liberate them. Two Zulu, who were eventually 
arrested, were touring the country saying that they had 
come from the Great Person /Solomoq/ to tell all 
the Chiefs in the Land that seeing the English 
were being defeated by the Germans ••• , that 
the men of the Zulus were to be on the watch, 
and have their arms ready.44 
Significantly, one of the Zulu constables sent out to locate 
the sources of such rumours reported difficulty in finding 
places to stay in Zululand during this search. "What are 
you going to eat, you of Government people", he had been 
asked.
45 h' f h . T e mag~strate 0 Ngots e sim~larly reported that 
the inhabitants of his district had been informed that 
Solomon wished "all chiefs and people to sleep on their 
assegies [SicJ, as something extraordinary is expected to 
46 
happen soon". And a Zulu reported that in mid 1916 in 
the eastern '~ransvaal, on the border of Northern Natal, a 
large meeting had been convened by a "white Africanders 
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Secret Society". Local chiefs had been urged not to supply 
recruits for the government's 'Native Labour Battalion' 
(for non-combatant service in Europe) because they would 
be used against Dinuzulu who was "now acting in Germany 
. . . h G ,,47 D' t to free his land agalnst the Brltls overnment lrec 
attempts were made to persuade Solomon to inspire a 
rebellion. In early 1917, Solomon received a letter from 
one Ben t-1achemula of Rosebank, Transvaal, which read as 
follows: 
Dear Nkosi of the Zulus, 
We, your people, are still well. Well, Zulu, 
we ask what you say about the matter of the 
English. All the Chiefs are uniting the people 
in order that we might fight the English. The 
Chief of the Pondos has consented, as also 
three Chiefs of the Basutus •••• I am a Shangane 
from Louis Trichardt ••• the Chiefs have sent 
people to me in order that I might unite the 
people here at Johannesburg. Well, I have 
been to speak to the labourers at Lyndhurst 
and Alexandra Township; some have consented, 
but they look to you ••• 
If we rise against the white people now we 
shall triumph over them, because the Germans too 
are drowning them in the water. We shall begin 
on them in June. You too rise and fight, because 
they killed Dinuzulu. It would be well that you 
send men to speak with our Chiefs to agree on 
a day to start the impi LWa~. 
We do not want to pay taxes; even if we pay 
this year, we shall not do so the coming one •••. 
Reply to me father ••.. 48 
Developments of this nature emphasized to the NAD the need to 
accommodate Solomon in some way. 
Wheelwright paid little attention to the rumours of revolt 
that so exercized local officials. His prime concern was 
with the administrative aspects of the 'Solomon problem', and 
he felt that the priority was to provide Solomon with a 
'suitable' domicile. Soon after his appointment, Wheelwright 
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noted that whilst the Usuthy were administratively divided, 
Solomon's continual movements between his private lands 
near Babanango and his late father's homesteads in Zululand 
reserve lands placed the appointed chiefs in an "invidious 
position". "Solomon and his adherents continue to intrigue 
against the tribal authority of such chiefs. On one hand, 
they have a duty to perform towards the Government and on 
the other they are faced with a strong sentimental and 
actual opposition in Solomon's favour ••.• " The solution 
that the new CNC proposed was the purchase for Solomon and 
his relatives of the Zulu ancestral lands on which the royal 
graves lay,near Babanango. The corollary was that this would 
"do away with the late Dinuzulu's kraals in Zululand" and 
so remove "the necessity of Solomon's constant visits to 
that place."49 His object was simply to remove Solomon 
from the Zululand reserves. The only problem he foresaw 
was that Solomon and his advisers would not accept the 
arrangements. Wheelwright's proposed solution was reportedly 
received by Botha with some favour, but the SNA, Edward 
Dower, whose knowledge of the Zululand situation had been 
gained under Addison's tutelage, foresaw complications. 
The SNA argued that the funds used to buy "the sacred lands" 
would have to be repaid (Solomon was officially no more than 
a private individual) and the national collections Solomon 
would undoubtedly arrange to enable him to do so would 
give the impression that he had government support. The 
real difficulty with Solomon, he realised, was that "he is 
not formally recognized in any position and we have no hold 
over him".50 
Directly after the public meeting at Nongoma to lay the issue 
of the 'hunt' at rest, the CNC had held a private discussion 
with Solomon which he emphasized was strictly confidential _ 
a condition which Solomon thoroughly appreciated. Here he 
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tentatively outlined his proposal to Solomon, to which Solomon 
"unhesitatingly replied that such a course of action would 
be most unacceptable". The CNC remarked later that he 
"never contemplated that he LsolomoQ1 would willingly be 
prepared to abandon the kraals in Zululand Proper, which 
form such a convenient stepping stone to his aspirations 
to become the Paramount Chief of the Zulus".51 
The discussion had also turned to the issue of Solomon's 
official status. The CNC made a serious appeal to Solomon 
I 
to "patiently await the time when the Government could 
consider his application for the definition of his status". 
Although Solomon's demeanour was impeccable, the CNC observed: 
He kept repeating "I do not ask these people 
to follow me and to show me any sort of respect; 
wherever I go they recognize me as the rep-
resentative of the Zulu House, and accord me the 
respect due thereto". He kept impressing on 
me thatfSuch devotio~ was gratuitously given 
on the part of the Natives. 
This the CNC believed to be true. He concluded by arguing that ' 
There is no room for doubt in my mind that at 
some very early and convenient date action of 
a definite nature must be taken to establish 
the man's status once and for all. At the 
present time he is engaged in attempting 
to build up his status as a leader of the 
Zulu people .•. selecting as his advisers only 
those who would be suitable to the furtherance 
of his scheme. I do not hope for a moment that 
the best of us will ever be able,or at any rate 
for a very considerable space of time, to 
eliminate the inherent sentiment and attachment 
to the Zulu House and to Solomon as its direct 
representative ... so that Solomon, whether he 
looks for it or not, has the very ready sympathy 
of a considerable body of people.52 
Despite the priority that both the CNC and the SNA gave to the 
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resolution of the 'Solomon question', for eight months no 
action was taken. Instead there followed lengthy correspondence 
and a number of official discussions in which clarity of 
administrative vision was blurred by a marked reluctance 
to make a commitment to any particular course of action, 
and an equally marked preoccupation with any red tape that 
could possibly pose ~mpediments. These were consistent 
characteristics of the NAD which often were to forestall 
substantial administrative change~ Indeed, the inertia 
and obstinacy of the Natal NAD officials also were to 
frustrate the implementation in Natal of wide-ranging changes 
in 'Native policy' that were being advocated at the national 
level by members of the Union Government.
53 
Dur i ng this period, Solomon constantly pressed the CNC for 
a formal interview. 54 After a delay of over three months from 
Solomon's first application, an interview eventually took 
place. Solomon did not pursue the matter of his status, 
but concentrated on the matter of his domicile. He requested 
first, a "permanent domicile", and, second, relief from tax 
due on the huts of his father's dependants. Mnyaiza, who had 
accompanied Solomon, added a request that Solomon be permitted 
to re-establish the Osuthu royal kraal to the west of Nongoma. 
The CNC supported Solomon's requests, particularly the first. 
But he strongly disapproved of Mnyaiza's suggestion: he was 
determined that it should be the NAD and not the Zulu royal 
family which specified the location of Solomon's domicile. 55 
The CNC's subsequent discussion of these issues with the SNA 
were inconclusive. Nearly a month later, he wrote to the 
SNA reiterating the urgency of the problem and his proposed 
solution - and went so far as to name Buys' 'Koningsdal' and 
Potgieter's 'Welgekozen' as the farms the government should 
buy for Solomon. The Usuthu, he reported, presently referred 
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to Solomon as the "government's orphan ••• a wanderer and 
uncared for ••• " He rather cleverly turned the argument 
that _the SNA had used so that it now supported his proposal: 
if the government did not buy the land for Solomon, Solomon 
would conduct collections and buy the sacred grounds for 
himself, and so build up his status as a national leader. 
Another advantage of the proposal, he argued, was that it 
would remove the "magnet to which will be attracted those 
who still desire to render LSolomo~ personal fealty as the 
representative of the old Zulu regime" from the Zululand 
reserves. Despite the forceful way in which Wheelwright 
argued his case, in the last instance he was still inclined 
to dither: almost as an afterthought he observed that the 
government could lose Zulu goodwill if it insisted that 
Solomon abandon all royal homesteads in Zululand. Perhaps, 
then, "for the time being", he should be allowed to retain 
the latter. 57 Wheelwright's argument had always stressed 
the desirability of removing Solomon from the Zululand 
reserves and confining his influence to a circumscribed 
area; his final suggestion thus destroyed the whole force 
of his argument. 
Solomon was unaware of the mental exertions he was causing 
within the NAD, and could only assume that the polite 
requests he had made by letters or at the meeting with 
Wheelwright were having no effect. Be now adopte-d a different 
strategy, making use of the opportunity provided by the 
government's decision to recruit a 'Native Labour Battalion' 
(or 'Contingent' or 'Corps') for non-combatant service against 
the German forces in Europe. 
The issue of 'Solomon and the Natal Native Labour Battalion' 
is important in many respects. It throws light on 
relationships between Solomon and his petty bourgeois advisers 
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or courtiers, Solomon and the Zulu rank-and-file, Solomon end 
the 1"AD, the NAD and the Prime Minister, the NAD and white 
Natal, and white Natal and the African population. Moreover, 
it was the issue that precipitated the government's reco~­
nition of Solomon as chief over a reunited Usuthu. 
Botha was both the initiator and the driving force behind 
the Native Labour Battalion scheme. Natal whites slated 
the prospect of the Zulu assisting the war effort as soon 
as the scheme was publicised in September 1916. They were 
fearful that Zulu expp.rience of the war situation in Europe 
would stir Zulu militarism at horne, but more so did they 
fear that the social experiences of the recruits overseas 
would upset the delicate balance of social relationships 
in Natal. A correspondent signing himself "A Colonial in 
Zululand" wrote to the Natal Mercury, for example, predicting 
that expressions of appreciation for African assistance 
would arouse in the recruits certain feelings of equality 
with the white man. "The respect for the white man would 
go .••. We have too much of this sort of thing today."S8 The 
scheme also aroused far more complex fears - fears which 
revealed that the sexual monopoly of white males over white 
females was related to the social dominance of white over 
black. "An abominable danger", wrote one Natal colonist in 
the same issue of the Natal Mercury, was being placed in 
"the path of the women of France .•• at the hands of these 
male brutes .•.• It is no party question but one of race ..•• " 
He predicted "the pollution of our race and unthinkable 
horrors when those natives return".59 The 'abominable danger', 
however, was not Zulu male lust; on the contrary, it was 
that white women in Europe did not know the social code of 
white settler society in Natal. 60 The editor of the Natal 
Mercury concluded that "the balance of authoritative opinion 
in Natal •.. is not favourable to the Native Contingent scheme".6l 
These sentiments were yet more stridently expressed outside 
III 
Natal - particularly by representatives of Hertzog's National 
Party. It fell to Botha to emphasize that all recruits 
were to be strictly confined to compounds whilst in Europe, 
and that they were categorically never to take up a combatant 
role. 62 
In Natal, immediately the scheme was publicized, Wheelwright 
received a telegram from Seme stating that he and Solomon 
wished to discuss the prospect of Zulus "helping the Empire".63 
Regarding this as yet another of Solomon's ploys to elevate 
his status, the CNC replied that he had no intention of 
discussing the matter with Solomon, but was prepared to 
discuss it privately with seme. 64 In fact the evidence 
suggests that Seme had acted independently and that Solomon 
had no intention of serving a government that would not 
accommodate him. It was a consistent characteristic of 
Solomon's petty bourgeois advisers that they counselled 
restraint, 'doing the right thing', and cooperation with the 
government when trying to win political advantage. Seme 
was undoubtedly concerned that Solomon's image in the eyes 
of the NAD had been tarnished by rumours of revolt and the 
saga of the 'hunt' - he thus pleaded that the CNC allow 
Solomon the "opportunity of justifying his verbal assurances 
of loyalty to the Government".65 For Dube, too, there was 
no question of how Solomon should respond in this matter. 
He published an emotional plea in Ilanga Lase Natal: "Arise 
ye Zulus", he urged, "Don't bring shame over us."66 
Individuals like Seme and Dube were often to claim to speak 
for Solomon when they had no authority to do so. Although 
the strategy of hamba kahle politics67 (literall~ 'go 
carefully') deeply influenced Solomon - and largely accorded 
with his own personality - the political face adopted by Solomon 
and his tribal advisers (who were not products of mission 
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education) tended to have its own unique characteristics. 
While on the one -handuthey -were inclined to adopt a 
posture of utmost subjection, describing their relationship 
with state authorities in images of master and dog or father 
and child, on the other hand they were on occasion inclined 
to be more blunt than the niceties of the hamba kahle 
posture would allow. 
In the matter of recruitment for the Native Labour Battalion, 
Solomon was quite bluntly not prepared to lend the government 
his unconditional assistance. He was, however, prepared 
to playa delicate political manoeuvre: he would only use 
his influence to assist the government under conditions 
that would serve his own political aspirations. By recruiting 
zulu for the Native Labour Battalion he could demonstrate 
to the zulu people that he was their paramount head, and 
emphasize to the NAD that if it wanted anything from the 
zulu it would have to work through him. Until such time 
as he could recruit under conditions that suited him, 
Solomon would use his influence to prevent recruits from 
enlisting. From the time that Seme announced to the CNC 
that Solomon wished to 'help the Empire', nearly three 
months of unsuccessful pleading for recruits passed before 
the CNC realized that Solomon's stance was not merely 
inconsistent and irresolute - which had been his own and 
cer t ain Zululand officials' conclusion so far. 68 
Immediately after the discussion between Seme and the CNC 
in August, the CNC instructed the magistrate of Mahlabatini, 
in whose district Solomon was at the time, to "get in touch 
with Solomon and to use him as far as he £the magistrateJ 
considered advisable and necessary". 69 It was precisely 
this sort of attitude that Solomon rejected. Thus,as the 
magistrate's report of the meeting related, Solomon "blew 
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hot and cold", ~hanged his mind frequently, and was evidently 
not willing to assist in recruitment. 70 Maphelu reported 
that Solomon had informed the magistrate that the "Government 
knows well that I don't rule anyone. . If I had people I 
71 
would let them go to help the Government". Subsequently 
the NAD called a large meeting of Zulu at Mahashini in the 
presence of Solomon. Maphelu observed that "officials had 
been asking him ~olomonJ to answer in connection with this 
matter frecruitmentJ. They did not care about the fact 
he was not officially installed". The officials provided 
many cattle to feed the gathering. Solomon then addressed 
the people and stated that it would be better to assist the 
war in Europe now and so prevent it from coming to Zululand. 
The officials then pleaded for recruits. Not one came 
forward - and moreover the 
that had been provided for 
This was a real affront to 
Zulu refused to touch the meat 
II. " 72 them. They Just walked away. 
the NAD, and it is apparent 
that instructions had been issued to the zulu by Solomon 
prior to the gathering that no-one should enlist. 73 
Meanwhile the Natal NAD was becoming increasingly embarrassed 
that of all the provinces in the Union the response of Natal 
74 and Zululand to recruitment had been the poorest. The 
failure of the Natal NAD to gain recruits did not reflect 
well on the administration either in the eyes of the white 
public or at NAD head office. 75 The Natal NAD thus put 
great effort into the recruitment campaign. It sent Mnyaiza 
to Cape Town for example, so that he could personally report 
back to the Zulu about the conditions on troopships.76 
And NAD head office appealed to the Zulu land Diocese of the 
CPSA for assistance.
77 
The desperation of those who were 
identified with the Natal NAD is illustrated in the poem 
that R.C.A. Samuelson composed in Zulu to urge the Zulu 
to enlist, of which a few extracts give the tone: 
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Forward! Forward: Forward! 
Bayede, King George, Where is he? 
The Black House of Zulu, Where is it? 
You greet those of Zulu, but what has become of them? 
Useless braggarts, loafers, self-seekers and the worthles 
The rallying call of Bayede, King George, 
Has reached all parts of the world seen by the sun 
All have responded, 
But the Zulus and Natal remain. 
Answer an urgent call, 
Manhood of Zulu and Natal, 
That disgrace may not befall you, 
You scions of a Black Race 
The sons of Malandela's Zulus were wont to declare: 
"AwO! AWo! Awo!" 
"The king's cattle are with the Basutos" 
(In the hands of the enemy demanding recovery). 
We should now also declare: 
"The Germans, the filth of the earth." 
"Destroy them." 
This is for you, our warring men! 78 
Bayede , King George is calling you. 
Solomon was in the meantime getting on with his own 
affairs. When, however, he applied for a permit to visit 
the Transvaal shortly after obstructing the magistrate of 
Mahlabatini's attempts to recruit Zulu, the SNA refused: 
Solomon could better employ himself assisting recruitment 
h · "b' d' . h'" 79 t an gOlng on a egglng expe ltlon to t e mlnes. In 
early September, Seme once more contacted the CNC. Solomon 
now wished to call a meeting of Zulu chiefs at Nobamba to 
prevail on them to cooperate, Seme said, and added - as the 
CNC related to the SNA - that this"would be the only way" 
of getting Zulu recruits. It was at this stage that the 
CNC realized the intricacies of Solomon's stance. Although 
Solomon's request had not been formally submitted, Wheelwright 
immediately wrote at length to the SNA stating that "the 
failure to recruit Natives from the Zulus has been largely, 
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if not entirely, due to the scheme and influence of 
Solomon", and demanding an immediate resolution of the whole 
'Solomon problem'. Realizing by now that the SNA was hardly 
inclined to take action, Wheelwright suggested that his 
letter be referred to General Botha "so that he may see our 
. . ,,80 
posltlon • 
A few days later, Solomon's official request to convene a 
meeting of chiefs came through and was transferred to the 
SNA. The SNA immediately telegrammed the CNC as follows: 
the prime minister regarded it as a matter of duty that the 
Zulu should respond to the king's call for overseas service, 
that the zulu should remove the reproach of being the most 
uncooperative of "all South African tribes", but that "any 
assistance rendered by Solomon ••• in inducing Zulus to view 
matter in right light .•• will naturally be placed to his 
credit". The telegram continued, "Government is quite 
unprepared to treat with him LSolomonl on the basis of a 
bargain".8l 
For Solomon, to provide immediate assistance for a possible 
future reward was to put the cart before the horse. In 
contrast to the SNA, the CNC realized that the NAD was now 
not in a position to prescribe 'rules' of diplomacy to 
Solomon - it had to bargain. The CNC's memorandum to the 
SNA, which had now been referred to Botha, analysed the 
situation pragmatically and with clinical clarity. 
The more one sees of it the more one realises 
the influence LSolomoqj possesses .•. over the 
people. To permit him to hold such a meeting 
and to conduct recruiting would without doubt 
be a recognition of the position of Solomon as 
the head of the Zulus. I believe he would get 
the Natives required, but he has undoubtedly chosen 
the opportunity - which is that of a lifetime -
to try and reestablish himself. We cannot get 
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away from the fact of his influence - it is 
unquestionably there. The question is, is it 
to be harnessed or is it to be left? To employ 
him on a mission of the kind suggested would 
have far-reaching effects - it would, in a 
measure, disturb the influence of many of the 
Chiefs and tribes in Zululand more especially 
the loyal Mandhlakazi [Sis! section, and would 
build up his hopes and aspirations to become 
the paramount head of the Zulus •••• lt might be 
worth risking a good deal ••. at the risk of the 
influences mentioned.82 
The last sentence is of particular importance. 
Within a matter of weeks, Solomon, Mnyaiza and other royal 
advisers were summoned to Pretoria to appear before General 
Botha and the SNA, the Under SNA, and the CNC. Solomon and 
his advisers had no idea why they were being summoned, and 
were apprehensive about it. 83 Botha had taken the initiative. 
At the meeting, in November 1916, Botha announced that 
Solomon was to be recognised as a chief, his ward would be the 
reunited Usuthu people, and his domicile would be in the 
Nongoma district. 
Overall, the emphasis of Botha's address was that Solomon 
was now a servant of the government. Botha instructed Solomon 
that he must go back to Zululand with the purpose of serving 
the NAD and the zulu people. He was to be a chief over the 
Usuthu only, and was to abide by his local magistrate "no 
matter what orders he may give you". He was not to raise 
'regiments', but was to maintain the peace, especially with 
the Mandlakazi and Ngenetsheni. If he did anything wrong 
he would be removed from Zululand without hesitation, but 
if Solomon behaved correctly Botha hinted that Solomon's status 
would be officially elevated. Botha particularly emphasized 
two points. First, the government stipend of £300 per annum 
which he was now to receive "will make you an official .... I 
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am going to make use of you in Zululand. I will watch with 
open eyes and see ••• what influence goes out from your 
kraal". Second, he broached the subject of education. It 
was the government's intention to place a school nearby 
Solomon's new domicile, and "when the school is started, 
I want you to take a personal interest in it and so stimulate 
the Zulu people to take an interest in it". 
Solomon was effusive in his thanks and expressed these in 
deferential fashion. "I am your child", he said. "You have 
. h . d . ,,84 treated me Wlt the greatest conSl eratl0n. 
The significance of Solomon's appointment 
The action taken by Botha, strongly encouraged by Wheelwright, 
was a real attempt to cure the administrative problem. All 
actions previously taken by the NAD had been merely to dispense 
relief to their ailing administration. The funeral ceremony, 
the ihlambo, the ukubuthwa, the rumours of rebellion and 
Solomon's constant disruptive 'wanderings' about the country 
had brought Solomon and the NAD into continual conflict in 
an indirect way. In the first instance, in these cases, 
the problem had lain in the relationship between Solomon 
and the zulu people, thereafter in the relationship between 
the Zulu people and the Natal NAD, and only then in the 
relationship between the Natal NAD and Solomon. The role of 
Solomon in the Natal NAD's attempts to recruit for the Native 
Labour Battalion, however, had brought the Natal NAD and 
Solomon to a direct confrontation for the first time. The 
Natal NAD had attempted to employ the influence of Solomon 
in Zululand for their own ends; and Solomon had shown that 
not only was he not prepared to cooperate but that he was 
prepared to use his influence to frustrate its objectives. 
In this confrontation, Solomon emerged as the unconditional 
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victor. There were horrified comments in Natal newspapers 
that the NAD had committed the blunder of appointing Solomon 
as a chief to enable it to commit the blunder of sending 
zulu to Europe. But this was not so. The NAD had far 
broader administrative objectives in mind. In fact, no 
att~mpt was made to use Solomon to enlist Zulu for the 
, f h' , trn t 85 Native Labour Battal10n a ter 1S appo1n en. 
The recognition of Solomon as chief of the Usuthu was a 
significant reversal of past Natal policy of 'divide and 
rule'. No longer were the Usuthu parcelled out into the 
wards of four separate chiefs: they were recognized to be 
a coherent group and their hereditary head was recognized 
as their chief. The administration had in effect been forced 
to take this action. The Natal NAD as a whole - including 
Wheelwright - still strongly adhered to the notion that 
'divide and rule' was the prescription for administrative 
success, and most especially in the case of the Zulu royal 
family. However, the return of the Zulu royal family to 
Zulu land had made this notion unworkable in practice. Solomon 
had attracted widespread loyalty and moreover the enmity that 
had existed between his father and the Mandlakazi and 
Ngenetsheni sections - enmity that had previously been 'grist 
to the mill' of the local administration - was clearly ebbing. 
The recognition of Solomon was thus not the rash 'experiment' 
that some Natal newspapers held it to be, but was rather a 
rational response designed to bolster the administration's 
powers of control that were patently tenuous under existing 
arrangements. 
Solomon's recognition might not have occurred when it did, 
however, but for the more flexible and perceptive stance 
adopted by Wheelwright. In contrast to Addison, Wheelwright 
had consistently been tolerant of the Zulu royal family. This 
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was no doubt partly related to a difference in temperament -
Wheelwright was a far more fair and generous-minded 
person - but also had much to do with Wheelwright's clearer 
administrative vision. His attitude was again in evidence 
immediately after Solomon's recognition in the way in 
which he arranged for the government to intervene in 
Solomon's tenancy problems, and to settle the debts he had 
accrued in this matter.
86 
Furthermore, quietly and without 
fuss, Mankulumana was allowed to leave his place of exile 
at Ndulinde near Eshowe and reestablish himself in the Usuthu 
h 'd h' l' 87 heartland. T e government palls re ocatlon expenses. 
Despite Wheelwright's attitude, however, it took the swift 
and decisive action of an 'outsider' in the person of Botha 
to break departmental paralysis and implement the requisite 
dm " , f 88 a lnlstratlve re orm. 
Whilst relations between the Zulu royal family and the NAD 
at the beginning of 1916 were extremely sour, by the end of 
1916 they were extremely amicable. Two vital changes in 
NAD personnel were soon to improve relations even further. 
First, Mr Oswald Fynney was appointed as magistrate of Nongo~a 
- the district in which Solomon's new domicile, Mahashini, was 
situated. Whilst his predecessor, T. R. Bennet, had been 
particularly obstructive to the Zulu royal family, Fynney 
transpired to be a keen supporter of the royal cause - and 
on this account he was to have an unrestrained public 
showdown with the Natal NAD in the late 1920s. 89 Second, 
Dower left the office of the SNA in Pretoria and was replaced 
by personnel whose attitudes were not buraened by the events 
of 1914 to 1916. 
Relations between the Natal NAD and the Natal white public 
at the end of 1916, on the other hand, were anything but 
rosy. Natal newspapers disapproved of the secrecy in which 
the "unexpected and incomprehensible departure in Union 
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policy" had been carried out. Fears were expressed that 
solomon's appointment could unite the Zulu, and fears were 
also expressed that it could accentuate divisions within 
the Zulu. Whatever the details of their arguments, all 
commentators condemned the change and, in the rhetoric of 
the day, were "apprehensive of a recrudescence of native 
effervescence in zululand".90 The Natal Advertizer argued 
that Solomon would not in practice adhere to the conditions 
of his appointment. 
The Zulus will flock from every corner of 
Zululand to congratulate their new "king" 
and pay homage to him. Will Solomon turn them 
away? Certainly not! He will feel flattered 
•.•• And so the game will go on ••• the Usutp 
kraal will again become the centre of intrigue 
••.• The Usutu location? What is that? •• 
Zululand remains Zululand, and populated from 
end to end by Zulus, all of whom ••• are either 
avowed, or potential, Usutus. 91 
A public meeting held in Eshowe forwarded an "emphatic 
message" to the government that Solomon's appointment would 
"jeopardize the security of the country" and that the 
government should therefore cancel its action. The scheme 
was attributed to Wheelwright, and the NAD head office was 
held to have acted on his recommendations without even 
informing the Union cabinet or the 'older' and 'more 
experienced' officials in the Natal NAD. Prominence was 
given to the view that"Solomon was being promo~ed on account 
of his demerits than on account of his merits" - and it was 
said that Solomon's main 'demerit', in the eyes of the NAD, 
had been his refusal to assist the Native Labour Battalion 
scheme which was so unpopular in white Natal. 92 
Solomon need only raise his hand and every able-
bodied Zulu in the country will respond to the 
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call. Will it be worse for the Government to 
reveal its own impotence, by resorting to this 
means of getting the men? One should say, 
certainly not!93 
Similar sentiments were expressed in a lengthy article in 
the Natal Mercury by J. S. Marwick, now manager of the 
Durban Hunicipal Native Affairs Department. He too condemned 
the appointment as representative of government weakness.
94 
Those who held such views obviously preferred to believe 
the NAD to be capable of ruling in an authoritarian and 
heavy-handed manner and to have no cause to adapt to 
political realities. They thus misunderstood the basic 
tenet of indirect rule. 
Government policy was not deflected. At a meeting held at 
the Nkandla magistrate's office in January 1917, Solomon 
was publicly appointed to his new position by Lord Buxton, 
the Governor-General, in his capacity as Supreme Chief. 95 
The initiative did not stop there, however. Steps were taken 
to place Solomon in contact with influences which were 
thought to be desirable, and the cooperation of the CPSA 
was readily secured. 
After Dinuzulu's ihlambo ceremony, Harriette Colenso's 
position as a close white adviser to the royal house had 
rapidly fallen into abeyance. As she remarked in 1915, "I 
am getting almost too old for excursions into Zululand and 
such proceedings". Moreover, it was she who had previously 
occupied the position of 'missionary to the Zulu royal 
family'. In 1910 the passage of the Church Properties 
r 
Spoilation Act in effect forced her to retire from her 
missionary activities. Harriette and her sister, Agnes, 
were forced to vacate Bishopstowe (Bishop Colenso's mission 
station) since the Act removed it from the ownership of the 
Church of England - Harriette had lost the lay battle against 
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the CPSA's attempts to appropriate the property. This, 
coupled with her activities in defence of Dinuzulu during 
the 1908 treason trial, left her physically and financially 
exhausted. 96 
The Zululand Diocese of the CPSA was quick to fill the 
vacuum Harriette had reluctantly left. It had first 
established an outstation in the Isikwebezi valley near 
Nongoma, in 1898. Here work had begun among the Usuthu 
by Rev. F. W. Walters (also the local government medical 
officer) soon after Dinuzulu returned from St Helena - but 
Walters found himself"up against a stone wall" which he 
ascribed to the negative influence of Dinuzulu. After 
Dinuzulu's trial and exile to Kwar.hengisa, Walters found 
that his missionary work began to take effect. 97 Thus, at 
the time of Dinuzulu's death, the CPSA had an established 
base from which to bring its influence to bear on his heir 
- who, it seemed, was more sympathetic to Christianity than 
his father. After Solomon and David had been speedily 
confirmed by the Bishop of Zululand, Rev. David Ntombela 
took up work at St Phillips, the new outstation near 
Mahashini. 
In the same month as he confirmed Solomon, the Bishop wrote 
to the Minister of Native Affairs urging that the royal 
youngsters be placed at KwaMagwaza, the CPSA mission school 
near Melmoth, for their education. 98 His exertions were not 
rewarded during the period of Addison's administration: the 
Zulu people, the NAD informed him, did not want Solomon 
and David to be educated, and the royal youngsters were 
"content as they are".99 Judging by his views on Seme and 
Dube, Addison was not fond of educated African politicians, 
and in the light of his views on the Zulu royal family, he 
was hardly likely to support a project to educate its young 
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heir. 
By the end of 1916, the NAD attitude was reversed. The 
closer relationship that had been generated between the 
CPSA and the Zulu royal family laid the foundations for the 
cooperation between the NAD and the CPSA soon after Solomon's 
recognition. Both were keen to manipulate Solomon's 
influence. Thus the Bishop of Zululand was approached to 
"cooperate with the government and the CNC about the future 
of Solomon". Rev Oscroft was requested to move to Nongoma 
"to be near Solomon La~ a kind of European adviser to him", 
and also to consider the possibility of establishing a school 
, d""l U h h" " 100 Th d 1 t at Solomon s new omlCl e at fla as lnl. ese eve opmen s 
caused great excitement in the CPSA. "So much may come of this", 
enthused the Bishop, "that I think it best to say no more, 
but to wait for the guidance of God in the matter".lOl 
It was Wheelwright who put the 'education project' in motion 
and, in so doing, had the fullest support of Botha. Right 
from the outset it was clear that the proposed school was 
to be no ordinary school, but an experiment unique not only 
in Natal but the whole of South Africa. The Zulu land National 
Training Institution (commonly referred to as the ZNTI) was 
established specifically and exclusively for the benefit 
of the sons of Zulu chiefs and headmen. It was to offer 
an education designed to prepare its students for the tribal 
administrative tasks they were expected to take up. The 
CPSA knew exactly where the interests of the NAD lay in the 
matter, and took care to maintain NAD enthusiasm. At a 
meeting of the Diocesan Synod,Oscroft - proposed a motion 
urging the government to establish such an institution because 
chiefs "frequently fail through lack of knowledge and 
incompetence to carry out •.• the various duties they are called 
102 
upon to perform". The motion, which was carried 
unanimously, was merely one of encouragement, because Wheelwright, 
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Fynney and Oscroft had already been making concrete plans. 
During these early negotiations, an issue of some significance 
arose: the question of who should be Oscroft's employer 
and hence to whom Oscroft would be primarily responsible. 
Although the church in the early twentieth century was not the 
outspoken critic of state policy that it was to become later 
in the century, there were many points on which church and 
state differed in the matter of 'Native policy'. An example 
of their differences lay in the issue of 'Ethiopianism'. 
Whilst the NAD aimed to repress it at all costs after the 
1906 rebellion, the CPSA went so far as to support it. In 
1912, The Net argued that "at the bottom of what is called 
Ethiopianism ••• is this - the desire to have some voice in 
the management of their own affairs, not entirely to be 
the underdog," and to suppress it was "bad for future progress." 
The Net saw Ethi9pianism as a religious reflection of the 
emergence of 'progressive' secular aspirations: "As in State, 
so in Church, they wish to have a voice."104 This was 
precisely the reason why the state opposed it. Another area 
over which church and state differed was land dispensation. 
The CPSA held the same views as the president of the SANNC, 
John Dube. The Rev. Archdeacon Johnson of Zululand told the 
1917 Natal Local Land Committee that he was "thoroughly in 
sympathy with the Government in its scheme of segregation",105 
but when details of the proposed land delimitation came 
out, the CPSA felt that it was inequitable. 106 An article 
entitled "The Absorption of Zululand" published in The Net saw 
the delimitation as violating the two commandments "Thou 
shalt not steal" and "Though shal~ not covet".107 
Although the Bishop pronounced that "our one aim is to assist 
the Government" in the ZNTI scheme, the real feelings of the 
CPSA were expressed privately. On the occasions the Bishop's 
Council discussed the matter of Oscroft's payment, it 
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recommended that he "be paid chiefly by the Diocese, with 
Government assistance ••• and that he should not be a 
Government official" - despite its constant shortage 
of funds. 108 In practice, when Oscroft moved to Nongoma 
to take up his new work, it was the Government who pai,d 
his salary for his work as educator and adviser to the 
Zulu royal family.109 The ZNTI was to be a government and 
not a mission school. Oscroft was appointed principal of 
the ZNTI in August 1918 (although it only opened in 1920}, 
arid during his principalship the government repeatedly 
emphasized to Oscroft that he was a government servant first 
110 and foremost. In the cases of both Solomon and Oscroft, 
the NAD had coopted influential persons whose influence 
operated from a base outside its direct control. 
By the end of 1920, the construction of the ZNTI was complete. 
It was situated at Evuna (named after a nearby stream) some 
15 miles from Nongoma and in the ward of Chief Solomon. 
There was a house for the principal, a hostel, a school 
building, and tracts of arable .and grazing land for practical 
instruction in agriculture. lll It was aptly described as 
a "Civil Service College for Natives".112 It was purely 
a school for the tribal elite, and the education that sons 
of chiefs and headmen reBeived there was carefully designed 
to prepare them for the posts they were to hold under the 
system of indirect rule. When General Smuts visited the 
ZNTI in 1922, he pointed out to the students that "a people 
without leaders cannot possibly ever become a people, and 
to be good leaders whom the people will always follow you 
113 must keep ahead of your people". 
The Report of the NAD for the years 1919-1921 outlined the 
ZNTI's spheres of activity. ~he normal course was 3 years, 
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and it was expected that students would reach the 'book 
education' equivalent of Standard IV. But included in the 
academic course was instruction in jurisprudence (customary 
law) to prepare students for their juridical responsibilities. 
On the moral side, the "virtues of discipline, cleanliness, 
punctuality and loyalty" were inculcated. Great emphasis 
was placed on "industrial training", which included practical 
farming, irrigation, treeplanting and building - a European 
farm manager was added to the staff (Pri.ncipal and 3 African 
teachers) for this purpose.11 4 Out of an 8 hour school 
day, 6 were spent on working on the land, ploughing, planting, 
weeding, and harvesting, according to the season. Only 
2 hours a day were devoted to"the three Rs" and jurisprudence.
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The school, which was built to accomodate twenty-five 
students, gradually built up its attendance figures from ten 
in 1920 to thirty in 1922,and forty in 1924.
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The policy adopted by the government when it recognized 
Solomon, which included the ZNTI scheme, was a fundamental 
departure from established policy. The specific consequences 
and wider implications of this change in policy must now 
be considered. It is essential to locate these within the 
contexts of first, development within Union-wide African 
politics, and second, the development of Union 'native policy' 
in the period 1917 to 1920. Although these two contexts 
will be treated separately, they are mutually interdependent, 
as will become apparent. 
The Zulu royal family and African politics, 1917-1920 
From the NAD's point of view, the policy that it adopted 
towards Solomon from January 1917 was an unqualified success: 
the 'Solomon problem' simply ceased to exist. Until the early 
1920s, Solomon's activities are mentioned only sporadically 
in the official records. With the exception of Solomon's 
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interminable problems with his white landlords, there was 
no official correspondence on Solomon either important or 
voluminous enough for the CNC's clerk to justify establishing 
a separate file to contain it - whereas before 1917 there 
were a number of files dealing with different aspects of 
the 'Solomon problem' running concurrently. 
After his recognition, Solomon was primarily concerned 
with settling into his new domicile at Mahashini and his 
new duties as chief over the Usuthu. Although Solomon and 
his advisers clearly indicated that they felt the status of 
mere chief to be insufficient for Solomon, they expressed 
their feelings in a relatively innocuous manner and the Natal 
NAD did not become unduly alarmed. When the Governor-General 
held an indaba with the Zulu at Nkandla in July 1918, it 
was noticed that the Zulu saluted him with 'Nkosi' only 
- and, in his address, Mankulumana requested that the Governor-
General permit the zulu to publicly salute Solomon with 
'bayede 1 • 117 Solomon occasionally interfered with the 
jurisdiction of other chiefs, indicating that he regarded 
himself as de facto paramount chief. In early 1918, for 
example, he had occasion to reprimand a chief in the Eshowe 
district for actions he had taken (not specified in official 
correspondence). He was also in the habit of using a 
personalized rubber stamp on his correspondence which bore 
the legend "Inkosi Yamabandhla Onken ('King of all assemblies') 
beneath his nam~. This caused some consternation among 
officials and the white public. 118 Administrative action 
against him was almost nonchalant. When asked later what 
action he had taken against Solomon for these 'misdemeanours', 
Wheelwright replied that he had merely sent a message through 
Oscroft to Solomon "not to be a silly ass".119 
Solomon also emphasized his status in more concrete ways. 
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Most important" in 1918 he once more summoned young men 
to complete the ibutho enrolment that had not been completed 
in 1916 on account of administrative pressure. In fact, 
the ukubuthwa of 1918 was a complete ceremony in itself and 
was far larger and more organised than the ukubuthwa of 
1916. Although the ceremonies of 1916 and 1918 enrolled 
essentially the same ibutho (the time between enrolments 
was usually seven or eight years), those enrolled in 1918 
were given a slightly different name, Nqabakucasha ('the-
will-not-hide'), to distinguish them from those enrolled in 
1916, Nqabakucetshwa ('the-will-not-be-betrayed,).120 
The ukubuthwa of 1918 reveals how important such traditional 
ceremonies were in establishing Solomon's social and political 
status. As in 1916, Solomon sent messages to chiefs and 
izinduna, who in turn called large meetings in their districts 
to announce the news and make arrangements for the journey 
to Mahashini. All were instructed to congregate fully armed 
(sticks and shields) and in full traditional dress. On the 
journey to Mahashini, each man had a carrier - either a 
younger brother or cousin. When the groups of men from the 
various districts arrived at Mahashini, the umpati (organizer 
or controller) of each group handed them over to the direct 
1 f f S 1 , . . ' d 121 contro 0 one 0 0 omon s ~Zln una. 
Their initial work was to build temporary huts for their 
own accomodation during the ukubuthwa period. 
every day, they congregated in line formation 




instructions for the particular day's activities. Solomon's 
izinduna required the young conscripts to perform a variety 
of tasks, all of which focussed on the person of Solomon. 
For instance, they had to collect wood and repair the royal 
cattle kraal, they had to plough and sow Solomon's fields , 
and, most important, they were to construct a new royal 
homestead. The new homestead was named KwaDlamahlahla and became 
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tasks, there were routine daily activities. Each day songs 
and dances were performed in the royal cattle kraal 
usually with Solomon in attendance. Every time the 
conscripts approached the cattle kraal, and every time 
Solomon appeared or left, they gave the royal salute 
'bayede' on the signal of one of Solomon's izinduna. The 
young men were also given instruction on the necessity 
to observe customs and traditions, to maintain personal 
discipline, to abide by moral codes, to respect and honour 
elders and tribal authority, to work hard and to honour their 
responsibilities to their relatives.
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Thus, the importance 
of the ukubuthwa ceremony was not only to foster a sense 
of unity under Solomon, but also to inculcate in the conscripts 
a set of tribal attitudes of mind and codes of conduct. 
These were just as important a foundation of Solomon's 
political power as the sense of loyalty to Solomon personally 
that the ukubuthwa inspired. 
Surprisingly, there is no record of the CNC having been aware 
of the 1918 ukubuthwa. The possible reasons are twofold. 
First, Mahashini needed to be reconstructed as Solomon's 
new domicile and the new Usuthu administrative centre,which 
justified Solomon's having large numbers of'labourers' there. 
Second, the new magistrate of Nongoma, Fynney, had already 
established a personal friendship with Solomon and was 
unlikely to make reports that would land Solomon in trouble. 
Immediately after the ukubuthwa ceremony, Solomon opened the 
issue of lobolo cattle due on women who had been members of 
Cetshwayo's isigodlo 
his death - exactly 
made in 1913. This 
but who had been married subsequent to 
the same claims that Manzolwandle had 
action was to emphasize his claim to the 
status of Zulu king, and, at the same time, to build up the 
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wealth of the Zulu royal house. To this end, Solomon called 
a number of meetings in the Nongoma, Vryheid, Mahlabatini 
and Emtonjaneni districts between early 1919 and late 1920. 
In contrast to Manzolwandle's attempts, Solomon's right 
to claim lobolo cattle from the father's of Cetshwayo's 
isigodlo women was seen as legitimate. The response he 
received from the Mahlabatini district affirmed that 
"there are many cattle belonging to the King in the 
neighbourhood" and promised that "if they are required they 
will be produced".124 Chief Somkhele reportedly transferred 
sixty head of cattle to Solomon in settlement of the 
lobolo 'debts' claimed from him alone. 125 The magistrate 
of Nkandla described Solomon's activities as "a tyrannical 
practice" and urged action to be taken to prevent any further 
transfer of cattle. 126 The NAD, however, took no action 
other than to refuse Solomon government assistance in 
securing these lobolo cattle. 127 In contrast to Natal 
NAD policy prior to Solomon's appointment, the administration 
now seemed to take the attitude that Solomon could make 
whatever claims he wished on the Zulu people and it was up to 
the latter to accept or reject these claims. 
Although the NAD had denied Solomon a political constituency 
beyond the confines of the Usuthu ward, Solomon had by now 
established himself as the figurehead of the Zulu people. 
Solomon certainly had a keen sense of what image a Zulu 
king should present. He was naturally athletic and good 
1 k " 128 00 lng. Being a good horseman, he was in the habit of 
riding between his various homesteads in Zululand, clothed 
in military-style khaki and sporting a leopard skin sash (the 
symbol of royalty), with the royal dogs running beside him. 129 
Solomon's image as Zulu head was not confined to the tribal 
inhabitants of Zululand. He was also called upon to act 
as a figurehead for kholwa organisations which, whilst 
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being products of European educational and missionary endeavour, 
were anxious to establish their 'separateness' and 
independence from their mentors. These kholwa attempts 
to forge a new Africanist 'counter-culture' - of which the 
Ethiopianism of the previous decade had been an example -
reflected both disillusionment with the prospects for being 
accepted into white society as equals, and the development 
of a modernist black (or more particularly, Zulu) conscious~ess. 
In early 1919 Gardener Mvuyana, who had recently broken 
away from the American Mission in the Transvaal, established 
an independent church at Doornfontein. He requested Solomon 
to lay the foundation stone of the new church, which he wished 
to name the 'National Zulu Church'. The Bishop of Pretoria 
observed that Mvuyana was associated with "the young 
nationalist crowd of the Batho-Bantu LPANNCJ".130 The 
NAD made successful efforts to persuade Solomon to have 
nothing to do with the movement; since Solomon was at the 
time visiting the Transvaal labour compounds, the NAD passed 
its advice to Solomon through the medium of the Director 
of Native Labour in Jo~annesburg.131 
Solomon did not establish a clear political role in the 
context of 'new generation' African political movements -
whether petty bourgeois or worker - until the mid 1920s. 
But as early as 1920 there were signs that his role as 
'social head' was already proving incapable of papering over 
the new divisions that were developing within Zulu society. 
An atmosphere of unrest had grown in Zululand. This unrest 
was partly related to an attempt by David to exploit a 
new-found source of support to usurp Solomon's position. 
The undercurrents that lay beneath the unrest, however, 
we r e far more com? lex and reveal that i mportant new influences 
were at work within the realm of Zulu politics. The events 
in Zululand in 1920 are also significant in two other 
respects. First, the reaction of the Natal NAD reveals 
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that it was still prone to paranoia about the activities 
and influence of the Zulu royal family, and second, the 
fact that its alarmist outbursts in 1920 justifiably 
focussed on the person of David was in part a reflection 
of the success of the policy it had adopted towards 
Solomon since 1917. 
It is difficult to identify conclusively the social origins 
of the unrest of 1920 - partly because NAD officials 
themselves were at a loss to explain the events that were 
taking place beneath their noses. At face value, the cause 
of the unrest appeared to be David's attempts to usurp 
Solomon's position but NAD officials knew that there 
h h ·· 132 h . t d was muc more to t e sltuatlon. T e unrest was aSSOCla e 
with a number of strange rumours that were not related 
to - and even contradicted the existence of - the royal 
'sibling rivalry'. In 1906 and 1916, the existence of 
rumours that centred on the person of the Zulu 'king' -
whether Dinuzulu or Solomon - had in fact less to do with 
the Zulu 'king' than with a more generalized social ferment. 
On these occasions, the ferment was primarily related to the 
land and taxation policies of the state. In 1920, there 
is strong cause to believe that the unrest was related to the 
growth of African political militancy that found expression 
in the urban areas shortly after the first world war. 
Before and during the war years, the SANNC had adopted 
'moderate' and 'conciliatory' methods of protest, expressing 
itself primarily through evidence given to government 
commissions and select committees, and by sending petitions 
and deputations to various authorities. After the war there 
was a wave of 'direct action' and militancy in the form of 
civil disobedience campaigns and strike action. Although 
petty bourgeois individuals as a rule continued to provide 
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leadership for African protest, certain sections of the 
urban petty bourgeoisie became 'radicalized', as Bonner 
has argued, and began to appeal to the political constituency 
, 1 b'l" 133 of African urban workers wh~ch was current y mo ~ ~z~ng. 
The move towards militancy was reflected in changes in the 
personnel of the SANNC itself. Dube, who had not opposed 
territorial segregation in principle and who was committed 
to non-militant forms of protest, was ousted from the 
presidency in 1917 by Sam Makgatho of the Transvaal, who 
infused a more aggressive spirit into Congress activities. 
Inspired by Ghandi's passive resistance campaigns, the 
Johannesburg branch in 1918 organized a civil disobedience 
campaign against the pass laws. In 1919, the Bloemfontein 
branch held a successful wage strike. These actions were 
part of a broader movement among urban Africans towards 
militant industrial and political action, spearheaded by 
radical worker organizations. In 1918, there was the 
pioneering 'bucket strike' (sanitary workers) in Johannesburg, 
following the work of the International Socialist League 
among the African workforce. In 1919, the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) was formed in Cape Town, and 
in the same year led the dockworkers into strike action. In 
Natal, whic h of all the provinces had been least affected by 
these new developments, African workers on the coal fields 
strikedforhigher wages in 1919. 134 In 1920, the activities 
of the Port Elizabeth branch of the ICU culminated in a 
clash with police which resulted in 21 deaths - the first 
martyrs of the new strategies of African political protest. 
In February 1920, the wave of militant action was brought 
to a head by the combined activities of the International 
Socialist League and the SANNC: the Johannesburg gold fields 
were virtually brought to a standstill by a strike of 71,000 
of their African workforce (primarily to demand higher pay), 
which incidentally put 8,000 white miners out of work. l35 
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This was the largest and most effective instance of worker 
protest that South Africa's primary industry had yet 
experienced. 
The events of 1906 in Natal and Zululand and of 1916 in 
Zululand had demonstrated the close relationship that 
existed between the African rural and urban areas in times 
of civil disturbance. The contact and interchange between 
the two had been expressed in the messages sent from the 
rural areas calling migrant labourers home, and the migrant 
labourers who returned home on hearing news of civil disturbance 
in the rural areas. A few months after the major strike on the 
gold fields, a number of strange rumours associated with 
Dinuzulu, Solomon and David were reported in Zululand. The 
overwhelming majority of Zulu proceeding to Johannesburg 
did so to work on the gold fields. It is unlikely that 
these facts are coincidental. More specifically, there are 
a number of reasons that suggest that the 'strained relations' 
between Solomon and David were directly linked to urban 
unrest. 
Before considering these reasons, it is useful to make three 
points. First, Zulu mineworkers formed the zulu royal family's 
most important constituency in Johannesburg - and in a financial 
sense they were the Zulu royal family's most important 
constituency altogether. Soon after his succession, 
Solomon had established the pattern of Zulu royalty 
maintaining contact with Zulu mineworkers, either personally 
in the course of what the NAD accurately described as 
'begging expeditions to the mines', or through the medium 
of royal representatives such as Franz and Mnyaiza. From 
the point of view of the mineworkers, however, the monetary 
tribute they paid to their royal visitors placed an obligation 
on the latter to provide political leadership and a means 
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whereby their grievances may be redressed - particularly 
if they had been recruited by a member of the Zulu royal 
family. The type of political leadership the royal 
representatives offered is thus very important. Second, 
it must be remembered that as a personality, Solomon tended 
to be humble and conciliatory, whereas David was restless, 
aggressive and even violent. The third comment is better 
expressed in the form of a question: Why did David have 
sufficient support to attempt to usurp Solomon's position 
in 1920 whereas he had meekly accepted his deposition in 
1913, and had not challenged Solomon before 1920? 
In August 1919, Solomon completed an extensive tour of the 
Johannesburg mining areas, visiting the labour compounds 
of Brakpan Mines (where Franz worked as a labour supervisor), 
New Modderfontein, New Kleinfontein, Geduld Proprietary, 
East Rand Proprietary, Crown Mines/and also the Municipal 
Compound which housed labour for the Jubilee and Salisbury 
Mines. In each compound that he visited he met with 
complaints of grave dissatisfaction with the conditions of 
work. Of the many grievances that were laid before him, 
the main and universal grievance was low wages. Complaints 
about the pass laws and pass arrests ranked next in importance. 
There were many other grievances: "injured for small wages 
and no compensation", "burials delayed until rotten", "post-
mortem examinations not wanted", "starved in hospital and given 
same kind of medicine for a l l classes of diseases including 
injuries", "not allowed to bre~ beer which is our natural food" .136 
Solomon had each set of grievances for each particular mine 
transcribed, and before leaving Johannesburg he called on the 
Director of Native Labour. He discussed the grievances 
with the latter, and handed him the lists he had compiled 
so that action may be taken to redress them. In response 
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the Director of Native Labour instructed inspectors to 
investigate the complaints and compile reports. On the 
matter of wages, the various reports merely indicated what 
the wage levels were and made no recommendation for increases. 
On all other matters the reports either simply denied that 
the grievances were justified or gave reasons why they could 
not be remedied. Post-mortems, for example, were "required 
by the t-1iners' Pthisis Bureau", brewing of beer was" a 
contravention of Liquor Laws", and labourers were only 
arrested on pass offences because they so "frequently 
137 disregarded" the pass laws. The inspectors' reports 
were forwarded to Solomon through the CNC and the magistrate 
of Nongoma, and the matter was evidently closed. 
Although their emotional identification with and loyalty 
to the Zulu royal family was unquestionable, it is patent 
that in the militant mood of 1920, Zulu mineworkers could 
not find in Solomon the leadership that they wanted. Seven 
months after Solomon's visit and futile attempt to redress 
miners' grievances, the mineworkers took matters into their 
own hands and came out on strike. During the period in 
which the strike took place, Solomon was in Zululand, 
engrossed in his attempts to claim lobolo for Cetshwayo's 
isigodlo women. David, however, was in Johannesburg.138 
The purpose of David's visit to Johannesburg was, following 
the pattern set by his younger brother, to visit the mine 
compounds and collect revenue. The militant atmosphere within 
the workforce which David met accorded well with David's 
character. 
When considered together, the rumours circulating in Zululand 
in May 1920 were inconsistent. There were again rumours 
that Dinuzulu was not dead but was soon to return to liberate 
his country. It was also said that the government had 
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instructed Socwatsha of the Magwaza people (i.e. the NAD 
spy who had reported on Dinuzulu's burial ceremony) to 
assassinate solomon. 139 But added to these rumours, which 
indicated Zulu hostility towards their existing white rulers, 
there were rumours that David was to usurp Solomon's 
position.1 40 It soon became evident that David had the 
support to do so, which indicated the existence of hostility 
towards Solomon's mode of leadership. The latter rumours 
were accompanied by reports of friction between David and 
Solomon and reports of strange occurrences at Solomon's 
homesteads. Several of Solomon's donkeys and a bull had 
been stabbed to death and organs of ritual significance 
had been removed from them. Mankulumana stated the purpose 
was to challenge Solomon. The magistrate of Ngotshe commented 
that there were Zulu who saw David as the true heir, and that 
these had prevailed upon David to lead the "discontents against 
Solomon's order". Solomon reported to Fynney that the 
people of his Sikalenesinyoka homestead had twice recently 
d ' h' 141 h d h' d' attempte to pOlson 1m. T en - an t lS cause panlc 
in the Natal NAD - it was reported that David was holding 
"political meetings" in the Nkandla district, had visited 
Cetshwayo's grave there, and was collecting money to provide 
th • ' f "14 2 h ' h 1 e Slnews 0 war. At t lS stage t e Nata NAD became 
convinced that the reports of 'sibling rivalry' were symptoms 
of a deeper malady. 
In response, the CNC chaired an inquiry into the matter 
at Nkandla in May 1920. David was not present to account 
for himself. The inquiry turned into a farce: witnesses 
were prepared to reiterate the various rumours and confirm 
that David's meetings had taken place, but refused to 
report what had been discussed at the latter. The CNC's 
questions revealed that he knew that people had come from 
outside Zululand especially to attend David's meetings. 
~oreover,as he related,the news of David's activities had 
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"thundered through the country Langl had been talked about 
hundreds of miles away". Eventually, in exasperation, the 
CNC said that if they did not wish to disclose the motive 
of the meetings, he would not mention the motives that 
had been reported to him. He concluded by warning the 
gathering that they "had learned one lesson during the 
Rebellion and now they are deliberately courting trouble again 
by becoming mixed up with royal youngsters •.• ,,143 It 
was clear that the Natal NAD knew a rebellion to be imminent, 
and that David would lead it. By the second half of 1920, 
however, rumours of rebellion had died away. David settled 
down in a new homestead he had constructed near Nobamba, 
and never again challenged Solomon's succession. For the 
rest of his life (he died in 1935) he was plagued with 
problems with his white landlords. 
The events of 1920, although apparently 'sibling rivalry', 
at a deeper level were a r~flection of a political militancy 
that David acted on for his own ends. In this he gained 
the support of those who had become disillusioned with 
Solomon's conciliatory stance. The year 1920 thus revealed 
that Solomon could not assume that his dynastic status 
entitled him to the unconditional loyalty of the Zulu people 
as a whole. The approach that he took on issues of central 
importance to his 'subjects' - such as wage levels and working 
conditions in both urban and rural areas - was vital to 
his political status. Whilst still seeking to consolidate 
his status as Zulu king, Solomon was in the process of 
redefining the political image of the Zulu royal house in 
such a way that it was impossible to associate it with 
rebellion or militant political action. The new forms of 
African political expression that flared between 1918 and 1920 
prefigured a far more militant and widespread movement in 
the late 1920s. During this period the political distance 
between Solomon and the rank-and-file was to become 
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unambiguous and explicit. Solomon nonetheless retained his 
emotional appeal as hereditary Zulu king and his place in 
the affections of the Zulu people as a whole. 
The political distance that came to separate Solomon and 
the Zulu 'rank-and-file', however, cannot be reduced to 
their different perceptions of political method. During 
the 1920s, class divisions among the Zulu became increasingly 
pronounced both objectively (in terms of economic activity 
and lifestyle) and subjectively (in terms of self-perception, 
class identification and political expression). Attached 
to the occupations of teacher, minister of religion or 
clerical worker, for example, were 'life experiences' and 
social and political aspirations that were very different 
to those of labour tenant or urban wage labourer. Socially 
and politically, Solomon and the zulu 'establishment' 
associated and even identified more and more with the 
numerically small petty bourgeois elite than with those who 
constituted the 'commoners' of tribal society and the 
'working class' of the new society of the twentieth century. 
In terms of political method and of social and political 
objectives, there was increasing cause for a political 
alliance between the tribal and petty bourgeois elites. 
Indeed, Natal's large measure of immunity from the militancy 
of the 1918-1920 period was a consequence of the doggedly 
hamba kahle posture of Natal's petty bourgeois African 
leadership. In 1918, militancy had spread to the workforce 
in Durban. In April of that year, the ricksha-pullers came 
t t ok 144 ou on s rl e. In August, the workforce of the Royal 
Hotel in West Streetstrikec successfully for higher wages. 145 
In response to thse new developments, Dube called a meeting 
of African workers in Durban on 10 August 1918. He told 
the workers that they"must not do this sort of thing. When 
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there was a request for a rise in wages, work must not 
be stopped •.• no trouble should be caused ••• Europeans should 
be spoken fairly to".146 He then handed out copies of 
a petition he had drawn up addressed to "The Government, 
Municipal Authorities and Employers of Labour Generally": 
this he argued, was the form that protest should take. The 
petition had been adopted at a "mass meeting of Natives held 
at the Victoria Street Bioscope" on 26 J~ly 1918, and 
was signed by Dube "For the Native Workers".147 It opened 
by requesting that "with a view to securing relief, your 
assistance is sought in such a direction as you in your 
wisdom may deem proper". The focus of the grievances listed 
was inadequate wage levels in Durban, especially since 
prices had rocketed during the war. Other grievances were 
evictions following the 1913 Act, the increase of rents on 
white farms and various restrictions imposed by government 
laws and municipal regulations. In conclusion, the petition 
stated that the "petitioners desire particularly to contradict 
allegations in the Press that they are working in accordance 
with the Socialistic Movement taking place in Johannesburg 
148 or elsewhere". Yet the very reason why Dube had called 
the meeting was precisely because workers had shown that 
they did sympathize with this 'socialistic movement'. The 
political distance between the Natal petty bourgeois leaders 
and the African workers matched that which was developing 
between Solomon and the Zulu rank-and-file. 
Turning to the relationship between petty bourgeois leadership 
and Solomon, it is of more than symbolic significance that 
precisely when zulu mineworkers were striking in early 1920, 
John Dube was in the Nongoma district discussing with Solomon 
the "organization of a proposed mission of congratulation 
to the Throne on the successful issue of the war, with which 
Solomon and his people were in full sympathy •.. ,,149 - a 
nicety distant indeed from the exigencies facing the masses. 
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Later in the same year Solomon was campaigning to be allowed 
to go to England to visit the Ring, on his own initiative, 
, , 1 k1' ng. 150 The presumably to ask for his recogn1t10n as Zu u 
forthcoming political 'marriage of convenience' between the 
elite leaders of the old and new worlds of the Zulu was 
symbolically represented in May 1920 by the marriage of 
, '1 1 ' ' 151 Pixley Seme to Phik1s1 e Harriette Zulu, So omon s s1ster. 
Phikisile was one of the most beautiful of the royal 
children and perh~ps the most 'civilized' and educated. 152 
In many respects, 1920 represents a watershed. Before 
attempting to unravel some of the complexities of Zulu politics 
during the 1920s, however, it is necessary to comment on 
new trends that emerged in the administration of Zulu land 
after 1917, and to note the development of 'Native policy' 
at state level until 1920. In certain respects, developments 
in these contexts defined the parameters of and gave 
direction to African politics during the 1920s. 
The Zululand National Training Institution, the Native Affairs 
Department and 'Native policy', 1917-1920 
The establishment of the ZNTI, under the patronage of Solomon, 
was not only an attempt to place Solomon in contact with 
'beneficial' influences and, in turn, to manipulate Solomon 
as a medium for diffusing 'beneficial' influences among the 
Zulu as a whole. It also confirmed the Natal NAD's commitment 
to tribalism and indirect rule. The function of the ZNTI was 
to entrench chiefly rule by making it more 'efficient' and 
'progressive' and hence more capable of meeting the demands 
that the twentieth century presented. Equally significantly, 
it reflected that indirect rule in Zululand was to be based 
on the principle of hereditary leadership. Like Clarke's 
scheme in the 1890s, the intention was to coopt Zululand's 
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'aristocratic establishment'. The Zululand Native Trust's 
statements of annual expenditure during the early years 
of the ZNTI's existence testify to its importance in the 
eyes of the Natal NAD: in 1920, the construction and 
maintenance of the ZNTI accounted for 90.2% of the Trust's 
total expenditure, whilst in 1921 it accounted for 59.7%.153 
This commitment represented a shift from earlier policy 
directions. The report of the 1903-1905 South African 
Nati ve Affairs Commission (Lagden Commission), which was 
a strong influence on 'Native policy' in the years after 
Union, most notably in its segregationist recommendations, 
observed that although chiefs continued to be recognised 
as a means of administration, their jurisdiction was being 
"gradually transferred to European Magistrates and Commissioners". 
"The abolition of the tribal system and chieftainship is 
being left to time •.• assisted by legislation where necessary 
and administrative methods." It argued that "assimilation" 
should be seen as the "ultimate goal".154 The report of the 
1906-1907 Natal Native Affairs Commission similarly stated 
that whilst tribalism must of necessity remain "an 
indispensible component part of the government of the natives ft 
for some time to come, it was nonetheless disintegrating 
of its own accord - and for reasons of morality and 'progress 
in civilization' such disintegration should be encouraged. 
As a means of breaking the power of hereditary chiefs, it 
argued that chiefs should be appointed to "territorial" 
rather than "personal" wards. 155 
In practice, the Natal NAD had continued to depend on 
tribalism. Addison even advocated that chiefly control be 
extended to the urban areas. In 1915 he had written to the 
Chief Magistrate of Durban arguing that the appointment of 
a chief over "Natives permanently living in the Borough" would 
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be an asset to the administration by reporting "cases of 
distress", "any undue influx of Natives and their wives 
who are being ejected from neighbouring farms" and to 
"trace Hut Tax defaulters". He felt sure that some 
"respectable families" in Durban would appreciate such an 
appointment. 156 Although no chief was appointed, Addison's 
suggestions were in effect taken up by J. S. Marwick when 
he was appointed Manager of the Municipal Native Affairs 
Department in 1916. Marwick appointed Pika kaSiteku Zulu, 
h ' d 1 'd 157 F th Solomon's uncle, as 1S epartrnenta 1n una. ur ermore, 
Addison was not a supporter of African education: he did 
not support the suggestion that Dinuzulu's sons be educated, 
and he certainly preferred to deal with chiefs and tribal 
Africans than with educated Africans. The attitude of 
Addison's successor was initially rather different. Wheelwright 
regarded the government's use 6f tribalism for administrative 
purposes as expedient rather than desirable; soon after he 
took office he stated that "to a very great extent we hope 
to replace the Chief by the Location Supervisor fl.e. a 
white officiaJJ".158 He was also a keen advocate of African 
education - and John Dube, leading educationist and politician, 
was said to have his "chief supporter" in Wheelwright. 159 
However, confronted by the realities of his administrative 
duties in Natal, he carne to realise that tribalism would have 
to be maintained. Through the ZNTI, he hoped to modernize 
chiefly rule from within. From the early 1920s, Wheelwright 
in practice strongly defended tribalism and opposed the 
application of government legislation which would serve to 
undermine the authority of chiefs. 160 
Tribalism and the set of paternal relationships that weaved 
through it/was deeply ingrained in the Natal system of 
'Native administration'. This was reflected in the interviews 
that took place between the CNC and various chiefs or 
representatives of chiefs at the Natal NAD head office in 
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Pietermaritzburg. Many of these interviews were sought 
by chiefs merely to 'pay respects to' (khonza) or 'make 
the acquaintance of' the CNC. The CNC, on the other hand, 
played pis role with consummate care. Attached to the 
minutes of the interviews in the CNC's records are notes 
recording brief history of the visiting chief and his ward 
for the information of the CNC. These were prepared by the 
CNC's clerical staf~and enabled the CNC to present himself 
as personally interested in his visitors and their particular 
concerns. 161 Discussions sometimes covered a wide range 
of topics. When Chief Mathole Buthelezi (Mahlabatini district) 
came to "pay his respects" in 1922, for example, the CNC 
and Mathole discussed, among other topics, the problem of 
locusts, Mathole's personal health (he had been unwell, and 
the CNC urged him to heed the advice of doctors and avoid 
exertions), and the CNC also took the opportunity to speak 
of labour being urgently required on the gold fields. 162 
Those who were directly involved in 'Native administration' 
in Natal were constantly made aware of the administrative 
advantages mf tribalism. As a social and political order, 
it described a set of responsibilities between leaders and 
their people layered downwards through the hierarchy (a chief 
for his ward, an induna for his section of the ward, a homestead 
head for his wives and children); and, in turn, it required 
the respect and obedience of the people to their leaders 
upwards through the hierarchy. Generally, in comparison to 
'detribalized' Africans, tribal Africans were far more 
amenable to control. They had a place in the 'old order', 
and their 'representatives',chiefs and headmen, were employees 
of the state. 
It is interesting that the Native Affairs Administration Bill 
that was introduced to parliament in 1917 by General Botha 
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included provisions that sought to entrench tribalism in 
the reserves and extend the autocratic power of the government 
over Africans in Natal, where the Governor-General as 
Supreme Chief could legislate by proclamation) to the rest 
of the Union. It also provided for the establishment of 
African local councils with restricted administrative 
powers, on the model provided by the Cape Glen Grey Act of 
1894, in areas where the local Native Commissioner felt 
that such a delegation of responsibility was feasible and 
desirable. The reason why the 1917 Bill failed tp pass 
into law was primarily because it also sought to entrench 
territorial segregation on the basis of the 1913 Act and 
the recommendations of the subsequent land commissions -
which had been the subject of a public outcry by both white 
and black. The administrative provisions of the 1917 Bill 
illuminate significant new developments in the sphere of 
state ideology - and the importance of the 1917 Bill in 
these respects has nowhere been recognized. 163 
There is a direct link between the administrative initiatives 
Botha had set in motion in Zulu land - the entrenchment of 
tribal rule through the medium of the ZNTI - and those that 
he placed before parliament in 1917. Whilst the 1917 Bill 
aimed to transform the 1913 Act's principle of territorial 
segregation into reality (by finalizing the delimitation of 
the reserves) the Bill was also the first attempt on the part 
of Union policy-makers to introduce statutory political 
segregation. The administrative proposals drew strong 
criticism from the 'liberal' backbenchers on the grounds 
that they were anti-democratic, 'anti-progressive' and 
entrenched the jurisdiction of chiefs. 164 The proponents of 
the Bill argued that it was essential to get back to 
'administrative basics': indirect rule and tribalism. 165 
Yet there were far greater issues involved. Great emphasis 
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was placed on the need for the preservation of racial 
separateness. Hertzog, who strongly supported the Bill, 
argued that the educated African who "tried to force his 
society on the white man ••• was a traitor to his own kith 
and kin".166 Other Nationalist representatives spoke of 
irreconcilable separateness of 'native kultur'; and the phrase 
'development on their own lines' was frequently repeated 
among the Bill's supporters. 167 Moreover, Botha made frequent 
references to the larger African territories in the Union -
Zulu land and the Transkei - and suggested that these might 
be administered as separate and discrete units by single large 
regional councils. In this context he alluded to the 
arrangements made for the High Commission Territories of 
Basutoland and Swaziland. 168 
In the context of the 1917 Bill, Botha's appointment of 
Solomon as chief of the Usuthu, his hint that if Solomon 
behaved correctly he would become a 'big man' in Zululand, 
and his interest in the ZNTI scheme, take on a wider significance. 
In short, it seems that Botha had in mind a political 
settlement in Zululand that would serve as a guiding light 
for 'Native policy' in the rest of the Union. The 1917 Bill 
is also significant in that it reflects the existence of 
thoroughgoing territorial and political segregationist 
thinking at parliamentary level long before it is conventionally 
held to orginate. Moreover, it reflects an early association 
between segregation, the policy of 'retribalization' and the 
Natal model of 'Natiye administration'. Even more specifically, 
the 1917 Bill indicates two sets of relationships that are 
of vital importance. First, that between the Zulu royal 
family and state attempts to explore a solution to the 'native 
problem' on segregationist lines. Second, that between the 
aspirations of the African petty bourgeoisie towards 'white 
South Africa' and state attempts to divert their aspirations 
towards 'their own people' - partly through the medium of 
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169 "f'" '1 "1 t" local councils. The next p~ece 0 nat~ve eg~s a ~on 
(which passed into law) actively encouraged the latter. 
However, before the next attempt on the part of the state 
to lay down a uniform South African 'Native policy' for the 
whole country, there were important developments in 
African political action. These were reflected in the waves 
of militant activity that spread through South Africa in 
the period 1918 to 1920, primarily in the urban areas. These 
developments served to influence both the provisions of the 
new legislation and the development of state ideology. 
The events of 1918 to 1920 provoked gr~ve fears in the ranks 
of the government and white public. It was a new form of 
political protest far more dangerous than the hamba kah1e 
posture of the SANNC before 1917 and the more localized 
examples of 'primary resistance' - of which the 1906 
rebellion is an example. The emphasis was primarily in the 
sphere of industrial action, and as such it constituted a 
direct assault on the very foundations of white South Africa. 
More than any abstract arguments on the necessity of defining 
the political rights of Africans in the Union and establishing 
channels through which they could express themselves 
politically, the events of 1918 to 1920 persuaded the state 
that the matter was now a priority. The ~pleas for delay" 
made during the debates on the 1917 Bill, on the grounds that 
legislators had not devoted sufficient time to the 
contemplation of the direction that 'political Native policy' 
should take, were not heard in 1920. The first five pages 
of the 1919-1921 report of the NAD dwelled on the new 
developments in African politics and the need for state 
action. The report detailed the more articulate and direct 
manner in which Africans had expressed themselves after the 
end of the war - and noted the attempts of the "Bolshevist 
section" to capture and exploit the "Native races" for the 
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purposes of subversion. Noting that the "inevitable develop-
ment of a race consciousness" was now underway, it argued 
that it was "very necessary that the attitude to be observed 
towards this natural development should ••• be controlling 
d d ' '" 170 an l.rectl.ve. 
The sense of alarm was not confined to the departments of 
state, urban areas and industries that had been directly 
affected in the recent events. Even in Zululand, the sugar 
planters (the sugar industry was the prime industry of 
Zululand) had noted signs of new opposition on the part of 
their workforce - which the South African Sugar Journal 
ascribed to "insidious propaganda of what ••• are called 
Bolsheviks, but what are known in other countries as 
International Workers of the World; in other words the riff-
raff of revolutionary Europe".17l In 1920, the Superintendent 
of the Natal Coast Labour Recruiting Corporation (which had 
been established by the sugar industry in an attempt to 
ameliorate its perennial labour shortage) wrote that 
the native you are getting today is not the same 
you got last year •..• A few years ago, the 'Native 
Labour Party' was an unknown quantity, but today 
it is a reality, and its power is steadily 
growing and one can see 'the writing on the 
wall, ••• 172 
In August 1919, Botha died and General Smuts succeeded him 
as leader of the SAP, Prime Minister and Minister of Native 
Affairs. In early 1920, Smuts introduced his 'Native Affairs 
Bill' to parliament. This Bill was purely a 'political' 
Hill, designed to meet the political challenges of the 
period 1918 to 1920. The proponents of the 1917 Bill, Smuts 
argued, had "taken too much hay on their forks, in mixing up 
large questions of native administration ••. together with the 
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demarcation of South Africa into various areas for whites 
and b1acks".173 In 1920, Smuts kept the 'political' 
priorities squarely in mind. 
Specifically, the 1920 Act had two purposes. First, to 
provide a "constitutional outlet" for Africans to express 
their "views and grievances".174 This aimed to entice 
Africans to discharge their political energies within 
government institutions where they would be more amenable to 
state control. Thus Smuts proposed the extension of the Cape 
Glen Grey system of local councils for rural areas to the 
rest of the Union, and for an annual 'Native Conference' in 
which African representatives from allover the Union could 
meet to discuss 'native affairs'. Second, he realised that 
the solution to the political aspects of the 'native problem' 
needed considerable investigation and could not be finalized 
in 1920. Thus the Bill provided for the establishment of 
a permanent 'Native Affairs Commission' to investigate all 
aspects of 'native affairs' and make recommendations to the 
Minister of Native Affairs.
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The Native Affairs Commission 
was to be an all white body and, in function, an extra-
parliamentary state 'think tank,.176 
The local councils provided for under the 1920 Act were vested 
with responsibility to administer and advise on matters 
affecting their local communities. Areas of responsibility 
included the construction and maintenance of roads, suppression 
of livestock diseases and noxious weeds, improvement of 
agricultural methods, and could extend to medical and 
educational facilities. They could make bye-laws to put their 
policies into practice, and 
on each adult male in their 
to carry out their work. 177 
were empowered to impose a levy 
local community to enable them 
Members of the council could either 
be elected or appointed. The internal operation of the local 
councils, however, was to be firmly based on the democratic 
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principle. So was · the operation of the annual Union-wide 
Native Conferences. However, the state. was determined not 
to extend democratic institutions for Africans to their 
logical conclusion. As Smuts affirmed, it . had already 
become accepted state poli~y that 
there should .be no extension of the CapeLAfricaul 
franchise to other parts of South Atrica •••• 
the proper solution of the native question 
was to divide South Africa into two camps -
white and black - and build up specific 178 
institutions for the blacks and whites •••• 
The 'democratic principles' contained within the 1920 Act · 
were introduced in respollS'e to the demands of the most 
voc'al African leaders. The latter - those responsible for 
the disturbances of 1918-1920 - were based . in the urban 
rather than the rural areas, and were educated and 
'detribalized' rather than tribal Africans. It is 
significant that the local councils, which were designed 
to attract educated and politicized African leadership, 
were to be established in the rural ' areas and not in the 
towns. Legislators regarded the co~peration that had been 
seen to take place between educated 'agitators' and the 
labouring masses in the urban areas as an e.special danger. 
In part, the 1920 Act was an attempt on the part of the 
state to divert the political energies of the former 
towards the rural areas and into 'safe' constitutional 
outlets. 
In the parliamentary debates on the 1920 Bill, there was 
a striking discrepancy between the legislators' preoccupation 
with the urban areas as the core of the 'native problem', 
and the legislation that they enacted - which dealt 
primarily with the rural areas. Smuts observed that "our 
future difficulty would not be with the raw tribal native 
in his location, but in the big centres ••• ~,,179 Merriman 
referred to Johannesburg as the Africans' "university of 
crime" and every other large city as their "high schools 
f . II 180 S h t . >.... o cr1me. uc sen 1ments were v1gorously endorsed by 
two newly-elected representatives from Natal: J.S.Marwick, 
1"51 
the representative for Illovo (south and inland of Durban) 
. h 11 h . f zululand. 18l and George Heaton N1C 0 s, t e representat1ve or 
The 1920 Act was the first step in the implementation of 
political segregation in the Union. What is more, the 
Act firmly based this political segregation on the pattern 
of territorial segregation already introduced by the 1913 
Act: local councils could only be established in areas 
scheduled as African reserves. By tying local councils to 
the reserves and by placing both the local councils and 
the Native Conferences under the control of the NAD and the 
extra-parliamentary Native Affairs Commission, the state 
emphasized that both urban areas and the central government 
were to be the preserve of 'white South Africa'. Smuts 
affirmed that the IJprinciple of self government for natives" 
was a development of the "law" of segregation: 
The white parliament would always remain the 
sovereign power in the country, but, subject 
to the sovereign power, he ~mutsJ did not 
see why a certain amount of self government ••• 
should not be allowed to the natives so that 
in their own territories they would be able 
to attend to their own domestic affairs. 182 
The 1920 Act established on the statute book the principle 
that the state was not to permit African political institutions 
in 'white South Africa', whether in rural or urban areas. 
Three years later, this was made more explicit by the Natives 
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Urban Areas Act of 1923. The corollary to the displacement 
of African politics from the realm of 'white South Africa' 
was that African political institutions were to lie in 
African rural areas. 
The year 1920 thus represents something of a watershed in 
the context of state policy. It was the year in which the 
state first resolutely grappled with the 'political' aspect 
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of 'native policy' and attempted to control by legislative 
action the dangers of 'uncontrolled' African political 
action. This legislation established the guidelines for 
the future development of 'native policy'. Furthermore, 
it ushered in a period of intense debate on 'native policy' 
during which state ideology was refined and state policy 
was clarified. 
More specifically, 1920 was also a watershed in that Marwick 
and Nicholls were elected to parliament. Both made their 
first parliamentary speeches on 'native affairs' and were 
to take an influential part in the 'native affairs' debates 
during the turbulent period from the 1920s to the mid 1930s. 
Both had a keen sense of the Natal tradition in 'native 
affairs'. Marwick had for a considerable time been in direct 
contact with the zulu royal family in various capacities, 
and Nicholls was soon to pursue a keen - even obsessive -
interest in Solomon and all that he represented. 
In important respects, the 1920 Act reflected back on African 
politics. The lull in militant action that followed it can 
in part be attributed to the success of the measure. It 
did have some success in disengaging the educated African 
leadership from the labouring masses by redirecting their 
energies into constitutional outlets. Fur.thermore, as the 
evidence for Natal was to indicate, leadership that was 
primarily based in the urban areas soon took a marked 
interest in the 'political development' of the rural areas. 
As evidence given before the Select Committee on the 1920 
Act illustrates, for the first time since Union, petty 
bourgeois interests welcomed a new piece of 'native' legislation. 
Dube was almost euphoric: "I support the Bill with- my whole 
heart. This is what we have always been wanting the Government 
to do. We have no voice ..• in the administration of our 
interests, and these councils will meet that general need." 
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But he added that the "difficulty ••• is that the chiefs may 
think that their power is going to be undermined" 184 For 
this and a variety of other reasons there was a clear 
need for some more formal interchange between petty bourgeois 
and tribal leadership. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ZULU ROYAL FAMILY AND INKATHA, 1920-1927 
The formation of Inkatha 
The history of African politics in the province of Natal 
during the decade of the 1920s falls naturally into 
two periods. The break comes after approximately 1926, - - -
when the dissatisfactions of the Natal African and Zulu 
'commoners' or 'rank-and-fi1e' were given political direction. 
Over the Union as a whole, the period 1927-1930 forms a 
high watermark of African protest; at the forefront of 
this development was the Industrial and Commercial Workers' 
Union (lCU), which appealed to and stimulated a new form 
of African political militancy in the rural areas. Divisive 
regional loyalties seemed to give way to political identities 
and methods more pertinent to the exigendesof the twentieth 
century. Somewhat incongrous1y in view of the strength of 
tribalism, the Natal branch of the ICU established Natal 
proper as the leading exponent of this new form of political 
protest. To a lesser extent, this 'socialistic propaganda' 
(perhaps the least emotive term employed by white Nata1ians) 
also found receptive ears in Northern Natal and even in. 
Zu1u1and. The support that such 'propaganda' found among 
the ra~k-and-fi1e was directly related to a multifaceted 
process of rural impoverishment, social disintegration and 
political repression which came to a head in the late 1920s. 
Among the Zulu, these conditions differentially affected 
the three major class-groupings which crystallized 
during the 1920s: the rank-and-file, the tribal elite and 
the petty bourgeoisie. The politicization of the rank-and-file 
in this later period restructures the character of Zulu 
politics - which until then was dominated by the petty bourgeo is 
and tribal elites. 
In contrast to the situation in the late 1920s, the earlier 
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half of the decade for Zululand was one of recovery, if 
not one of prosperity. No further land alienation had taken 
place since the declaration of Union and flush of evictions 
from white farms in Northern Natal after the passage of the 
1913 Act had slowed to a trickle during the post-war 
depression. A drought of the proportions of 1912 was not 
repeated until 1930/1931 and the rains were consistently 
good. Nor did the locusts return in any appreciable numbers. 
And however much the Zulu bemoaned the state's livestock-
dipping regulations,by 1920 these had succeeded in controlling 
the various diseases (most importantly east coast fever) 
which had decimated Zulu cattle between the l890s and 1913. 
Indeed, Zulu cattle herds had been so successfully 
replenished by the late 1920s that overgrazing and 
consequent soil erosion were important causes of the ensuing 
economic crisis. Moreover, the high incidence of venereal 
disease among migrant workers and hence the rural areas had 
decreased from about 1914; indeed, after the post-war 
influenza pandemic the Zulu were relatively disease-free 
until the malaria epidemic of 1930. 1 The Zulu 'Inkatha' 
organisation was formed during this period of relative 
prosperity. 
The initial inspiration for the formation of the "Zulu 
National Congress" (later named 'Inkatha') came from "educated 
natives from outside" rather than from the zulu in Zululand. 2 
Most prominent among this group was Rev. Samuel D. Simelane 
who, in the company of Mnyaiza, called upon Fynney in 
February 1921 to learn whether the 1920 Native Affairs Bill 
was now law. He then requested permission for a deputation 
of "prominent and progressive Natives" to see the CNC in 
order to discuss how they could respond to the Act. 3 
Simelane had been educated at Amanzimtoti Training Institute 
before being ordained into the Dutch Reformed Church. He now 
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lived in Chief Mathole Buthelezi' s ward in the Nongoma 
district, and although his ministerial duties lay primarily 
in the Vryheid and Ngotshe districts,he was in close contact 
with Mahashini. 4 During his private meeting with the CNC 
in March 1921, he took pains to emphasize that the proposals 
he was making were the outcome of discussions with Solomon, 
and had Solomon's fullest support. First, he stated that it 
was "our wish" to follow the advice of the government 
(referring to the 1920 Act) and establish an "annual meeting" 
to discuss "matters that will tend to promote the welfare 
of the people". This reflected Simelane's possibly deliberate 
misreading of the 1920 Act's provision for an annual Union-
wide 'Native Conference', and represents an attempt to 
establish an exclusively Zulu forum. Second, he requested 
permission for the establishment of a "cooperative 
agricultural scheme" in zululand. 5 It transpired that the 
intention was to buy land and farm it for commercial 
purposes. 
The formation of Inkatha was essentially an attempt on the 
part of local educated individuals (mainly from the Vryheid 
district) to cooperate with rural chiefs in order to take 
advantage of the 'progressive' provisions of the 1920 Act. 
Further, Inkatha was seen as a means through which commercial 
agriculture could be set underway on land purchased 
ostensibly by a 'tribe' - non-tribal land-buying syndicates 
had been practically outlawed following the 1913 Act. 
However, there was more behind the formation of Inkatha. The 
prime movers were either members of or in contact with 
Natal's veteran African 'gentleman's club', the Natal Native 
Congress (NNC). For less tangible political objectives 
individuals in Pietermaritzburg were just as interested 
in the formation of Inkatha as those in Zululand and 
Northern Natal. It seems that the NNC leadership deliberately 
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stayed in the background whilst the case for the establishment 
of Inkatha was presented to the NAD. The NNC's reticence 
apparently arose from an awareness that the scheme would 
be more acceptable in official eyes if it was presented 
- as Simelane so pointedly did - as the wishes of the 
chiefs of Zululand. 
Those at the NNC headquarters in Pietermaritzburg were less 
interested in Inkatha for the tangible political advantages 
that it might realize in Zululand - whether directly 
political (in the form of a state-recognized local or 
regional council) or material (in the form of a commercial 
agricultural scheme). Their interest was primarily a 
reflex of the 'pan-Africanist' ideology which was becoming 
increasingly influential among the educated African elite. 
In the Natal context, this ideology imparted to the Zulu 
royal family an undefined and rather mystical role of 
leadership. In the second instance, their interest was 
related to the events of 1918-1920. These had shown the petty 
bourgeois hamba kahle leadership that it was in need of 
influential new allies if it was not to be swept aside in 
the new moods of popular militancy.6 
Since Dube had lost the SANNC leadership to the more radical 
Makgatho in 1917, he had virtually run the NNC as an 
independent and conservative fief of his own. Dube was 
the medium through which the NNC made contact with Solomon, 
and Solomon was urged to associate himself with NNC activities. 
In March 1921, on the same day that Simelane was meeting 
the CNC with his proposals for the Zulu National Congress, 
Albert kaTshingana Zulu was in Pietermaritzburg to attend 
the annual meeting of the NNC as Solomon's representative. 
Solomon had been requested to send "someone to listen 
f h '" 7 l' ' or 1m. So omon s tentat1ve acknowledgement of NNC 
activities sharply contrasts with the NNC's obsession with 
• 
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solomon. The June 1922 NNC meeting in Durban clearly 
exposed the ideological influences at work on the NNC, 
and the way in which these were being interpreted in Natal. 
Dube had just returned from England where he had attended 
a ·Pan-African Congress" composed of representatives of 
black people in French, Belgian and British Africa and 
America. After a formal welcome by the chairman, William 
Bhulose, Dube reported that the Pan African Congress had 
agreed that "if any native in any part of the world was 
oppressed or living under hardships that such conditions 
should move every black man throughout the world". During 
his presidential address Dube announced that he was shortly 
to leave for America "as a result of an invitation of 
prominent Negroes" there. 8 
Dube in particular and the African elite that he represented 
had long been influenced by Americans, Booker T. Washington 
(who argued that black advancement towards equality with 
whites could best be achieved through education and industry 
rather than political agitation), and later,W. E. B. DuBois 
(who conversely argued that black nationalism should be 
stirred as a pol~tical force in the struggle for equality). 
After 1920, the appeal of a world-wide black consciousness 
came increasingly to inform the practical politics of 
SANNC and NNC activities. The 'transatlantic inspiration' 
was now transformed into a more concrete 'transatlantic 
connection' through such media as the Pan African Congress 
and - for the first time - visits of 'foreign' black 
dignitaries · to South Africa. Although Washington's doctrine 
was still influential (especially after the visit in 1921 
of James Aggrey, an American-based West African educationist 
who advocated black progress through 'enlightenment') it 
was the more assertive doctrines of DuBois and Marcus Garvey 
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that found most purchase within the national and provincial 
Native Congresses in South Africa. Garvey, a Jamaican 
now resident in America, introduced a new facet to the 
cause of a world-wide black consciousness: the search for 
roots. His 'Back to Africa' movement swept black America 
9 in the early 1920s. In Natal, the search for 'roots' 
inevitably turned to the Zulu royal family. In addresses 
to the NNC meeting, Dube announced that 
he regretted that he was not prepared to 
expose the very important matters that had 
been discussed at the Pan African Congress ••• 
He desired to meet the Paramount Chief of the 
Zulus, 'Solomon ka Dinuzulu' to whom he would 
make a full report ••• L1hi~ could only be 
submitted to 'Solomon' and no other man. 
Dube reiterated these views at an NNC meeting the following 
day in Pietermaritzburg, chaired by a member of the Msimang 
family from the Edenvale Kholwa community.lO Henceforth 
references to Solomon, with the implication that he was in 
support of NNC activities, were frequent at NNC gatherings. ll 
If the NNC aimed to establish Solomon as its ideological 
centrepoint, Solomon proved to be a highly elusive quarry. 
A meeting which was held at Mahashini, two months after Dube's 
report-back to the NNC, made this quite clear: Solomon was 
not prepared to associate himself openly with 'Congress 
people' whose social and political aspirations were removed 
from his own. Moreover, they might jeopardize his 
12 standing in the eyes of the NAD. Inkatha therefore 
necessarily got off to a slow start, and although prominent 
NNC members were consistently in the wings, it was not 
until late 1924 that they held official positions in Inkatha. 
It was only then that Inkatha was established in practice. 
Prior to this date, all that existed of Inkatha was a 'Zulu 
National Fund' (Isigijimi sika Zulu), which was established 
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for no particular purpose other than to accumulate money 
to 'conduct the business' of the Zulu National Congress. 
The driving force behind this fund was Rev. Simelane, 
who held the office of secretary. The 'acting chairman' 
was Mnyaiza kaNdabuko, and its treasurer was Mankulumana 
kaSomaphunga. Publicity leaflets distributed in February 
1923 called for contributions on a sliding scale - which 
illustrates how Simelane envisaged the social composition 












Whilst Mnyaiza's support for the venture was unquestionable, 
both Solomon and Mankulumana "repudiate£dJ any association 
with the fund under its present auspices". Mankulumana 
informed Fynney that he had "protested his unwillingness 
•.• to bear any other part than that of subscriber to the 
Fund ••. " but had had the treasurership foisted upon him.14 
His appointment was in the first instance to lend the Fund 
a national and royal image. As Fynney remarked, Mankulumana 
15 could not even write his name - and was thus hardly capable 
of acting as treasurer. When attempts were made in 1923 
to establish formally a 'Zulu National Congress', Solomon 
informed Fynney that he was 
in favour of the establishment on constitutional 
lines of a representative national organization, 
and realizes the necessity for a fund, fbutJ 
he is opposed to its creation other than under 
government auspices, i.e. he ~olomoQ/ required 
that any fund established for such a puppose 
should have as its treasurer ..• a Government 
officer ••• 16 
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Solomon had already approached both Fynney himself and Rev. 
L. E. Oscroft to act as treasurer to the Fund into which 
d 
. 17 money was alrea y pour~ng. 
Although Solomon's statements to NAD officials must be read 
with some caution, this is less so in the case of Fynney. 
It is nonetheless clear that Solomon felt himself to be 
under considerable pressure from petty bourgeois interests, 
and that he baulked at the political ascendency in 'his' 
preserve. But perhaps most of all, whilst he realized that 
the proposed Zulu National Congress could contribute to 
his drive for recognition as ~ulu king, he was equally 
aware that such recognition had to come from the South 
African government. Thus he wished - quite literally - to 
'tarry to the magistrate', and wished only to be associated 
with the organisation when he had ascertained it had NAD 
approval. 
It was during 1923 that the organisation was given the name 
'Inkatha' (or Nkata, or Inkata, in the orthography of the 
time) - a name charged with royal and mystical associations. 
It was a remarkable and enlightening choice in view of 
Solomon's refusal to openly associate himself with what he 
f d t • S . l' .. t . ,,1 B Th " 1 re erre 0 as ~me ane s act~v~ ~es • e orlglna 
Zulu inkatha was a coil of woven grass containing ingredients 
of mystical significance, and representing the unity and 
spiritual essence (insila) of the nation. It also represented 
"supreme power", and was thus a symbol of the kingship.19 
In the words of Baleni kaSilwana (one of Stuart's informants), 
its purpose was"to keep our nation standing firm. The binding 
round and round symbolizes the binding together of the 
people so that they should not be scattered.,,20 
Every year, on the occasion of the umkhosi festival ("first 
fruits' agricultural ceremony), the royal izinyanga 
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administered the assembled amabutho with an emetic. There-
after the amabutho were required to vomit into specially 
dug trenches which had been lined with the wisps of grass 
taken from the king's huts. The royal izinduna then 
incorporated these wisps into the existing inkatha, which 
was then presented to the royal ancestors in the royal cattle 
kraal before being replaced in the king's hut. In this 
way, the insila of the whole nation was vested in the inkatha 
every year. Thus the inkatha also symbolized the continuity 
of the nation through time: until 1879, when it was destroyed 
as the British fired Cetshwayo's huts at Ondini (Ulundi), 
the coil had been passed down from king to king. 21 Though 
Dinuzulu evidently created a new national inkatha, Solomon 
had not inherited it.22 
The resuscitation of the inkatha concept in 1923 represents 
a striking instance of syncretism. A traditional royal 
symbol was being invoked to serve political purposes that 
were quite different from those which it originally served. 
In their search for 'roots' and a suitable symbol for their 
present cultural and political objectives, educated and 
'civilized' Africans passed over the very many rituals 
associated with the original inkatha which they would 
unquestionably have regaraed as 'backward', if not loathesome. 
At this stage there were clear differences of political 
objective between petty bourgeois leadership and Solomon. 
Apart from their demands for better educational facilities 
and their longer-term aspirations for the franchise, the 
Natal petty bourgeoisie had two more immediate and urgent 
political goals. Both related closely to the ethos of 
private ownership and accumulation to which they adhered, 
and which separated them from 'tribal' Africans whose world-
view was more informed by the communal and redistributive 
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ethos of pre-colonial African society. 
First, the~e was the desire to establish business pursuits 
in both urban and rural areas. The obstacles here were 
trading rights (even in African reserves, white trading 
monopolies were sanctioned by law) and insufficient capital. 
At the annual convention of the SANNC in Bloemfontein in 
1922, a decision was made to create a fund to purchase and 
run a number of trading stores. Whilst these would remain 
SANNC property and profits would return to SANNC coffers, 
they were to be managed by individual members providing them 
with 'respectable'employment and valuable business experience. 
Jos i ah S. Gumede, secretary of the NNC, was one of the 
prime movers behind this scheme. 23 The 'business interest' 
was strongly represented in the NNC by its chairman, William 
Foshla Bhulose, who was also a member of its 'Organizing 
and Finance Committee'. Bhulose, who was born in Inanda 
and educated at Amanzimtoti, entered business as a 
storekeeper "at an early age" to become "one 6f the most 
. b . . b" 24 progresslve USlnessmen ln Dur an • 
Second, there was a desire for private land ownership - both 
as a matter of cultural and ideological principle, and with 
a view to commercial agricultural production. William 
Washington Ndhlovu of Vryheid East Township had been a 
longstanding member of the committee which drew up the 
constitution of the SANNC in 1919. With the 'radicalisation' 
of the SANNC following Dube's replacement as president, 
Ndhlovu found a more comfortable political home in the NNC 
as member of the executive committee, on which he succeeded 
25 
Seme as treasurer. The attitude of the NNC leadership as 
a whole accorded with those of Ndhlovu - the NNC meeting of 
October 1923 (addressed by Dube, Bhulose and Gumede) focussed 
primarily on the issue of how the "Native population was being 
generally held back, more especially in respect to owning land 
26 and property". 
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These desiderata are reflected in Simelane's proposed 
'cooperative agricultural scheme' - the only area in which 
the early Inkatha took practical action. For Simelane the 
purchase of land in the Vryheid district for commercial 
agricultural production was the prime reason for collecting 
funds. Like the SANNC's scheme for business pursuits, its 
envisaged advantages were twofold: first, to generate profits 
which would revert to Inkatha funds and, second, to provide 
an instructive model of 'progressive' agricultural techniques 
to assist those who wished to pursue careers in commercial 
agriculture. To these ends, Simelane took it upon himself 
to establish at the Johannesburg goldmines a fund called 
"Imali yo Umpini" (literally, 'money for the (hoe) handle') 
- which was to be united with the Zululand-based Zulu 
National Fund in furtherance of the agricultural scheme. 
He also began negotiations with a Vryheid solicitor, Mr Horace 
. h' h' f 27 Guy, Wlt a Vlew to purc aSlng a arm. 
The acquisition of land was a central political objective for 
tribal Zulu. But they, in contrast to petty bourgeois 
interests, wanted more reserve land, held under communal 
tribal tenure. Tribal Zulu had at various times since 1913 
associated the Zulu royal family with schemes to regain Zulu 
lands either by purchase or by reconquest, on the under-
standing that the Zulu royal family would redistribute such 
lands among the Zulu as in precolonial times. The reasons 
are quite clear: for those who did not aim to engage in 
commercial agricultural production, and thus did not feel 
oppressed by the ~unprogressiveness' of communal tribal 
tenure, reserve land provided the cheapest and most secure 
means of carrying out (sub) subsistence agriculture. The 
indaba between the Governor-General (Prince Arthur of Connaught) 
and the Zulu at Nongoma in July 1923., held at the same time as 
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Simelane was negotiating with Horace Guy, provided tribal 
representatives with a forum through which to voice their 
land demands. Such 'royal interchanges' were the manner 
in which Solomon preferred to deal with his white rulers; 
here it was his role to express Zulu loyalty and make the 
appropriate gestures with the utmost dignity - on this 
occasion he presented His Royal Highness with a loin skin, 
a meat mat, a beer strainer, and an autographed portrait 
of himself. Mankulumana however, whose role it was to be 
more pithy, dwelt on the lands that had been alienated from 
the Zulu and argued that the areas now reserved for them were 
inadequate. He called for more land to be given to the zulu.
28 
Such pleas for the extension of the reserves were frequently 
made by tribal leadership. In a series of interviews with 
Fynney, Solomon and Mankulumana made it clear that they saw 
little value in - and were not fully informed of - Simelane's 
scheme. Solomon notified Fynney that the "campaign is 
entirely unauthorized so far as he fSolomonJ is concerned".29 
Significantly, the fund had been publicized in the Vryheid 
district and not in the Nongoma district which lay in 
the Zululand reserves. Equally significantly, it was 
publicized primarily by way of posters rather than through 
the network of tribal leaders, and non-literate" Zulu seemed 
to have only the vaguest awareness of the existence of an 
agricultural scheme and much less understanding of what it was 
all about. 30 
Notwithstanding Solomon's middle class tastes and the weight 
of petty bourgeois influence on him, his stance on the land 
issue illustrates that his political attitudes remained 
deeply informed by the tribal system to which he owed his 
position of leadership. Indeed, during the 1920s when the 
ideological and material underpinnings of tribal leadership 
were becoming increasingly insecure, Solomon adopted the 
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role of defender of the tribal order. His middle class 
tastes should not blur his role in this context: Solomon's 
policy was to seek to modernize tribal leadership rather 
than to assert blindly the privileges of the 'ancien regime'. 
However, the power ~o allocate land in the reserves -
land held on the basis of communal tribal tenure - was 
perhaps the prime material support to the rule of chiefs, 
and was thus to be defended at all costs. That Solomon 
personally was in the process of buying landed property in 
Johannesburg (through Seme) does not mean that he supported 
private ownership of land by 'commoners' in the rural areas. 
Land ownership was an appendage and buttress to his status 
as Zulu 'king' at a time when the cultural climate of Zulu 
leadership was undergoing change.
31 
Unti l October 1924, Inkatha barely existed except in name 
and in the Fund that Simelane had established. The reasons 
may be summarized as threefold. First, from the outset, 
both petty bourgeois and tribal leaders had wished Inkatha 
to be formally constituted with NAD approval. Although Fynney 
had been moderately supportive, he was nonetheless perturbed 
about the influence of non-tribal 'outsiders'. The CNC had 
adopted a non-committal and voyeuristic 'wait and see' 
policy.32 Second, as Solomon and Mankulumana made clear, 
political differences and suspicions existed between the 
tribal and petty bourgeois leaders who were intended to be 
'allies' within Inkatha. Third, the petty bourgeois initiative 
had been tentative, somewhat disorganised and without the 
full organisational backing of the NNC - part~y for the reasons 
cited above, and partly because petty bourgeois backers in 
the urban areas of Natal proper held political priorities 
different from those represented by Simelane. 
The failure on the part of Natal's conservative petty bourgeois 
leaders to institutionalize a relationship with Solomon 
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became an urgent political issue in mid-1924. The origins 
of the urgency lie in the radicalisation of African political 
33 consciousness in Natal proper. Since the NNC was 
practically the only African political organisation in 
Natal at the time and since it defined its political 
constituency as all-embracing, the NNC was in the first 
place susceptible to currents of political opinion that 
took hold outside the ranks of its conservative 'old guard' 
leadership. What happened in 1924, however - with consequences 
that were all the more devastating for the NNC 'old guard' -
was more in the nature of a palace revolt: certain members 
of the existing NNC leadership became radicalized and 
identified with the mood of militancy among the rank-and-fi1e. 
Before looking into the consequences this wrought within the 
NNC, however, it is useful to explore what this 'revolt' 
suggests about the African petty bourgeoisie. 
This development mirrors the way in which the petty bourgeois 
leadership of the Transvaal Native Congress radica1ised 
during the period of worker militancy on the Rand between 
1917 and 1920.
34 
Similarly, lCU leadership in the late 
1920s was mainly composed of Africans who, in view of their 
social origins and educational background, could be described 
as unfulfilled members of the African petty bourgeoisie rather 
than 'organic leaders of the work~ng c1ass,.35 As both 
Philip Bonner and Helen Bradford have argued, the key to 
understanding the poli tic.a1 instability and apparently poor 
'class instinct' of the petty bourgeoisie is the recognition 
that "a cohesive middle class does not exist" and there is 
no clear "disjuncture between the masses and the lower 
middle classes".36 The petty bourgeoisie as a whole was 
primarily an aspirant class which was being prevented from 
achieving its social, economic and political objectives _ 
objectives which, if achieved, might have stabilized its 
political stance. For all the educated or 'civilized' individuals 
168 
who successfully took up'respectable' professional, clerical 
or skilled occupations the~e was a great substratum 
which hovered uneasily in the upper levels of the working 
class. It was this group, the unfulfilled, marginalised 
and petty bourgeois in little more than cultural and 
ideological terms, which was prone to identify downwards 
with the masses in particular phases of the economic, 
37 
political and ideological class struggle. The petty 
bourgeois establishment, which was correspondingly more 
secure in its class position, was clearly represented in 
the NNC by Dube (educationalist, minister and journalist), 
Bhulose (businessman), Ndhlovu (lawyer's clerk), Chiefs 
Stephen Mini, Walter Khumalo and D. Sioka (all 'kholwa 
chiefs' - one of the anomalies of indirect rule in Natal) 
and, though he held no office in the NNC, Simelane (minister). 
At the NNC annual general meeting in Estcourt in April 1924, 
the core of the NNC's hamba kahle leadership was not 
returned to office. Remarkably, John Dube himself was not 
re-elected to the executive, and neither were W. W. Ndhlovu 
or William Bhulose. "The better type of educated Native", 
the SAP report of the meeting recounted, felt that "the 
election of the present [ne~ office bearers was rushed through 
with the object of getting rid of Dube and other moderate 
minded officials."38 The new president was Josiah Gumede 
(previously secretary) who, in the space of a year, had risen 
to become "the most prominent speaker in Native meetings in 
Maritzburg ..• an extremist [Whos~ utterances disclose a 
bitter hatred towards the European". The SAP report 
further observed that "although he has attained a certain 
amount of popularity amongst the young Native hotheads, 
he carries very little weight with the older men".39 
Gumede had been educated in Grahamstown and had taught in 
the Cape before coming to Natal at the turn of the century. 
Little is known of Gumede's life outside politics after his 
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arrival in Natal. Whether his rootlessness and restlessness 
was an inborn personality trait or a reflex of his inability 
to find a respectable petty bourgeois niche in Natal remains 
unclear. 40 
Another 'hot head' elected to the executive committee was 
Alexander (or 'Eric') Madune, a man who had not previously 
held a formal position of leadership but who had been noted 
for his fiery speeches alongside Gumede during the past 
year. 4l The Natal police alleged that he had at some stage 
served a five-year prison sentence in the Cape. In his 
new capacity as assistant secretary to the NNC, Madune's 
report-back to the NNC in Pietermaritzburg took the following 
form: Dube had been "thrown out", Gumede was "now supreme" 
and hence "Natives must now get their money ready as the 
Government would now be attacked and told what the Natives 
wanted". He added that Africans should expect to incur 
imprisonment in the process. The audience was reportedly 
"very satisfied with the proceedings".42 The new character 
of the NNC was made equally clear in the course of Gumede's 
presidential address to a meeting in August 1924. Great 
emphasis lay on "our bounden duty to help the ICU to organise 
Native Labour in Natal and Zululand", and Gumede announced 
that formal cooperation with the ICU had already been 
established. However, he further announced that the NNC 
was to pay special attention to land alienation in Zululand 
(presumably referring to Northern Natal) and to assisting 
Inkatha. 43 Th h h b f h . e ot er tree mem ers 0 t e new NNC executlve 
were, however, all "moderate men". All were kholwa chiefs. 
The new vice-president, Chief Stephen . Mini, was chief of 
the Edenvale community and had been influential in the NNC 
for some time. Chief D. Sioka, of a Christian community 
near Pietermaritzburg, became secretary. Chief Walter Khumalo 
of Driefontein Township near Ladysmith, became treasurer. 44 
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Nevertheless, the dominant clique was a militant one - which 
accorded with the mood of the working people in the Natal 
midlands. Especially significant was the displacement 
of the conservative old guard from leadership of the 
organisation which they had in practice regarded as their 
own. 
The erstwhile slow-moving dignity or even complacency of 
petty bourgeois politics in Natal proper had been shattered 
by Gumede and Madune identifying with the spirit of militancy 
and drawing the rank-and-file into the NNC's body politic. 
One aspect of the clash between the old guard and the new 
radicals in the NNC was a battle for the 'royal patronage'. 
Apart from the more ethereal significance that petty bourgeois 
ideologues attached to the person of Solomon, his support 
was vital in a practical sense since it would serve 
to impart a broad legitimacy and thus a populist character 
to the political organisation with which he had identified. 
In this respect, Solomon held the key to African politics 
in Natal. 
The first major meeting of Inkatha, and certainly the 
most thoroughly organised, was held at Mahashini in October 
1924. Inkatha's executive committee was enlarged - and 
provided a political home for the two most prominent 
conservative petty bourgeois leaders who had been displaced 
from positions of leadership in the NNe. John Dube and 
William Bhulose were joint chairmen of the new Inkatha 
committee. 45 Apart from Rev. Timothy Mathe (an associate 
of Simelane's evidently from the Vryheid district), the 
balance of the committee was made up of existing office 
holders: Simelane (secretary), Mnyaiza and Mankulumana. 
The success of the petty bourgeois conservatives in associating 
themselves with royalty through Inkatha was, however, something of a 
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phyrric victory at this stage. Although Solomon was 
interested in Inkatha - after all he had allowed its 
meetings to take place at Mahashini - and various royal 
advisers were influential within the organisation (Franz 
and Gilbert were active during the 1924 meeting though they 
did not hold formal positions like Mnyaiza and Mankulumana),46 
Solomon still refused to give it his open support. 
An important factor in Solomon's hesitancy was the influence 
of his two closest white advisers or confidantes: Fynney 
and Oscroft. 47 Both keenly supported the principle of 
a Zulu 'national gathering' and advocated that the government 
in some way adopt Inkatha as part of the administrative 
machinery of Zululand, but - and this was a crucial 
qualification - they were anxious that Inkatha should be a 
separate 'Zulu' organisation. 48 Furthermore, they knew 
that the NAD would be unsympathetic to an organisation that 
was in practice an offshoot of the NNC. Through Fynney 
and Oscroft, Solomon was made well aware that his standing 
in the eyes of the NAD would be prejudiced if he openly 
associated himself with 'outside' politicians. Since Solomon's 
ultimate political objective - official recognition as king 
of the zulu - in the last instance defined his political 
strategy as collaborative, this was persuasive advice indeed. 
Hence Mankulumana's motion (an ironic one) that since "this 
Congress j1nkathaJ would be independent of any other such 
association in the Union ... it should have the approval of 
the Government".49 Apart from these considerations, the 
apprehensions held by Solomon and the tribal elite themselves 
about committing themselves to an organisation dominated 
by non-tribal outsiders were exacerbated in 1924. 
The coexistence of prominent tribal and conservative petty 
bourgeois leaders on the Inkatha executive committee, the 
"peaceful and decent character of proceedings",50 and the 
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instance in which a speaker who "tried to create a sensation 
concerning the Ccattle and goat! Dipping Levy ••• was called 
51 to order", all suggest that the elitist alliance had been 
consummated with some success. However, the proceedings 
provided a wealth of evidence that the alliance was extremely 
tenuous. The meeting had been called at the instigation 
of petty bourgeois leaders and with petty bourgeois interests 
in mind. It had been advertized in Dube's Ilanga lase Natal, 
and, further, notices had been personally circularized to 
"abafundisi" (teachers or educated people) in Natal. 52 
Zulu chiefs had simply not been called to the meeting; the 
only local Zulu present were those "who through coincidence 
merely, were at Mahashini'! amongst whom was Chief Mthethwa 
of the Qulusi. The main body of those present comprised 
"delegates from Johannesburg, Newcastle, Umzimkulu and from 
all parts of Natal". Oscroft concluded that "the meeting 
was certainly not representative of Zululand or even Natal 
and zululand".54 Chief Mthethwa, Mnyaiza and Mankulumana 
strongly censured Simelane for having been "most concerned 
for the attendance of outside natives"; and at the outset 
Mankulumana announced that any resolutions that the meeting 
might pass could not be regarded as those of the "Zulu 
Nati on" since its chiefs were not present to represent it. 55 
Before the public meeting got underway, a private meeting 
took place between Solomon, his advisers and the Inkatha 
executive committee. Even here, the discussion dwelt on 
three petty bourgeois issues: first, "that Natives should 
be admitted to the Franchise" (never demanded by Zulu 
tribal chiefs); second, a project to erect a church at 
Hahashini wherein "the nation" could worship; and third, 
the local council provisions of the 1920 Act (apart from 
Mnyaiza, there is no record of any member of the Zulu tribal 
elite expressing interest in the 1920 Att).56 This was the 
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only meeting in which Solomon participated - he did not appear 
during the public meetings. 
The franchise issue was not raised at the public meetings, 
but the church question preoccupied proceedings. It was 
purely a petty bourgeois motion,S7 and reflects the 
importance attached to culture and ideology in petty bourgeois 
politics. It transpired that the project was to establish 
not an interdenominational place of worship, but an 
independent African church on the Ethiopianist model. Situated 
at Mahashini, it could not fail to be of an explicitly 
nationalist character. During the private meeting Solomon 
had agreed that a building be erected in which "various 
Christian bodies could all hold services", and he had 
requested that the building be called "Chaka Zulu's Church" 
in commemoration of the founder of the Zulu nation. S8 The 
practical details were then delegated to a special sub-
committee of five, all of whom were educated and - with the 
exception of Daniel Vilakazi - from N.atal proper. Vilakazi was 
a zulu of the Vryheid district who had once served Dinuzulu 
as a secretary, and who was now an induna of the Qulusi 
under Chief Mthethwa. S9 Illustrating the more expansive 
ideological tenets of 'modern' (or petty bourgeois) African 
nationalism, the sub-committee reported that the building 
should be called the "African National Church" rather than 
the Shaka Zulu Church. As Oscroft remarked, "it was patently 
obvious that these people wished to establish a black church 
apart from any white control ••.• Such a church would be 
religious only in name and would quickly become a political 
organization under the cloak of religion". The proposal 
met with strong opposition from local Zulu - Solomon (whose 
objections were made in private) , Gilbert, Franz and Mnyaiza 
- and from Bhulose. The whole project was shelved as a 
consequence.
60 
A related project to erect a memorial and 
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public building on the site of Shaka's grave, however, 
was set underway. A separate fund was established for this 
61 purpose. 
Regarding the 1920 Act, the public meeting passed a 
resolution against its application to Zululand, and resolved 
that "the present means of government through Solomon should 
not be interfered with". In Oscroft's opinion, the 
church fiasco 
helped harden local feeling iagainstl the 1920 
Act and national councils LsiqJ for it is felt 
that they will injure the name and power of 
the present heads of the Zulu race •.. certain 
natives from outside Zululand want to acquire 
gradually the leadership in all native matters. 62 
The resolution against the 1920 Act was remarkable in the 
light of petty bourgeois support for the council scheme: 
indeed, Simelane had at the outset intended Inkatha to be a 
local representative organisation that would seek state 
recognition under the 1920 Act. To understand why petty 
bourgeois leaders were prepared to retract on this issue 
and even support the resolution, two points must be borne 
in mind. First, the very reason why petty bourgeois leaders 
were at Mahashini was because they wished to ally themselves 
with the Zulu tribal elite, and some political compromises 
were essential. Furthermore, whereas educated leaders had 
previously shown disdain towards their tribal brethren, by 
the 1920s they had developed a respectful regard for the 
tribal 'aristocracy'. This atti t ude was most pronounced 
in relation to Solomon: the petty bourgeoisie did not wish 
to undercut the status of the 'aristocracy' at its very 
heart when it was so central to petty bourgeois ideology. 
Second, it is important to remember that the resolution 
was opposed to the application of the 1920 Act in Zululand. 
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In 1924, petty bourgeois leaders from Natal proper had 
swept into dominance in Inkatha and had swamped the different 
political priorities of the relatively small Zulu petty 
bourgeoisie - represented on the Inkatha executive committee 
by the lone figure of Simelane. The outsiders from Natal 
proper were less interested in social and political 
conditions in Zululand than in the transcendent significance 
of their alliance with Solomon; for them, the ideological 
issue was par'amount in 1924. Oscroft perceptively remarked 
that Inkatha was part of a broader movement whose "real 
aim LWasJ the uniting of all the black races of the Union 
•••• They are casting about for a rallying point - a central 
figure - and that would seem to be solomon".63 
The question of unity was also a prime consideration for 
tribal Inkatha personnel. However, the question was a 
zulu one and not a Union-wide or pan-African one. During 
the meeting, Mankulumana rose to lament the divisions within 
"the Zulu house" which prevented the Zulu from being a true 
nation. It was thereafter resolved that "the two streams 
(Usuta fsic.J and Mandlakazi) must be made one". 64 This 
resolution - which was the only resolution introduced to 
the meeting by a tribal leader - highlights another feature 
of the royal drive for national unity, a drive which distinguished 
it from its petty bourgeois counterpart. In the first 
instance, the divisions that preoccupied Solomon and his 
tribal advisers at this stage were vertical (dynastic or 
tribal enmities like those between Usuthu, Mandlakazi, 
Buthelezi and Ngenetsheni) rather than horizontal (or class) 
d ' " 65 l.Vl.Sl.ons. 
Closely related to this aim to revive Zulu national unity 
was the aim to resuscitate the institution of kingship 
as the socio-political centre of the Zulu nation. Integral 
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to this was the need to build up Solomon's monetary wealth 
to support his increasingly extravagant lifestyle and 
western tastes. In the cultural climate within which 
African leaders now operated, the latter were seen to be 
an essential support to the image of a king. 
Whatever reservations Solomon and his tribal advisers had 
about Inkatha, they recognized the role that the organisation 
could play in securing their objectives. Inkatha's petty 
bourgeois leaders played on this to entice them more 
concretely into the Inkatha fold. Significantly, during 
the 1924 meeting, the purpose of Simelane's scheme for an 
agricultural cooperative was presented with a subtly 
different emphasis: the 'Umpini' fund was "for the purpose 
of buying implements and growing crops for the subsistence 
of Solomon, his children, and those who corne to Mahashini".66 
It was still to be an "agricultural undertaking to be 
run at a profit .•. while teaching improved agriculture", but 
it was now made clear that any "profits LwereJ to go to 
the benefit of Chief Solomon".67 
Solomon was indeed soon to be totally dependent on the 
revenue he received by way of Inkatha, and the 'confusion' 
that existed between Solomon's personal finances and those 
of Inkatha were to become a scandal in the late 1920s. 
During the 1924 meeting, Inkatha's funds were said to stand 
at £3000, banked at the National Bank at Vryheid (shortly 
afterwards they were estimated to be £5000); and there was 
"much discussion as to the ownership of the money and 
h d ' " f " ,,68 h muc lV1Sl0n 0 oplnl0n It seems t at this money was 
eventually invested directly in Solomon's name,69 and in 
practice Solomon treated Inkatha money as his own. Solomon's 
son, Thandayiphi, observed that there was "no difference 
fDetweenJ Solomon's per-sonal money and Inkatha. That fSicJ 
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d h k ' "70 was all a royal thing so all money belonge to t e ~ng. 
At the time of the 1924 meeting, Solomon was already heavily 
in debt to the Denny Dalton liquor retailers in the Vryheid 
district and was 'embarrassed' on account of his Lnvestments 
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in private land in Johannesburg through Seme. Directly 
after the 1924 meeting, Solomon bought a new car at Vryheid 
for £500 and hired a chauffeur to drive him.72 
The 1924 meeting was the first meeting of 'Inkatha proper', 
as opposed to Simelane's 'one-man-show' that had existed 
previously. Despite the internal strife at the meeting -
this was to characterize Inkatha throughout its existence -
it had established something of a working relationship 
between the conservative petty bourgeoisie and the tribal 
elite, and it had gone some way in clarifying their inter-
relationship and political objectives. The 1924 meeting had 
unquestionably established the conservative Natal petty 
bourgeoisie as the group most favoured by royalty and most 
able to manipulate the royal influence. It had also 
demonstrated that the tribal elite could not remain aloof 
from 'new generation' politics and its petty bourgeois leaders 
- the latter had much needed organisational skills and a 
political awareness which the exigendesof the twentieth 
century demanded. Moreover, Inkatha provided Solomon with 
a far greater source of support and a far more efficient 
means of collecting tribute than he could otherwise muster. 
The interdependence and cooperation (albeit uneasy) between 
conservative petty bourgeois leadership and tribal chiefs 
was hereafter consolidated, and the former made every effort 
to include the latter in the 'modern' political process. In 
October 1924, for the first time a tribal chief (as opposed 
to a kholwa chief) - and furthermore, one from Zululand -
participated directly in the 'civilized' and democratic 
political world: Chief Mathole Buthelezi of the Mahlabatini 
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district attended the annual 'Native Conference' called at 
Pretoria under the 1920 Act. He was accompanied by John 
. hId 1 . 73 Dube and W. W. Ndh~ovu 1n t e Nata e egat1on. 
After its major meeting in 1924, the single area in which 
Inkatha took practical action was the scheme for an 
agricultural cooperative. Here too, it is significant that 
Mankulumana now took an active role. The agricultural fund, 
Umpini ka Zulu, was based in Johannesburg in accordance with 
fi"nancial good sense. Its chairman, Emmanuel Peter Mart 
Zulu, was a progressive man: he owned the property on which 
he lived and was a member of the 'Alexandria Township 
Ratepayers' Association', an organisation dedicated to the 
defence of private landholding rights and the maintenance 
of the township's 'respectable' character. 74 Umpini in fact 
presented itself not only as an agricultural fund but as 
the "Transvaal branch" of Inkatha, which represented 
"practically all of the Zulus on the Witwatersrand".75 
Evidently, however, its main support came from the local 
petty bourgeoisie and white collar workers, for it had 
virtually no support in the mining compounds. Interestingly, 
Umpini made special efforts to represent itself at the 
Native Conference to state its opposition to the establishment 
of local councils in Zululand, since these would "weaken 
the power of chiefs in zululand".76 Similar to the Natal-
based petty bourgoisie, it wished to preserve Zululand as 
a museum piece of Zulu tradition which all could revere. 
Mankulumana and Daniel Vilakazi came up from Zululand to 
assist in the collections Umpini made, and they took the 
money back to Inkatha headquarters at Mahashini. 77 
Eleven months after the 1924 Inkatha meeting, the NAD blocked 
Inkatha's hopes for the agricultural scheme. Bhulose had 
requested that Inkatha be officially permitted to buy 
a farm in the Vryheid district, comprising 2444 acres, from 
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its present white owner for the sum of £5288. Contrary 
to the then current NAD information, Bhulose had stated 
that the profits from the scheme were to be returned to 
the public fund rather than Solomon personally.78 Whilst 
the CNC was not unsympathetic to the proposal, the SNA 
adamantly opposed it. Land should be purchased by 
"definite tribal bodies" rather than an "irresponsible 
general fund", he stated, and Inkatha should employ its 
funds "usefully /1orJ philanthropic purposes, such as an 
asylum for the crippled and the destitute".79 Ironically, 
an asylum for the destitute was soon to be much needed in 
the Vryheid district, and an agricultural cooperative might 
have been the most constructive form that it could take. 
But Inkatha's agricultural scheme was not designed to be 
of benefit to those who were destitute. 
The only role which the rank-and-file had played in the 
formation of Inkatha was a negative one: it was through its 
militancy in Natal proper that the conservative petty 
bourgeois leaders had been displaced from the NNC. After the 
rumblings of 1920, Zululand had lapsed into a period of 
quiescence that was hardly ended by the few rumours of 
rebellion that circulated shortly after the 1924 Inkatha 
meeting. It was a measure of how uninformed the rank-and-file 
was that some chose to believe that the spate of Inkatha 
collections was to buy arms and ammunition from neighbouring 
Portuguese East Africa. Once more, messages were sent to 
relatives working in Johannesburg instructing them to return 
to Zululand because some kind of disturbance was imminent. 80 
One Paul B. M. Mdhluli of the Vryheid district, an authorised 
Inkatha collecting agent, publicized the notion that "Solomon 
is making this collection from the Black Nation of South 
Africa to fight for their country and rights which the white 
race is occupying ••• " He was believed to have a revolver 
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in his possession. 8l Mdhluli certainly knew he was mis-
representing Inkatha's intentions; perhaps he was expressing 
his own hopes of what course Inkatha should take. 
If, in the context of Inkatha, 1924 had been the golden year 
of the conservative petty bourgeoisie, 1925 was to prove 
to be the golden year of the tribal elite. In the period 
1920 to 1925, Solomon's main sphere of activities lay quite 
separate from Inkatha. In June 1925, when Solomon and the 
Prince of Wales met in the course of a flamboyant royal 
extravaganza, Solomon's drive for Zulu unity and his own 
recognition as Zulu king reached a peak. The next section 
examines this royal and tribal side of the story. 
Tribal politics: Solomon, 'royal culture', and Zulu unity 
Until the late 1920s, Solomon's political activities did 
not make a significant break with the tribal mould, although 
in various spheres he had adapted tribal leadership to the 
twentieth century. His prime source of wealth lay not in 
cattle and tribute from Zululand's subsistence farmers, but 
in money collected from wage labourers on the gold mines. 
Part of his political duties now lay in representing mine-
workers' grievances. And he was closely associated with an 
educational project for the tribal elite. His main political 
objectives in this period, however, were to reunite the 
Zulu people as one nation as they had been in precolonial 
times, and to establish himself as Zulu king as his grandfather 
had been. 
At the same time, however, Solomon was fashioning a royal 
'culture' that was very different from that of his dynastic 
forebears of the precolonial period. Whilst his predecessors' 
world-views, religious beliefs and way of life in general -
the food they ate, the clothing they wore, the type of dwellings 
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they lived in, the sort of furniture they used - were at one 
with those of Zulu society as a whole, those of Solomon 
set him apart from ordinary Zulu people. Although Solomon 
continued to play out his traditional cultural role with 
great care - and his role in ceremonies like the enrolment 
of ibutho continued to be central to his political status 
- his tastes and habits became increasingly of a middle class 
character after 1920. The influence of Solomon's petty 
bourgeois courtiers and advisers took hold primarily at the 
cultural level - the sphere in which individuals and groups 
define their perception and experience of both themselves 
and the world about them, and into which they project their 
aspirations. 
Solomon's cultural eclecticism illustrates the struggle of 
a tribal leader to maintain a position of dominance during 
a period of accelerated socio-economic and political change. 
Tribalism and all that it encompassed - an agricultural 
and pastoral subsistence economy socially ordered by a 
redistributive rationale, a s0cial ethos of reciprocal 
obligation and a political ideology that defined rulers as 
organic components of the society that they ruled but as 
inherently authoritative - was being assailed by social forces 
that tended to divide society into two groups. One one hand 
there were those who were 'improved', 'progressive', 
'respectable' and 'civilized', and on the other hand there were 
those who were not. In this new order that was developing, 
it was clearly the 'black Englishme.ri' who were the new social 
and political elite - and they assuredly knew so themselves. 82 
If Solomon was to be a twentieth century African leader he 
would in some way have to identify with this class. It must 
be emphasized, however, that Solomon's increasingly middle 
class tastes and habits were in the first instance the trappings 
of a modern African leader: Solomon was not becoming part of 
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the African petty. bou~geoisie. 
solomon remained a tribal leader but adapte~ the image and 
role of tribal leadership to the 'twentieth century - and he 
was not alone among Zulu tribal leader's in doing so. The 
following account of social and cultural adaptation among 
the elite of tribal Zululand is nonetheless not merely 
a mirror to their changing .'appearance': deeper changes 
were also t~king place. After all, the trappings of middle 
class life were expensive and required considerable private 
monetary wealth to obtain and maintain. Whereas precolonial 
Zululand had always been socially stratified, it was 
characterized by consensus between chiefs and commoners. 
By the end of the 1920s, however, chiefs could no longer 
pretend to embody the unity of the peo"ple: they defined 
themselves against rank-and-file militants. Socially, 
culturally and politically the trend during the 1920s was 
for the tribal elite to distinguish themselves as a separate 
class, drawing their economic power from their control of 
land, their sal~ried 'pub'i:ic office, from their own and their 
_wards' agricultural pursuits in Zululand, and 
in the urban ;areas. These contradictions and 
form the coptexi within which Solomon pursued 
monetary earnings 
complexities 
h ' b' , 83 1.S 0 )ect1.ves. 
There is little need to~ake out a case for Solomon's ., 
def ini ti ve rO'le in the context of 'tradi tional' Zulu culture. 
It .is significan.t .that James Stuart called on Solomon to 
ass'ist h.im in recordiI)g zulu history and custom. One of the 
informa~ts Solomon 'sent to Stuart in 1921 was Hoye kaSoxalase, 
Solomon'S' imbongi (the royal bard, or reciter bfizibongo). e4 
In many ways, ' the imbongi may be regarded as the prime 
custod'ian of Zulu ' tradition. Both the context in which Solomon's 
imbongi performed '.:(such as ukubuthwa ceremonies) and the 
contenb, of his performance (the outstanding qualities and 
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heroic deeds of successive Zulu leaders since Shaka) served 
to identify Solomon as inheritor, embodiment and guardian 
of Zulu history and custom. This, and the heroic form 
in which Solomon's own achievements were recited, presented 
Solomon as a living legend. 8S 
However plausibly Solomon played out his traditional role 
during ceremonial occasions, there is no doubt that he 
himself had discarded the belief system that had once 
informed the king's function in these contexts. The 1918-
1920 influenza pandemic, which caused considerable loss of 
life in zululand,86 provided the context in which the king 
would traditionally have played the role of high priest and 
'medicine man', assembling the nation's izinyanga and 
'd' , hO 1" 87 pres1 1ng over ceremon1es to appease t e ancestra sp1r1ts. 
Indeed, forms of ancestor possession - amandiki or amandawe 
possession, reflecting psychopathological disorders - were 
rife in the reserves
88 
and called out for this type of 
remedial action. Solomon's response to the messages of 
widespread illness that arrived at Mahashini, however, was to 
act as a dispenser of European medicines which Mrs Fynney, 
the magistrate's wife, supplied him. Sometimes included with 
the medicinal supplies were "comforting delicacies" - packets 
of tea and sugar. 89 
Such cultural incongruities were demonstrated in a wide variety 
of contexts. Though they were undoubtedly a reflex of the 
disparate pressures to which Solomon was subject, there is 
similarly no doubt that Solomon of his own accord 'pooled' 
the different belief systems and cultural practices and 
selected whatever was appropriate to the particular occasion. 
An example here is the way in which Solomon presented himself 
to Denys Reitz when the latter was touring Zululand shortly 
after his appointment as Minister for Crown Lands and 
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Irrigation. Whilst Solomon's retinue was elad in skins 
and ostrich feathers, Solomon appeared as a respectable 
gentleman, wearing a frock coat and top hat. Reitz found 
Solomon's clothing incongruous at the time, but more 
incongruous was a request mad~ by Solomon whilst so clothed: 
he reopened the issue of unpaid lobol.o for Cetshwayo's 
isigodlo women, and asked that the government assist him 
in recovering 10bolD from the various men who had married 
90 
them after Cetshwayo's death. 
Solomon's marriages offer the most instructive example of 
his cultural eclecticism. Whereas Solomon's sexual tastes 
knew few boundaries - he was by all accounts an epic lover 
and at times a wanton lecher - his taste in women he wished 
to marry was quite specific: they should be Christian, 
91 'sophisticated' and, if possible, 'educated'. They were 
primarily the products of a mission-station upbringing, for 
it was here that they learnt at close quarters all the habits 
so essential to the business of respectable living - the 
brewing of tea, the turning down of bedspreads and a 
tasteful abhorrence for the frivolity of young 'heathen' 
"d 92 mal. ens. 
Solomon's first wife (and the one he evidently held most dear, 
despite their subsequent separation) had been brought up in 
a kholwa family on a Norwegian mi ssion station near Nhlazatshe 
in the Vryheid district. When Christina Sibiya was only 
eight years old, her father, Hezekiah Matatela Sibiya, had 
'recanted' and taken two heathen wives with the result that 
he was rejected by both the mission and his Christian wife, 
Elizabeth. Perhaps reinforced by this trauma and her family's 
subsequent poverty, Elizabeth clung to Christianity and her 
'superior ways' with a vigour that was remarkable even 
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within the mission community.93 At the age of ten, Christina 
left home and moved into the mission house to work as 
babysitter to Rev. and Mrs Ec~enbren's new baby. Here 
her days were devoted to her domestic duties and attendance 
at school and church. She was also taught to sew, knit, 
crochet and embroider by Mrs Eckenbren. Whilst still a 
naive teenager, Christina left this cloistered environment 
for another: she took up a salaried post as primary teacher 
at a nearby outstation. Here she caught Solomon's attention.
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Because Christina was so shy of both marriage and the Zulu 
king, Solomon courted her mainly through letters and gifts. 
The letters followed the prescriptions laid down by mission 
education, and the gifts included combs, an ornate brooch 
and a silk ' scarf. 95 For permission to marry Christina, 
Solomon approached the "head of her ·kraal" - the African 
pastor at the outstation, then Rev. Eckenbren - and only in 
tbe last instance the Sibiya family.96 She thus left the 
mission world - and was immediately plunged into a night of 
beer-drinking and ribald celebration. In the cultural 
disorientation and trauma that followed, Solomon instructed 
Maphelu to be an "uncle" to Christina, to educate her in the 
"customs and laws of my house ••• {"and whateverJ those Christian 
women who have brought her up have forgotten to tell her".97 
Solomon was nonetheless determined that Christina should 
preserve her 'civilized' £mage. Yet the first shopping spree 
at Denny Dalton's store in Babanango to which he treated her 
proved that her new image was not to be the dull propriety 
of the mission station, but the sophistication of a social 
leaderene. She was bought a hat and coat, and selections of 
flamboyant 
a dress. 98 
Christina's 
striped material which Mrs Dalton made up into 
The marriage itself was a traditional ceremony at 
father's homestead, but it was subtly blended with 
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western influences. In the course of the ceremony, Solomon 
and Christina held hands after the European fashion 
(traditionally the bride and groom never touched during the 
ceremony, and opposite sexes did not hold hands), Solomon 
presented Elizabeth Sibiya with dress materials in consideration 
for the pain she suffered in bringing Christina into the 
world (this ingquthu transaction was traditionally a beast), 
and Solomon formally indicated to Hezekiah that he would 
honour his lobolo committments (no mention was made of the 
form or value of the lobolo and in the event it was never 
paid) .99 Thereafter followed a ceremonial dance at Zibindini 
during which Christina was formally introduced as a member 
of the royal household and, as tangible confirmation, was 
presented with a beast as her personal property (the umneke 
token) .100 
As Solomon's first choice, Christina's appeal lay in the 
first instance in the refined qualities exhibited in herself 
and the social station she represented - though there is 
no doubt that Solomon became genuinely fond of her as a person. 
Her family's material poverty and inconsequential place in 
the network of tribal kinship linkages and structures of 
authority did nothing to recommend her. However, having 
followed his personal preferences in marrying Christina -
and making a social statement in the process - Solomon then 
proceeded to enter into polygamous marriages in accordance 
with Zulu custom~ This horrified Christina's sensibilities 
and was the major reason for her subsequent desertion. 10l 
Solomon's undoubted lustiness does not explain the number of 
wives he amassed in his lifetime - variously estimated to be 
102 between thirty and seventy - for, as 'king', he was both 
entitled and encouraged to accommodate as many isigodlo women 
(concubines) as he was able. As much as Solomon himself 
used the institution of Zulu marriage to consummate important 
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socio-political linkages with various groups within his realm, 
he was subject to great pressure from below to accept the 
many daughters that were proferred to him. In the tribal 
context, a marital connection established between a sub-
ordinate and dominant kin group was, for the former, an 
important means of upward social mobility. 
The women Solomon married after Christina shared two character-
istics in their social origins. First, despite all the 
opportunities provided by his extensive travels and widespread 
veneration, Solomon only married Zulu women - as Magogo 
expressed it, "he didn't even want to hear of marrying a 
foreign girl".103 Solomon's concern throughout his life was 
with the Zulu, and he singlemindedly carried this through 
to his married life. Second, Solomon married primarily into 
what Mahaye calls the "hero families" of the Zulu. Speaking 
of Solomon's wives, Mahaye stated that Solomon " j ust loved 
them according to •.. their grandfathers, they were the heroes 
who defended Zululand •... "104 Thus he married into the 
descent groups of preconquest ikizhulu, izinduna ezinkulu and 
. f d' . 105 warrl0rs 0 outstan lng merlt. 
Since the internecine strife in Zululand in the post-conquest 
period had served to explode its pre-conquest unity, the 
arrangement of many of Solomon's marriages required great 
perseverance on his part. Yet the difficulties Solomon 
encountered provided the precise reasons why he persevered: 
through marriage, Solomon could dissolve old animosities and 
reconcile disaffected sections and lineage groups to the royal 
house. Thus he married three women from the Buthelezi,106 
because of rather than despite the tension that had existed 
between the Usuthu and Buthelezi since 1888. One of these 
marriages was to Sokwenzeka, daughter of Mbulawa kaMnyamana 
Buthelezi. Apart from being Mnyamana's son, the latter had 
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. h .. h dl 107 served with distinction agalnst t e Brltls at Isan wana. 
OkaMbulawa (nee Sokwenzeka) was destined to become Solomon's 
highest ranking wife alongside okaMatatela (nee Christina) : 
indeed, when okaMatatela's son, Cyprian, and okaMbulawa's 
son, Thandayiphi, reached their majority in the early 1940s, 
they were locked in a five year succession dispute that only 
a government Board of Inquiry was able to resolve. 108 Magogo's 
account of okaMbulawa's marriage ceremony, given as evidence 
at the Board of Inquiry in 1945, testifies to its broader 
political significance: all members of the zulu royal family 
from every royal homestead were summoned to be present, the 
amabutho were called up, and Solomon invited "Fynney to attend 
as witness (Fynney gave the bride a present of two blankets) 
- all of which was unprecedented. 109 
However, as Mahaye reveals, Solomon did not confine himself 
to marrying into the descendants of pre-conquest heroes. The 
turbulent years since conquest had thrown up a new set of 
individuals who had earned their places in Zulu history in 
less than heroic ways. Solomon married Malele, daughter of 
Sintwangu of the Cele, who had been one of Cetshwayo's 
lesser izinduna. However, the reason Solomon married into this 
lineage group was because Mayatana Cele, Sintwangu's 
brother, was popularly believed to be the man who murdered 
the magistrate of Mahlabatini during the 1906 rebellion. 
This deed was barely heroic in the traditional Zulu sense 
(the open battle field, like Ndondakasuka or Isandlwana were 
the venues for heroism), but it was nonetheless "the fact 
that made Solomon marry the daughter of Sintwangu".110 
Although incongruous at first sight, Solomon also married 
into the descent groups of those who had made their marks 
as traitors to the royal cause. Before 1920, Solomon and the 
Usuthu had reserved a particular animosity to Zulu commoners 
who had collaborated with the colonial powers. After 1920, 
IB9 
however, Solomon embarked on a thoroughgoing drive for Zulu 
unity and attempted to reconcile even traitors to the royal 
cause - however unpleasant a task this may have been on 
a personal level. Thus he married the daughter of Shibilika, 
who had earned infamy as a spy who assisted colonial forces 
in hunting down Dinuzulu after the civil disturbances of 
IBBB.lll 
Solomon also used marriage as a political device by arranging 
his sisters' marriages. In accordance with Zulu custom, 
when Solomon succeeded Dinuzulu he simultaneously inherited 
the responsibility of acting as 'father' to his sisters with 
the power to 'advise' them in their choice of husband. Magogo 
describes a meeting, held in approximately 1920, to which 
1 d 11 h·· 112 1 . So omon summone a ~s s~sters. Near y twenty pr~ncesses 
attended (Magogo was one) and, faced with Solomon and his 
izinduna, each was required to announce the names of their 
"sweethearts". As each sister did so, the merits of their 
choices were discussed by Solomon and the izinduna, and 
almost without fail their affections were the objects of 
public hilarity and ridicule. "Whose daughter would marry 
h th . ? " .. k d 113 h suc a ~ng., var~ous pr~ncesses were as e . Beneat 
the teasings lay a very serious purpose. Solomon proceeded 
to instruct his sisters to put on 'top knots' (headdress 
signifying eligibility for marriage). With the exception of 
three, all refused. In effect they were refusing to empower 
Solomon to assign them to a man of his choice. Ultimately, 
this was not much more than a delaying tactic because, short 
of absconding, they had to get Solomon's approval for their 
'choices'. Apart from the socio-political gains he could 
make, Solomon also stood to gain the hundred head of cattle 
(or equivalent) which princesses could command as 10bolol14 
- and he would only do so if the princesses married men of 
wealth and rank. He thus had good cause to defend his 
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prerogative, and he refused to accept the regrets that were 
tendered to him for 'disobedience'. The remaining three 
"tremblteqJ •.• not knowing whether when we had put up our 
115 
top knots we would be given men with headrings, going grey". 
Magogo agreed to put on a top knot even though she had already 
developed an affection for a son of Mankulumana Ndwandwe -
a choice that would have been highly acceptable to the 
patriarchs were it not for their political priorities. Magogo 
was thereafter assigned to Mathole, chief of the Buthelezi. 
This was the most celebrated marriage arrangement Solomon 
made, and was responsible, more than any other single event, 
for the reconciliation between the Usuthu and Buthelezi. 116 
Magogo was Solomon's eldest and highest ranked unmarried 
sister (she was the only daughter of Dinuzulu's great wife, 
and hence Solomon's only full sister). Moreover, she was 
highly attractive. Although, as Magogo relates, "I was 
taken away from my fiance by Solomon by his own hands", 
Solomon left it to his Buthelezi wife, okaMbulawa, to persuade 
Magogo to marry Mathole: "My mother Lie. okaMbulaws7 asked 
me if I loved Mathole, and I said 'Yes, since it is your 
desire,,,.117 She also observed that she would have loved 
Mathole in any case. Thereafter Solomon announced 
Today I am enhancing the prestige of the Buthelezis 
and establishing a blood relationship between 
the two tribes, for never since the advent of 
their ancestor Ngengeleli LSic - referring to the 
appointment of Ngqengelele, Mnyamana's father, as 
counsellor to Shak~ •.. has there been any fusion 
of our blood with that of the Buthelezis: I have 
merely appointed indunas for them. This is the 
first time a Royal girl has been given as a 
bride to them. lIB 
That the whole Buthelezi chiefdom rather than Mathole personally 
supplied the hundred head of cattle required as lobolo for 
Magogo is testimony to the wider significance of the 
marriage. As a special gesture, Mathole added another eighteen 
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head of cattle to this hundred, plus £40 in cash. For 
Solomon, the immediate benefit of the marriage was that, 
by selling the lobolo cattle, he was able to buy his first 
119 motor car. But the reconciliation between Usuthu and 
Buthelezi was of far greater and more lasting value. 
There were two other marriages of note. Whilst the marriage 
between Phikisile Harriette and Pixley Seme was not a 
'blind' assignation (they had met and worked together in 
1913 120 ) arranged by Solomon, Solomon gave the marriage his 
fullest support. Indeed, during the 1920s the family 
connection with Seme was of great value to Solomon as a 
source of independent advice (Seme never got involved in 
Inkatha) and a frequent source of legal assistance. 12l And 
as much as Seme benefited by his association with the Zulu 
royal family, the Zulu royal family's image among the petty 
bourgeois elite benefited by its association with such a 
luminary as Seme. Second, Solomon's sister, Kessie 
Impiyamaxhegu, was married to Prince Dlamini of the Swazi 
royal family. This was the only instance in which a member 
of the Zulu royal family was married to a 'foreigner' during 
Solomon's time. There is little doubt that Seme had 
persuaded Solomon of the importance of this marriage. 
Throughout the 1920s, Seme acted as adviser and legal officer 
to the Swazi royal family, and there seemed to be no contact 
between the two dynasties but through the indirect medium 
of seme.
122 
Moreover, while Solomon's political ambitions 
lay squarely wi thin ,the Zulu, it was the ideologues of the petty 
bourgeoisie (of whom Seme was a leading exponent) who were 
anxious to promote the notion of a pan-African aristocratic 
'super culture'. This was an integral part of the Garvey-
inspired search for roots. 
Overall, Solomon's 'marriage policy' sought to extract advantage 
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in two social contexts. First, in the tribal context Solomon 
employed the zulu institution of polygamy and his patriarchal 
powers over his sisters as a central part of his 'reconciliation' 
and 'reunification' strategy. Second, as a twentieth century 
zulu king, Solomon aspired to establish a royal image that 
would not be outshone by the effete ways of the new African 
elite, and so he attempted to ensure that the marriages 
he arranged also served to 'keep up with the Dubes' and 
their perceptions of social propriety. Solomon's marriage 
policy had a single aim - the achievement of Zulu unity and the 
preservation of his royal status - and the incongruities 
that these entailed are a measure of the complexity of his 
task. Solomon had married Chrstina knowing that the core 
of her 'civilized' attractiveness lay in a set of religious 
beliefs which abhorred polygamy. Not only did Solomon 
establish himself as a polygamist, bu·t he insisted that 
each woman he married become a 'Christian' when they took 
up residence at one of his homesteads. 
The term 'Christian' here raises problems. 
term kholwa has two interrelated meanings. 
it refers to a person who believes in Christ 
of the Bible, and on the other it is used to 
In Zulu, the 
On the one hand, 
and the teachings 
refer to people 
who wear European clothing. Importantly, the opposite of 
kholwa - in both of the above senses - is bhincayo which 
describes a person who wears traditional clothing. 123 
For Solomon, the term kholwa was primarily interpreted in 
a cultural rather than a religious sense. Indeed, the 
Christian veneer which he prescribed for his wives was 
designed for a cultural purpose. The incongruities were never 
far from the surface, for not only did Solomon require all 
his wives to dress after the European fashion 124 but he also 
encouraged their attendance at church. In its role as earthly 
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outstation for the great finishing school in the sky, the 
church gave instruction in 'decorum'. It also dispensed 
the fundamentals of Christian belief within which lay an 
injunction against polygamy. Solomon was not permitted 
to receive Holy Communion because he was a polygamist/but 
his wives could do so because each had only one husband. 
125 
Despite all the incongruities, through his problematical 
relationship with the church Solomon succeeded in forging 
for the Zulu royal family an image of western respectability 
even in the midst of a social practice that was its antithesis. 
The gains he extracted in the tribal context through the 
practice of polygamy were thus not incompatible with gains 
in the'civilized' context. 
These observations on Solomon's marriage policy indicate 
that Solomon was forging a particularly 'royal' cultural 
hybrid that drew from the cultural worlds of both Zulu 
traditionalism and the mission station. During the 1920s, 
there was a trend among the Zulu royal family and other members 
of Zululand's aristocratic estaalishment to associate 
themselves increasingly with the very font of African 
'civilized' counter-culture: the church and education. In 
1922, Solomon had given the CPSA a site for a church in a 
part of his ward within three miles of the ZNTI. 126 In the 
same year Solomon gave a site for a church and a priest's 
house at Mahashini itself, and a catechist named Mbuko 
Mhlongo took up residence there to assist Oscroft in his part-
time pastoral duties among royalty and the Usuthu. Mhlongo 
was ordained at Nongoma in 1924 and thereafter took over 
full responsibility for the Mahashini congregation. 127 In 
1929, Solomon gave the CPSA another site for a church and 
African school in a part of his ward that abutted Nongoma 
- which by then was no longer merely an administrative centre 
but a thriving trading centre and European enclave employing 
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employing its own 'urbanised' labour force. When the 
Bishop of Zululand blessed the site, he was accompanied by 
a representative from Solomon, dressed in skins and with 
a tall feather standing from his headring, in both the service 
and the procession around the site.129 
These developments were not peculiar to Solomon. As the 
secular civilisedness associated with Christianity came to 
be the mark of social excellence and political leadership, 
chiefs in various parts of Zulu land scrambled to consolidate 
their positions by associating themselves with the church. 
In 1922, the CPSA established four "preaching places" among 
the Mandlakazi, long the most implacable opponents of missionary 
endeavour in north-western zululand.
130 
Some of these 
developed into regular outstations with their own catechists 
in charge, and by 1926 Oscroft had built a wattle and daub 
church at Bangonomo itself - the principal homestead of the 
Mandlakazi, corresponding to Mahashini of the Usuthu. 131 
In 1929, the Bishop blessed a substantial church at Emsebe 
(stone construction, with a capacity for 500 people) built 
on a site given by Chief Bokwe of the Mandlakazi - after 
which there was a huge feast given by Bokwe and his izinduna. 132 
Further, in the mid 1920s a new outstation at Emngeni -
towards the south of the Nongoma district where it served 
Usuthu and Buthelezi communicants - was graced with a 
properly constructed church,and Rev. Cuthbert Buthelezi 
took up duties there.
133 
Chief Silimane kaMkungo, a grandson 
of Mpande whose ward lay to the east of Eshowe, approached 
the CPSA in 1923 to build a church at his principal homestead. 134 
After it was built, SiIimane was not permitted to take Holy 
Communion in it - but his wives could. In 1925 Silimane 
requested the CPSA to conduct a special service at Ihis' 
church for the benefit of the souls of those who had .died 
at the battle of Ndondakasuka in 1856 (at which Cetshwayo 
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defeated his rival brother, Mbulazi, and so secured the 
135 succession to Mpande). Especially in the north-western 
regions of Zululand, the mission work of the CPSA during 
the 1920s rode on an unprecedented wave of success, with many 
new centres of worship being opened "at the request of the 
people".136 Whilst the CPSA ascribed the developments 
variously to the will of God, a spontaneous Zulu rush towards 
'the light', or, more plausibly,the influence of the ZNTI 
'b 1 l' 137 h ' '1 t b 1 t d on the tr1 a e 1te, t e causes are pr1mar1 y 0 e oca e 
in the changing cultural climate within which tribal leaders 
found themselves. 
There are three other manifestations of Solomon's 'royal 
culture' which deserve especial mention: motor cars, liquor, 
and houses. Collectively, these were the prime causes of 
the private and public maladies that beset Solomon's later 
life. They did much to establish a 'fitting' image for a 
twentieth century Zulu king, but Solomon seemed powerless 
to curb his extravagance. By 1925 Solomon already had two 
cars - and his preference was for the largest, fastest and 
arguably the most prestigious available to him: Buick 
'Straight Eights' and Chrysler 'Imperials'. His Buick was 
soon seized by Charles Adams, an Eshowe storekeeper, on account 
of debt. 138 
His tastes in liquor were considerably more catholic: whisky, 
brandy, beer and wine in order of preference. As early as 
1918, Solomon was seen to be drunk in the company of Albert 
zulu.
139 
In 1920 he was involved in two affrays whilst under 
the influence of alcohol - one at a wedding in Zululand and 
one at a store in Johannesburg where he was "badly assaulted" 
and fined £5.
140 
The CID responded by employing an agent 
in Zululand to unearth the source from which Solomon bought 
h ' l' 141 1S 1quor. Other members of the Zulu royal family and 
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tribal elite were also great drinkers - very notably so in 
the case of the young Chief Bokwe.
142 
Their consumption of 
liquor should not be taken at face value. In the first 
place, as the 'respectable' anodyne of the white man's 
leisure time, it had social implications. In the second place, 
by the 1920s liquor had come to be regarded as the 'drink 
of kings' and, perhaps heightened by its illegality, a 
very high ranking form of royal or chiefly tribute. Magogo 
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refers to cases of liquor being brought to Solomon. 
Perhaps most revealingly, Rev. Oscroft's son, Basil Oscroft, 
recalls how Solomon used to demarcate the flower beds 
alongside his magnificent new house at Mahashini with row 
upon row of empty bottles of 'hard tack' buried head down.
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This display of bottles and the flower beds themselves formed 
a twin cultural statement. 
When Solomon moved into Mahashini it was no more than a 
collection of dilapidated and largely uninhabited beehive 
huts. His initial renovations included building a few 
rectangular wattle and daub kholwa houses set slightly 
apart from Mahashini, which were called KwaDlamahlahla.
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Soon after 1920 he set about having an imposing stone house 
constructed, modelled on the prevalent colonial style but 
outsripping it in grandeur; this became the new KwaDlamahlahla. 
Significantly, at the same time as Solomon was constructing 
his respectable home at Mahashini, he was also in the process 
of building a five-roomed brick house in Sophiatown township, 
Johannesburg, on a stand which he had bought on freehold 
tenure through Seme. (Soon after this house was completed, 
however, Solomon sold it through Seme to King Sobhuza II 
of Swaziland - who had already bought 5 other stands there 
through seme. 146 ) 
In the construction of KwaDlamahlahla Solomon drew on the 
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experience that Oscroft had had in the construction of 
the ZNTI. Oscroft not only assisted in designing the house 
but acted as Solomon's agent in supervising Mr Grassi, 
147 the Italian builder hired by Solomon. In accordance with 
colonial style, the house was basically a square bungalow, 
encompassed by a deep verandah and surmounted by dummy 
turrets (above the bay windows) with turned woodwork.
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Set on a slight slope on the crest of Nongoma range, the 
front of the house is raised about five feet from the ground 
and access is gained by broad flights of stairs that fan 
out from the verandah. The decorated brickwork on the house 
itself (indigenous sandstone is juxtaposed with 'imported' 
bluestone) and the large classical urns that stand atop 
the pillars beside each flight of stairs - probably reflecting 
Mr Grassi's interpretation of the colonial style - lend 
distinction to KwaDlamahlahla. For all its European-style 
ambience, however, it was - and still is - set not in a 
landscaped garden but amidst veld grass and bare earth. 
Also in the grounds, moreover, is a 'monument' to the fusion 
of European and Zulu material culture: from a distance this 
seems to be a traditional zulu beehive hut (domed structure 
of saplings and grass) but in fact it is made of concrete, 
has a square door and glass windows, and a fitted fireplace 
at the rear, complete with chimney. On the roof is a 
concrete ornament which, the present caretaker suggested to 
me, represented a traditional beer gourd. The 'hut' was 
evidently built to be habitable/and, though the caretaker 
could offer no explanation of its purpose, it is interesting 
that a white journalist who visited in 1946 made the 
following (arrogantly phrased)report: 
... when Solomon grew tired of the European 
corners and angles and the many windows that 
are obnoxious to the primitive soul treferring 
to the main housgl he too had his rondavel. This 
was a peculiar structure of cement with a domed 
roof close to those of his wives. 149 
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Mahashini thus represented in itself the unique distillation 
of the cultural forms that Solomon had so carefully aimed 
to balance. The 'blend' proceeded from the traditional 
beehive huts of the original Mahashini and the royal cattle 
kraal in which traditional ceremonies were performed, 
through the wattle and daub kholwa houses with the royal 
wagons and stables nearby, through Rev. Mhlongo's rectory 
and the small church and school in which the royal children 
received their primary education, and finally to the imposing 
house, KwaDlamhlahla, with the Buicks in the forecourt. 
There was at least something here with which every Zulu 
could identify. As much as it was a fitting meeting place 
for the organisation that aimed or claimed to represent 
them all - Inkatha - it was the perfect base for Solomon's 
drive for national unity. 
This drive, the overriding concern of the zulu royal house, 
was tackled in a variety of ways. The little CPSA outstation 
at Mahashini where all Solomon's tribal wives and children 
were baptised (mainly by Oscroft, on his frequent visits 
to Mahashini
lSO
) soon developed into an elitist educational 
centre for the very young. Magogo was the first to gather 
the children at Mahashini to teach them the alphabet and the 
singing of hymns. Rev. Mhlongo then took up duties as 
primary teacher - holding his lessons on the verandah of 
KwaDlamahlahla before the school building was completed. 
This school did not, however, only teach the royal children 
born to Solomon's wives who lived at Mahashinii royal children 
from royal homesteads allover Zululand, together with 
children of other 'great men of the nation', came to 
Mahashini to live and to be taught for extended periods of 
. 151 . 
tlme. An lmportant example was Gatsha Buthelezi, son 
of Chief Mathole Buthelezi and Magogo, and present Chief 
Minister of the KwaZulu Government. After his birth at Ceza 
mission hospital in the late 1920s, the young Gatsha was 
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"immediately rushed" to KwaDlamahlahla "as was the custom 
in those days" where he was to live a.nd complete his 
primaryeducation. 152 He only came to live at KwaPhindangene 
(literally 'return again', the name of the principal 
homestead of the Buthelezi) when he was a "strapping young 
b "153 oy • 
The value of the ZNTI as a centralising device was, however, 
of far greater importance than the royal 'kindergarten'. 
Since its inception, the ZNTI had been popularly regarded 
as 'Solomon's school'. This had considerable justification 
because Solomon had thrown his full support behind the 
venture, as General Botha had pleaded for him to do in 1917. 
Solomon had been personally responsible for sending six of 
his younger brothers there - which constituted about a third 
of the ZNTI's whole enrolment in the early years of its 
existence. 154 Solomon attended the end of term concerts 
and prizegiving ceremonies, usually making a speech himself 
and presenting the prizes. Incidentally, the links Solomon 
forged through the ZNTI were not confined to the Zulu: the 
prizes that Solomon presented in 1922 were donated by C. G. 
155 Smith, the Natal sugar baron; and the visit of the 
Prime Minister, General Smuts, and two Natal MPs, Marwick 
and Nicholls, to the school earlier in the same year had a 
part in establishing contacts that were to be vital later 
in the 1920s.l
56 
The Zulu royal family's priorities, however, 
were revealed by the comments of Ndesheni: "the whole Liul'll 
country", he stated, came to the ZNTI since they "needed to 
learn the protocol of the royal household".157 
The ZNTI was in fact the means by which Solomon accomplished 
the most difficult and important tribal reconciliation of 
his chieftainship: the Usuthu/Mandlakazi dispute. Since 
the Mandlakazi leaders were a collateral branch of the Zulu 
royal family, Solomon could not use intermarriage as a part 
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of his reconciliation strategy. Besides this difficulty, 
the dispute had had no hope of ending while the fiery 
Mciteki was Mandlakazi regent. Even shortly after Bokwe 
assumed the chieftaincy in January 1922, a major conflagration 
nearly erupted between the Usuthu and Mandlakazi during a 
wedding ceremony in the Nongoma district. The police 
estimated that fifteen hundred combatants would have been 
involved had officials not intervened. Evidently Mnyaiza 
(who had led the four hundred strong and fully armed Usuthu 
party) had been the aggressor, and Solomon responded by 
conducting a Usuthu tribal inquiry into the incident in which 
. d d . 158 h . . d d he personally reprlman e Mnyalza. T e lnCl ent cause 
such a stir in NAD and police circles that arrangements were 
made to increase the size of the Nongoma police force.
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At the beginning of 1924, however, Bokwe enrolled at the ZNTI 
as a student and remained there for three years. Oscroft 
initially saw Bokwe as one who showed "promise and enthusiasm", 
but, in Oscroft's view, Bokwe regressed to "an indifferent 
pupil". Oscroft was, however, pleased to note that the school 
was vindicated in the improved agricultural practices Bokwe 
160 had introduced at Bangonomo. For Solomon, it was far 
more of an achievement that the chief of the Mandlakazi 
was attending a school which was spoken of as 'Solomon's 
school'; it reflected the success of Solomon's persistent 
diplomatic approaches. The friendship cemented by Solomon 
and Bokwe while the latter was atfue ZNTI permanently doused 
any possibility of a resurgence of the forty-year-old family 
feud. The Zulu held this to be the most memorable achievement 
of Solomon's lifetime. 161 With the major reconciliations 
between Usuthu, Mandlakazi and Buthelezi achieved, the stage 
was set for the display of unity at the indaba with the 
Prince of Wales in 1925. 
The other major tribal reconciliation that had faced Solomon 
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at the time of his succession was that between the Usuthu 
and the Ngenetsheni - led by Hamu's son, Chief Kambi. 
However, the gradual disintegration of the Ngenetsheni 
as a social group meant that Solomon's diplomatic manoeuvres 
with Kambi were ultimately of less importance than those 
with Mathole and Bokwe. Solomon's policy towards Kambi 
and the Ngenetsheni was one of consistent goodwill,and 
it was a somewhat ironic measure of its success that Solomon's 
death in 1933 occurred whilst he was at Kambi's homestead 
d " b f b"' 162 attempting to resolve a lspute etween two 0 Kam 1 s sons. 
The reasons for the disintegration of the Ngenetsheni were 
twofold. First and foremost, in 1884 the lands upon which 
the Ngenetsheni lived had summarily become Boer land, 
depriving the Ngenetsheni leadership of the prime material 
foundation of their power. Each individual Ngenetsheni 
homestead head was thereafter required to make his own 
tenancy agreements with his white landlord. Moreover, here 
they were subject to the near autocratic powers of their 
landlords who, particularly after the 1913 Act and during 
the late 1920s, tended to evict 'surplus' tenants and impose 
more stringent labour tenancy requirements on those who 
" d 163 G h" 1 d" "d" 1 " remalne • eograp lca an SOCl0-economlC lS ocatlon 
corroded Ngenetsheni unity. In the second place, Chief Kambi 
showed no inclination to perpetuate the family feud initiated 
by his father. This was no doubt related to his ebbing 
authority over a disintegrating Ngenetsheni - a process which 
the NAD's purchase of a 'government farm' in the Ngotshe 
district for his personal use had done little to arrest. 164 
But it was also a reflex of Kambi's peaceable - or thoroughly 
benign - disposition, his advanced age, and deteriorating 
165 
health. Thus Kambi's conspicuous absence from the display 
of Zulu unity at the meeting with the Prince of Wales was 
not because he did not wish to attend, but because he was so 
"old and bedridden" that he could not make the journey to 
Eshowe. The magistrate of Ngotshe took charge of the 
bedraggled Ngenetsheni dele gation to the indaba.166 
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The indaba with the Prince of Wales, 1925 
The news that Edward, Prince of Wales and heir-apparent, was 
to visit Zululand had thrown English-speaking. Zululanders 
into a frenzy of excitement. A public fund was floated to 
cover the cost of decorations, triumphal arches, and the 
celebrations themselves. Arrangements were made to present 
a farm to HRH (a plan abandoned because of the Hertzog 
Government's opposition), a new bridge was built across the 
Tugela, and a dance hall was especially erected at Eshowe for 
the Grand Royal Ball. 167 Whilst the reaction of the settler 
community is understandable, the reasons why the Zulu felt 
the visit to be so evocative are less obvious and require 
some preliminary explanation. 
If anything, the Act of Union which had vested South Africa's 
white settlers with sovereign power over South Africa had 
heightened the wistful and emotional attachment that Africans 
in Natal and Zululand (both petty bourgeois and tribal) had 
for the'imperial connection'. Among educated Africans 
there had arisen a belief in the colour-blindness of Queen 
Victoria's rule, founded on the Natal 'exemption clause' 
and African land purchase rights prior to the 1913 Act. 
The drift of legislation since Union tended to dash any 
previous hopes that 'civilization' was to be a more persuasive 
social criterion than skin colour - thus the calls for a 
return to the 'good old days of Queen Victoria,.168 In the 
post-Union period, educated leaders drew heavily on 
liberal democratic ideology in arguing that Africans too were 
'His Majesty's subjects' and hence that discriminatory 
legislation was unethical. 169 The faith in the imperial 
connection was reflected in the series of deputations 
that were arranged to go to England to complain about the 
1913 Act.
170 
As Brian Willan has argued, the mainspring 
of the attachment was not only on account of the foreseen 
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an expression of the socio-cultural values and beliefs 
the petty bourgeoisie had imbibed, all of which 
. ' b 1 f .. 171 to be assoc1ated w1th the sym 0 0 Queen V1ctor1a. 
Though incongruous at first sight, even in tribal Zululand 
a romanticized memory of'the Great White Queen across 
the seas' had remained equally strong. It was a matter of 
importance that, after 1879, she had left the Zulu in 
possession of their land even if not their king. It was 
the Boers who had taken the prime zulu lands in the north-
west as their 'New Republic', and it was the colonial 
settlers who, in 1905, were seen to parcel out the remainder 
of Zululand into Zulu reserves and areas for white occupation. 
In the disastrous two decades of civil strife following 
the Anglo-Zulu war, it was not only the imperial government's 
zulu collaborators (primarily Zibhebhu and Hamu) who felt 
an attachment to British rule; for their part, the royalists 
also came to draw a distinction between the representatives 
of the 'mother country' and of colonial Natal. 172 When 
Union was declared, with Dinuzulu in prison and with 
memories of the ruthless way in which the Natal Government 
had suppressed the 1906 rebellion, the Zulu had displayed 
a very marked indifference to the death of the Natal 
Government and the transfer of power to the new Union 
Government. The death of King Edward VII in the same year, 
however, occasioned a "spontaneous outburst of sorrow amongst 
the Na ti ves of Natal and Zululand ". Expressions of condolences 
poured into the magistrates' offices throughout the 
countryside and some "expressed their sympathy in a practical 
way" by collecting money for the bereaved House of Saxe-
coburg.
173 
Where hostility was directed to white rule, it 
was directed to white settlers who encroached on Zulu lands 
or offered unattractive terms of employment, or to Natal or 
South African state officials who were seen to implement 
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policy. The British royal family was not directly implicated 
in the black experience of white rule in South Africa 
and it had an immunity from black protest arising from 
it. Moreover, the British royal family appealed to the 
monarchical sentiments so ingrained in the tribal world-
view - at the heart of which was the notion that political 
legitimacy was in the first instance imputed by birth. For 
all the liberal-democratic ideology - and soon, Marxist 
ideology of organised labour - to which sections of the 
Zulu were so receptive, the weight of their own political 
traditions were not lightly shed. If Solomon naturally 
stood at the apex of the Zulu social and political order 
in the imaginations of the vast majority of the Zulu, 
the Zulu also had a more detached and ethereal monarchy in 
the British royal family. Zulu attachment to the latter was 
very evident in Solomon himself. Indeed, Solomon hung 
portraits of British royalty on the walls of KwaDlamahlahla.
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The sixty thousand Zulu who amassed on the Eshowe golf links 
to meet the Prince formed the first mass assembly of the 
Zulu since their conquest in 1879. 175 Groups had come from 
as far afield as the Ubombo and Ingwavuma districts and the 
borders of Portuguese East Africa to be present. They met 
as a Zulu nation, not as a collection of colonised lackeys 
or discrete tribal chiefdoms. Most had marched to Eshowe 
dressed in odd scraps of European clothing, but on arrival 
they stripped and turned out in traditional ceremonial 
dress - loin skins, three dancing sticks each, oval hide 
shields and plumed head-dress. Furthermo~e, they camped 
in the open and slept on their shields, as was the custom 
in pre-conquest times on occasions requiring a national 
assembly.176 In a remarkable expression of their mutual 
reconciliation, Solomon and Bokwe had together led the 
Usuthu and Mandlakazi concourses from Nongoma to Eshowe. On 
arrival, Solomon received massed royal salutes from those 
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already encamped, and then pitched his own camp - three 
tents on a promontory above the Umlalazi river, overlooking 
the whole assembly. Thereafter, he assembled all the 
Zulu tribal leaders present and (once more with Bokwe beside 
him) led a "picturesque cavalcade of Chiefs and Zulu 
notables four abreast" through the streets of Eshowe to 
. h ff" 1 177 confer W1t NAD 0 1C1a s. 
This was the first in a series of coups for Solomon. Those 
assembled quite clearly saw Solomon as their leader and 
Solomon had made a great effort to ensure that they did 
so. In accordance with his royal duties, Solomon had made 
a substantial personal contribution to the fund to cater 
for the Zulu mass that assembled to meet the prince. 178 
At a meeting of all chiefs held on the day before the 
indaba, Solomon and Mankulumana were unanimously selected 
as the representatives who were to address the Prince, and 
Solomon was to lead the nation in the royal salutes. The 
CNC, too, had placed a special responsibility on Solomon 
179 to control the whole Zulu assembly. But more important, 
the indaba showed that the Prince himself had no doubt about 
Solomon's superordinate status. 
The proceedings of 6 June 1925 were divided into two parts: 
first, the formal exchange of greetings and gifts between 
the Prince and the Zulu during the morning, and, second, 
a less formal display of Zulu dance and song during the 
afternoon. In the morning ceremony, Solomon and his royal 
entourage was seated before the crescent-shaped Zulu assembly 
and directly facing the Prince's dais. Solomon's arrival 
was greeted with a roar of 'bayede' from the Zulu concourse -
a demonstration which some white observers believed Solomon 
had deliberately engineered as a public affirmation of his 
royal status and as an insult to the prince. 180 Solomon wore 
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a uniform of British military cut which he had had 
tailored especially for the occasion. It was of black 
cloth and faced with leopard skin - the symbol of Zulu 
royalty - and on his epaulettes and his white sun helmet 
were brass insignia bearing the elephant emblem of Zululand. 
Ceremonial sticks and white gloves completed his outfit. 
So attired, Solomon clearly stood out among the other Zulu 
dignitaries: zulu teachers and ministers wore nondescript 
morning suits and other tribal chiefs presented themselves 
in various idiosyncratic combinations of traditional and 
European clothing. 
who was conspicuous 
as he was but for a 
1 181 1 ' caws. So omon s 
Mankulumana was the only other Zulu 
- though in a very different way, naked 
loin skin and a necklace of leopard 
only real rival was the Prince himself. 
The Prince also wore a military uniform with a white sun 
helmet. In keeping with the pomp of the occasion he was 
"laden" with decorations, and his scarlet tunic was 
traversed by the blue sash of the Garter.
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When the Prince 
arrived to ascend the dais, Solomon led the royal salute 
'bayede' by raising his helmet three times - and it was 
unclear to which royal figure the salute was given. 
In his address, Solomon did not restrict himself to the 
customary expressions of devotion and great joy, but made 
a direct political appeal from 'king' to 'king': the Zulu 
were a nation, he proclaimed, and should have the opportunity 
to tak a t ' f ' th 1 th t l' d h 183 e par ln ramlng e aws · a app le to tern. 
Solomon's speech was ultimately of less significance than 
the four separate occasions during the course of the day on 
which he spoke to the Prince on .a one to one basis. Only 
the first of these was officially scheduled; the rest 
represent a unique achievement on Solomon's part, for he alone 
in Zululand was singled out for such repeated royal favours. 
After the speeches, the Prince made presentations to ten high-
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ranking Zulu chiefs. Nine were presented with silver-mounted 
ceremonial sticks, but to Solomon he gave a gold-mounted 
ceremonial stiCk. lB4 Having received the presentation, 
Solomon alone delayed to make a personal statement of 
loyalty to the crown - to which he pointedly added that 
the Prince should "take that not only from himself but from the 
whole Zulu nation".185 ·Solomon thereafter made his own 
presentation of two ·elephant tusks to the Prince, again 
on behalf of the Zulu as a whole. Months before the 
indaba, Solomon had personally equipped an expedition to 
·East Africa to shoot an elephant bull with tusks of 
suitable proportions.186 
At the close of the morning's proceedings, Solomon made 
a special request for a private interview with the Prince. 
This took place on the royal train at Eshowe s~ation, and 
Solomon was accompanied by Mnyaiza, Dube and two other 
I' • . •• t II 187 N t t . f nat1ve m1n1S ers • 0 ~ccoun appears p surV1ve 0 
what transpired there, but that Solomon made further 
presen ta tic:>ns: an extravagant gold album oJ .,pressed flowers, 
and a personal letter expressing devotion to the British 
crown. ISS However~ the very privacy of the meeting ga~e 
rise to a rumour Solomon took care not to quash:before the 
Zulu dispersed from the indaba it was'common knowledge' that 
the Prince had appointed Solomon as Zulu king. IS9 
When Solomon returned to the indaba grounds he progressed 
around the perimeter of the assembly, being acclaimed as 
he did so, before resuming his seat before . the dais. In the 
course of the afternoon's dances, the Prince summoned Solomon 
with a request for some shields and assegais as souvenirs. 
In presenting them, Solomon delayed once more to chat with 
the Prince. This third meeting was openly observed by the 
whole multitude, and was evidently taken as a cue for the 
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climax of the dancing. The performing amabutho raised their 
sticks aloft and charged the royal dais, causing panic in 
some officials. At this point Solomon distinguished himself 
by taking control of the dancers, driving them back and 
, h' h ' b th 190 reform~ng t em ~nto t e~r ama u o. 
Solomon then approached the Prince for a fourth consultation 
- this time requesting permission for his two thousand 
horsemen to absent themselves for refreshment. The Prince 
readily acceded, and thanked Solomon for the magnificent 
display. He then left, having undoubtedly been impressed 
by the emotional power of the indaba, and by Solomon himself. 
However politically innocent the Prince's intentions were, 
he left behind him a Zulu throng charged with monarchical 
and nationalist euphoria. Solomon had expertly transformed 
the indaba into a combined zulu and British royal showpiece 
- all the while maintaining a fastidious deference to the 
,191 'd h' l'd Pr~nce. He now se~ze upon t ~s moment to conso ~ ate 
his achievements: Solomon called the whole Zulu gathering 
together on his own account and enrolled a new ibutho. The 
full ukubuthwa ceremony could not be performed since the 
location and time available prevented it. But balanced 
against these deficiencies was the unprecedented size of 
the Zulu assembly, the new unity Solomon had achieved since 
the ukubuthwa of 1918, and the emotional atmosphere that the 
inter-royal indaba had generated. The new ibutho was named 
'Phendowendhlovu' ('the tusks of the elephant') in commemoration 
of the 'Zulu nation's gift' to the Prince - an appropriate 
symbolic climax to the whole event. 192 
Solomon's high profile during the indaba not only intensified 
national attachment to him but effectively broadened the 
~eographic and demographic base of his support. Beforehand, 
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there had been Zulu enclaves distant from the royal 
epicentre in north-western Zululand and Northern Natal which, 
while occasionally expressing loyalty to Solomon, had never 
seen Solomon nor in practice looked to Mahashini as the 
font of Zulu political authority. Of great importance was 
the rumour - which, in practice, was 'accepted fact' -
that the Prince of Wales had appointed Solomon as Zulu king. 
It was understood that the appointment had deliberately not 
been made public at the indaba because of the presence of 
South African Government officials. It was more in the 
nature of a secret pact between the Houses of Windsor and 
Zulu. That this 'appointment' was seen to be so important 
highlights a feature of Zulu political consciousness. In 
contrast to t~e situation in pre-conquest Zululand, political 
authority was no longer simply bestowed by the Zulu on their 
chosen leader; subjugation and dependency had now pervaded 
Zulu political consciousness and the Zulu clearly felt 
that their 'chosen leader' should also be the one chosen 
for them by their white overlords. Although the Zulu royal 
family was perceived in some quarters as a rallying point 
for rebellion against white rule in times of rural distress 
and political militancy, in the more usual quiescent mood 
(which had a part in sustaining their own dependency), they 
favoured a correspondingly more quiescent leader who 
commanded the approval of at least some quarters of the white 
oligarchy. In this light, Solomon's consistent aim to gain 
recognition as Zulu king by the South African state must 
not only be taken at face value - the issue was also intimately 
related to his standing among his own people. 193 
The legend of Solomon's appointment was exploited by A. H. 
Todd and Co., a Durban-based retailer of patent cure-all 
medicines for the African market. Late in 1925, A. H. Todd 
issued a 'commemorative' pamphlet bearing portraits of the 
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Prince of Wales and Solomon alongside each other, and 
including a small notice announcing that "Edward kaNkosi 
George" (Edward the son of King George) had appointed Solomon 
as king. It also included a word from Solomon endorsing 
A. H. Todd's medicinal supplies.
194 
This was the first of many instances in which Solomon allowed 
his name to be used for commercial purposes, and clearly 
represents one of the concrete advantages he gained from 
his petty bourgeois contacts. Simpson Isaac Bhengu was the 
intermediary between A. H. Todd and Solomon. Bhengu was 
born into the royal house of the Ngcolosi of Krantzkop in 
Natal; after receiving a miss i on education he moved to Durban 
to sell his literacy on the job market. In about 1918 he became 
secretary of the Durban branch of the NNe, organiser of 
the Durban African night schools, and an official of the 
Football Association. In 1922 he took up employment with 
A. H. Todd as a clerk and, after the petty bourgeois 
initiatives at Mahashini two years later, he met Solomon. 
He soon developed a friendship with Solomon, and after 
having taken up residence at Vryheid, he took up the dual 
role of Solomon's private secretary and secretary to Inkatha 
in 1929 - replacing Simelane's successor, Leonard Ncapayi. 195 
Solomon's endorsement of A. H. Todd's merchandise both 
established a precedent for similar business relationships 
and continued in itself to constitute a means whereby Solomon 
could earn additional revenue and keep himself in the public 
eye. By the late 1920s, A. H. Todd's advertisement repeatedly 
dominated the front page of Ilanga lase Natal, featuring a 
facsimile of a letter from Solomon, the "Inkosi yamabandla 
onke" ('King of all assemblies'). The medicines themselves 
were headlined as "Inkosi Yemit i Yonke" ('King of a l l medicines') 
and "Umuti Wamakhosi" ('medicine of kings') .196 
These advertisements reflect Solomon's new image among the 
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petty bourgeoisie. Ten years previously, when newspapers 
like Izindaba Zabantu were bewailing Solomon's basic 
education, 'rawness', and inadequate acquaintance with 
'civilization', Solomon's endorsement of European medicines 
would have been plainly farcical and not commercially viable. 
The adverts that appeared in 1925 were thus in a sense a 
manifestation of the way in which he had redefined the royal 
image in a suitably 'civilized' manner - while simultaneously 
remaining at the forefront of a tribal and populist nationalism. 
Local officials and white residents soon recognised the 
consequences of the visit of the Prince of Wales. In a 
new departure, even those in southern Zululand now found cause 
to complain that Solomon's influence was disrupting the day-
to-day running of their districts. A local resident notified 
the Defence Force that "something queer" was afoot in the 
Gingindhlovu and Melmoth districts. Zulu had refused to 
disclose any details, but the local resident had noticed 
that individual labourers were sending all the money they 
had - as much as £4 apiece - to Solomon. Others were selling 
their mealies and goats to realise further capital for this 
197 purpose. The magistrate of Lower Umfolosi district 
made a similar report, and complained that Solomon had issued 
instructions to chiefs that they were to attend a gathering 
of the zulu people at Mahashini on 6 October 1925 - which was 
to be the occasion of the annual Inkatha meeting. What 
perturbed him most, however, was that a "petty chief" (meaning 
Solomon) held the power to override his magisterial authority 
over chiefs in his district - and that the Zulu believed 
that Solomon legitimately held this power because he had been 
"appointed Paramount Chief of Zululand ••. by the Prince of 
W 1 "198 1 d . a es • He a so reporte that on the day followlng the 
indaba, Solomon had addressed the Zulu saying that Zululand 
belonged to the Zulu and whites should live elsewhere. 199 
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The complaints of the magistrate of Eshowe, A. D. Graham, 
expressed substantially similar sentiments. The notices 
of the Inkatha meeting, of which he had not been informed, 
constituted a "great breach of etiquette", he said, and 
his own powers and those of 'his' chiefs were being undermined 
accordingly. In his district it was similarly alleged that 
Solomon was now paramount chief and that his intention was 
h ' f zululand.
200 I d d th ur to drive the w ~tes rom n ee, e rumo s 
of Solomon's appointment were so endemic and were expressed 
with such certainty that some officials came to wonder if 
it was in fact true. In a somewhat piqued letter to the CNC 
the magistrate of Mtunzini asked that Solomon's status and 
powers be defined if he now really was the Zulu naramount 
chief. 201 State officials outside the ranks of the NAD were 
b Idl f ' t S 1 "the K~ng".202 noway re err~ng 0 0 omon as • 
What officials were observing was a new wave of Zulu nationalism 
that was unprecedented since 1879. What was different in 
late 1925, however, was that the role of the Zulu 'king' as 
national leader was now being supported by a modern organ-
isation such as Inkatha. The indaba had brought to a head and 
fused two parallel political developments both of which 
centred on the person of Solomon: first, the petty bourgeois 
drive to formalise Inkatha as a link between themselves and 
the tribal elite, and second, Solomon's own drive for tribal 
reconciliation. The sixty thousand zulu who had assembled 
at the indaba represented all sections of the Zulu people 
- in both a tribal and class sense. Together they had seen 
Solomon in the company of advisers ranging from Mankulumana 
in his beshu (loinskin) to Dube in his morning suit, behaving 
and being treated as a king by all present. The suspicions 
and divisions between tribal and petty-bourgeois zulu that 
had hitherto hamstrung Inkatha were nowhere evident in the 
euphoria of 1925. Riding on the crest of this new wave of 
adulation, Solomon openly turned to Inkatha's organisational 
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structure to consolidate his success. As the above magistrates' 
reports indicate, the instructions that were being issued 
within Zululand to attend the forthcoming Inkatha meeting 
were held to be from Solomon himself. As Solomon now 
publicly took up his role at the pinnacle of Inkitha, even 
those Zulu furthest from the royal epicentre were now not 
only aware of Inkatha as a political force, but regarded the 
names 'Inkatha' and 'Solomon' as inseparable. 
Solomon's new acclaim was reflected in the scramblings of 
various bodies to associate themselves with him. Similarly, 
the welcome that Solomon gave them reflected his new confidence 
in his role as Zulu king. For example, Gardener Mvuyana, who 
had led an offshoot from the African Congregational Church, 
conducted the 1926 general synod of his Church at Mahashini. 
Solomon had previously rejected Mvuyana's approaches, 
evidently because he had lacked the confidence to disregard 
D id" k h' d' 203, h h b h NA a V1ce to eep 1S 1stance. IS1a S em e, t e 
flamboyant and influential leader of the large Nazarite 
'sect based at Ekuphakemeni (in Inanda, near Durban) similarly 
succeeded in forging a link with Solomon. Solomon accepted 
Shembe's daughter, Zondi, in marriage, a special house was 
built for Solomon at Ekuphakameni, and a Nazarite hymn soon 
affirmed the relationship in the following manner: 
,King Solomon is called 
He, the son of Dinuzulu 
And the fame of Jehovah 
Is in Ekuphakameni. 204 
After 1925, Solomon's multifaceted role as Zulu king thus 
represented a more powerful and pervasive presence in Natal 
Af ' d Z 1 ' t 205 h 1" r1can an u u SOC1e y. T e po 1t1cal consequence 
was that the Zulu now clearly felt the institution of 
kingship to be functioning once more in a 'real' and practical 
sense. Before examining developments within Zulu politics 
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in the ensuing period, however, it is first necessary to 
identify the NAD attitude. 
Inkatha through official eyes, 1921-1925 
The NAD had adopted a "neutral" and "non-committal" attitude 
to Inkatha from the time of its formation. The CNC and SNA 
consistently rejected the pleas from Simelane, Mpyaiza, 
Mankulumana, Solomon, Gilbert and Bhulose 
recognition - which in practice meant the 
Inkatha into the system of indirect rule. 
for government 
integration of 
They had similarly 
rejected Oscroft's and Fynney's suggestions that a government 
official be formally appointed as adviser and bookkeeper to 
Inkatha as a preliminary to making more formal use of the 
organisation. 
Until the 1924 Inkatha meeting, the reasons the CNC and SNA 
offered for their reticence was that Inkatha was a "political 
organization" (the NAD was elsewhere creating political 
organisations in the form of local councils), it had "no 
definite object" (the NAD had quashed Inkatha's main practical 
objects by refusing permission to buy a Vryheid farm and by 
refusing to recognise it as a form of local council), and it 
lacked an accredited bookkeeper and system of accounting for 
its finances (the last word in tautology).206 
The essential problem was that, in presenting itself as a 
basis for a local council for north-western Zululand or a 
general council for the whole of Zululand in 1921, Inkatha 
had taken the NAD by surprise. The Natal NAD had not persuaded 
itself that such a body was desirable so soon after the 1920 
Act, let alone formulated any plans of its own as to what form 
h "1" h k 207 t e counCl mlg t ta e. The NAD's response had merely 
been to identify the ways in which Inkatha was not suitable 
for recognition - a response which overlooked the fact t hat the 
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early Inkatha had explicitly offered itself to the NAD as 
a ~oose organisation which could be fashioned into a local 
council suitable to the NAD. 
Inkatha's expansion and formalisation in late 1924 forced 
the NAD to take greater cognisance of the organisation. But 
the NAD continued to resist recognising it for four specific 
reasons. First, since Inkatha was associated with Solomon, 
the CNC and SNA had to consider the opposition that would 
issue from the many Natal NAD officials who still held a 
f 1 1 f 'I 208 S d b th deep mistrust or the Zu u roya aml y. econ, 0 
were greatly perturbed that the influence of Natal petty 
bourgeois ideologues faF outweighed the influence of local 
Zulu in Inkatha - although the SNA, J. F. Herbst, at one 
stage suggested that formal recognition might be the best way 
to "get ahead of them and not be dragged after ••• Land tQ] 
knock out the status of any outside men".209 Third, the CNC 
was of the opinion that the local councils envisaged under 
the 1920 Act were unsuitable for Zululand because the Zulu 
were insufficiently 'advanced' to take over responsibility 
for their own local government. Moreover, the democratic 
principle which underlay the councils would undermine the 
210 tribal system upon which his administration depended. 
Fourth, the 1920 Act was unsuitable because it only provided 
for the establishment of local councils in reserve areas -
and about forty percent of Natal's African population lived on 
lands outside the reserves. The core of Inkatha's local 
support was itself split between th~ Zululand reserves and 
white-owned land in Northern Natal. 2ll Overall, however, NAD 
inaction concerning Inkatha can be attributed to the ever-
present factor of NAD inertia. Moreover, there was little 
organic need for change in administrative arrangements because 
between 1920 and 1925 the NAD's Zululand administration had 
functioned with a smoothness which it had never previously 
known. 
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This was not so, however, after June 1925. Local officials 
found that Solomon's de facto power was disrupting their 
administration. The situation mirrored that which had existed 
between 1914 and 1916, except that now Solomon's unaccommodated 
influence was far more widespread. In response, just as in 
1916, the NAD began to think more seriously of coopting Solomon's 
influence. There is another factor, however, that contributed 
to the subtle changes of attitude that took place in certain 
NAD officials. Whilst Solomon's conduct at the indaba had 
infuriated a number of Natal NAD officials and certain sections 
of the Natal white public, others had evidently identified 
with Solomon and had felt a glow of pride that 'their' Zulu 
king had presented himself in such a way as to visibly impress -the heir to the British throne. That these were the 
emotional responses of Fynney and Oscroft goes without 
saying, but it is important that they were also felt by the 
CPSA as a whole and, indeed, by those at Natal NAD headquarters 
in Pietermaritzburg - including the CNC himself and his 
212 influential clerk, Carl Faye. 
In July 1925 the CNC catalogued the weaknesses of Inkatha as 
he perceived them: it was representative mainly of Natal 
proper rather than Zululand; "bogus collectors" were 
defrauding the local population; the custody and "proper use" 
of Inkatha subscriptions were not vouchsafed, and the motive 
for the collections was still unclear. His general conclusion, 
however, was that the NAD had little need to suppress Inkatha 
since it was likely to dissolve of its own accord: 
The people will tire of contributing hard 
cash to a nebulous object, and ••. the Fund 
will become dissipated as easily as large 
amounts of money in the hands of Native 
Chiefs and their courtiers have been frittered 
away in the past. 213 
But directly after the CNC had received the wad of magisteria l 
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complaints about Solomon's influence between July and September 
1925 (some of which are recorded above), the CNC dramatically 
changed his stance. "Magistrates generally seem to be 
unnecessarily fearful of the results which will follow 
collections .for the Zulu National Fund", he wrote to the 
SNA, and argued that the official definition of Solomon's and 
Inkatha's status was now a priority: 
I would be the last to suggest any action which 
would tend to decry Solomon's influence as 
the representative of the Zulu Royal House, 
for I feel that his influence can be made to 
serve a useful purpose in Native Administration 
in this Province. 2l4 
The CNC's new attitude had also been stimulated by the news 
that Inkatha had accepted the new 'Natives Taxation and 
Development Act' - a measure which replaced the existing 
system of taxation (14s hut tax and, in the reserves, a 5s 
livestock dipping levy) with a new £1 poll tax which was 
coupled with a lOs 'local tax' in the reserve areas. The 
1925 Tax Act was integral to the state's determination to 
implement local council policy in the reserve areas - the 
local tax was specifically designed to constitute the local 
councils' source of revenue. Where no local council existed, 
local tax payments would accrue to a 'Native Development 
Account', which would be deployed by state officials for 
improvements in reserve areas. The £1 poll tax would accrue 
to state revenue, and amounted to a reimposition of the poll 
tax that sparked off the 1906 rebellion. Natal officials had 
thus been apprehensive of the reception it would receive in 
1925.
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"Had LInkatha'~ decision been otherwise we should have 
had considerable difficulty in making collections next year", 
the CNC observed. 2l6 
The larger question of 'recognition' would take some time to 
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resolve. In the meantime, Solomon and Inkatha were pr~senting 
the administration with problems that needed immediate 
attention. The first problem was that royal agents ware prone 
to belittle local Chiefs and to suggest that they are but 
puppets directly subject to Solomon" s control", with the 
result that tbe influence of local chiefs "will be seriously 
undermined". The CNC's interim solution to this problem, 
together with the problem of ever-increasing collections, was 
to suggest that Inkatha be instructed to abstain from making 
any further collections until further notice. 2l7 The second 
problem was one of magisterial "umbrage W to Solomon's influence. 
Here the CNC recorrunended that magistrates be informed that 
Solomon's status had not changed since his appointment in 1917, 
bu t that "the Government does not wish to close the door 
to possible future use of Solomon's services ••• ,,2l8 The 
following month the CNC and SNA met to discuss the larger 
issue of Solomon's and Inkatha's future,21 9 and the interim 
t " t t" 220 measures were soon pu 1n 0 prac 1ce. 
While the overall attitude of the NAD towards Solomon and 
Inkatha in late 1925 was by no means supportive, it was 
clearly one of active interest in the latter's future. Indeed, 
the events of 1925 had demonstrated to the NAD for the first 
time that according greater official cognisance of Inkatha 
might be expedient, both because of the extent of the 
organisation's unaccomodated influence in practice, and, as 
its response to the 1925 Taxation and Development Act had 
proved, because of its potential administrative value. The 
NAD was nevertheless extremely hesitant to redefine its 
policy of studied 'neutrality' towards Inkatha, and, moreover, 
was absolutely determined that the fact that it was 
contemplating doing so should remain secret. Not knowing of 
the deliberations of the NAD's high-ranking officials, 
Solomon and Inkatha inevitably interpreted the order that no 
further collections be made as an unprecedentedly blunt sign 
of official disfavour - a factor which contributed to Inkatha's 
loss of momentum during 1926 and 1927.221 
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The fissures beneath the populist facade: Inkatha, 1925-1927 
The tensions that were so much in evidence in the Inkatha 
meeting of 1924 were overlaid by a buoyant nationalism in the 
meeting of 1925. The immediate consequence of the indaba for 
Inkatha was the vastly increased weight of tribal represent-
ati ves within its body politic. Whereas only one tribal 
chief had attended the 1924 meeting {Chief Mthethwa - Solomon 
only attended the private preliminary meeting}, twenty-five 
chiefs attended the 1925 meeting • . They were supplemented 
by a number of representatives .of ch~efs who had been unable 
to attend, and a number of izinduna :.from allover Natal and 
Zululand. 222 Three Other featur.e~. ~f ': th~ meeting deserve 
conunent. First, a comprehensive ·.·.t:eport , found its way into 
. , , 
the Natal' Mercury, reflecting. the ,n.ew pr:ominerice that Solomon 
. . 
and Inkatha .- had achieved in white Natal. · Second, Solomon . .. " . ' 
clearly played the role of .constitutional· monarch at the 
meeting - providing the venue, the food, and, most important, 
an air of legitimacy by his mere '. presence. Third, Inka tha 
now took up the task of acting ,as a,' Zulu ,'shadow government' 
to the South African Government. . The proceedings and 
resolutions of the 1925 meeting were forwarded to the NAD 
f . d' d ' f ,223 Th . h' h h or ~ts a v~ce an ~n ormat~on. e new way ~n w ~c t e 
organisation perceived itself ~as .reflected in its new 
insignia: two hands clasped in the manner of'a European 
handshake, surrounded by laurels and bearing the legends 
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"Ukuhlangana ku Ngamandhla." and "Unity is Strength" -
,the Zulu and English translations of .the Latin Ex Unitate 
Vires of the South African coat of arms. 
The resolutions of the 1925 meeting covered a wide range of 
topics which reflected the broad base of its support. The 
most important related to education and political represent-
ation, and reflected the tribal and petty bourgeois composition 
-
of its leadership. First, a plea was made that the education 
of the sons of chiefs and headmen be made compulsory; this 
was effectively a motion of support for the ZNTI. But the 
meeting also resolved that "some primary education" be made 
compulsory for all African children (as with white children) 
since "much trouble and unrest emanates from the uneducated 
class of Natives through ignorance". The latter was nrnh~hl" 
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an allusion to the expanding bo~y of ICU supporters in Natal 
proper. Second, the meeting applauded the establishment 
of the 'Native Development Account' under the 1925 Tax 
Act. However, for Zululand, it rejected the underlying 
significance of the 'local tax' - the implementation of 
'local councils' policy. In a resolution which reflected 
the new power of the tribal elite in Inkatha, and subtly 
pointed a finger at the petty bourgeois excesses of 1924, 
it was said that 
the time for Native Councils in Zululand has 
not yet arrived, ••• only outside blood would 
rule the Council and the people of Zululand 
would be left out in the cold as they were 
not yet sufficiently educated to know the rules 
of debate, etc., but they request that heretofore 
the 'Inkata . ka Zulu' should be recognised as 
the official mouthpiece of all the Chiefs of 
Natal and Zululand. 225 
Nationalist fervour had thus not dissolved the differences 
that existed between Inkatha's old and new elites. Soon, 
however, the tussles within Inkatha's elitist alliance were 
to be overshadowed by a confrontation between this alliance 
and a new element: a militant rank-and-file. 
In the province of Natal as a whole, the years 1925 and 1926 
represent the watershed between the rank-and-file's phase 
of more informal and disunited action (reflected in instances 
of desertion from employment, 'absconding' to the towns, 
and attempts to avoid payment of the hut tax and dipping 
levy226) to its phase of organised and explicitly class-based 
action. The midlands of Natal proper became the storm-centre 
of rural militancy in the prov ince. Here, rent-paying 
tenants - who comprised about one third of the African farm 
population shortly after Union - had been reduced to labour 
tenants by the mid 19205. During the post-war depression, 
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white commercial farmers intensified labour demands on labour 
tenants; simultaneously they reduced the quality and 
quantity of tenant-homesteads' land and fixed wages for 
farm labour at pre-war levels. But the local African farm 
population suffered most during the period in which agrarian 
capital sought to recoup the losses of the post-war depression 
by producing for the newly-lucrative markets for wool and 
wattle bark. As land values soared in the mid 1920s and more 
land was required for grazing and the cUltivation of wattle, 
an unprecedented wave of tenant evictions took place. More-
over, corporate capital now flooded into the rural districts 
to establish wattle production on a large-scale industrial 
footing - farms were bought up, tenants were evicted, and 
African wage labour was engaged. The advent of wattle 
plantations (on which work was strenuous and the 'task 
system' of payment kept wages at a low level), accelerated 
h f 1 1 .. . 227 t e process 0 rura pro etarlanlsatl0n. 
The politicisation of the rank-and-file owed much to the 
activities of the ICU. During 1925, A. W. G. Champion moved 
from the Transvaal to Natal to take up the post of secretary 
to the Natal branch of the ICU. Here he spearheaded the 
meteoric rise of the Natal ICU to the role of the bastion 
of the whole ICU by 1926. 228 Although lesser ICU officials 
and local organisers were often drawn directly from the rank-
and-file, most ICU leaders had petty bourgeois backgrounds -
and the relationship between the latter and the illiterate 
poor who formed the phalanx of the ICU's support was somewhat 
problematical. Champion was born to a kholwa family resident 
on the border between Natal proper and Zululand, and after 
being suspended for rebelliousness from Amanzimtoti Training 
College in the middle of his secondary education, he ente~ed 
the police force. Interestingly, in the course of his duties 
as an intelligence officer (spy) in Northern Natal in 1915, 
he first saw Solomon - which meeting, Champion later suggested, 
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caused him some discomfort and assisted his decision to 
leave the police force. He thereafter took employment as a 
clerk on the Crown Mines in Johannesburg. Here he gained 
his first experience in politics as president of the African 
Mine Clerks' Association, and met Clements Kadalie, general 
secretary of the ICu. 229 Two months after Champion's 
arrival in Natal, the Natal ICU established the Durban-based 
'African Workers' Club'. This social club hardly 
catered for ordinary 'African workers': it provided dancing, 
singing, boxing and dining facilities, writing tables, rest 
rooms and was rigidly opposed to the consumption of alcohol. 
In practice it can be seen as a forerunner of the arch petty 
bourgeois 'Bantu Social Centres' that were established 
(sponsored by the South African Institute of Race Relations 
and the inter-racial Joint Councils movement) in urban areas 
h . f 1 230 h b· .. throughout t e Unlon a ew years ater. Team 19u1t~es 
of Champion's role as a 'militant working class leader' 
were to be especially evident during the Durban Beer Hall 
riots of 1929 - and significantly he was then simultaneously 
attempting to inaugurate a scheme at Clermont (inland of 
Durban) for a respectable African township of land-owners. 231 
However, the class ambiguities of some of those in the upper 
echelons of the ICU leadership should not disguise the political 
impact that the ICU made among urban workers and particularly 
the rank-and-file in the rural areas. At local ICU meetings 
in the countryside, the latter heard promises of a thorough-
going redistribution of economic and political power, couched 
in terms derived from Marxist ideology of apocalyptic class 
struggle (and inspired by the success of the revolution in 
Russia), and infused with an awareness of the linkages that 
existed between class and racial oppression in South Africa. 
Moreover, the ICU was prepared to intervene directly, with 
legal assistance, on behalf of aggrieved workers and labour 
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tenants. It was for these reasons that the ICU grew 
to be the "mass movement for national liberation" which 
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was at the forefront of popular protest. 
Champion was a vitriolic and dynamic character, and he 
personally played a large part in the expansion of the ICU 
in Natal proper. However, by the time Champion arrived 
in late 1925, the post-1920 period of quiescence was already 
drawing to a close throughout the union
233 
and Natal was 
no exception - as the 1924 'palace revolt' within the NNC 
indicates. Soon after Champion's arrival, the Natal 
ICU and the NNC established an informal alliance: the March 
1926 meeting of the NNC stated its disgust that the Durban 
Municipal Native Affairs Department refused both the ICU 
and NNC the use of the public hall in Depot Road Native 
Location, and resolved that "all men and women be requested 
to join the NNC and ICU ••. "234 
The campaign among Natal's militant leaders to organise the 
Zulu of Zulu land and Northern Natal really only got underway 
in 1927. Yet as early as August 1925, the inhabitants of 
the Vryheid district in the heart of Solomon's immediate 
domain had begun to organise themselves in accord with the 
ideologies of working class action. Superficially, local 
magistrates identified an "entirely new ••• and distinctly 
defiant" attitude among the local Zulu appearing in the 
magistrates courts, and were convinced of "impending unrest 
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among the Zulus" - similar to the reports that issued from 
magistrates in the Zululand reserves. The local Defence 
Force Commanding Officer suggested that the new mood was 
related to the "general bearing and conduct of Solomon - the 
King" after the indaba. Undoubtedly the surge of nationalism 
had raised rebellious spirits, but there was something more 
underlying the mood of the Vryheid district. On the Candover 
Estates (a newly established cotton plantation, employing eight 
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thousand Zulu and eighty whites) the Zulu employees had 
recently become "very insolent" and had threatened to strike 
"and so on". Similarly, the Commanding Officer noted that 
the "strike fever" was "very prevalent on the LVryheig] 
Coal Mines". He was so impressed with the situation that 
he recommended that the manager of the Candover Estates be 
issued with ten rifles and five thousand rounds of ammunition, 
and that eighty rifles be distributed amongst the defence 
. . . h h . d d' . f d' . 236 auxil1ar1es 1n t e Vry e1 an P1et Ret1e 1str1cts. 
The 'strike fever' on the Candover EstaDes and the Coal Mines 
represent the onset of a particularly Zulu rank-and-file 
militancy. Although the Inkatha meeting of 1925 had made 
brief and disparaging reference to "unrest", it was not until 
1927 that this new force came to be a factor determining 
the evolution of the political stance of Solomon and Inkatha. 
However, it is against the background of the development of 
this new force that the activities of Inkatha's two elites 
during 1926 must be seen. 
After the meeting of 1925, Inkatha's petty bourgeois leaders 
preoccupied themselves with the task of drawing up a formal 
constitution for Inkatha with a view to formal approval 
by the NAD. This would serve two purposes. First, it would 
satisfy petty bourgeois and - more important - NAD conceptions 
of a properly constituted political organisation. As the CNC 
himself observed when he was served with a copy of the 
constitution, part of its function was to persuade the NAD 
to lift its 'ban' on further Inkatha collections. 237 Second, 
the constitution would define the specifically petty bourgeois 
interests and objectives it was hoped Inkatha would pursue. 
The 1926 constitution was drawn up under the guidance and 
the Durban offices of J. Ray Msimang - evidently a man of 
1 1 t " 23B some ega ra1n1ng. Details about J. Ray Msimang are 
in 
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unavailable, but it seems likely that he was a member of the 
same kholwa Msimang family that had produced a number of 
church and political leaders.
239 
The preamble to the 
constitution dwelt on the need for Zulu national unity: 
••• it is necessary to attempt to have unity amongst 
the Zulu people now scattered throughout and 
outside the Union with a view to establishing 
something tangible and worth the name of the 
once powerful ZULU NATION and also with the 
ideas of obtaining a place under the sun and 
not infinitely to suffer to be trodden and 
looked down upon by other nations •.•• 
Inkatha, which had as its"Patron" the "Hereditary Paramount 
Chief of the Zulu Nation" was the organisation which aimed 
. .. f h' h 1 240 to real~se the asp~rat~ons 0 t e nat~on as a woe. 
The constitution's statement of Inkatha's aims, however, 
clearly identified the petty bourgeois interests that lay 
beneath this nationalism. First, Inkatha aimed to "encourage 
thrift amongst the Zulus and also LlqJ establish industries 
and Trades ..•• " The appended reasons for this - to ensure 
that the Zulu were "worthy of the name and traditions of 
their Ancestors" - hints at the intricacies of the petty 
bourgeois stance in Inkatha: it was not only a cynical attempt 
to manipulate Zulu nationalism for sectional interests, it 
was also a reflex of their cultural disorientation and their 
paradoxical preoccupation with 'roots' and 'progress'. The 
second, third and fourth aims all related to the agricultural 
cooperative for which the Umpini ka Zulu fund had been 
established. Thus Inkatha aimed to buy or hire farms for 
the purposes of cultivating sugar cane and cotton (the 
plantation cash crops then cultivated by white farmers in 
Zulu land and Northern Natal) together with a variety of other 
vegetables and fruits that "might prove to be remunerative 
to Inkata ka Zulu". It was emphasised that the produce 
was for the open market rather than subsistence. Moreover, 
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apart from supplying the markets with its own produce, Inkatha 
intended to establish itself as a trading broker buying 
and selling hides and livestock. The fifth aim was to 
establish "Educational and Industrial Schools" for the Zulu 
(on the lines of Dube's Ohlange Institute). It was hoped 
that those who qualified in these schools would be able to 
find employment in Inkatha's own expanding agricultural and 
. 1 241 commerC1a concerns. 
In accordance with western prescriptions, the constitution 
mapped out the structure of Inkatha's executive, the powers 
and duties of its office-holders, the rules of procedure during 
meetings, the methods by which its activities would be 
publicised and subscriptions collected, and its financial 
regulations. Overall, great emphasis was placed on Inkatha's 
'respectableness' in western terms and its loyalty to the 
South African Government and British Crown. It was written 
into the constitution that every meeting was to open with 
prayers, and that the "regulations for the conduct of Meetings 
of civilised Races shall operate at the sittings of Inkata 
ka Zulu". All government officials were entitled to attend 
and participate in Inkatha meetings (otherwise restricted to 
paid-up Inkatha members), and any Inkatha member who evidenced 
a "spirit of disloyalty to the throne" would be immediately 
"evicted".242 The constitution furthermore firmly stated that 
the decision-making process would be democratic. It stated 
equally firmly that Solomon's relationship to Inkatha was that 
of "Patron" - the executive leader was to be the elected 
president. The only regulation not based on the democratic 
principle ~as that a member of the zulu royal family would 
always automatically be a treasurer to Inkatha - in practice 
this meant Solomon and his heirs. 243 
Though the constitution as a whole was foreign to Inkatha's 
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tribal elite, it was the democratic principles enshrined in 
it that were clearly contrary to their interests. During 
1926, Inkatha's tribal elite prepared a petition to the 
Minister of Native Affairs that stood in stark contrast 
. . 244 Th' t' t' . d b to the 1925 constltutl0n. lS pe 1 lon, slgne y 
Solomon's most wordly tribal associates, Mnyaiza and Franz, 
and presented to the CNC personally by Solomon in January 
1927, was an attempt on the part of the Zulu roy.al family 
to establish its own and separate concord with the South 
African Government. But apart from being symptomatic of 
class struggle within Inkatha leadership, it was also related 
to two other developments of 'national' importance. First, 
Mankulumana had died late in 1926 whilst in Johannesburg. 
He had been visiting the Transvaal to attend to Inkatha and 
Umpini matters there, and to arrange the collection of royal 
tributes through Franz at Brakpan Mine Compound. He further 
intended to visit the NAD head office to speak the "words" 
245 of the Zulu people. Mankulumana, a man who had been a 
forthright and eloquent national leader throughout the turbulent 
era since the conquest of Zululand, had been deeply respected 
by the Zulu (including the Mandlakazi) and whites alike. 246 
His death left a very marked gap in the ranks of Zululand's 
royal and national leadership. Second, while Solomon's 
policy of tribal reconciliation had been effectively achieved 
in 1925, the reconciliation had not been 'officially' formalised 
by the appointment of Mandlakazi and Buthelezi leaders to 
positions of leadership at Mahashini. 
The petition began with a bald statement that Solomon's "present 
Title, Chief of the Usuthu merely, is misleading to the 
authorities because he is in fact recognised by the Zulus 
as head of all the clans which form the Zulu Nation". The 
request was that Solomon's title should be such as would 
"adequately express his responsibility to the Government 
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and to the people as head of the Zulu Nation".247 In practice 
this was a request for the recognition of Solomon as paramount 
chief - a fact immediately recognised by the NAD despite 
the care that had been taken to dwell on the matter of 
h ' ff" 1 248 Th Solomon's 'title' rather than lS 0 lCla powers. e 
force of the argument was that the Zulu themselves saw 
Solomon as king, and, - in a feat of legerdemain the NAD 
found difficult to counter - had done so since the indaba 
with the Governor-General (Lord Buxton) in 1917, because the 
latter had intimated that this was to be so.249 It went 
on to complain that Zululand magistrates were forbidding local 
chiefs to attend national gatherings at Mahashini and that 
the CNC had forbidden the Zulu to continue making contributions 
to the Inkatha fund. 250 
The petition made two further requests. First, that Mathole 
kaTshanibezwe Buthelezi "be restored to the office of his 
grandfather Mnyamana" - that is, chief counsellor to the head 
of the Zulu royal house. The death of Mankulumana provided 
the petitioners with a tangible pretext for the resuscitation 
of the national role of the Buthelezi leader, and it was 
integral to Solomon's own drive for recognition that 
recognition should be sought for Mathole's new petition. 
Similarly, it was requested that Bokwe kaZibhebhu Zulu of 
the Mandlakazi be appointed to the position of "Induna of 
the Nation" so that "the two of them Mathole and Bokwe £Caw 
assist each other in the affairs of the Nation, they being 
next to Solomon, the principal men of the Nation".251 
The NAD response to both the 1926 constitution and the royal 
petition was coloured by the retirement of Oswald Fynney 
from the key post of magistrate of Nongoma. His replacement, 
Mr Gebers, was no supporter of the Zulu royal cause. The 
1926 constitution had confirmed two of the CNC's earlier fears: 
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first, that educated men from outside were seeking to 
'interfere' with Solomon and so might disrupt the tribal 
system in Zululand, and, second, that Inkatha did not see 
itself as an organisation that represented only Zululand, 
or even just Natal and Zululand. The CNC's response was to 
argue that Inkatha's stated aims were still "hopelessly 
indefinite", and accordingly the NAD informed Inkatha that 
f ' , 1 ,,252 d it could not be given of lCla recognltlon. In regar 
to the royal petition, the new magistrate of Nongoma stated 
that he feared the "very powerful combination of Natives 
under Solomon in Zululand" if the historically 'loyal' (ie. 
loyal to the British Crown subsequent to conquest) leaders 
of the Buthelezi and Mandlakazi were allowed to become 
Solomon's chief counsellors. He was convinced that there was 
no room in the administration for the office of paramount 
chief. 253 In turn, the CNe's response to being explicitly 
'hurried' by the Zulu royal family was to retreat from his 
recent pragmatism. Referring to the conditions of Solomon's 
appointment in 1917, he suggested Solomon be informed that 
his jurisdiction was limited to the Usuthu ward alone and was 
"still temporary" - a rash and unrealistic response. He went 
on to argue that if Mathole and Bokwe wished to take up posts 
with Solomon, they would have to renounce their chieftainships 
of the Buthelezi and Mandlakazi - he was particularly fearful 
of the consequences that the unification of the Usuthu and 
Mandlakazi would have for Solomon's status.
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In late 1926 
and early 1927 the NAD could feel the Solomon and local council 
issue to be less pressing; the emotional euphoria of 1925 had 
ebbed and the events of 1926 had proved Inkatha to be less a 
monolithic populist movement than it had appeared in 1925. 
The annual meeting of Inkatha held during September 1926 is 
one of crucial importance: it highlighted a number of important 
features of the organisation and signalled that it was entering 
a new phase of its history. First, there was a comparatively 
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small attendance at the 1926 meeting. In particular there 
were very few tribal leaders present. The simultaneous meeting 
of the Native Affairs Commission at Vryheid, together with the 
inclement weather, had a role in keeping the attendance down. 
But the main factor was that the recent NAD instructions 
against Inkatha collections had been interpreted as a sign 
of the government's disapproval of Inkatha's existence 
altogether. 255 The sensitivity of Inkatha's body politic 
(especially among its tribal supporters) to the wishes of 
the government emphasised that Inkatha was essentially a 
collaborative organisation and was largely dependent on 
government approval. Second, during the 1926 meeting there 
was an attempt on the part of local militant leadership to 
redefine Inkatha's political stance. This introduced a new 
fissure within Inkatha. As the poor attendance and the low 
spirits of the Inkatha leadership (Oscroft's report spoke of 
a sense of "futility") at the 1926 meeting indicated, Inkatha's 
impetus and sense of direction in late 1925 had been corroded 
by discord within its leadership during 1926. The import of 
th~ meeting was not, however, purely negative: the way in 
which Inkatha personnel reacted against the militant element 
at the meeting indicated that there were new grounds for an 
elitist alliance, and that Inkatha had a role to play in 
representing it. 
Solomon chose not to attend any of the proceedings of the 1926 
meeting - not even the private executive committee meeting 
which the 'patron' and 'treasurer' was obliged to attend. 
He preferred instead to remain out of sight in his house for 
the duration of the meeting. Furthermore, the cost of catering 
for the gathering was not met by Solomon personally as in 1925, 
but by Inkatha funds.
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Divisions were expressed even within 
Inkatha's petty bourgeois leadership: friction existed between 
the secretary, Simelane, and the chairman, Bhulose, which was 
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probably a reflection of the different political priorities 
of the local Zulu petty bourgeoisie as opposed to the 
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'outs~der' from Natal proper. Nonetheless, it was the 
petty bourgeoisie as a whole that was undeniably dominant. 
The proceedings of the meeting were almost wholly taken up 
in discussion of the three new 'Native Bills' that Hertzog 
had tabled during the 1926 parliamentary session. Apart 
from the 'Native Lands Further Release and Acquisition Bill', 
which aimed to 'release' certain tracts of land abutting the 
reserves for African ownership, the bills were barely of 
interest to Zululand's tribal elite. The 'Union Native Council 
Bill' aimed to establish a council of fifty Africans, of whom 
thirty five were to be elective, as a substitute for the 
Native Conferences established under the 1920 Act. The 
'Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill' aimed to remove 
Cape Africans from the common voters' roll in the Cape, and 
as an alternative provide seven white representatives of 
258 African interests in the House of Assembly. 
The meeting passed two related resolutions. One was an 
"appreciation of the life and work of the late Hon. J. X. 
Merriman" (the prominent defender of the 'Cape liberal 
tradition'). The other was an expression of "regret that 
certain Cape Natives should be deprived of the Franchise, which 
••. they have never abused". These issues were far divorced 
from the political priorities of those tribal zulu who were 
present; and the resolutions were passed despite Mankulumana's 
statement that the meeting had "no right"to pass any resolutions 
since the chiefs were absent. 259 
M. L. E. Maling, a delegate from Northern Natal, also 
disagreed with these resolutions but for very different reasons: 
he believed that they were not forceful enough. Maling was 
a Christian (Wesleyan Methodist), educated and exempted African 
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from the Vryheid district who was employed as a clerk. 
Although details of his career before 1926 are fragmentary, 
it seems that Maling had been connected in some way with the 
NNC and, like other educated Natal Africans, had become 
'radicalised' in the mid 1920s. When the lCU took off in 
Natal under Champion in late 1925, Maling took up the role 
of ICU organiser in Northern Natal - a role that he 
strenuously denied before NAD officials. During 1926 -
prior to his arrival at the Inkatha meeting - Maling had 
conducted a number of meetings throughout Northern Natal, 
and had consolidated a solid base of support among impoverished 
labour tenants and farm workers. 261 He was by nature a 
flamboyant and confident character, and his forthright 
approach to politicizing the local rank-and-file soon earned 
him the archetypal image of an "out of work agitator, 
exploiting the Natives .•• for his own advancement and selfish 
ends" in the eyes of the Natal NAD. Indeed, there were 
strong parallels between Maling and Champion. Maling's 
stylish clothing, flourishing handwriting and good command 
of English also made a particular impression on the CNC. 262 
However, living in a region in which the authority of chiefs 
was stronger than in Natal proper, and in which lnkatha 
was unquestionaby the dominant political organisation, Maling 
needed in sarewayto establish a relationship with Inkatha. 
This need was also prompted by Maling's personal reverence 
for Solomon. Thus he attended the 1926 Inkatha meeting, 
accompanied by a group of supporters from Northern Natal. 263 
Although Maling's prime concern had hitherto been with the 
relations between labour tenant and landlord in the Vryheid 
(including Babanango sub-district), Ngotshe, Utrecht, 
Paulpietersburg and Piet Retief districts, at his first 
appearance in Inkatha he chose to focus on what seemed to be 
the issue of the day - Hertzog's 'Native Bills'. Addressing 
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the meeting, Maling. used his considerable oratorial skills 
in a rigorous denunciation of state policy. As Oscroft 
remarked, "his views obviously appealed very strongly to 
the gathering". He would have led the assembly to pass a 
resolution in condemnation of Hertzog's 'Native Bills' were 
it not for the intervention of Inkatha's existing conservative 
rulers. Oscroft was deeply impressed by the way in which 
Mankulumana and Mnyaiza arose to "counteract the influence 
of extremists .••• a striking illustration of the powers of 
leadership still retained by the headmen of Zululand". 
Mankulumana and Mnyaiza were strongly supported by the 
. Bh 1 264 chalrman, u osee 
This incident set the shape of Inkatha politics for the rest 
of its existence. Whatever the differences between Inkatha's 
petty bourgeois and tribal elites and however strongly these 
were contested, petty bourgeois and tribal leaders were 
to unite solidly ~gainst rank-and-file radicalism and 
militant leadership. From 1927, Zulu politics resolve into 
a struggle between three classes: the petty bourgeoisie, the 
tribal elite and the rank-and-file, and the dominant cleavage 
is between the two elites on the one hand and the rank-and-file 
on the other. As an organisation that pretended to represent 
all Zulu, Inkatha was liable to 'subversion' from within just 
as the NNC had been in 1924. What distinguished Inkatha from 
the NNC at these equivalent points in their history, however, 
was that Inkatha was necessarily inseparable from Solomon and 
the zulu tribal establishment. Within Inkatha there was thus 
an inbuilt bias towards those leaders most favoured by the 
latter. The pressures on Solomon to identify with radical 
leadership were thus considerable. 
The political struggles that ensued within zulu politics at 
large and within Inkatha in particular were much more than a 
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struggle between two political strategies - militancy versus 
hamba kahle respectability: a real understanding of the 
clashes must be located in a context of an understanding 
of Zulu social change and class differentiation. Moreover, 
the political struggles cannot be understood in the context 
of Zulu politics exclusively, for various white interest 
groups, in their own struggle against the threat of the leU 
and kindred movements, began to seek Zulu allies. In so doing, 




MILITANT AFRICAN ADVERSARIES AND WHITE ALLIES: THE ORIGINS 
AND PURPOSE OF INKATHA'S RECONSTITUTION IN 1928 
Economic crisis and social stratification among the Zulu 
After the respite of the early 1920s, Africans in Zululand 
and Northern Natal entered a period of socio-economic 
hardship and dislocation far worse than they had endured 
in the period immediately preceding and during the first 
world war. The crisis point came in 1931 and 1932, for in 
these years the already fragile economic life of the rural 
areas was subject to two additional afflictions. First, 
the early 1930s in Zululand and Northern Natal were drought 
years comparable to those of the late l890s. However, the 
consequences in 1931, when the drought was at its height, 
were far more devastating - partly as a result of the pressures 
that human and livestock population growth during the 1920s 
had placed on the land. Between 1916 and 1936, the African 
population in the Zululand inland reserves increased by 
1 approximately 43 per cent; and, although contemporary official 
reports do not provide statistics, it is evident that livestock 
population growth in these reserves for this period far 
outstripped human population growth. 2 In the neighbouring 
non-reserve districts of Vryheid and Ngotshe - where east 
coast fever had also been virtually eradicated by 1920 - the 
number of African-owned cattle were increasing at the phenomenal 
rate of approximately 11 per cent per annum during the mid-
1920s. 3 Ndesheni kaMnyaiza vividly recalled that in ·the 
aftermath of the drought in the Nongoma and Mahlabatini 
districts, a snake could be seen moving across the other side 
4 of the valley for there was no grass left at all. In 1931 
the Natal Witness reported that all that stood between the 
Zulu and starvati on was "feeding daily on the dying cattle".5 
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Second, as a dependent periphery of the capitalist economy, 
Zulu land and Northern Natal shared in the consequences 
of the Great Depression. More and more would-be migrants 
were unable to find employment, and rural families were thus less 
able to supplement their sub-subsistence agricultural 
d ' h '1' t 6 production with wages earne 1n t e cap1ta 1st sec or. 
Under these conditions, the demands made on those who were 
employed were intensified. In late 1931 the Natal NAD 
instructed the Director of Native Labour in Johannesburg and 
all local officials and pass officers in Natal to "impress 
upon Lall employed Africans from Northern Natal and Zululang] 
the necessity for making regular remittances as money is now 
required at their homes more than ever".7 Local chiefs 
followed this up with personal visits to employment centres 
- Chief ~1a thole, for example, arranged to tour the mining 
8 
compounds and Natal collieries in early 1922. Many Zulu 
resorted to selling their cattle in order to buy food from 
local trading stores. Local traders and NAD officials arranged 
cattle sales in Eshowe, Nongoma and Vryheid districts; these 
9 proved to be highly popular. Another response, however, 
was to seek employment on the Zululand sugar estates - which 
the zulu had hitherto resisted, despite the efforts of the 
sugar industry, because working conditions and wages compared 
unfavourably with those on the gold fields and in urban 
10 centres. The consequence was a major malaria epidemic in 
the Zululand inland reserves and Northern Natal. Inland Zulu 
had not developed an immunity to malaria which had become 
endemic in the coastal districts following the extension of 
plantation production and the railway network. In early 
1932 Oscroft reported that there were homesteads in the Nongoma 
district in which half a dozen people had died of the disease. ll 
Further factors in the spread of the disease were the evictions 
of Zulu from white-owned land in Northern Natal and the 
overcrowding of the healthy and more fertile Zululand inland 
reserves: this increasingly forced non-immune Zulu to settle 
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in the low-1Y1ng reg10ns. 
In late 1931, the state of the Zulu people became a matter 
for widespread public concern. In one of its many articles 
on the matter, the Natal Witness reported that "practically 
all sign of plant life has been killed ••• famine prevails in 
all its intensity". This same report's estimate that 
deaths among Zulu-owned cattle were to be numbered in 
"tens of thousands" was undoubtedly conservative: E. G. 
Jansen, Minister of Native Affairs and MP for Vryheid, 
informed parliament that over two hundred thousand Zulu 
13 
cattle died in the period June to November 1931 alone. 
The Bishop of Zululand petitioned the government for the 
distribution of emergency rations. 14 The Natal Witness also 
gave prominence to zulu representations to the SNA during 
an indaba in Nongoma in 1931. Chief Mathole announced that 
the Zulu were starving and could only hope that their 
hitherto unsympathetic father, the government, would now 
provide food. Msenteli Zulu of the Mandlakazi, Chief Bokwe's 
brother, developed the patriarchal imagery in his emotive 
observation that "we are in the position of orphans".15 In 
an unprecedented move, the NAD declared the Zululand inland 
reserves to be famine areas and instituted the distribution 
of emergency maize rations to the inhabitants on the basis 
of nine months credit. 16 For the financial year 1931-1932 
the NAD spent £35,800 on the "relief of distress" in Zululand 
and Northern Natal - 81 per cent of its total expenditure 
in this category over the whole union. 17 It also wrote off 
£30,000 of the £80,000 local tax arrears that had accrued 
18 in the Zululand inland reserves. 
The drought was only the immediate cause of the famine; the 
underlying causes lie in the complex process of socio-economic 
decline which had accelerated after 1925. The famine relief 
distributed by the government in the early 1930s saved many 
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Zulu from starvation - and informed white opinion said so 
b 1 'd 19 E at the time with a sense of enevo ent prl e. mergency 
food was not distributed during the comparable drought 
years of the 1890s - at which time Zulu subsistence was 
simultaneously afflicted by locust plagues and cattle losses 
, 1 d 20 Th through disease - and no mass starvatlon resu te . e 
intensity of the famine in the early 1930s illustrates how 
Zulu economic life in the reserves and on neighbouring white 
farms had become more fragile between the two periods of 
drought. However, these observations on economic decline 
among the Zulu as a whole do not by themselves provide a 
basis for an understanding of developments in Zulu politics 
in the late 1920s. Indeed, not all sections of the Zulu 
became poorer during this period. 
During the late 1920s, the existence of sparsely inhabited 
low-lying regions in the reserves and the increasing number 
of Zulu-owned cattle led certain magistrates and many local 
settlers to claim that the Zululand reserves were not 
21 
congested and that the Zulu were prosperous. The sugar 
industry's persistent complaints that Zulu prosperity in the 
reserves kept them away from wage labour on the sugar 
plantations was prejudiced and hence is not entirely reliable 
- the sugar industry resolutely refused to accept that poor 
wages and health conditions rendered plantation work 
unattractive to the zulu. 22 But there was an element of 
truth in these local white views on the state of the reserves. 
As Charles Simkins has shown in his detailed analysis of 
agricultural production in the Union's reserves between 
1918 and 1969, the value of agricultural production in the 
Zulu land reserves in relationship to the number of inhabitants 
in 1927 was the highest in the whole Union except for the 
Transkei. He concludes that Zululand and the Transkei were 
the two reserve regions "most nearly self sufficient in 
food .•• ,,!3 This must not, however, be taken at face value. 
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Two crucial qualifications must be made. First, the relative 
prosperity of many Zulu in the reserves masks the fact 
that very many more were becoming acutely impoverished. 
Simkins' conclusions are based on statistics arrived at by 
dividing the value of agricultural production in the Zululand 
reserves as a whole by population figures. They do not, 
in Simkins' words, take account of "the distribution of 
production and productive assets" within Zulu society - in 
other words, differential distribution of wealth and social 
stratification. 24 Second, about one-third of the Zulu lived 
outside Simkins' domain of study - the reserves. The following 
survey of socio-economic change among the Zulu considers 
conditions in both the Zululand reserves and Northern Natal. 
In order to provide an index to social stratification among 
reserve dwellers, Simkins goes on to calculate the distribution 
of cattle among the population of selected reserves. His 
findings indicate that in the Nongorna district in 1945, 53 per 
cent of the population owned no cattle at all. Of those who 
did own cattle, 55 per cent (ie. 27.5 per cent of the whole 
population) owned herds of more than twenty-five. Social 
stratification was, however, even more marked than these 
figures suggest, because the average herd size was thi:ty-
six. By comparison, in Umtata district (Transkei) in 1942, 
26 per cent of the population owned no cattle at all, and 
only 7 per cent (ie. 3.5 per cent of the Umtata population) 
owned herds of more than twenty-five. The reserves in which 
the distribution of cattle among the population was most 
egalitarian were those of Natal proper. 
represents the most striking instance of 
ownership in all the Union's reserves. 
The Nongoma district 
inequality of cattle 
The next highest 
disparity is recorded in the Nqutu district - the only other 
Zululand district to be considered in Simkins' survey.25 
Simkins' findings describe conditions approximately fifteen 
years after our period. The late 1920s, however, were the 
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years in which differences of wealth widened within the 
zululand reserves and social stratification crystallised 
in a new form. 
In giving evidence before the Native Economic Commission 
in 1930, Archdeacon Lee reported that individuals in the 
Zululand reserves had herds of as many as three hundred 
to four hundred cattle. More tellingly, he argued that 
"one of the obstacles in the way of more economic use of 
the land is through the land-grabbing by men of importance 
in the community".26 In reply to a question about wealth 
among the Zulu, Chief Mgixo kaZiwedu Zulu (a grandson of 
Mpande) told the same commission that "some are very poor; 
in other words it [WealtQ7 is unevenly distributed".27 Chiefs, 
like Mgixo, constituted the wealthiest stratum within the 
reserves. Their status and role as allocators of land 
accorded them positions of advantage in gaining access to 
the most fertile areas within their wards for their personal 
use. Furthermore, the tribute that tribal leaders received 
from their wards, together with the higher sums their 
daughters commanded as lobolo, continually reinforced their 
material predominance. Chiefs and headmen also had a 
consistent source of monetary income by way of the fines that 
they imposed in the course of carrying out their judicial 
functions under customary law - they were also empowered to 
impose 'spot fines' for "any defiance or disregard for their 
28 
orders" - and by way of the regular stipends they drew from 
the state. In the late 1920s, Zululand chiefs' stipends 
mainly fell between £250 and £350 per annum, depending on 
the size of their wards (Solomon's was the highest at £500 
29 
per annum). Chiefs had the largest cash incomes in the 
reserves and did not have to face the insecurities of possible 
unemployment - the NAD very rarely deposed chiefs. Commoner 
homesteads had no correspondingly large and stable insurance 
against the failure of the harvest; in such times they were 
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forced to divert more of their labour-power from their own 
agricultural activities to the wage sector, or resort to 
selling their cattle to generate cash for subsistence. The 
latter responses served, in the long term, to undermine 
the resilience and productive potentiality of commoner 
homesteads. In this way, years of poor crop yields had the 
effect of drawing more sharply the divisions of wealth 
within Zulu society. 
The comparative wealth of chiefs and headmen was not so marked 
in Northern Natal, primarily because they had no more 
control over land allocation and use than commoners in their 
wards. The government's purchase of a farm in the Ngotshe 
district for Chief Kambi's personal use was an exception. 
Like every homestead head within their wards, chiefs on white-
owned land had to negotiate their separate tenancy agreements 
with their white landlords. And because every homestead 
head was beholden to his respective landlord rather than his 
chief for the land upon which his homestead lay, and more 
often than not was required to offer labour service to his 
landlord, the authority of chiefs was attenuated and 
truncated. Moreover, chiefs on white farms were sometimes 
subject to the indignity of personally having to provide 
labour service to their landlords - which tended to act as 
a social leveller. When the CNC heard that Chief Mshudulwana 
of Paulpietersburg district had been required by his landlord 
to perform the "humiliating task" of wagon leader (normally 
performed by youngsters), he intervened and attempted to 
ensure that Chief Mshudulwana was not given such work again. 
Generally, the erosion of the status of chiefs in Northern 
Natal perturbed the CNC: it was in the interests of the 
"better government of the natives", he argued in 1928, that 
land be bought for the "personal occupation of chiefs 
th 1 "30 emse ves. But, as Rev. Mahamba of Dundee remarked to 
the Native Economic Commission, the reason why Africans were 
242 
"abandoning their chiefs" was because of the difficulties 
that all Africans (not only chiefs) experienced with land 
tenure in the white countryside.
31 
And indeed, those who 
had to remove during the wave of evictions in the late 
1920s were in effect forced to 'abandon' their chiefs. These 
factors were compounded by ideological and cultural forces 
corrosive to the tribal order. Without fail, those individuals 
who have been mentioned so far who can be seen as part of 
a local zulu petty bourgeoisie - Rev. S. D. Simelane, W. W. 
Ndhlovu, the Sibiya family, Daniel Vilakazi, Rev. T. Mathe, 
Rev. C. Buthelezi, Rev. M. Mhlongo, M. L. E. Maling - either 
lived, worked, or had originated from that part of the Zulu 
country which had become the Boer New Republic and, 
subsequently, Northern Natal. 
These were conditions corrosive to the status of chiefs and 
sense of unity among each chief's ward that had no parallel 
in the reserves. The process of 'social levelling' in Northern 
Natal should not, however, be overemphasised. Most chiefs 
here were hereditary Zulu chiefs, and they retained considerable 
status at the ideological level: in the late 1920s they clearly 
held more sway than those in the white countryside of Natal 
proper. And, unlike commoners, they could still look to the 
state for financial support and special intervention in 
their personal tenancy problems. Nonetheless, it is more 
useful to regard chiefs in Northern Natal as a privileged 
and conservative component of the rank-and-file, rather than 
- as in the case of chiefs in the Zululand reserves - an 
entrenched class of wealthy aristocrats. 32 
Hitherto, the Zulu petty bourgeoisie (as distinct from that 
in Natal proper) was comparatively underdeveloped and had only 
really come into being in Northern Natali even there, the 
move against African landownership and cash tenancy after 
Union repressed its development. However, by the late 1920s 
there was a small stratum of Zulu in the reserves who pursued 
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careers as commercial farmers or trading brokers - and there 
were many more who aimed to do so. These individuals were 
predominantly western-influenced (whether through a basic 
education or through experience of urban life) and young. 
S. Mncwango, Mkwintye, and T. Kumalo were examples: all were 
commoners resident in the Nongoma district (none were exempted), 
and they gave evidence before the Native Economic Commission 
representing the 'Young Zulu Movement,.33 Mncwango made his 
living as a broker of skins and poultry, and was also keenly 
interested in commercial agriculture.
34 
There were an 
appreciable number of individuals like Mncwango who traded 
under hawkers' licences, and they provided the medium through 
which the local commercial farmers sold their produce. Others 
were taking aut licences to open butcheries and, though 
prospective shopowners were being 'held back' by the white 
monopoly of trading stores, some of Zululand's trading stores 
35 
were now managed by Zulu. Mkwintye was a successful 
commercial farmer in Zululand. He employed forty to sixty 
zulu "assistants" on a seasonal basis, and his labourers were 
paid 1/- a day - the same rate that obtained for wage labour 
on whl'te farms.36 N t 'th t d' th f 1 f o Wl s an lng e success u ew, Mncwango 
observed that prospects for "progressive agricultura~ists" 
were poor in the reserves because chiefs and headmen (Mncwango 
lived in Chief Bowke's ward) refused to allocate them 
sufficient and suitable land. 37 
'Progressive' individuals living in the reserves throughout 
the province of Natal were confronting opposition from the 
tribal elite. A representative of the 'Bantu Youth League' 
(an association similar to the Young Zulu Movement but based 
in the reserves of Natal proper) told the Native Economic 
Commission that chiefs held their wards in a "state of 
stagnation ••• new ideas coming from people other than chiefs 
and headmen receive no recognition; the door to individual 
ini tia ti ve is closed and thus progress is hampered .•. ".38 
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Speaking generally of Natal and Zululand, Dube observed that 
tribal commoners opposed 'progress' as much as the chiefs 
themselves. 'Progress', in Dube's view, meant that "there 
must be some people getting ahead of the others" but "the old 
idea of communal life Lffiean§7 that all people should stay 
39 on the same level". Wheelwright instanced a case in which 
an individual who fenced 'his' lands, employed labour and 
produced cash crops was "got at" by other reserve dwellers 
through witchcraft because he was deemed to be "apeing the 
white man".40 Tribal opposition was as much a reaction against 
the different social habits and values of 'progressive' 
Africans as a jealousy for the latter's private wealth. 
Oscroft told the Native Economic Commission that there was 
a"growing intolerance between tribal and detribalised natives" 
in zululand;41 and Solomon reported that migrants returning 
to the reserves from the urban areas tended to find traditional 
food and housing to be "inconveniences".42 
The evolution of a small petty bourgeoisie in the Zululand 
reserves in the later half of the 1920s was a significant 
development. Specifically, it was to lend greater power to 
petty bourgeois interests in Inkatha. However, like the 
African petty bourgeoisie in both the white countryside and 
urban environs throughout the Union, the Zulu petty bourgeoisie 
in the reserves was stunted and repressed, and was primarily 
an aspirant class. Beneath the comparatively few who did fulfil 
their 'progressive' ambitions in Zululand, there were many 
who were struggling to do so - and in the meantime 
oscillated between wage labour outside Zululand and the 
fringes of tribal life at home. This latter group was 
particularly unstable and in practice formed an important 
component of the somewhat amorphous underclass, the rank-
and-file. 43 
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Political developments among the Zulu and Natal African rank-
and-file 
The rank-and-file were indeed such an amorphous social 
grouping that it can be most succintly defined in a negative 
sense: broadly, it included those who were not chiefs and 
headmen in the reserves or were not relatively successful 
members of the petty bourgeoisie both in the reserves and 
in the 'white countryside'. As a broad rural underclass, 
comprised of disparate elements, the rank-and-file lacked 
objective unity within itself. The manifestations of a 
specifically rank-and-file political consciousness tended 
to be sporadic, isolated and often inconclusive. Nonetheless, 
during the late 1920s the rank-and-file developed a certain 
self-identity, based on a common experience of impoverishment, 
exploitation and insecurity. This was coupled with a shared 
frustration with 'the system' - whether this was represented 
by state officials and the laws they enforced, conservative 
tribal authorities and demanding parents, employers or 
landlords. Moreover, there developed a basis of shared 
political attitudes: a predisposition to reject established 
structures of authority and the modes of political represent-
ation that worked through them, a tendency to abjure 
acquiescence and 'polite pleading' in favour of organisation 
and action, an impatience with piecemeal reforms, and an 
enthusiasm for fundamental changes in property relations 
and the distribution of political power. These attitudes 
were expressed with varying degrees of conviction through 
the province of Natal. The power of chiefs and the extent 
to which the rural population felt themselves to be politically 
compartmentalised into discrete tribal units were not 
uniform throughout the province - and the particular socio-
political conditions extant in the rural districts defined 
the parameters for the evolution of rank-and-file uriity and 
consciousness. The power of local chiefs and the attitude they 
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adopted to the political inclinations of the rank-and-file 
was thus of great importance. Even more so was the 
attitude of Solomon: since popular consciousness accorded 
him the role of popular leader, Solomon in practice held 
the key to the political development of the rank-and-file. 
As a rule, however, the tribal elite disavowed militancy 
and saw the development of popular protest as inimical to 
their social and political dominance. It is notable that 
in the regions in which social stratification was greatest 
and the rule of chiefs was most entrenched, popular protest 
was least in evidence. Nonetheless, even in the Zulu land 
reserves, chiefs perceived their positions to be potentially 
threatened. This was to be a dynamic influence on the political 
stance of the tribal elite - and on the political alliance 
within Inkatha. The following account outlines some of the 
social and political forces at work in the rural areas which 
the tribal elite perceived to be threatening. It is important 
to remember that the Zulu royal house and Inkatha defined 
the whole province of Natal as its political domain and all 
the inhabitants as 'Zulu'; hence, developments among Natal 
Africans in the white countryside of Natal proper were not 
seen in isolation from those among the Zulu in Northern Natal 
and Zululand. 
Throughout the province of Natal, the power base of the leu 
lay not in the reserves but among the rural poor resident 
on white-owned land - and for clear reasons. Outside the 
reserves, the constraining tribal order was more fragile 
and 'social disintegration' was more pronounced. Reflecting 
the lesser material division between chiefs and common 
people in the white countryside, chiefs tended to identify 
more with the rank-and-file. Rather than deploying their 
influence in an attempt to undermine popular struggles (as 
did chiefs in the Zululand reserves), many chiefs in Northern 
Natal lent the latter their support - albeit conditionally and, 
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in practice, at the cost of dampening popular militancy. 
The white countryside of Natal proper came to be the storm-
centre of rank-and-file militancy in the province, as was 
reflected in the strength of the rcu there, and Northern 
Natal was the region in which the rcu gained most support 
among the Zulu. Rank-and-file political concerns in Northern 
Natal, however, were mainly expressed through the medium 
of the 'Abaqulusi Land Union' (ALU) - a local rCU-derivative 
organisation established by Maling in 1927.
44 
Above all, 
the exploitative relations between tenants/labourers and 
landlords/employers in the white countryside caused rank-
and-file political mobilisation to be far more urgent and 
political issues far clearer than in the reserves. As Maling 
expressed it (referring specifically to the Zulu rather than 
Natal Africans), whatever the problems of reserve dwellers, 
they were "infinitely better than people living on farms".45 
Although conditions on white farms gave cause for Zulu 
in Northern Natal to wage their separate struggles against 
their landlords and the state, the division between Northern 
Natal and the Zululand reserves should not be too boldly 
drawn. Not only were the Zulu in the two regions bound 
together by kinship linkages and tribal political affiliations 
(Chief Nkantini kaSitheku Zulu's ward, for example, was 
divided between the Emtonjaneni reserve and the Babanango 
sub-district): the unprecedented wave of tenant evictions 
that accompanied the extension of white commercial farming 
in the late 1920s caused physical trans locations as homeless 
Zulu poured into the reserves for shelter. 46 This had the 
twin effects of heightening the discontent of the reserves 
on account of overcrowding and land degeneration, and 
introducing to the reserves a body of inhabitants whose 
political outlooks had been shaped by direct experience 
of political struggle in the white countryside - and by 
the pronouncements of rcu and ALU leadership. Evictions and, 
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more broadly, decreasing land availability, were thus urgent 
political issues for Africans on both white farm land and 
in the reserves. 
Local NAD officials in Northern Natal and Zululand were 
unusually explicit in their complaints about the "unscrupulous 
landlord ••• being unjust to his tenants", and they were well 
aware that the socio-economic consequences were not confined 
to the aggrieved tenants themselves.
47 
Maling held that 
more evictions took place in Northern Natal between 1928 
and 1930 than in the whole twentieth century history of the 
region prior to 1928. 48 A representative of a chief who 
lived in the Vryheid district held that generally "people 
on farms are being scattered and are drifting ••• being 
. 49 
deprived of all that home connotes". Revealing their 
different perspective on the matter of evictions, chiefs 
in the neighbouring reserves complained of refugees "flocking" 
to 'their' land from not only Northern Natal but from Natal 
proper as well - and, as one chief put it, "crowding me out".50 
Chief Mgixo of the Nongoma district vividly described the 
border between his reserve and white farm land as a "yawning 
crack that empties forth human beings". He continued that 
"these unfortunate people come along to me and plead with 
me to accommodate them; after all we are of them and they 
are of us ••• ". Though Mgixo made efforts to accommodate the 
people themselves on his already overcrowded lands, he prevented 
them bringing their livestock with them. However, the response 
of the 'unfortunate people' to such additional deprivations 
was not only, as Mgixo related, to "just fold their arms and 
look at me in a sad way" 51 Indeed, during the late 1920s 
the zulu tribal elite in the reserves expended much energy 
in forestalling the growth of rank-and-file militancy which, 
to them, was coterminous with the breakdown o f the tribal 
order and the corrosion of chiefly authority by 'young 
upstarts', 'agitators', 'self-seekers' or people with 'a bit 
. ,52 
of book learnlng • 
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Although he was somewhat over-emphatic, 
there was considerable truth in the SNA's statement to the 
Select Committee on the 1926 'Prevention of Disorders Bill' 
(ie. anti-sedition Bill): "None of thisLlcu and kindreQ7 
propaganda is being carried out in Zululand. The Zulu 
chiefs are very strict .•• they do not allow these agitators 
to come into zululand.,,53 
Apart from the impoverished new arrivals from the white farms, 
the reserves contained numbers of 'detribalised' Zulu. 
From the point of view of the tribal establishment, the 
54 
latter were the abaqafi - or 'those whose heads have turned'-
who reneged on thei~ 'tribal' obligations and did not offer 
financial support to their relatives. In 1927 Chief Kula 
of the Msinga district (in Natal proper, on the south-western 
border of Zululand) described "a certain element of the 
younger natives who are •.• becoming entirely separated from 
the tribal natives. They are found in the native reserves 
also. They are irresponsible and disrespectful and recognise 
no authority at all.,,55 More broadly, these people were 
part of the restive floating population of acculturated 
social 'misfits' and unfulfilled 'progressive' men ~ as 
Kula's description went to to indicate. There "is also this 
tendency amongst them LQetribalised youngster§7, Kula observed, 
"that the ground allotted in the locations Lreserveg? should 
be recognised as belonging to certain individuals, but this 
is not recognised by tribal rule.,,56 The largest (and 
also the least volatile) part of the rank-and-file in the 
reserves comprised the inhabitants of small homesteads who 
no longer owned cattle and who, in the course of increasing 
land congestion, social stratification and labour migration, 
had been left with neither adequate land or labour-power 
to generate a subsistence by 'picking the eyes of the ground,.57 
One response of these impoverished homestead heads was to 
look to their chiefs and headmen to assist them in forcing 
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'b 1 bl' , 58 B t the abaqafi to fulfil their tr1 a 0 19at10ns. u 
another was to dispense with such inherently conservative 
and piecemeal attempts to alleviate their poverty, and 
_ alongside other restive elements within the Zulu, including 
the abaqafi - lend support to militant leadership whose 
sweeping promises of more land and higher wages seemed to 
1 1 
' 59 offer the ong term so ut10n. 
The expression of popular discontent in the reserves - and 
the politicisation of the rank-and-file there - was 
consistently undercut by the rearguard action of chiefs, 
supported by state officials and white interest groups. 
When, for example, the leu held a meeting in Empangeni in 
mid-1927, it was well attended by enthusiastic local Zulu. 
Two local chiefs, having been told that Solomon was also 
to be present, also attended. Soon afterwards, the Empangeni 
and District Farmers' Association and local NAD officials 
together convened an indaba with seven local chiefs and 
their headmen ('commoners' did not attend) to discuss how 
to eradicate the leu. The meeting also discussed the 
disturbing influence of a firebrand "ex-minister" from 
Durban who had been in the region: he had reportedly told 
the locals that aggressive political action would force the 
h ' , d ,60 , aut or1t1es to re ress gr1evances. Col. Tanner, mag1strace 
of Empangeni, and George Higgs, sugar planter and represent-
ative of the local Farmers' Association, warned the 
intimate gathering of the consequences of leu policy and 
emphasised that the main casualty would be the position 
of chiefs. Why listen to "a man who was nothing, who 
stood on a chair and waved his arms and cast his shadow 
over [YoW", Higgs asked, and continued, "why must your 
grievances be voiced from a man in Durban?" The chiefs 
needed little persuasion. 6l 
In Northern Natal, the history of Maling and the ALU highlight 
the difficulties in the path of mobilising the rank-and-file 
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in a society in which tribal traditions weighed so heavily 
upon political consciousness. Maling's formation of a 
separate and regional ICU-style organisation after his 
unsuccessful debut at the 1926 lnkatha meeting, rather 
than assisting the new Vryheid branch of the ICU, was 
partly a reflection of his own personal ambition. Maling 
showed every sign of being as ambitious and fiery as 
Champion himself. However, the ALU was also designed to 
appeal to those notions of Zulu 'superiority' and exclusivity 
that formed such a tenacious component of the political 
traditions of Northern Natal. The name 'Abaqulusi Land 
Union' is itself significant: 'Land' identified the main 
political concern of the local inhabitants, and 'Abaqulusi' 
indicated that the organisation's leadership sought to 
integrate tradition with present popular protest. The 
Qulusi section in the Vryheid district - which formed a 
numerically small part of the ALU's political constituency 
- was traditionally a 'royal section' of the Zulu. In 
preconquest times the Qulusi were administered directly by 
the Zulu royal family and the Qulusi menfolk used to 
mobilise as an ibutho on their own (they were not conscripted 
into the usual age-grade amabutho).62 In the 1920s it retained 
its fervently royalist character and keen sense of military 
heritage. From the outset, therefore, the ALU attempted 
to come to terms with Zulu political traditions, rather 
than to present itself as a completely 'new' political 
organisation whose appeal was purely class-based. 
The mood of the ALU's constituency in Northern Natal was 
illustrated in a statement that was drawn up in early 1927 
following a number of regional meetings convened by Maling. 
Rather than dealing with grievances in a fragmentary fashion, 
the statement went to the heart of the matter: it contested 
white rights to the land in Northern Natal and called for 
the reversion of the land to the Zulu. Maling went to 
Cape Town and submitted this statement to A. B. Payn, MP for 
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Tembuland and leading parliamentary philanthropist. Payn 
arranged for Maling to see the Prime Minister personally, 
63 but this meeting served no purpose. On Maling's return 
to Northern Natal, the ALU's immediate priority was to 
compile comprehensive and plainly worded statements of Zulu 
tenants' and farm labourers' grievances, also including 
indictments of the behaviour of white farmers, the justice 
dispensed by magistrates' courts, and the partiality of 
local state officials. These formed the basis of a petition 
which was sent directly to the Prime Minister - an action 
that was regarded as an open breach of the etiquette of both 
indirect rule and employer-employee relations. 64 Obviously 
struck by the directness of the petition, and also very 
sensitive to the growing power of the leu in Natal proper, 
the NAD immediately arranged a thorough inquiry into the 
allegations. 65 The petition itself, the evidence collected 
during the eNe's inquiry, and the eNe's subsequent report 
immediately predated the 1928-1930 period of accelerated 
evictions, and thus focussed on conditions of Zulu tenure 
and employment of white farms. 
By the mid-1920s, the payment of cash rent for 'unbound' 
tenure on white-owned land in Northern Natal had been phased 
out: labour tenancy was the only way in which Zulu could 
retain access to land in the region. In the latter half 
of the 1920s the move among white landlords to exploit their 
landholdings more thoroughly for the purposes of commercial 
agriculture had adverse consequences for labour tenants 
66 in two broad respects. First, the plots of land available 
to the labour tenant for his personal use were reduced. 
Second, white farmers attempted to extract as much labour 
service as they were able from each homestead on their farms 
- making use of child labour and often requiring tenants to 
perform more than the six months free labour service that 
the 1913 Act had laid down as the maximum in Natal. Tenant 
homesteads which could not or would not acquiesce to such 
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demands were liable to retribution from the farmer (in the 
form of livestock seizure, for example) or, ultimately, 
eviction. Moreover, corporate capital flooded into the 
region, buying up farms from white landowners who had 
sunk deeply into debt during the post-war depression, 
and establishing large cotton plantations. On these 
plantations, of which the Candover Estates and Goss Estates 
were examples, labour tenancy was phased out and replaced 
67 by wage labour. For the Zulu in Northern Natal, these 
developments initiated a period of acute impoverishment 
and disruption of horne life. 
The ALU petition and the evidence given before the CNC's 
inquiry emphasised the autocratic and brutal nature of 
exploitation on white farms. Several complaints of physical 
1 d ' h' f 68 th assau t were rna e agalnst w lte armers. In e course 
of a detailed investigation into one complaint, the CNC 
uncovered evidence that on the newly-established Goss Estates 
- comprising twelve cotton farms in the Ngotshe and Vryheid 
districts owned by a single company - staff were 'disciplined' 
by farm managers and Zulu "farm constables" by way of handcuffs, 
leg-irons, solitary detention in special "lock-ups" and 
arbitrary appropriation of personal property. Mtateni 
Ndwandwe, a labour tenant on a Goss Farm who had been subjected 
to all these forms of violence and who had provided eighteen 
months unbroken free service, stated that he had not 
complained to the local magistrate or police because "I thought 
Goss was acting under Government authority ".69 Generally 
there was a sense among the rank-and-file in Northern Natal 
that state officials and farmers were in collusion: complaints 
were made that magistrates' courts offered little protection 
against farmers either breaching the statutory rights of 
labour tenants or dispensing their own 'justice' and 
, hm h' f 70 punls ent on t elr arms. Although the CNC felt the 
accusation of injustice in the magistrates' courts (ie.that 
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"Europeans always win") to be unfounded, he did not deny 
that farmers took the law into their own hands and forced 
their labour tenants to acquiesce under the threat of 
" " 71 eVl.ctl.on. 
As in Natal proper, farmers engaged complete homesteads in 
labour tenancy contracts (which were often verbal and thus 
easily 'modified' to suit the farmer) under what was known 
72 as the "kraalhead system". The contract was made with 
the homestead head and it was he who was reponsible for 
ensuring that all his dependants discharged their 'contractual' 
obligations to the farmer. The labour contract was thus 
superimposed on the tribal hierarchy at the familial level, 
and, like indirect rule,was predicated on the survival of 
the tribal order. However, these contracts ultimately 
undermined the tribal order at its very base. Not only were 
sons and daughters required to perform six months free service, 
but they were often required to continue working on the 
73 farm afterwards at the "current rate of LIarl!!7 wages" (and 
frequent complaints were made that they were sometimes not 
paid at al1
74
) which meant that they could not seek more 
remunerative employment elsewhere. Moreover, sons could not 
look to their fathers or chiefs to provide land for them 
to establish their own homesteads and families. The high 
incidence of youth breaking free from their labour obligations 
to their fathers and landlords and deserting permanently 
to the towns was a direct consequence of these conditions. 75 
Following a desertion, the homestead head was responsible 
for either providing a replacement labourer at his own 
expense, or paying "damages" to the farmer. If the homestead 
h d f "1 d t d h f d " " 76 ea al. e 0 0 so, e ace eVl.ctl.on. 
Even when tenant homesteads were not depleted of their full 
labour complemeht through the desertion of youths, they had 
difficulty in meeting their subsistence requirements and 
monetary needs. Since farmers made such stringent labour 
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service demands on all members of the tenant homestead -
from children to the very elderly - throughout the seasonal 
cycle, little time and labour power was left for tenants 
d b 
. 77 
to cultivate their own plots of land to pro uce a su s1stence. 
Tenant homesteads thus became increasingly dependent on 
a cash income for food. In view of the poor local rates of 
pay, they were already hard pressed - or unable - to pay 
government taxes, the annual livestock dipping fees (in the 
reserves, dips were state controlled and the levy was 
standardised, but in Northern Natal, white farmers used their 
dipping tanks as "profit making concerns"), and provide for 
"general necessities"like clothing. 78 Tenant homesteads 
thus looked to two sources of cash income: first, the sale 
of their livestock,79 and, second, remittances sent to them 
by members of the .homestead who had taken up paid employment 
after the expiry of their six-month period of free service. 
Remittances sent 'home' from the urban areas were at best 
sporadic, which further reflected . the breakdown of familial 
unity and the tribal ethos on which it was based. Rural 
dependants' complaints of the irresponsibility of youth 
were more forceful and widespread during the late 1920s 
in comparison to the early post-Union period: this suggests 
both that rural subsistence production had become less 
supportive and 
had widened. 80 
that the generational fissure in zulu society 
Ultimately, espeCially after they had no more 
cattle which they were able to sell (the sale of tenant 
livestock, incidentally, was applauded by white farmers, 
and high dipping charges encouraged the process), tenant 
homesteads became dependent on food rations from their 
81 landlords and employers. The 'debt' incurred by the 
receipt of food could be repaid in the form of labour service 
over and above the six-month period of free service. 
The conditions under which labour tenants in Northern Natal 
lived and worked varied according to the different labour 
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tenancy contracts that respective farmer/employers enforced. 
Nonetheless, it was a trend in the late 1920s that 
considerable numbers of Zulu in Northern Natal were becoming 
enmeshed in a downward spiral of impoverishment that was 
transforming them from labour tenants into rural serfs, 
almost wholly dependent on their landlords for daily survival 
and all the more exploitable for it. Conditions on the 
twelve farms of the Goss Estates provided an example. Here, 
individual labourers (even children) were summarily shifted 
from one farm to another, and those who had completed their 
term of free service were contractually not free to choose 
their own employment - they were still obliged to "turn out 
when called upon to perform any work which the landlord 
may require to be done". Moreover, no tenant was permitted 
to leave the Goss farm on which he or she was employed at 
any time "for any purpose whatsoever without the written 
permission of the landlord".B2 Although the CNC noted that 
"the younger Natives" were generally leaving for the towns, 
he opined that if conditions were as bad as had been 
represented there would be a "general exodus of tenants from 
farms" - arid this was not occurring.
B3 
Such a 'general exodus' 
was, however, underway within a year. The cause was not 
voluntary migration on the part of tenants but forcible 
evictions on the part of white farmers. Rather than 
signifying that farmers needed less labour, evictions reflect 
that farmers were exploiting more thoroughly the labour 
tenants that they chose to retain. Despite the worsening 
conditions on white farms, Zulu were loathe to sever their 
connections with the land of their ancestors on which, if 
little else, they could still cultivate hollow illusions 
of former independence. Moreover, because east coast fever 
regulations laid down that livestock could not be moved from 
one district to another without expensive veterinarian and 
bureaucratic sanction, emigre tenants were sometimes forced 
to "lose all they possess" in the course of moving. B4 
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The ALU petition and the CNC's inquiry it provoked were in 
practice of little material benefit to labour tenants in 
Northern Natal as a whole. The CNC's report called for 
minor changes in judicial practice in the magistrates' 
courts (designed to enlighten tenants of their rights), the 
standardisation of labour tenancy contracts, and, most 
important, the establishment of reserve areas in Northern 
Natal - he was satisfied that the Zulu could not raise the 
requisite cash for land purchase by means of 'tribal 
levies,.85 No action, however,was taken. And despite the evidence 
he had collected, the CNC still tended to subscribe to the 
colonial 'agitator thesis' on African protest: he argued 
that the ALU and ICU had "accentuated the state of affairs 
in the region". It is notable, however, that the influence 
of the ALU on the Goss Estates, which led forty tenants to 
go on strike during the CNC's inquiry and represent themselves 
to the CNC in a single deputation, resulted in an important 
victory. The CNC made special efforts to investigate 
conditions on the Goss Estates, and not only prevailed on 
management not to punish the strikers but also to ameliorate 
the terms of its labour tenancy contracts. In the final 
analysis, there is little doubt that the CNC's inquiry served 
to contain the further development of popular protest in 
Northern Natal. Indeed, striking Goss tenants immediately 
obeyed the CNC's instruction to return to work after he had 
promised that the NAD would negotiate with Goss management 
on their behalf. 86 In the midlands of Natal proper - where 
racial violence was shortly to erupt - the Natal NAD head 
office had at no stage formally intervened to play the role 
of an impartial intermediary between the rank-and-file and 
white farmers. 
The CNC's inquiry highlighted two other factors that hindered 
the development of rank-and-file militancy in Northern Natal 
to a level comparable to that in Natal proper. First, the 
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predominantly Afrikaner settlers in the region displayed 
a marked disregard for the rule of law, and were prone 
to 'administer' the African inhabitants of their farms 
in a manner reminiscent of the traditions of the white South 
African frontier. The transition to capitalist relations of 
production was carried through with a ruthlessness underpinned 
by an everyday brutality that seems to have been unequalled 
in the countryside of Natal proper. That the rank-and-file 
in Northern Natal were subject to more stringent everyday 
repression, and had every cause to believe that not only 
their livelihoods but their lives were endangered if they 
dropped their facade of servility, was certainly a reason 
why it could not mobilise so openly as the rank-and-file in 
the neighbouring Natal midlands. Although there were isolated 
cases of Northern Natal farmers being fined for assault, 
local police and NAD officials generally turned a blind eye 
to the flagrant transgressions of civil and criminal law 
that were committed on white farms. 87 
Second, and most important, the hierarchical nature of zulu 
society was reflected in the ALU - which proved to be a 
profoundly undemocratic organisation. Positions of 
leadership remained in the hands of unfulfilled 'progressive' 
men like Maling, and the popular appeal of the organisation 
relied heavily on the moral support it received from local 
chiefs. The apogee of rank-and-file radicalism in Natal 
proper was reached when 'ordinary people' - with neither 
educational or hereditary claims to positions of leadership 
- adopted the Natal rcu as their own representative organ-
isation and became unpaid local organisers or, in Bradford's 
words, "self-appointed propagandists".88 By contrast, the 
ALU's local leadership was never infused by Zulu 'ordinary 
people'. For all their radical and emotive exhortations, 
both Maling of the ALU and Champion of the Natal rcu were 
prone to be less militant in practice than the political 
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constituencies they purported to represent. When the Goss 
tenants went on strike, for example, Maling immediately 
"disclaimed all responsibility for what they had done" -
just as the Natal lCU headquarters in Durban had disowned 
the spontaneous strikes that took place in Durban and on 
the Northern Natal coal mines during 1927.
89 
Maling's role of leadership among the Zulu rank-and-file 
was underpinned by the status and skills that a petty 
bourgeois background and a mission education had imparted to 
him. Even so, despite the inroads that white occupation 
had made on the status of chiefs in Northern Natal, the Zulu 
inhabitants did not easily transfer the role of political 
leadership to 'commoners' like Maling when it came to so 
weighty a matter as confronting white rule. Although the 
socio-economic conditions in Northern Natal were virtually 
indistinguishable from those which fostered the ebullient 
militancy of the lCU in the Natal midlands, Maling was 
operating ih a context in which cultural and political 
traditions were both more rigid and tenacious - as his 
rebuttal at the hands of lnkatha's leadership had emphasised. 
The Zulu looked to tribal leadership to give sanction and 
morale to popular protest. But, in the words of the CNC, 
it was a "significant fact" that "no Chief associated himself 
wi th !>1alinga' s LSigl representations" or presented himself 
voluntarily to give evidence before the CNC's inquiry.90 
This was despite the support that chiefs had pledged the 
ALU before the inquiry.91 However, when the CNC summoned 
certain chiefs to him to give evidence, they left him in 
"no doubt ••• that they are solidly with 61aling7 in regard 
to the representations touching land".92 The stance of 
chiefs in Northern Natal was ambiguous: while they tended 
to support the political objectives of popular movements 
they were extremely hesitant to do so openly. Thus chiefs 
stopped short from taking up the vital popular role that 
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popular consciousness accorded them. Because of their 
ambiguity, they often tended to undermine the militancy and 
effectiveness of popular protest from within. The action 
of one chief resident near the border between the Nqutu 
district and Babanango sub-district provides an illustrative 
example. When it became known that this chief's whole ward 
- including the chief - supported the lCU, the magistrate 
of Nqutu, F. W. Ahrens, refused to hear any representations 
from them. The chief immediately responded by calling on 
Ahrens to apologise for "offending" him, to offer £1 as 
obeisance, and to promise that his ward would leave the 
lCu. 93 
The available evidence indicates that there were many parallels 
between the ALU and the Natal lCU (ie. the latter's rural 
network) during late 1926 and early 1927. The two organ-
isations shared essentially the same class character, political 
objectives, and militant style. The ALU petition clearly 
identified ordinary labour tenants in Northern Natal as the 
group that the ALU represented - not :te"nant chiefs 
in p~rticular, and categorically not the Northern Natal petty 
bourgeois establishment. Like the Natal lCU, ALU leadership 
was mainly composed .of men of some education who, in 
occupational terms, stood in the lower echelons of the petty 
bourgeoisie. Chiefs or chiefs' representatives did not hold 
positions on the executive committee (although chiefs were 
represented in the ALU): the early ALU did not take special 
cognisance of the tribal political order, for it perceived 
itself to be the direct representative organisation of the 
rank-and-file. The ALU chairman, A. M. Khubeka, and the 
regional organiser in Paulpietersburg district, E. H. S. Xaba, 
both described themselves as 'evangelists', but neither were 
d · d 94 or alne • 
Maling himself was born to a Wesleyan Methodist family of 
261 
Newcastle sharecroppers. P. Maling, who was evidently M. L. E. 
(Lymon) Maling's father or uncle, was an archetypal example 
of the petty bourgeois hamba kahle establishment of 'black 
Englishmen'. He was a founder member of the NNC, had 
subsequently acted as a representative of the Wesleyan 
Methodist Chief T. Gule of the Newcastle district.
95 
It 
is significant that P. Maling chose to change his name from 
the original Zulu 'Malinga' to the more English-sounding 
'Maling' (Lymon Maling sometimes reverted to the Zulu form). 
Lymon Maling, however, had reached adulthood in the post-
Union period when the prosperity and status of the colonial 
. b' . b . d' d 96 . Afrlcan petty ourgeolsle was elng un ermlne. Desplte 
his fluent Eng l ish, literacy and high-society inclinations 
(as reflected in his taste in clothing), he had only managed 
to penetrate the lower ranks of the urban salariat before 
turning to full-time politics. 97 In these respects, Lymon 
Maling's personal history correlates closely with that of 
Gilbert Coka, a leading figure in the ICU, whose relatively 
prosperous Vryheid sharecropping parents had moved to town 
soon after Union when their landlord attempted to bind 
them to labour tenancy. Thus both Lymon and Gilbert came from 
'respectable' backgrounds, and, like many others of their 
generation, found difficulty in fulfilling their own and 
their parents' aspirations. It was because this generation 
was, Bradford argues, "being precipi~ated into the under~ 
classes" that it was "ideologically linked" to the latter. 98 
Despite their early similarities, however, the political 
priorities of the ALU and Natal ICU diverged during 1927. 
In the white countryside of Natal proper, the Natal ICU 
continued to focus on rank-and-file grievances, and its 
local branch executives were infused by local 'commoners'. 
But the ALU increasingly devoted its attention in the first 
instance to tribal authorities, in an attempt to secure the 
latter's open and active support, and only i n the se cond i n s t ance 
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to the rank-and-file. The ALU was partly forced to do so 
by the political consciousness of the Northern Natal rank-
and-file itself - which was preoccupied with Zulu chiefs 
and Zulu nationalism. Thus the ALU leadership sought to 
associate itself with the latter in order to consolidate 
its popular support. In effect, the Northern Natal rank-
and-file dug its own political grave in the ALU: the 
emphasis of ALU activities came to lie less in practical 
politics - the redress of material grievances among the 
rank-and-file - and more in the realm of ideology. Moreover, 
Maling's militant spirit, which was in the first place 
somewhat fragile, was to be increasingly dampened as his 
direct political contact with the rank-and-file decreased. 
By late 1927, the ALU had had some success in gaining the 
support of chiefs. Chief Sikukuku Sibisi (Paulpietersburg 
district), Chief Mtshikila Buthelezi (Ngotshe district) and 
Chief Hali Mdlalose (Vryheid district) were all represented 
in the organisation. Chief Hali's support was especially 
important. His ward included most of the Qulusi section 
in the Vryheid district, and, moreover, his representative 
in the ALU was Zinyo Mdlalose, a brother of Solomon's mother, 
Silomo Mdlalose, and one of Solomon's lesser izinduna. 99 As 
soon as the NAD became aware of the ALU's new-found support 
among chiefs, the SNA instructed that chiefs be informed that 
their allowing the ALU to represent them would "lessen their 
own dignity, abdicate their privilege and acknowledge their 
inability to perform their proper functions".lOO Simultaneously, 
he suggested that the CNC personally warn Maling that he was 
"courting inconvenient consequences to himself".lOl 
Maling's ideological preoccupation with chiefs and Zulu 
nationalism in practice served to cripple the effectiveness 
of the ALU. Not only were chiefs themselves inclined to be 
considerably less volatile than ordinary labour tenants and 
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farm labourers, but, as state employees, they were more 
amenable to NAD 'advice' - which inevitably influenced the 
ALU through the chief's representatives in the organisation. 
It is significant that when it became known in September 
1927 that Hertzog was to visit Vryheid, Maling called upon 
the magistrate of Vryheid with two traditional Zulu earthenwa~e 
pots which he wished Hertzog to accept as a gift. Each pot 
bore Hertzog's name, the date 1927, and the initials "Z. N." 
, 102 h 'I' which stood for "zulu Natl0n". Suc a conCl latory or 
even ingratiating gesture would h.ave been very out of 
character for Maling in late 1926 or early 1927. Like 
Inkatha, the ALU set out to affirm its political legitimacy 
among the rank-and-file by presenting itself not only as a 
vehicle fo+ Zul u nationalism but as an organisation which was 
in some way 'recognised' by the government. The magistrate 
of Vryheid astutely observed that the prospective presentation 
to the Prime Minister was probably a ruse to gain government 
recognition - and the SNA ruled that the pots would not be 
103 
accepted. 
It seems that the ALU dissolved soon after the CNC's inquiry 
in January 1928. Maling thereafter turned his attention 
to Inkatha, attempting once more to insinuate himself into 
the organisation as a delegate representing:- Northern Natal. 
The reason why Maling did so was probably because Inkatha 
was formalised in early 1928, on the basis of a new constitution 
drawn up by some of the organisation's new-found white allies, 
and it seemed that it was soon to be recognised by the 
government. As they were during the 1926 Inkatha meeting, 
Maling's class identification and militant views were disdained 
by Inkatha's leadership in 1928. But before relating the 
fate of Maling in his problematical role as 'militant' 
and 'rank-and-file representative' in Inkatha, it is necessary 
to identify the immediate reasons why Inkatha had attracted 
white allies and was formalised primarily through their efforts 
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in early 1928. 
The 'hlonipa' code of social etiquette (which affirmed 
acceptance of sexual role and social rank) and the 'khonza' 
custom (which prescribed obedience to elders, social 
'superiors' and political 'authority') were socio-political 
traditions common to both Zulu and Natal African society. 
Among Natal Africans in Natal proper, however, such 
conservative traditions demanding obeisance and 'respect' 
were not as tenacious and had never been as rigid. Moreover, 
Natal African society was considerably less stratified in 
both a material and political sense than in zululand,104 
and popular protest was less dependent on the sanction of 
tribal or royal authorities. For these reasons, the 
impediments to the growth of rank-and-file militancy were 
not so great in Natal proper, and both the petty bourgeois 
establishment and tribal authorities were less able to 
undermine the increasing radicalism of popular politics 
there. But Inkatha had become the representative organisation 
of the conservative petty bourgeoisie and tribal authorities 
from allover the province of Natal after 1925 - chiefs 
from the reserves of Natal proper were increasingly rep-
resented in the organisation - and both Solomon and Inkatha 
were as concerned about the rise of militant popular movements 
south of the Tugela as in Northern Natal and Zululand. 
In the white countryside of the Natal midlands during 1927 and 
1928, rank-and-file grievances were expressed with a rigour 
that was unprecedented since 1906. Champion's role as 
general secretary of the Natal leU was certainly important 
in this context. But it was the local reu organisers who, 
issuing from the communities they represented and being 
closely aquainted with the burning local issues of evictions, 
wage levels and labour conditions on white farms, were primarily 
responsible for disseminating the radical message in the most 
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turbulent districts of Umvoti, Kranskop and New Hanover. 
The latter proclaimed that the land rightly belonged to 
the black people, and the whites and white rule were to 
be driven from the country: as Bradford argues, their 
preoccupations were less with wages and the terms of labour 
tenancy than with the eradication of wage labour and labour 
obligations altogether. Local officials simultaneously 
spoke the language of Zulu nationalism, urging attendance 
at separatist, rather than white churches, and invoking 
zulu royal symbols and memories of the 1906 rebellion. Soon 
after Zabuloni Gwaza became ICU branch secretary in Grey town 
(Umvoti district) in mid-1927, he personally smashed a 
wreath on the graves of white policemen killed in 1906, and 
proudly announced this to local Africans. lOS 
Apart from offering a vision of a prosperous future unburdened 
by white rule, the ICU also promised - and often provided -
its supporters immediate practical benefits. It employed 
lawyers to act in court for members who brought evidence 
of maltreatment or harsh contracts of tenancy and employment 
to its offices, and was sometimes successful in reversing 
eviction orders through legal action. From mid-1927, Champion 
was also conducting much-publicised negotiations on behalf 
of the Natal ICU for the purchase of farms in the Natal 
midlands on which to settle evicted members - which proved 
to be unsuccessful, as were t h ose conducted by national 
leader Kadalie on the latter's visits to Natal. 106 Thus the 
ICU ultimately did not fulfil its promise to provide land 
for its members; nor its promise that members would get 8/-
a day as a minimum wage - the figure currently being demanded 
by the Labour Party for whites. l07 Even when these 'failures' 
became evident in 1928, however, they did little to quell 
enthusiasm for the ICU. 
During 1927, ICU membership mushroomed as Natal Africans flocked 
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to leu meetings in the small towns of the white countryside 
to buy their 'red tickets'. By early 1928, Umvoti membership 
allegedly amounted to over 80 per cent of the adult population 
of the district. The political consequences were soon 
apparent to white farmers. Many tenants now simply refused 
to obey eviction orders - and resolutely returned to their 
old homes even after they had been forcibly evicted - and 
farmers were increasingly forced to go to court to have 
their eviction orders enforced. Moreover, when good rains 
provided an unusually good harvest in 1927, farmers all 
over the Natal midlands found that many in their workforces 
refused to continue working for less than 8/- a day. The 
political impact of this 'strike' became more accentuated 
as it persisted well into the labour-intensive wattle 
stripping season. Reflecting the new mood of the African 
population in the Natal midlands, the magistrate of Umvoti 
reported a significant increase in the incidence of 'crime', 
d . . 1 1 h' 108 an ln partlcu ar, assau ts on w ltes. 
Such developments were cause for intense consternation among 
white farmers and the white public at large: the role of 
the leu was interpreted as a threat not only to employer 
interests but also to white rule itself, 'white civilisation', 
and the physical safety of white families in the countryside. 
As early as September 1926, when the dramatic expansion of 
the leu in the countryside had just begun, the Natal Witness 
published an alarmed account of leu support and activities 
in the Natal midlands. This article, entitled "Watch the 
leU", expressed a plethora of revealing fears: the leu 
leaders did not intend to limit themselves to their stated 
'trades union' aims, they were recruiting by way of a "gang 
spirit", Natal Africans were "naturally combative", and a 
"General Strike" was imminent. Europeans had to take counter-
measures, it argued, and called on the government for the 
introduction of a sedition bill. l09 
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White fears became more widespread during 1927, when the 
work stoppages on white farms were accompanied by strikes 
on the Northern Natal coal mines and at the Durban docks. 
Farmers' Associations and MPs for the Natal country 
constituencies made repeated calls for police and NAD 
reprisals against the leU, and for the enactment of repressive 
legislation to enable the latter to do so more efficiently. 
Demands were also made for changes to the Masters and 
Servants Law which would serve to tighten control over the 
rural labour force and define breaches of employment contracts 
, '1 h h ' '1 ff 110 B 1 as a crlmlna rat er t an a C1Vl 0 ence. ut rura 
whites' strategy was not merely to rely on state coercion, 
as was reflected in the widespread "counter defensive action", 
as the MP for Weenen described it, on the part of farmers in 
evicting or ~efusing to employ any African who was believed 
to be an leu member. Such class action, which was made 
'official' policy by various local Farmers' Associations in 
early 1927, took effect in the most troubled midlands 
districts of Umvoti, Kranskop and New Hanover and also the 
'hb ' d' , f 111 nelg ourlng lstrlcts 0 Weenen, Estcourt and Dundee. 
Furthermore, rural whites mobilised through the medium of 
'vigilance associations' - often formed on the initiative 
of the local Farmers' Assocation - which were dedicated 
to the defence of all the leu was perceived to threaten. 
Perhaps the most belligerent of these, the aptly-named 'Anti-
leu', was formed in early 1928 in the Umvoti district soon 
after one hundred gravestones were overturned in Grey town's 
white cemetery - allegedly by an leu activist. 
In the context of both European and African beliefs surrounding 
death and the afterlife, the wrecking of gravesites was an 
act of sacrilege. The desecration of white graves in 
Grey town in February 1928 occasioned fear, anger and deep 
personal distress among the white oommunity. Undoubtedly 
it was designed to do so, while, as Bradford suggests, 
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simultaneously appealing to a sense of revenge among those 
Africans whose ancestors' graves had been ploughed over 
by landlords. But given the mystical ties that Africans 
traditionally believed to conjoin ancestral sFirits, their 
living descendants, and the land in which ancestors were 
buried, the gesture can be seen to have had a deeper 
symbolic meaning. rt amounted to a repudiation of the right 
of the white community to become spiritually and materially 
'embedded' in the land, and a 'policy statement' that white 
occupation was not permanent. That one white and one black 
cowtail had been placed at the cemetery - which evoked 
associations with traditional zulu war symbols and the 
tshokobesi badges worn by the rebels in 1906 - is further 
testimony to the way in which traditional symbols and beliefs 
were now being interwoven with what was essentially rank-
and-file class action.
112 
The gestures made in the cemetery transformed what had 
hitherto been a simmering class conflict with racial or 
nationalist overtones into a series of violent racial 
confrontations in the countryside. Armed with shotguns, incensed 
whites first grappled with police guarding the cell containing 
Zabuloni Gwanza, the rcu official who had been arrested as 
the prime suspect. Thereafter the Grey town men scoured 
Grey town and the Umvoti countryside for all trace of the rcu, 
and fired the rcu offices in Grey town and the nearby village 
of Kranskop despite the defensive efforts of local rcu members 
and the police. In the five days of race violenoe that 
ensued, white mobs also attacked rcu property in Bergville, 
Estcourt, Weenen and Pietermaritzburg itself. 
At Estcourt the local magistrate condoned the action taken 
by the wbi te ,mobs: who could blame them, he wrote to the SNA, 
if they "adopt primitive measures for redress" if the state 
had taken inadequate action against the "noxious society 
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Lihe ICW,,?113 Tacit support for the white reprisals was 
widespread both within departments of state and the white 
public. Indeed, the ICU assailed almost every aspect 
of white rule and thus attracted explicit condemnation from 
almost every quarter of the white establishment. While 
the organisation's class character and 'direct action' 
strategy were a threat to property and 'the peace', its 
ideologues' Marxist-derived denunciations of religion - and 
Christianity in particular - were an offence to the god 
that the colonisers had brought with them. In July 1927, 
the Ecclesiastical Authorities of the 'Roman Catholic 
Church of South Africa and Rhodesia' responded in kind to the 
ICU's ideological warfare by pronouncing that all Catholics 
who were ICU members be refused the sacraments - an injunction 
that the Pope subsequently confirmed. 114 In parliament, 
the eradication of the ICU and the enactment of a more 
disciplinary 'native policy' was now being presented as the 
most urgent objective facing the state. Deane, the MP for 
Umvoti, and, more especially, Marwick and Nicholls were 
1 d · . f th' 115 ea 1ng protagon1sts 0 1S cause. 
As the social forces which physically clashed in March 1928 
were polarising during 1927, the leading exponents of Natal 
African popular interests had corne increasingly to issue from 
the ranks of local 'commoners' who were mainly young and without 
formal education; the political role of tribal authorities 
had become increasingly peripheral. Certainly the NAD 
instructions to local chiefs in mid-1927 to inform their 
wards that farmers would not be dispossessed of their land 
and that tenants would not be freed from their labour 
obligations did little to dampen popular support for the ICu. 116 
Deane nonetheless looked upon African chiefs within his 
constituency and elsewhere in the province as allies against 
the ICU - although his statement that they "prohibited 
agitators addressing meetings and they did not allow their 
young men to attend ••• " was an exaggeration of their practical 
270 
role. 117 There is in fact little evidence that chiefs 
resident on white farms resolutely and of their own volition 
took actions to undermine the ICU, nor had the power to 
do so. Indeed, it seems that at least one openly 
sympathised with the ICU. A meeting of Kranskop farmers in 
May 1927 called upon the government to take punitive action 
against Kranskop Chief Mxamo, since, it was alleged, an 
ICU meeting that had recently taken place in his ward was 
d d d b h
' 118 both arrange an supporte y 1m. 
It is apparent, however, that the different responses of 
Zulu chiefs in the Zululand reserves on the one hand and in 
Northern Natal on the other was mirrored in Natal proper. 
The most vociferous African opponents of the ICU in the 
Natal midlands were chiefs who were resident on reserve land. 
In giving evidence before the select committee on Hertzog's 
Native Bills (Marwick and Nicholls were members of this 
committee) in June 1927, Chief Kula of the Msinga district 
and Chief Swayimana of the New Hanover district delivered 
broadside attacks on all "detribalised" elements in African 
society, and the ICU "thieves" with whom they were associated. 
They claimed that ICU activists had not penetrated their wards 
- even though the latter abutted the Umvoti, Kranskop and 
Weenen stormcentres. Both emphasised the disciplinary 
virtues of tribalism, and felt that "the proper system of 
rule was by a king and council", and felt that "Solomon 
is by birth the big chief of the natives in Natal".119 It 
was likely that they were lnkatha members. 
Until August 1927, neither Solomon personally nor lnkatha 
had made any public comment on the struggles that were being 
waged in the countryside under the lCU banner. In that 
month, however, Solomon made a bitter attack on the ICU, 
which was publicised through the columns of llanga lase Natal. 
Since he had heard that the ICU was in the countryside, 
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including Babanango and Vryheid, Solomon said, he realised 
that it was not the "town movement" he had originally thought 
it to be. At no stage had ICU leaders reported to him. 
Moreover, it was "wicked" that they presented themselves 
as "independent makers of law", capable of both forcing 
Europeans to pay B/- a day in wages and seizing farms. 
Solomon reminded the readers what had happened to the white 
miners who had "tried to do things unconstitutionally" in 
1922. The people were now being misled, he concluded, and 
it was the duty of chiefs and headmen to "kill the ICU in 
their tribes".120 In a tract published in English, the 
editor, Dube, added his own observations. These highlighted 
the threat that Natal's kholwa landowners and employers of 
labour felt the ICU to pose to them: 
LSolomonJ regards the activities of the leaders 
••• as very dangerous ••• The lCU are exploiting 
poor Native workers •••• The leaders are irresponsible, 
they do not understand the relations of capital 
to labour, the need for investment, ••• what 
workers are they looking for in the native areas 
and reserves? Are any of their leaders engaged 
in business employing a number of people for 
farming and paying B shillings a day to their 
workers? How about that for the men of Groutville, 
Amanzimtoti and lfafa! Are they prepared to 
pay their employees that wage? How long can th~l 
raise cane at a profit if they pay such wages?l 
These twin statements expressing unity between lnkatha's 
tribal and petty bourgeois elites against the lCU - which 
Champion described as an "underground political plot of 
f B t 1 " 1 ' ,,122 " a gang 0 an u po ltlca traltors - eVldently had not 
been solicited by either the NAD or white farmers' rep-
resentatives. They alerted the latter, however, to the role 
that Solomon and lnkatha could play in combatting the leu. 
Twelve days after Solomon's and Dube's views were published, 
the intimate 'anti-lCU indaba' between George Higgs (Empangeni 
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and District Farmers' Association), Col. Tanner (Magistrate 
at Empangeni), and local chiefs and headmen - as related 
above - took place at Empangeni. That local ICU officials 
had recently claimed that they had Solomon's sanction 
had particularly perturbed local whites, but there is 
no evidence to suggest that either Higgs or Tanner knew of 
Solomon's public denunciation of the ICU when the indaba 
was convened. But at the close of the indaba, Higgs 
introduced one Saul Gumede to the assembled chiefs who then 
read Solomon's views to them. None of the tribal leaders 
present had already heard of Solomon's instructions that 
they 'kill the ICU' in their wards, and the latter had a 
great impact on them. As one chief remarked, "the position 
had now been made clear, and LW~ know what to do". For 
the Zululand <Times reporter who attended, the attitude adopted 
by the chiefs at the indaba, and the influence that Solomon's 
wards had so clearly exerted on them, "generated the wish 
that the old days were back again and that the ICU could be 
dealt with by the Chiefs themselves".123 
Shortly afterwards, a similar but far larger indaba took place 
on the Campbell Sugar Estates in Mount Edgecombe in Natal 
proper, inland of Durban. It was presided over by William 
Campbell, leading Natal sugar baron, and the most prominent 
personnel of the Zulu royal family and lnkatha: Solomon, 
Mnyaiza, Dube and Bhulose. The proceedings took the form 
of an 'anti-ICU festival', nine head of cattle and beer 
having been provided for the large workforce that attended. 124 
In an attempt to counter the propaganda disseminated at such 
meetings, Champion published a pamphlet entitled "The Truth 
about the ICU" in which he slated the Campbell indaba in 
characteristic style: "The workers' minds were set thinking 
of a new economic gospel ••• Lang] many glasses were consumed 
to make them forget the new gospel ••• there was an organisation 
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to be killed and the ICU lamb was there to be slaughtered 
all to the honour of one who is of the royal blood LSolomoQ7." 
Despite the fact that Solomon had by then clearly announced 
himself to be antagonistic to the ICU, Champion studiously 
avoided any criticism of Solomon personally for attending 
the Campbell indaba. Instead, Champion sought to suggest 
that Solomon was not in full agreement with the proceedings, 
and had attended somewhat unwittingly and only on the advice 
of Dube - who was there in the capacity of church minister 
"to bless the occasion" and "mouthpiece of the son of 
Dinuzulu". Thus Champion heaped scorn on Dube: 
When [educated? men who are the accepted leaders 
of the people play the role of Mr Facing-both-ways, 
when they go so far as to mislead ignorant chiefs, 
members of the royal blood, when ministers of 
the gospel of Christ stoop so low as to take 
advantage of the weak ••• the position becomes 
deplorable and outrageous. 
He emphasised that Solomon merely "sat still, with the marked 
feelings as of one who realised the seriousness of the 
occasion ••• LSolomoti7 maintained his silence, to the amazement 
of the crowds".125 
The anti-lCU gatherings presided over by representatives 
of white farmers, the NAD, Zululand's tribal elite and the 
petty bourgeois establishment, following shortly after 
Solomon's and Dube's denunciations of the lCU through the 
columns of llanga lase Natal, signified that new class were 
being made expl i cit - and these were soon to be embodied in 
the reconstituted lnkatha of 1928. Before giving an account 
of lnkatha's reconstitution, however, it is necessary to 
reflect further on the seminal role played by militant 
rank-and-file politics in forging a political situation 
conducive to Inkatha's recovery from its post-1925 period 
of internal discord and directionlessness. 
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Popular consciousness and the ironic courtships: ICU leaders 
approach Solomon 
By early 1928, African politics in the province of Natal 
had entered a period in their history in which class divisions 
within African society were reflected at the political 
level more clearly and with greater emotional power 
than ever before. That white employer interests and the 
NAD directly intervened to manipulate African leadership 
and popular consciousness made the class dynamics of 
African politics in the province yet more complex. None-
theless, there were direct parallels between the way in which 
African politics developed during 1924 - when class divisions 
were also clearly represented at the political level, 
following the rise to prominence of militant leaders who 
appealed to the rank-and-fi1e - and the period late 1927 
to early 1928. In both periods, the importance that popular 
consciousness attached to the Zulu royal family was highlighted, 
as was the practical political role played by the Zulu ' 
royal family. It is illuminating to outline the similarities 
between these two periods - which both led to the 
reorganisation and formalisation of Inkatha as an alliance 
of elites which opposed rank-and-fi1e militancy. 
In 1924, before the ICU became a significant political force 
in the province, the NNC had become radica1ised when key 
members of its conservative petty bourgeois leadership, 
Dube and Bhu10se, were deposed and the militants Gumed~ and 
Madune were elected to the NNC executive committee. Although 
they did so with ultimately less success than leaders like 
Maling and Champion of the later period, Gumede and Madune 
in 1924 adopted the role of militant leaders who in the 
first instance represented the rank-and-fi1e. The political 
trends reflected in the rise of Gumede, Madune, Maling and 
Champion respectively to positions of political influence 
met with the disapproval of the tribal elite, and 
particularly the petty bourgeois establishment - which , 
of all elements in African society, was most distanced 
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from the basic issues of evictions, working conditions and 
wage levels in both rural and urban areas. In their attempts 
to consolidate their political standing among the rank-
and-file, however, all of these militant leaders at their 
respective historical 'moments' sought to associate the 
Zulu royal family or Zulu nationalism with popular protest. 
All were well aware that the rank-and-file increasingly 
looked to the Zulu royal family as a source of political 
morale in times of militancy - as 1906 had demonstrated 
so clearly. In both 1924 and 1928, an important area of 
struggle between militant leaders and their political 
opponents was the battle for the 'royal patronage'. 
Thus Gumede announced in one of his first presidential 
addresses in 1924 that the 'new' NNC was to work together 
with both the ICU and the nascent Inkatha organisation, and 
would pay particular attention to land alienation in Zululand. 
And subsequently the NNC invited Solomon personally to attend 
NNC functions. 126 Similarly, Maling in early 1928 was 
attempting to find a niche within Inkatha having failed to 
do so in 1926, and having failed to independently associate 
himself with Zulu nationalism despite his appropriation of 
the name 'Abaqulusi', contacts with Zulu chiefs, and attempts 
to make a public presentation to the Prime Minister on 
behalf of the Zulu nation.
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Also in early 1928, and far 
more significant, Kadalie, the national ICU leader, and 
Champion were separately attempting to forge concrete links 
with Solomon, as will be related below. 
In 1924, the radicalisation of the NNC lent urgency to the 
attempts on the part of the petty bourgeois establishment 
to make a political alliance with Solomon and the tribal elite. 
It succeeded in October 1924: Inkatha was transformed from 
little more than a moribund 'Zulu National Fund' into an 
active political organisation under the joint chairmanship 
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of deposed NNC leaders Dube and Bhulose, and lnkatha pleaded 
.. 128 Th . t d 1 for government recognltlon. us 1 was rna e c ear 
that, under pressure to make a 'choice', the Zulu royal 
family was more disposed to ally itself with representatives 
of the petty bourgeois establishment than a militant 
rank-and-file, and that it favoured a collaborative rather 
than 'confrontationist' political strategy. Similarly, the 
activities of especially the Natal lCU during 1927 acted as 
a catalyst that united all those anxious to counter rank-
and-file militancy. And the approaches made to Solomon by 
Kadalie and Champion in early 1928 further emphasised the 
urgency of formally and publicly clarifying Solomon's 
antagonism towards the lCU. Indeed, local lCU officials, 
like those at Empangeni, were wont to claim Solomon's 
sanction if local ignorance of Solomon's vie~s on the lCU 
enabled them to do so, and Champion had published a pamphlet 
that was calculated to ensure that an element of doubt 
remained about what Solomon's views really were - which 
Solomon could barely have made more explicit. The June 1928 
lnkatha meeting, which resolved to accept a new 'official' 
constitution drawn up by the leading Durban solicitors 
'Nicholson and Thorpe', signified that a new alliance around 
the figurehead of Solomon had taken shape - which covertly 
included representatives of white landowner and employer 
interests and had the qualified approval of the Natal NAD. 
In both periods, therefore, rank-and-file militancy played 
a negative but leading role in strengthening lnkatha as 
perhaps its most influential opponent - even though the 
alliances within lnkatha were in themselves problematical. 
The negotiations between the various interest groups that 
were to comprise the new lnkatha alliance of 1928 took place 
at a time when Zulu nationalism was corning to play an 
increasingly important role in the articulation of popular 
protest in the province of Natal. Speaking in 1930 about 
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Africans from allover the province - including the towns 
- who had rejected the authority of 'their' chiefs, Oscroft 
remarked that "it is an amusing thing when you see these 
detribalised natives coming to the Zululand National 
gatherings how theykonza LSi£? to the ~ul~ chiefs, 
. . k d ,,129 St t especially Ch~ef Solomon. It ~s very mar e • a e 
officials, white farmers' representatives, petty bourgeois 
establishment leaders and rank-and-file leaders alike were 
well aware that the act of khonza'ing to Solomon was not 
merely a politically innocent expression of personal devotion. 
To them, Solomon represented a key means by which popular 
consciousness could be politically manipulated. During the 
period 1927 to 1930 - which was a highwatermark of popular 
protest in the province - Solomon was for this reason 
subjected to unprecedented pressure by diverse political 
organisations and interest groups to use his influence to 
support their respective political objectives. 
In this period when the rank-and-file increasingly felt the 
need to perceive themselves as 'Zulu warriors' (popular 
protest was conducted almost exclusively by males at this 
time) when confronting white employers, the state or municipal 
authorities, leaders like Champion grappled with popular 
consciousness by appealing simultaneously to popular class 
interests and popular 'Zuluness'. In Durban, which was 
Champion's most important urban constituency, African workers 
had long interwoven traditional zulu quasi-combative customs 
into popular culture. This was particularly reflected in 
the ngoma dance groups (the dances derived directly from the 
~'ing performed by the amabutho, and by clan groups at 
traditional weddings) which were an important form of popular 
association and entertainment in the city. Paul la Hausse 
suggests that links existed between ngoma groups and the 
belligerent amalaita gangs (comprised of young male 'criminals', 
often unemployed), and that the 'faction fights' that occurred 
278 
between the latter were possibly "expressions of intra-
working class competition for jobs".130 The way in which 
traditional Zulu symbols and concepts were employed in the 
late 1920s to serve contemporary popular economic and 
political objectives were especially clear during the 
disturbances surrounding the 1929 boycott of the Durban 
Municipal Native Affairs Department beer halls - whose monopoly 
over the sale of utshwala (beer) to urban Africans financed 
African administration in the city. Utshwala was referred 
to as 'Zulu beer', Champion pointedly spoke of 'Zulu workers', 
and when addressing their supporters ICU leaders used phrases 
that the royal izinduna had used when giving instructions to 
. 1 ... f ld 131 the amabutho at natlona ceremonles ln tlmes 0 0 • 
In early 1928, Solomon was 'courted' with unusual persistency 
by ICU leaders Champion and Kadalie - particularly the latter 
who, as an outsider to the Natal ICU, was more distanced 
from Solomon's wrath. The reason for this sense of urgency, 
of which police and NAD officials were unaware at the time, 
was that Kadalie, the general secretary of the national ICU, 
and Champion, secretary of the Natal provincial branch, 
were waging a personal battle with each other for the leadership 
of the Natal ICU. When Kadalie returned to South Africa 
in November 1927, after having spent about five months making 
contacts with leading trades unionists in Britain and Europe, 
the Natal ICU had already established itself as the politically 
and financially most powerful provincial branch of the ICU in 
the Union. From Kadalie's point of view, Champion presented 
a threat to his position as national leader; there were 
also political differences between them, since Kadalie was 
intent on reorganising the ICU on 'proper' trades union 
lines and affiliating it with white South African trades unions 
and overseas labour organisations. On the grounds of alleged 
financial corruption within the Natal ICU, a national ICU 
disciplinary tribunal suspended Champion as secretary for Natal. 
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Before the ICU annual congress met in April 1928 and confirmed 
Champion's dismissal, however, Champion had rallied Natal 
branches to his personal support. As a result, the'ICU 
yase Natal' was formed, a separate Natal organisation with 
132 Champion in charge. The secession of the Natal ICU can 
in part be attributed to Champion's personal ambition; but 
it was also designed to appeal to the sense of 'Zulu' 
superiority and exclusivity that was so prevalent in the 
province even south of the Tugela river. Kadalie was to 
explicitly play on these two factors in mid-1928 when he 
was attempting to entice Champion and the ICU yase Natal 
back into the national fold: "what is self to be compared with 
the great cause ~~", he wrote to Champion, and continued, 
"To day Durban is talking about the Great Zulus to stand Lsi£! 
alone and have nothing to do with greater South Africa. Are 
we going to allow this?,,133 
In the midst of the power struggles that resulted in the 
formation of the ICU yase Natal, Kadalie visited Natal in a 
desperate attempt to save the province for himself. While 
in Natal during February 1928 he adopted two strategies. On 
the one hand, he toured the Natal countryside with Mr Glass, 
the white bookkeeper Kadalie had employed to assist in the 
'cleansing' of the ICU, presenting himself as the leader of 
a 'proper' trades union, the revamped national ICU. In the 
Natal midlands he indicated that he was specially interested 
in buying land for evicted tenants, and gave out that the 
policy of the national ICU in this matter would be to buy 
as much land as possible in one area rather than having pieces 
scattered allover the province. 134 On the other hand, 
Kadalie sought to affiliate himself with Solomon; if he 
could present himself as, in a sense, Solomon's induna-in-charge 
of labour matters, this would be possibly his greatest 
asset in his drive to secure the leadership of the ICU in 
Natal. Thus one of Kadalie's first actions on arrival in Natal 
• 
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was to intercept Solomon on the road between Nongoma and 
Durban. Kadalie was accompanied by Glass, whose presence, 
as a white and professional person, could perhaps persuade 
Solomon more than anything else that Kadalie's ICU was 
not the same as the 'riff-raff ICU' which was causing havoc 
in the Natal midlands. The police inspector at Eshowe 
was unable to ascertain what transpired at this meeting, 
but felt that any further developments in this matter 
would demand the"closest attention of the Government". In 
the personal opinion of the inspector, however, an ICU-
Solomon affiliation was unlikely for two reasons. First, 
because of Solomon's public stand against the ICU. Second, 
Solomon had recently fallen into "financial difficulties", 
and the cause was that "contributions to the Nkata have 
fallen off, and particularly among the Tribes of Natal 
proper, since the rise of the ICU".135 
Yet unbeknown to the inspector at Eshowe, Kadalie was making 
plans immediately after his apparently unsuccessful meeting 
with Solomon to exploit the latter's financial problems -
in a way which suggested that Kadalie knew Solomon to be 
sensitive about the way in which ICU popularity had reduced 
the royal revenue. The Johannesburg CID had succeeded in 
finding an informant among Kadalie's personal staff, and this 
source reported in late February that two meetings of 
Kadalie's cabal, then in Natal, had focussed on the "matter 
of enlisting the sympathies of Dinuzulu LSigl". It had 
been resolved that Kadalie and Glass were to proceed to 
Mahashini as soon as they had finished issuing instructions 
for a civil case against Keable Mote, the ICU 'Lion of the 
Orange Free State', who was then attempting to break away 
from the national ICU as was Champion. At Mahashini they 
would "offer Dinuzulu Lsi<v a certain percentage of the 
contributions of the ICU members, in order to secure his 
support".136 
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That Champion too was attempting to make arrangements with 
Solomon while the latter was visiting Durban during February 
served to exacerbate official consternation. Following 
reports that Champion was in contact with Solomon, the 
Natal NAD requested the CID to undertake a special 
investigation into what had taken place and what might 
transpire. 137 In the light of reports of contacts between 
Solomon and the ICU, NAD and police officials feared that 
a -furtive alliance" might be made between the former parties 
- and that Solomon's denunciations of the ICU could not be 
trusted. As the police inspector at Eshowe reminded the 
police Deputy Commissioner at Pietermaritzburg, Dinuzulu 
had publicly denounced the rebellion in 1906 but was 
f d b h 1 · . b 1 138 subsequently oun to e s e ter1ng certa1n re e s. 
These fears were in fact groundless. The CNC, who had by 
then known Solomon for twelve years and was best informed of 
Solomon's movements in early 1928, had at no stage succumbed 
to them. In early February 1928, so the magistrate of 
Vryheid notified the CNC, Solomon's attention was in the 
first place focussed on festivities at Mahashini in 
celebration of his important marriage to a daughter of Chief 
Manziyekofi Sithole of the Nkandla district. Manziyekofi's 
late father, Chief Matshana Sithole, had been a man of some 
standing in tribal society and was suspected of assisting the 
rebels in 1906. 139 Indeed, left to his own devices, Solomon 
was as a rule far more disposed to the making of very public 
tribal alliances - which were innocuous from the administration's 
point of view - than the making of 'furtive' and threatening 
alliances with the likes or Kadalie or Champion. Nonetheless, 
Solomon was in the process of making a 'furtive alliance'; 
officials knew nothing of it despite the close watch that was 
being kept on Solomon's movements, but had they known they 
would no doubt have been relieved of their anxiety. The 
reason why Solomon visited Durban in February 1928 was to 
keep an appointment with Mr J. H. Nicolson, a Durban solicitor. 
Nicolson was acting on the instructions of Nicholls, Zululand 
sugar planter, member of the select committee on Hertzog's 
'Native Bills' and MP for Zululand, to inform Solomon how 
he might better use his influence against the ICU and, 
no doubt, how he might expect to benefit personally by doina 
140 ~ __ ,-" 
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only other persons who knew of the negotiations between Solomon 
and Nicholls were Dube and Marwick, champion of Natal white 
farming interests, member of the select committee on Hertzog's 
'Native Bills' and MP for Illovo. l4l 
That ICU leaders were approaching Solomon for support at 
precisely the same time as Solomon was conferring with the 
ICU's most outspoken antagonists was not merely ironic; there 
was a causal link between the activities of IOU leaders and 
those of Solomon during February 1928. Kadalie's and 
Champion's determined efforts to appropriate the emotive 
symbol of Zulu royalty to the cause of militant political 
action made it clear to the tribal and petty bourgeois 
elites, together with representatives of white planting and 
farming interests (whose sensitivity to the dynamics of 
popular consciousness was particularly well evidenced in the 
two anti-ICU gatherings of late 1927), that the 'menace' of 
the ICU was currently threatening to escalate. The CNC, 
furthermore, was similarly to draw the latter conclusion. 
Though it was a crucial factor, however, the reconstitution 
of Inkatha cannot be understood solely in terms of a 
pre-emptive strike on the part of the above interest groups 
against an escalation of ICU power. 
The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928 
As has been noted, a deep fissure had emerged during 1926 
between the petty bourgeois and tribal elites within Inkatha. 
This fissure, combined with the NAD's instructions in early 
1926 that Inkatha cease making collections and the NAD's 
rejection of the petty bourgeois 1926 constitution, had been 
reflected in the low spirits and directionlessness that had 
pervaded Inkatha's annual meeting in late 1926. And subsequently 
royal morale had been dealt a blow when the NAD curtly rejected 
the royal petition to the Prime Minister.142 During 1927, the 
differences between Inkatha's petty bourgeois and tribal 
leaders remained unresolved, and the NAD did not withdraw its 
instructions against Inkatha collections. For Inkatha these 
were crippling problems: the organisation in the first 
instance represented an alliance between the petty bourgeois 
and tribal elites, and from the outset had sought NAD 
approval with a view to formal 'recognition'. 
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Inkatha was virtually inactive during 1927, and the annual 
meeting of October 1927 clearly reflected its near-moribund 
state. Following tension between Simelane and Bhulose, 
Simelane had left the office of Inkatha secretary with the 
result that the meeting was poorly organised. Because of an 
administrative "oversight", Oscroft was for the first time 
since 1924 not invited to attend as government observer. 143 
The meeting itself was notable for three absences. First, 
the absence of a large crowd. Only three chiefs attended. 
Second, the absence of the leading representatives of both 
the petty bourgeois and tribal elites in Inkatha - including 
Solomon, Dube and Bhulose. The meeting was chaired by Rev. 
Mathe, a low-ranking Inkatha official who was an associate 
of Simelane. Third, the absence of any sense of purpose 
and conviction. The politely-expressed and somewhat vague 
resolutions called variously for better education, an end 
to the dipping " of goats, a clampdown on "unknown churches", 
and permission to "go back to our own laws and customs and 
govern ourselves in our own way, all things to be known 
to our Hereditary Chief. h144 
While Inkatha itself was at a low ebb from 1926 to early 1928, 
however, the political interdependency of and interconnections 
between the Natal African and Zulu petty bourgeois and tribal 
elites were increasing during this period. Moreover, during 
the course of 1927 the NAD came to look upon Solomon's and 
Inkatha's potential political role in an increasingly 
favourable light. Both of these trends, which were 
accelerated by the rising mood of militancy among the rank-
and-file, augered well for the future of Inkatha - as was 
illustrated in the rapid and dramatic way in which Inkatha 
re-established itself in early 1928. 
Relations between Solomon and the NAn could barely have been 
worse in early 1927. Solomon was as a rule punctilious 
about reporting to the magistrate of a district which he 
was visiting, as was prescribed by official etiquette, but 
he was not in 1927. In March 1927 the magistrate of 
Emtonjaneni, who was a not unemotional opponent of the Zulu 
royal family, concluded with unusual clarity that Solomon's 
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recent lapses in "paying respects" when 
his district indicated that Solomon had 
passing through 
no "respect- to 
pay.4S In July, Solomon sent a letter to the magistrate 
of Nongoma, for transferal to the CNC, recounting the 
conditions of his appointment as chief of the Usuthu as 
explained to him by both General Botha at Pretoria in 
November 1916 and the Governor-General at Nkandla in January 
1917, and adding the falsification that the latter had also 
appointed him as King George's "induna enkulu" for the 
province of Natal. Solomon then correctly recounted Botha's 
words that if Solomon carried out the conditions of his 
appointment as chief of the Usuthu he could expect his status 
146 
to be elevated. This letter was evidently a counter to 
the CNC's response earlier that year to the royal petition: 
Solomon should be advised that his appointment as chief was 
147 
"still temporary". The CNC promptly replied, through 
the magistrate of Nongoma, that the NAD "cannot take 
148 cognisance" of a letter not signed by Solomon personally 
- it had been signed on Solomon's behalf by Solomon's 
private secretary, Leonard Ncapayi. In a confidential minute 
to the magistrate of Nongoma, the CNC stated that Solomon 
knew exactly how the government had defined his status, and 
that Solomon was possibly the "victim of flatterers •• ~who 
might gain from Solomon's enhanced position".149 
The CNC's stance was modified after Solomon's views on the 
ICU were published in Ilanga lase Natal in August; the 
latter were translated at Natal NAD headquarters for the 
information of the CNC. 1SO In September the CNC learnt from 
the Bishop of Zululand that Solomon was describing himself 
in writing as "Paramount Chief of the Zulus";lSl he thereupon 
wrote to the SNA seeking concurrence with his view that the 
NAD should take no action to contradict Solomon's new 
designation of himself, and adding that there was "a spirit 
antagonistic to Solomon among Europeans, including I regret 
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to say some officials, and it is in the interests of sound 
k 't ,,152 T th administration to keep a chec upon 1 ••• • 0 e 
Bishop of Zululand the CNC wrote that Solomon would be 
'paramount chief' in the eyes of the Zulu irrespective of 
any official assertions to the contrary, and, moreover, 
that solomon was currently steering "quite a good middle 
f 1 " 153 course" in the matter 0 po 1t1CS. 
In April 1928, when police and NAD intelligence reports 
of ICU approaches to Solomon were still frequent, the CNC 
received an application from Inkatha for permission to 
hold a "formal meeting" for the purpose of passing a new 
constitution which had been drawn up by Nicolson and 
154 Thorpe. At this stage the CNC came out in strong support 
of both Solomon and Inkatha: he immedia'tely granted Inkatha' s 
request, and also wrote an - illuminating confidential 
memorandum to the SNA. In the latter, he described in detail 
the "crisis in the affairs of the ICU in Natal" that had 
recently come to his notice. He noted Kadalie's frequent 
attempts to gai n Solomon's support, and then reported that 
a few days previously a large "Native meeting" in Durban 
had passed a unanimous vote of confidence in Champion - and 
the CNC had subsequently learnt that Champion intended once 
more to make approaches to Solomon. The CNC then alluded 
to the replacement of the cautious and conservative 
president of the African National Congress (hereafter ANC -
the renamed SANNC), Rev. Z. R. Maharnbane, with the radical 
Josiah Gumede (previously president of the NNC) in late 
1927: "despite Gumede's reported repudiation of Bolshevik 
doctrines", the CNC argued, it seemed that there was now 
an "affiliation of the ICU and the Native National Congress 
LANQ". All of these considerations, in his opinion, had 
to be taken into account when reviewing official policy 
towards Solomon and Inkatha. Solomon was currently trying 
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to build up the power of Inkatha because Solomon knew 
that an increase in the influence of the lCU and the ANC 
would undermine the power of chiefs in general and himself 
in particular, the CNC opined, and continued 
... 1 do really feel that at the stage that 
matters have now reached the question of giving 
some moral support to the Nkata ••• might well be 
considered as the most promising counterblast 
to the lCU. 
The CNC concluded by referring to the 'problem' of Inkatha 
in the context of official local council policy. That 
Inkatha did not accord with the description of a local 
or regional council under the terms of the 1920 Act should 
not preclude the possibility of the government 'recognising' 
Inkatha: a council could be established alongside a 
'recognised' Inkatha (which would presumably act as a 
'House of Lords'), he suggested, for "there would be ample 
work to do for both in their respective spheres ••• LInkath~ 
might be made a power for good".155 This wave of unprecedentedly 
favourable opinion, which was infused through the ranks 
of the Natal NAD, was to be of great value to Inkatha while 
it was reconstituting in 1928. 
The political interconnections between the petty bourgeois 
and tribal elites during 1926 and 1927 were reflected in 
a variety of contexts. Chief Mathole (who also acted as 
Solomon's representative) and Chief Msiyane (Lower Umfolosi 
district) were familiar faces among the Natal provincial 
delegations to the annual Native Conferences held in Pretoria, 
as were Dube (who did not attend in 1926), Bhulose, and 
Ndhlovu. Of all the provincial delegations, Natal's were 
unique in that about half the delegates were chiefs. The 
latter ranged from extremely conservative tribal 'aristocrats', 
like Chiefs Kula (Msinga district) and Msiyane, to 'progressive' 
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kholwa chiefs, like Chiefs Walter Khumalo and Dirk Sioka 
(both of whom were from the Natal midlands, and were members 
of the NNC conservative 'old guard' who remained on the 
156 
NNC executive after the 1924 'coup'). Natal's 
delegations reflected that in Natal in particular, the 
political division between the old and new elites was 
crumbling - even if the tribal leaders were somewhat out 
of their depth during the conferences. The 1926 conference, 
for example, was dominated by a detailed and perceptive 
debate on Hertzog's 'Native Bills', focussing on the issue 
of African parliamentary franchise. Chief Mathole did not 
speak at all; Chief Msiyane merely announced that he 
"deplored the changes which had occurred since the days of 
Queen Victoria"; and Chief Sioka's main contribution was 
to successfully propose a motion that "all the Natives in 
Natal Ljequest7 that the Umtwana ~child'or 'prince~ u 
Solomon ka Dinuzulu be officially recognised as the Paramount 
Chief of zululand ••• "!57 
Of greater overall significance was the establishment of 
the 'South African Native Chiefs' Convention' in April 1927 
under the auspices of the ANC. This was a result of the 
process of courtship between 'Congress people', particularly 
in Natal and the Transvaal, and chiefs that had been underway 
since 1920. 158 Rev. Z. R. Mahambane, the ANC president who 
had called the inaugural Chiefs' Convention in 1927, 
regarded Solomon as the "most important" chief in the union. 1 59 
Since only twenty-two chiefs attended, mainly from Natal 
and the Transvaal, the Chiefs' Convention could not 
justifiably claim that it "consists of the chiefs of the 
whole Union".160 It was nonetheless regarded as successful 
by those who attended, and became a permanent body - the 
'upper house' within the ANC. From the province of Natal, 
prominent members were Chiefs Mathole, W. Khumalo and Simon 
G. Majozi (kholwa chief of the Indaleni mission community, 
near Richmond), and Solomon was represented by an emissary.161 
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The ANC Chiefs' Convention provided a vital medium of 
contact between petty bourgeois and tribal leaders, and 
between tribal leaders themselves (many of whom were 
kholwa chiefs). One of the specific consequences of the 
contacts that were made was that Chief Majozi, who had 
hitherto taken no part in African politics in Natal, became 
interested in lnkatha; after 1928 he was to be an influential 
. .. 162 
figure 1n that organ1sat1on. 
Within the ANC, the Chiefs' Convention acted as an ally 
of the ANC's conservative petty bourgeois leaders and an 
opponent of militancy. This was especially clear after 
Gumede was elected to replace Mahambane as ANC president 
in late 1927. Gumede's election indicated that the move 
towards African radicalism - which had hitherto been 
expressed by only a few ICU leaders, and in isolated urban 
and rural 'irruptions' - was becoming more pervasive: it was 
now penetrating the mainstream of 'establishment' African 
politics. 
In this development, the South African Communist Party 
(hereafter CP) was playing a leading role - indeed, at the time 
of his election Gumede was consolidating links with Communists 
in both South Africa and Europe. The CP had after 1924 
resolved to divert its focus from white South African workers 
and 'turn to the masses'. This objective was not easily 
realised: the CP was dealt a particularly severe setback 
when it crossed swords with the lCU over matters of organ-
isation and strategy in 1926, whereafter CP members were 
expelled from the ICU. But in the ensuing few years the 
scope of CP activities among African workers and political 
leaders broadened. In July 1927 the CP moved its headquarters 
to an African quarter in Johannesburg, and the Communist 
newspaper, the South African Worker, was transformed into a 
primarily African-language (Xhosa, Sotho and Zulu) publication. 
And in March 1928 it established the 'South African Federation 
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of Non-European Trades Unions', comprising black trades 
unions not affiliated with the leU. These developments 
were stimulated, if not initiated, by the new policy 
directives that were being enunciated by Soviet leaders -
notably Stalin - in the Comintern after 1926. The latter 
were based on Lenin's 'Colonial Theses'1 the principle that 
an "independent Native Republic" should be established in 
South Africa was mooted during 1927, and was promulgated 
as a policy directive at the Sixth World Congress of the 
Comintern in early 1928. In 1927, James La Guma, previously 
an ICU leader, and Gumede were nominated by the CP to attend 
the 'League Against Imperialism' (also named the 'Congress 
of Oppressed Nationalities') in Brussels. Both then went 
on to visit Soviet Russia - ' where La Guma conferred with 
Bukharin and Gumede was taken on a tour of the Asiatic 
regions towards the east. On their return, La Guma was 
appointed general secretary of the Federation of Non-European 
Trades Unions, in which capacity he championed the cause 
of the 'Native Republic', and Gumede set about attempting to 
h C . . . 1 163 convert t e AN to communlst prlnclp es. 
In the ANC, Gumede encountered the concerted opposition of 
the petty bourgeois conservatives and the Chiefs' Convention. 
At the ANC Easter conference in 1928, the chiefs passed a 
resolution dissapproving of the "fraternisation" between 
the ANC and CPo Roux reports that the mover of the resolution 
argued that the Communists had "brought Russia to the stage 
it is now. The Tsar was a great man in his country, of 
royal blood like us chiefs, arid where is he now?" Though the 
chiefs withdrew their resolution following an eloquent appeal 
on behalf of the CP by Gumede, they continued to act as 
a powerful opponent of radicalism. Kadalie appeared at the 
same conference and proposed that the ANC and ICU establish 
a loose 'united front'; he somewhat opportunistically addressed 




During the period 1926 to late 1927, there was much evidence 
of interchange between Inkatha's petty bourgeois and tribal 
elites closer 'horne', though this took place outside 
the context of Inkatha. Two examples will suffice. First, 
in mid-1926, Solomon and some of his tribal advisers paid 
an unexpected visit to a mission school at Inandai Dube 
too accompanied them. Solomon addressed the pupils, speaking 
d 1 f d . 165 S d encouraging wor s on the va ue 0 e ueat~on. econ , 
early in 1928 the CPSA's Zululand 'Diocesan Native Conference' 
was held at the ZNTI. The climax of the four-day session 
was a visit to KwaDlarnahlahla, where the delegates were 
cordially received by Solomon and conducted a discussion with 
him. 166 The then-current division between the petty bourgeois 
and tribal leaders in the context of Inkatha belied the 
essential interdependency of the classes they represented. 
As the spread of ICU power especially had emphasised, the 
tribal political process was under unprecedented threat of 
becoming anachronistic and sterile even in its rural preserves. 
With the speed with which social, economic and political 
change was taking place among the African population of 
the province of Natal, enmeshing it increasingly in a wider, 
industrialised South Africa, the political issues it faced 
were becoming increasingly less 'parochial' and 'tribal' 
in nature. In particular, the political questions of the 
day demanded a detailed knowledge of legislation, and an 
informed understanding of the Westminster parliamentary 
system and the process of law. These were skills possessed 
by very few tribal chiefs, and the latter were largely 
dependent on their educated petty bourgeois allies to 
'educate' and advise them in these matters. From the point 
of view of the tribal elite, Inkatha and the Chiefs' Convention 
played an important role in this context. While the proceedings 
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of the 1926 Native Conference had left tribal delegates 
plainly flummoxed, those of the 1927 Chiefs' Convention 
_ which also focussed on Hertzog's 'Native Bills' - did 
not. Away from the somewhat noisy and abrasive company of 
'hotheads', tribal delegates at the Chiefs' Convention in 
a congenial atmosphere took part in a discussion of the 
Bills - which was inevitably led by their kholwa chief 
colleagues whose political attitudes were as a rule virtually 
indistinguishable from those of the conservative petty 
bourgeoisie. Accordingly, the resolutions of the 1927 
Chiefs' Convention made frequent appeals to liberal democratic 
ideology, and might just as well have been drawn up by the 
likes of Rev. Mahambane of the ANC proper, or the Dubes, 
Bhuloses, and Ndhlovus of Natal.167 
From the point of view of Natal's conservative petty bourgeois 
leaders, their need to consolidate their alliance with 
chiefs in the few years after 1925 was similarly becoming 
more urgent. First, it was of more than mere symbolic 
significance that Gumede in 1926 formed a new Congress 
organisation in Natal which was named the 'Natal African 
Congress'. Although the change in name was in keeping with 
the current replacement of the word 'Native' with 'African' 
in the name of the national Congress (ANC) , it also signified 
a more complete break with the traditions of the NNC prior 
to the 'coup' of 1924. It seems that the NNC 'old guard', 
who had remained on the NNC executive committee after 1924 
alongside Gumede and Madune, attempted to split away in 
1926 to preserve the NNC as an independent provincial Congress 
disaffiliated from the national body. This was not, however, 
successful. Gumede's election to the presidency of the ANC 
in the following year served to further accentuate the Natal 
conservatives' sense of isolation from the 'mainstream' 
f Af ' 1" 168 o rlcan po ltlCS. 
Second, after their initial expressions of enthusiasm for the 
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1920 Acts' mechanisms for direct Union-wide inter-racial 
consultation - the annual Native Conferences and the Native 
Affairs Commission - even Natal's most hamba kahle leaders 
soon grew disillusioned. The meeting of the Native Conference 
at Pretoria in December 1925 demonstrated its impotence: 
Hertzog, in the capacity of both Prime Minister and Minister 
of Native Affairs, addressed the gathering in regard to the 
'Native Bills', but (as the SNA, J. F. Herbst, put it) he 
did so purely "as a matter of courtesy". The delegates were 
not allowed to discuss the Bills. Instead, they were 
instructed to consider matters concerning 'native administration'; 
for example, the recognition of customary law, problems 
relating to lobolo transactions, and the system of rule by 
way of (Supreme Chiefs') proclamation. Although it was not 
made explicit at the time, the state was inviting feedback 
on what was to become the 'retribalising' 'Native Administration 
Act' of 1927. Such proceedings were hardly congenial to the 
predominantly petty bourgeois and educated African delegates. 169 
John Dube, perhaps the prime exponent of the compliant 
hamba kahle tradition, refused to attend the 1926 Native 
f · . th" f f' 170 Con erence ln protest agalnst elr lne ectlveness. 
Furthermore, after the 1926 meeting - which slated the 
'Native Bills' - the government did not call a Native Conference 
again until 1930; and in 1930 any discussion of the Bills 
was forbidden. 171 
Alongside these alienations and disillusionments, however, 
a sense of direction was imparted by the current trends in 
state 'native policy' and the segregationist ideology that 
informed its formulators. These influences form the third 
reason why petty bourgeois conservatives sought to consolidate 
their alliance with tribal authorities. The hamba kahle 
disposition that was such a feature of the Natal petty 
bourgeois establishment was more than mere 'strategy': it 
derived from their adherence to liberal democratic ideology and, 
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in particular, the rule of law. For all the grievances that 
they voiced through the accepted channels, their politics 
was always informed by an ingrained deference to 'authority' 
_ however illegitimate that authority might be in liberal 
democratic terms - and a desire to work within the law. 
Yet the legislation that was enacted and the Bills that were 
being debated during the 1920s served to disillusion their 
hopes of a 'liberal-democratic' solution to the South African 
'native question'. The soured enthusiasm for the quasi-
liberal mechanisms for the consultation of African opinion 
established under the 1920 Act was hardly ameliorated by 
Hertzog's two 'political Native Bills' of 1926: the 'UnionNative 
Council Bill' and the ironically named 'Representation of 
Natives in Parliament Bill'. The kholwa chief-dominated 
Chiefs' Convention declared that the Bills were unacceptable 
in view of "sixteen years' experience of indirect 
representation of Bantu interests" since union,172 and the 
1926 Native Conference rejected the Bills far more bluntly. 
During the latter conference, Rev. A. Mtimkulu (an arch-
'establishment' Natal man,who was to earn infamy in the 
1930s as Dube's accomplice in fracturing the unity of African 
opposition to the disenfranchisement of Cape Africans) 
sardonically observed that he now understood "development on 
our own lines" to mean "send the natives back to tribalism".173 
All the more reason, therefore, that the key exponents of 
'tribalism', the chiefs, should be made more amenable to 
petty bourgeois interests. 
The basic import of Hertzog's 'political Native Bills' was 
that the state was firm in its resolve to keep Africans out 
of parliament. On the other hand, the legislation that 
was accumulating on the statute book emphasised that, first, 
the state was committed to its local council policy for 
limited African self-government in the rural areas; and, 
second, the state did not intend 'tribalism' to die a 'natural 
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death' - particularly in Natal. The 1925 Natives Taxation 
and Development Act laid down new financial regulations 
designed to promote the implementation of local councils' 
policy, and provide the local councils with the financial 
means to perform their duties.
174 
In 1926 and 1927 respectively, 
moreover, two crucial further enactments were made concerning 
the local council policy: the 'Native Affairs, 1920, Amendment 
Act' (No. 27 of 1926) and the 'Native Affairs, 1920, further 
Amendment Act' (No. 15 of 1927). The first referred to 
local populations whose "stage of development ••• did not 
permit of the delegation of the comparatively extensive 
powers contemplated by the Li92QJAct". In these cases 
provision was made that the Governor-General, in consultation 
with the Native Affairs Commission and the Minister of Native 
Affairs, be specially empowered to issue proclamations 
modifying the internal structure and operation of the local 
, 1 d l' " , t 175 I 'h' counC1 ,an 1m1t1ng 1 s powers. n present1ng t 1S 
Bill to parliament, Hertzog stated that it was particularly 
, d d f d" 'N 1 176 h d ' 11 1nten e or con 1t1ons 1n ata. T e secon spec1a y 
empowered the Governor-General to proclaim sections of white-
owned land adjacent to African reserves as "a Native area 
for local council purposes" - hence Africans living on white 
-owned land were no longer excluded from the operation of 
the 1920 Act.
177 
These two amendments removed the SNA's 
and particularly the CNC's reservations about the 
appropriateness of the original Act's local councils in 
Natal: they now had legislat ive encouragement to realise 
their vision of hybrid 'chiefs' councils' and local councils, 
on the Pondoland model, spanning the African reserves and 
Natal white countryside. 178 
The 'retribalising' Native Administration Bill was enacted 
in 1927. Until 1927, 'native administration' in each of 
the four provinces of the Union was based on the separate 
systems that each had inherited from the colonial period. 
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With a view to 'administrative uniformity', the 1927 Act 
extended the operation of the Natal system of indirect 
rule to African areas throughout the Union. The Natal 
system Was to be applied complete with the recognition of 
'customary' law, the employment of chiefs as administrative 
and judicial officials, and, moreover, the appointment of 
the Governor-General as Supreme Chief with the power to rule 
by proclamation. The 1927 Act thus represented a substantial 
committment on the part of the state to the preservation 
of the tribal order: where no local councils had been 
established, the autocratic system of rule through Supreme 
Chief, magistrates and native commissioners, chiefs and 
b . 179 h' ff' headmen was to 0 ta1n. Moreover, t e Nat1ve A a1rs 
Amendment Acts of 1926 and 1927 had provided that local 
councils did not have to be incompatible with the maintenance 
of tribal authorities. For those African leaders who held 
a particular respect for 'the law' and were particularly 
disposed to 'work within the law', however onerous it mi ght be, 
the 1927 Act and the Xrural) local councils' Acts together 
provided them with their legislative guidelines. 
Simultaneously, the state was offering new ideological 
guidelines; these directly conflicted with the British-
derived liberal-democratic notions that the African petty 
bourgeoisie had imbibed from its missionary mentors. What so 
endeared the Natal system of 'native administration' to the 
state in 1927 was not only that it nurtured the disciplinary 
virtues that were embodied in 'tribalism': it was also 
because it entrenched a division between white and African 
political and cultural systems. The rash of 'Native Bills' 
that had been tabled before parliament between 1920 and 1927, 
and particularly between 1925 and 1927, had given legislators 
in parliament, the select committees and the Native Affairs 
Commission the opportunity to focus resolutely on the 'native 
question'. With exception of a few renegade 'liberals' or 
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'philanthropists' and Labour Party MPs, these legislators 
achieved a unanimity that a policy of segregation provided 
the answer. Hence the importance of the Natal 'Sheptonist' 
model as opposed to the Cape 'liberal-democratic' model -
which envisaged the assimilation of 'non-Europeans' to 
white civilisation and, through the medium of the franchise, 
, 1" 1 t 180 the whlte po ltlca sys em. 
The 1927 Act was a clear reflection of the way in which the 
ideology of segregation was being refined. Fired by new 
developments in social anthropology, the time-honoured 
arguments concerning the inherent separateness of the races 
were currently being elevated from the status of mere 
bigotry or white self-interest to that of observed 'scientific 
fact'. And the need to preserve racial separateness was 
currently being presented as not only in accordance with 
the immutable logic of positivist social science, but also 
as ethically correct and a moral duty. There were certain 
points of 'agreement', albeit very problematical, between 
these trends in white segregationist ideology and the racially-
exclusive ideology of African nationalism which was a strong 
influence on educated African opinion during the 1920s - and 
which was clearly enunciated at various times by key 
ideologues of the petty bourgeois establishment like Dube 
and seme. 181 The academic purification of the ideology 
of segregation exerted a subtle but sure influence on 
those African leaders who kept closely in touch with 'advances' 
in the field of , scientific' knowledge (which was seldom 
regarded as derivative or value-bound) and the pulse of white 
political thought. Moreover, the florescence of anthropology 
as an academic discipline captured the attention of the 
'friends of the natives', the white liberals; some of the 
latter now came to see a logical connection between the 
'cultural pluralism' of contemporary anthropology and political 
segregation. And the educated African elite was exposed to 
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such ideological developments through the media of liberal-
sponsored institutions like the Joint Councils and Bantu Men's 
Social Centres. In the late 1920s there developed something 
of a consensus among members of Natal's petty bourgeois 
establishment that the solution to the 'native question' from 
their point of view no longer lay in the pursuit of acceptance 
into the propertied and professional elite of a colour-blind 
unitary South Africa: it seemed instead to lie in the 'develop-
. 1 ' 182 h h . ment' of 'thelr own peop e • Furt ermore, t ey were anXlOUS, 
as was the state, that the likes of Gumede, La Guma and ICU 
leaders should be prevented from finding a solution to the 
'native question' by means of class struggle. Indeed, it was 
in the first instance the consensus of anti-ICU opinion 
between Natal's petty bourgeois establishment, Natal's key 
'native policy' legislators, white employer and propertied 
interests, the tribal elite, and the NAD that led to the 
reconstitution of Inkatha in 1928. But it was to become clear 
that the 'new' Inkatha embodied far broader, more subtle 
and more long-term objectives than merely the destruction of 
the ICU. 
Representatives of sugar planter interests in Zululand and 
Natal proper played a leading role in the negotiations that 
led to the reconstitution of Inkatha. George Higgs, who had 
co-organised the Empangeni indaba, was a prominent Zululand 
sugar planter and well known to Nicholls. In 1917, when the 
latter was president of the Zululand Planters' Union, Higgs 
and Nicholls were co-signatories of a Zululand Planters' 
Union pamphlet in protest against the Natives' Lands Commission's 
recommendations for enlargement of the Zulu land reserves. 183 
William Campbell, who had hosted the second anti-ICU indaba, 
was a prominent Natal sugar planter and the managing director 
of the Natal Estates Ltd. He was well known to Dube,for the 
Campbell family had long taken a special interest in 'native' 
matters and had been since before Union a keen supporter and 
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1 . at Inanda.
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financial benefactor of Dube's Oh ange Inst1tute 
Dube, incidentally, also had close contacts with the Huletts, 
who were perhaps the most prominent Natal north coast - sugar 
planting family: in his capacity of president of -the SANNC 
soon after Union, Dube advised Congress members in Natal 
- 185 
to refer their legal cases to the lawyer G. H. Hulett. 
Nicholls, who was now instructing Nicolson to 'advise' Solomon, 
had first met Solomon when, accompanied by Marwick, he 
attended the prizegiving ceremony of the ZNTI in 1922: here 
Solomon had distributed prizes that had been donated by C. G. 
Smith, the leading Natal south coast sugar planter~186 
Marwick's involvement in the'Inkatha negotiations' signified 
that white motives were not only, as Marks has suggested, to 
187 "make Zululand safe for the sugar planters". After 1920 
Marwick had become the most determined parliamentary 
representative of white commercial farming interests in Natal 
187 proper. Marwick in fact played a vital 'linking' role, 
for he had built up an extensive web of contacts during his 
career in 'na·tive administration' and white politics in Natal 
since the 1890s. He had long been well known to members of 
the Zulu royal family188 and to Dube. His relationship with 
the latter before 1920 was not always cordial. In 1917 
Marwick had sued Dube for an article published in Ilanga lase 
Natal which denounced 'native administration' in Durban, and also 
alleged that Marwick was no longer known as 'Muhle' (the good 
one) but as 'Mubi' (the evil one). 189 Since 1920, Harwick 
and Nicholls had cooperated closely in parliament to express 
the interests of Natal's rural employers on matters concerning 
labour, and to expound the Shepstonist or 'Natal view' 
on 'native affairs'; they continued to act together when 
both were appointed as members of the successive select 
committees on Hertzog's 'Native Bills' after 1926. It is 
perhaps significant that while Marwick was manager of the 
Durban Municipal Native Affairs Department before 1920, the 
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mayor of Durban was J. H. Nicolson - the same person who was 
acting for Nicholls in negotiations with Solomon in early 
1928. 190 . 
In early 1928, Nicholls supplied Solomon, through Nicolson, 
with a draft speech. Nicholls wished Solomon to recite this 
speech on the occasion of the ZNTI's graduation and prizegiving 
ceremony for the students of 1927. Nicolson at the same time 
made arrangements that 'Solomon's address' be given extensive 
coverage in the Natal Advertizer. These arrangements were 
very confidential. As Nicolson wrote to Nicholls, "Of course 
I have kept your name out altogether Lie. from the newspaper 
report? Nobody knows you had any part in it, nor will they 
know."191 On 7 February 1928, the Natal Advertizer published 
a leading article emblazoned under no less than five headlines: 
"SOLOMON KA DINUZULU TO HIS PEOPLE: ADDRESS TO 'FUTURE LEADERS 
OF OUR RACE': NARNING AGAINST 'NOISY BAND OF SELF SEEKERS': 
ZULUS MUST DEVELOP ALONG THEIR OWN LINES: WARRIORS YESTERDAY, 
PEACEFUL TOILERS TO-DAY." The "Paramount Chief of the Zulus" 
seldom made speeches, it reported - but the ZNTI prizegiving 
"was one of those rare occasions when he lets himself go ..• ". 
'Solomon's speech' bore the unmistakable imprint of Nicholls' 
polemical style and political views. It also included some 
quaint phraseology similar to that which Chief Kula (Msinga 
district) .had used while bitterly denouncing the :IOU in mid-
1927. Kula had made this denunciation while giving evidence 
before the select committee on the ' Native Bills', and, in 
doing so, he h ad been keen l y questioned by Nicholls.192 
'Solomon's speech' began by emphasising that the Zulu had ample 
cause for "pride of ancestry" because ~f their renowned 
courage, virtue, discipline and imperial might in preconquest 
times. But in "the quagmires of the new world", Solomon said, 
many zulu were no longer under the control of tribal authorities 
or, indeed, under any control at all. Some had begun to pursue 
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"strange gods". The whole nation was crying aloud for 
guidance which, Solomon continued, could be best provided 
by hereditary leaders. The ZNTI was specially for the 
educational "training of those inherent gifts of leadership" 
that reposed in the sons of chiefs, so that the "standards 
of the tribal system ••• LPoul97 be adapted to meet the changing 
needs of the times." Solomon emphasised that the Zulu were 
a different race to the white people, and it was correct that 
the Zulu should preserve their separate culture - within which 
they could attain their own "high state of civilisation". 
The ZNTI stood for the "maintenance of the tribal system", 
and indicated · that it was also "the wish of the Government 
that we should be given a full opportunity to develop along 
our own lines". The Zulu were to be thankful that the 
government was not requiring them "to abandon a harmonious 
brotherhood in exchange for a discordant individualism". 
Solomon then gave an account of the political activities of 
certain "well-clothed newcomers, trading on a little book-
education •.. " The latter were working in the towns "to 
seduce Lthe zulu peopl~ from their tribal allegiance", and 
were also sowing "the seeds of discontent in the kraals". 
They could only cause "conflict and darkness", and Solomon 
suggested that their existence further stressed the urgency 
of rebuilding the tribal order. Solomon concluded by noting 
that there were white men who had come to understand the 
problems that the Zulu nation was experiencing, and that 
these white men were keen to lend their assistance. 193 
At this stage - in early 1928 - it is evident that Nicholls 
had made contact with only Solomon, rather than the leadership 
of Inkatha. Furthermore, although Nicholls envisaged making 
194 
further use of Solomon, the arrangements that had been 
made between these two figures so far related only to the 
ZNTI speech. But Dube was working quietly in the background, and 
it seems that it was he who was responsible for 'opening up' 
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the negotiations to Campbell and Marwick; and other Inkatha 
personnel. A couple of weeks after the ZNTI speech Marwick 
received an unexpected letter from Dube. In this letter 
Dube chose to dwell on the matter of the ICU, undoubtedly 
because Marwick was the most dedicated and outspoken white 
opponent of the ICU in Natal. The latter had been so since 
1926, when Kadalie sued the Natal Witness for libel: Marwick 
voluntarily assisted the counsel for the defence in building 
up a dossier on ICU 'sedition', and he was the prime witness 
for the defence at the court case in 1927. 195 Dube 
denounced ICU leaders' "misleading and dangerous propaganda, 
their absurd promises, their international socialistic 
inclinations and communism" which would be "misconstrued 
amongst our backward Natives". He continued: "\ve, the moderate 
section of the Bantu people, feel just as you do that 
communism, whether among white or black, is a real danger 
h ." 196 to t e communlty. 
The real purpose of Dube's letter, however, was to ascertain 
whether Marwick concurred with his views on how the 'native 
question', in broader perspective, should be resolved. More 
specifically, it was intended to ascertain whether Marwick 
would be a supporter of Inkatha - although Dube avoided making 
this explicit. Thus Dube went on to argue that the victory 
of 'socialistic' doctrines 
would mean breaking down of parental 
control and restraint, tribal responsibility 
and our whole traditions, - the whole 
structure upon which our Bantu Nation rests 
•.. We have got to maintain, in my opinion, 
the sense of paternal and tribal respons-
ibility by Bantu traditions with all its 
obligations of courage, honour, truth, 
loyalty and obedience for all we are worth 
••• Don't think for one moment I am not 
progressive. I am anxious as any man could 
be for the development of my people, but on 
the right lines.l~7 
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Just as 'Solomon' had done recently, Dube thus affirmed 
his willingness to collaborate in the evolving state policy 
of 'development on their own lines'. Dube ended the letter 
in an open-ended fashion; it was up to Marwick to decide 
whether to collaborate with the state's African collaborators. 
Although records of Dube's activities are fragmentary, it 
seems that he was successful during the following month in 
establishing contact between Nicholls, Marwick and Campbell 
on the one hand, and the personnel of the Inkatha executive 
on the other hand; he and Nicolson acted as the 'middle men'. 
The solicitors Nicolson and Thorpe then began drafting the 
new Inkatha constitution. When the draft was complete in 
mid-April 1928, Campbell paid a personal visi t to the 1-1inister 
of Native Affairs and requested that Solomon now be recognised 
as Zulu king. He also argued that Solomon was in need of 
guidance, particularly in view of his financial difficulties, 
and therefore that "a retired magistrate" should be appointed 
as Solomon's private secretary. There was little doubt that 
the 'retired magistrate' that Campbell had in mind was Oswald 
Fynney - who later in 1928 was to begin personally 
petitioning the CNC for the recognition of Inkatha. 198 
Campbell further intimated that if the government complied 
with these requests concerning Solomon, "friends of his 
" LSolomon'~ would be prepared to settle his debts. The Minister 
replied that he would "seriously consider"these propositions.1 99 
The main strategy of Inkatha's white allies in April 1928 , 
however, was to ensure that the 1928 Inkatha meeting was 
well attended and had official sanction. Thus Nicolson and 
Thorpe requested that the NAD be represented at the forthcoming 
meeting, since the latter was to consider the acceptance 
f .. 200 o a new constltutlon. In a remarkable departure the NAD 
nominated Oscroft to attend in an official capacity201 
previously NAD officials were instructed not to attend Inkatha 
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meetings except in a personal capacity and only when invited 
to do so. Then Nicolson and Thorpe requested that the NAD 
circularise all magistrates in the province of Natal, 
inviting their cooperation in making the meeting as 
representative as possible. 20 2 Accordingly, the CNC instructed 
all magistrates to inform their districts that the government 
had no objection to the forthcoming Inkatha meeting. 203 In 
this way, the NAD - or, more specifically, the CNC - played 
an active role in making the Inkatha meeting of 31 May-4 June 
the largest in Inkatha's history. 
Apart from Oscroft, the only white people to attend the 
1928 meeting were Nicolson, who attended in a professional 
capacity, and FynneYi it had always been the intention of 
Inkatha's leading white allies to remain in the background. 
The proceedings began, as was customary, with a private 
meeting of the executive committee. The latter unanimously 
passed the new draft constitution. It is significant that 
Solomon did not attend this meeting, nor the 'open' meetings 
of Inkatha's ordinary members in the following days. He 
was confined to bed, being seriously ill with what Oscroft 
described as "rheumatic gout".204 Solomon's addiction to 
liquor was now taking its toll. 
Oscroft estimated that over two thousand Zulu attended the 
meeting. Among these were over sixty chiefs or accredited 
chiefs' representatives. The latter came mainly from Zululand 
and Northern Natal, but some had come from as far afield as 
Umzinto, Richmond, Harding and Pinetown in Natal proper, 
and the IngwavUma district on the border of Portuguese East 
Africa. The Natal African and zulu petty bourgeoisie was 
also strongly represented, and the close cooperation of the 
old and new elites was a marked feature of the 1928 meeting 
in every sphere of its proceedings. 
The chairman, Bhulose, opened the general Inkatha meeting by 
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arguing that the time had corne for .lnkatha to be "legally" 
established "so that it should obtain the recognition and 
favourable support of the Government". He then explained 
the main points of the proposed new constitution, and moved 
that the latter be formally approved by the meeting. Chiefs 
Nkantini and Msiyane (who had represented Zululand alongside 
Mathole at the Native Conferences) seconded Bhulose. 
There followed many objections from the general quorum that 
the proposed constitution could not be passed without a 
thorough discussion of its contents. The size of the meeting 
made this impracticable, and a compromise was agreed upon: 
all the chiefs and ministers of religion present were appointed 
to form a special committee to discuss the constitution. 
This special committee, whose deliberations occupied the third 
day of the Inkatha meeting, made minor amendments to the 
constitution before accepting it. At the same time, the 
special committee elected Inkatha's office bearers for the 
forthcoming year: Bhulose was re-elected as chairman; Chief 
G ., b . h' 205 S. • E. MaJoz~ ecame v~ce-c a~rman; and Solomon was 
elected as treasurer. Significantly, the appointment of the 
secretary was left to a later date; it was very likely that 
Inkatha leaders desired the government to nominate an NAD 
official for this position. The following non-office bearing 
members completed the new Inkatha executive committee: Mnyaiza, 
Chief Nkantini, Chief Silimane (son of r.1kungo Zulu, a brother 
of Cetshwayo who had fled to the Colony of Natal in 1856), 
Dube, and Rev. E. A. Mahamba (a minister of the Free Church 
of Scotland from the Dundee district). Finally, two "patrons" 
of Inkatha were elected: one was Solomon, and the other 
was Fynney - which reflected Inkatha's anxiety for 
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official approval. All the actions of the special 
committee were subsequently approved by the general quorum 
of the Inkatha meeting, and Nicolson and Thorpe were authorised 
to legally "execute" the "Deed of Trust and Constitution of 
the Inkata ka Zulu".207 
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The 1928 constitution was clearly based on the 1926 petty 
bourgeois Inkatha constitution. In places, the only difference 
between the two constitutions was that the 1928 version 
was expressed in more pedantic legal terminology. However, 
there were certain important differences of emphasis in 
the 'official' constitution which presented Inkatha in a more 
favourable light from the perspectives of both segregationist 
ideology and the local council policy.208 Thus the preamble 
to the 1928 constitution emphasised that it was necessary 
"to foster by every constitutional means the spirit of unity 
among the people of the Zulu Nation ••• and to keep alive 
the Nation's fine traditions, and its sense of obligations 
imposed upon it by these traditions ••• " Furthermore, it had 
become expedient to "organise the heads of the Nation, and 
its responsible members in such a manner, and under such 
constitution as will have the approval and sympathy of the 
Government of the Union of South Africa".209 
The 1928 constitution's statement of Inkatha's aims was 
essentially identical to that of 1926; if anything it was 
more vague, since it did not specify precisely how Inkatha 
intended to "develop" the farms it wished to buy. But there 
were important additional aims in 1928. First, Inkatha now 
dedicated itself to the "proper development" of the reserves 
- which probably meant that commercial agriculture, trade and 
small industries would be encouraged there. 210 Second, 
Inkatha would foster the Zulu wish to maintain their separate 
traditions, social discipline and sense of nationhood. In 
this context, it was said that Inkatha would 
promote and encourage the development and 
progress of the Nation along such lines 
as will naturally be evolved out of the 
life and traditions of its people and to 
prepare them for the establishment of 
their own trade and industries.211 
Overall, Inkatha presented i tself as a 'self-help scheme' writ 
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large - and one that accorded well with segregationist 
thinking at state level. 
The rest of the constitution dealt with Inkatha's regulations 
concerning membership, the conduct of meetings, the 
composition and powers of the executive committee, and 
financial regulations. Three points deserve especial mention. 
First, no "agents' or "collectors" were to be authorised 
to receive subscriptions; all payments had to be made directly 
to the secretary who would keep "proper books". Moreover, 
a"European accountant" would examine Inkathats balance 
sheets and financial statements annually. By 1928 it had 
become widely known in NAD circles that Inkatha's monies 
were being misappropriated, primarily by Solomon, and these 
regulations were presumably intended to persuade the 
government that this would not happen in future. Second, the 
Inkatha executive committee was empowered to coopt white 
people to "assist in their deliberations", even though whites 
could not be members of Inkatha. Third, and concerning the 
relationship of Inkatha to the head of the Zulu royal family, 
it was laid down that the latter would always be a "patron" 
of Inkatha; and "if possible" a descendant of the Zulu kings 
would always be treasurer. The chairman would be "in charge" 
of Inkatha, and would have a casting vote in the executive 
committee. The executive committee was not bound to act on 
the resolutions of Inkatha's committee of 'heads of the 
nation' - comprising all chiefs and certain appointed ministers 
of religion; in the event of deadlock between these two bodies, 
however, the ultimate decision would rest in the hands of 
all of Inkatha's members voting together at a general meeting. 
It was thus envisaged that, under Inkatha, the Zulu nation 
ld b .. 1 212 wou e a constltutlona monarchy. 
The constitutional 'democratisation' of Inkatha was an , 
important development. Solomon had always attempted to 
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superimpose the traditional prerogatives of a Zulu monarch 
on top of Inkatha's organisational structure: he had sought 
to treat the executive committee as a royal ibandla (king's 
council) in which he, and not the elected chairman, remained 
the executive head. The differences between royal interests 
and petty bourgeois interests on this matter had been one 
of the main reasons for Inkatha's virtual disintegration in 
1926 and 1927. In 1928, petty bourgeois interests triumphed. 
The democratisation of Inkatha also meant that the organisation 
was now more in accordance with the basic tenets of local 
council policy - which, even as amended in 1926, envisaged 
that the internal operation of the local councils would 
accord with the Westminster-style democratic principle. 
Moreover, it meant that Inkatha might now be more readily 
favoured by the Natal NAD, which overall was still vehemently 
opposed to the resurrection of the historic 'autocratic' 
powers of the Zulu royal family. In 1928, Oscroft 
appreciatively reported: "In the past, Solomon's word was 
law ••. the Indhlu Nkulu [great hous~ was supreme. The 
Inkata existed for the royal house. Under the new Constitution, 
the position will gradually be reversed, the royal house 
becoming part of the Inkata ••• "213 In the light of this 
development, on top of the disparate pressures with which 
Solomon had been confronted between 1925 and 1928, the reason 
why Solomon was bed-ridden with a liquor-induced illness 
during the 1928 meeting can be better understood. 
Apart from approving the new constitution and re-establishing 
lnkatha as a working alliance between the petty bourgeois 
and tribal elites, the 1928 meeting was also important insofar 
as it clearly defined Inkatha as an opponent of militancy. 
Oscroft's report stated that there was no evidence of "the 
slightest connection" between lnkatha and the ICU. In view 
of the strong suspicions of police and Natal NAD officials 
during the first half of 1928 that a connection did exist, 
this statement was not as redundant as it might appear. While 
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no ICU leader dared to attend the meeting, Maling 
did do so. An account of Inkatha's responses to both Haling's 
appearance at the 1928 meeting and his subsequent attempts 
to penetrate the 'new' Inkatha not only illustrates Inkatha's 
role as an opponent of militancy: it also effectively 
summarises Inkatha's activities between 1928 and 1930. 
Oscroft's report of the 1928 meeting recounted that Maling, 
"of the agitator type, from Vryheid", attempted to address 
the meeting: "those present were obviously quite hostile 
towards him, and he was pulled up by the chairman and informed 
that he had no right to speak as he was not a member of 
the Inkata. Nothing more was heard of him.,,2l3 Maling 
reappeared at the annual Inkatha meeting in June 1929. 
Bhulose submitted a report of the meeting's resolutions, 
where it was recorded that the "most vital question largely 
discussed" at the meeting was that of land tenure; the matter 
had been "introduced by poor suffering Natives - especially 
from the district of Vryheid". No resolution was permitted, 
however, "owing to the overheated arguments advanced". It 
was thereafter decided to refer the matter to "a special 
meeting of Chiefs only" the following month. Somewhat 
ironically, this same report described Inkatha as the "widely 
recognised organisation of all Native human beings in and out 
of the Union of South Africa".214 
Maling attended the special Inkatha meeting in August 1929, 
even though it was called for chiefs only. Chief Nkantini 
took the chair. This meeting transpired to be Maling's 
greatest success in the context of Inkatha: he was elected 
to represent the Vryheid district on a specially-convened 
'Inkatha land committee' which was to accompany Solomon to 
Pretoria to "take forward our wail to the Government". 215 
Of the twelve members of this committee, only Maling, Rev. 
Mathe and Samuel kaDinuzulu Zulu (David's full brother) were 
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not chiefs. In this context, Maling was forced to defer 
to the hamba kahle and ineffectual political strategies 
of the Zulu tribal establishment. In contrast to the 
ALU petitions, which had been forthright in content and 
were sent directly to the House of Assembly or the Prime 
Minister, the chiefs' meeting sent a somewhat florid 
'request' to the magistrate of Nongoma: 
Natives are cast out in the country by 
white people on farms and we hear nothing 
which the Government replies on their 
behalf to find a place where they might 
fall, and they are without cause deprived 
of their cattle ••• we have not fought after 
the Queen restored Cetywayo ka Mpande saying 
to him your country is yours always, I 
take your sovereignty only ••• we pray to 
go to hear from our father the Government 
what it is that we his children have now done 
that we then should be made mere wanderers 
in the hills now. 216 
While the NAD could fear civil disturbance and strike action 
if it ignored the ALU petitions of two years previously, such 
'chiefly prose' was barely threatening. The request was 
routinely rejected, with the instruction that "individual" 
1 . h Id b d " . . .. " 21 
7 
comp alnts s ou e rna e to respectlve Natlve CommlSS1oners • 
Because of the support Haling commanded among the Zulu in 
Northern Natal, including certain important chiefs there, 
he could not be simply rejected by Inkatha's dominant clique. 
After Maling had gained a foothold in Inkatha, however, it 
was his rather than Inkatha's class position that was 
redefined. Inkatha's role in defusing what hope there had been 
of effective rank-and-file class action among the Zulu was 
thus a very subtle one. Maling adopted an increasingly 
conciliatory stance. In 1920 he gave evidence before the 
Native Economic Commission, accompanied by a deputation, 
and claimed to be the chosen representative of all Zulu 
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in Northern Natal and Solomon's regional official in that 
, ' 'f' d 218 area. Evidence suggests that these cla1ms were not unJust1 1e • 
He spoke almost exclusively on behalf of ordinary labour tenants 
and farm workers, but the political opinions he tendered 
before the commission suggested that he was now identifying 
more with the tribal and petty bourgeois elites. "Everything 
in native custom is good except the practice of witchcraft", 
he said; "fnativesj must be given a chance to develop their 
own civilisation and good things in their customs", the most 
important of which was the "showing of respect to elders and 
those in authority". He also reported that he had been 
, bl' 'c ' 1' h 'd 219 Th attempt1ng to esta 1sh a J01nt ounC1 1n Vry e1 . ere 
was in fact nothing in Maling's evidence that would not have 
been heartily endorsed at the Inkatha meeting of 1928. 
Between 1928 and 1930, Inkatha played the role of an ideological 
bulwark against rank-and-file militancy on the one hand, and 
an ideological bastion of Zulu nationalism and the most 
conservative elements in Zulu society on the Dther hand. 
Apart from the aborted attempt to send a chiefs' deputation 
to Pretoria in 1929 to 'wail' about evictions, Inkatha took 
virtually no practical political action of its own accor.d. The 
main purpose of the reconstitution of Inkatha in 1928 had been 
to Lormalise Inkatha in such a way as to make it a more 
attractive ally of the state. In effect, Inkatha was pressing 
the Union Government to implement among the zulu a more 
thoroughgoing policy of segregation than was currently envisaged 
in ~uling circles - a policy which bore resemblances to the 
'Bantustan' policy of the 1950s. After the 1928 meeting, 
Inkatha entered a period of paralysis as it awaited the 
government's response. But before recounting how the government 
responded and how the question was finally resolved in 1930, 
it is first necessary to comment on the objectives of those 
who were the driving forces behind and within the 'new' 
Inkatha: first, white sugar planting and commercial farming 
interests and 'native policy' legislators in Natal, and, second, 
the Natal African and Zulu petty bourgeoisie. 
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The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution 
The class actors who were primarily responsible for the 
reconstitution of Inkatha had come together in the first 
instance because they wished to counter the class threat 
that the ICU was seen to represent. In the context of the 
reconstituted Inkatha however, they cooperated not only as 
opponents of the ICU but also as advocates of 'tribalism', Zulu 
nationalism, and Zulu 'self government'. Clearly enough, the 
aim to foster those aspects of tribalism that prescribed 
respect for 'authority' and 'social discipline' generally 
was not in the interests of popular protest; neither was the 
cultivation of zulu nationalism as an unambiguously hamba kahle 
political force. But the aim to establish a measure of Zulu 
national autonomy or self government - which was keenly 
supported by Nicholls - made it manifest that Inkatha's 
purpose went beyond the obstruction of popular protest. 
An overview of the objectives of white interest groups in 
allying themselves to the Zulu political 'establishment' is 
essential to an understanding of the history of Solomon and 
220 Inkatha after 1928. Inkatha's white supporters primarily 
represented, first, the sugar planting interest ('sugar 
barons' were the most prominent of Inkatha's white supporters) 
and second, the Natal commercial farming interest. These 
two 'fractions' of rural capital in Natal had acted in alliance 
since 1920 in regard to labour matters and 'native policy'. 
Their support for Inkatha after 1928 was a further development 
of this existing alliance - which in the first instance had 
set out to secure a cheap, tractable and abundant supply of 
African labour. 
The sugar industry had become dependent on an African labour 
supply by the first few years of Union (the importation of 
indentured Indian labour was terminated by the Union Government 
in 1911). Sugar planters found that they could not rely on 
the African reserves in the province for a labour supply; the 
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highly-capitalised gold mining recruitment networks had long 
held a virtual monopoly over those reserve Africans who were 
willing to bind themselves to employment contracts. Neither 
could they draw labour from the African population in the 
province's white countryside~ farmers fiercely defended 
'their' labour supply against encroachment by labour recruiters, 
and, moreover, tended to demand labour service from their 
tenants erratically throughout the year which prevented the 
latter taking up 'outside' contract work.
221 
In the transition 
from indentured Indian labour, the sugar industry carne to 
favour a migrant form of African labour, and drew its labourers 
from mainly Pondoland, Tongaland and Mocambique - rather than 
. h' h . 222 Wlt ln t e provlnce. 
However, following the rapid expansion of the sugar industry 
- particularly in Zululand - during the first decade of 
Union, the industry was afflicted with a chronic labour shortage. 
The latter persisted although the industry expanded the 
geographical scope of its recruiting activities in 1918 by 
establishing the 'Natal Coast Labour Recruiting Corporation' 
(which was based on the model of the gold mines' Native 
. . . ') 223 192 h . d Recrultlng Corporatlon. By 0, t e sugar ln ustry 
had corne to realise that the only hope for a long-term solution 
to its labour shortage lay in the greater exploitation of the 
labour resources within the province of Natal.
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Moreover, 
labour from the coastal and midlands districts of the province 
offered two important advantages over 'imported' labour. First, 
it was cheaper because of reduced recruitment and transport-
ation costs. Second, it was more resistant to the fever 
(mainly malaria) which had become virtually endemic in the 
225 
'sugar belt'. The sugar industry's drive to employ Zulu 
and Natal African labourers, which became increasingly urgent 
in the course of the 1920s, did not bring it into conflict with 
Natal's farmers. The sugar planters sought to employ the 
inhabitants of the province's reserves as migrant labourers, 
whereas the farmers sought to .bind the African inhabitants 
of the white countryside to more stringent labour tenancy 
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agreements. While planters and farmers did not compete with 
each other over labour supplied, however, they both competed 
against urban employers and the gold mines. The existence 
of 'common enemies' provided cause for an alliance. 
Soon after their election to parliament in 1920, Nicholls 
(who had stood for parliament as a sugar representative) 
and Marwick (who acted as leader of the HPs for the rural 
constituencies of Natal proper) established themselves as 
inseparable allies and Natal's leading spokesmen on labour, 
land and 'native' matters. Their alliance as representatives 
of the labour interests of Natall·s planters and farmers was 
clearly illustrated in 1921. In that year, Marwick introduced 
to parliament a catalogue 6£ proposals - which Nicholls was 
first to support.- regarding "methods of ensuring an increased 
and more constant supply" of African labour in the country 
districts. The proposals sought to remedy two complaints on 
the part of Natal's rural employers. First, the "extreme 
tendency •.. for natives to drift to the towns and labour 
centres" (Marwick) where there was already "an enormous 
amount of wastage in native labour" (Nicholls); rural industries, 
however, were afflicted with unreliable and insufficient labour. 
Furthermore, the experience of urban life had a "strong 
detribalising influence" on migrant youths, who returned to 
the rural areas "utterly demoralised" and incapable of respect 
for authority (Marwick). These factors were seen to be the 
root causes of the labour problems in the rural areas. Second, 
extant legislation pertaining to labour contracts and African 
identification passes was regarded as inadequate and in need 
of revision. This legislation, it was felt, did not place 
sufficient control over the workforce in the hands of the rural 
employer (civil actions were a clumsy way of enforcing obedience); 
and, more especially, it did not provide a failsafe means of 
apprehending and prosecuting labourers who deserted prior to 
the expiry of their contracts. The 1921 proposals outlined 
the main objectives of the Natal planter/farmer alliance 
throughout the 1920s.226 
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Among the measures that were persistently advocated to counter 
the 'rural exodus' were the revision of the Pass Laws (so that 
a more rigorous policy of influx and efflux control could be 
implemented), and the prohibition of the system of 'advances' 
(mining recruiters had instituted the practice of paying 
large advanee wages to lure labour to the compounds). It 
was alleged that the 'injudicious persuasion' and superior 
buying power of the mine recruiters were largely responsible 
for the breaches of labour contracts in the rural areas. Thus 
it was argued that the recruitment and distribution of labour 
be placed under 'impartial' state control, and that 'government 
agencies' be established in the reserves - not in the white 
countryside - for that purpose. And the Zu1u1and Planters' 
Union in particular repeatedly called for the closure of the 
Zu1u1and reserves to 'outside' (ie. mine) recruiting. The 
demands for new legislation pertaining to labour tenancy contracts 
on white farms (which then fell under the purview of the 
Natal Masters and Servants (Natives) Law of 1894) and migrant 
labour contracts on sugar plantations (which were modelled on 
those of the gold mines, and did not fall under the purview 
of any law applicable in Natal) were closely related to the 
aim ~o halt the townward drift. Through this proposed new 
legislation, Natal's rural employers sought to ensure that 
more rigorous criminal action could be taken against both those 
labourers who deserted to the towns, and those employers who 
employed deserted labour. Furthermore, it was envisaged that 
the revision of the Pass Laws would be of service in arresting 
the escape of both potential labourers and deserting labourers 
towards the towns and gold mines. Overall, the objectives of 
the Natal planter/farmer alliance were first to retain Natal's 
rural labour reserves in Natal's rural districts, and, second, 
to shackle African labourers to Natal's rural employers. More 
specifically, the alliance sought to secure 'first option' on 
the labour resources of Natal's coastal and midlands reserves 
for the sugar industry, and to bind more securely the labour 
resources -of the white countryside to Natal's farmers. 227 
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Yet Natal's planters and farmers did not only call upon the 
state to resolve their labour problems - particularly since 
228 1 k . the state was so slow to respond. They a so too actl0n 
of their own accord at a local - level, and sought to use 
tribalism and tribal authorites - whether chiefs or ordinary 
homestead heads - as a means of securing better control over 
the local labour force. In the rural districts of Natal in 
the 1920s, there is evidence that a particularly Natal-style 
'solution' to both the labour and 'native' questions was taking 
form: this was based on a ~oose accord, if not an alliance, 
between rural employers and tribal authorities. That MPs for 
the rural districts of the province were concurrently waging 
a battle at state level for the preservation of tribalism 
and the 'Natal system' of 'native administration' suggests that 
the expressly political aspects of Natal's 'native policy' 
proposals were closely interrelated with the labour interests 
of rural employers. And at the local level, the way in which 
planters and farmers supported chiefs and tribalism as the 
main antidotes to 'socialistic propaganda' and the truculence 
of the labour force is perhaps even more illustrative in this 
respect. 
Natal's farmers strongly favoured labour tenancy arrangements 
that were based on the tribal order at the level of the family 
(ie. the 'kraalhead system' where the contract was made with 
only the household head and not each member of the family) 
for two reasons. First, it placed in the hands of the homestead 
heads much of the responsibility of 'policing' the labour force 
on the farmers' behalf. Second, the engagement of whole 
homesteads as productive units meant that the labour force 
was able to prov i de for its own subsistence - the costs of 
feeding and housing were not incurred by the farmer. Farmers 
~elt that the process of 'detribalisation' was a social evil, 
particularly since it increased the likelihood of young labourers 
deserting the labour contracts to which their elders had bound 
them. The desertion of youths deprived both farmers and the 
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tenanted homesteads of their most productive labour - which 
could serve to increase the hunger of the tenanted homesteads 
to an extent that they became dependent on the farmer for food. 
As a spokesman for three Farmers' Associations in the Dundee 
district told the Native Economic Commission: "Detribalisation 
has no advantages for the European farmer, nor yet does it 
benefit the native.,,229 Indeed, farmers were keenly aware that 
those individuals who farmers despised as deserters were often 
equally despised by tribal authorities and parents as abaqafi. 
The chairman of a Newcastle Farmers' Association might have 
been speaking on behalf of tribal authorities when he complained 
of the tendency of youths to "defy their parents" and to 
abscond to the towns where they learnt further "irresponsible" 
habits; so too when he painted an idyllic picture of the "olden 
days" when chiefs and homestead heads we~e "respected and obeyed 
by everyone in the kraal" and any disagreements between labourers, 
homestead heads and farmers were "fixed up at once" by 
the intervention of the local chief.
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In the 1920s, farmers sought to rehabilitate the tribal order 
and the web of inter-generational obligations that underpinned 
it. Their attempt to do so was extremely problematical: the 
. nature of African land tenure on white farms had itself done 
much to undermine the status of tribal authorities and the 
rationale of tribalism. Tribal authorities, too, had many 
grievances about tenure on white farms - as had been evidenced, 
for example, in the support that they had given the ALU 
in Northern Natal. Moreover, some farmers in effect used the 
'kraalhead system' to punish their lieutenants, the homestead 
heads, by fining or eviction if any of the latters' dependants 
deserted. 23l 1 h However, a tough the overall effect of African 
tenure on white farms had been to forge a restive rank-and-file 
from the ruins of the tribal order, a strong element of 
generational struggle between tribal authorities and detribalised 
youth still persisted. And while tribal authorities continued 
to defend their tribal prerogatives against the forces of 
'social disintegration', farmers had African compatriots in the 
317 
struggle to defend the 'kraalhead system'. 
context, three points can be made. 
In the latter 
First, by resisting the 'individualism' of sons who sought to 
make their own separate labour tenancy arrangements, fa~mers 
served to force youth to maintain their allegiance with their 
parents and tribal superiors if they wished to maintain a link 
with the land in the white countryside. One of the farmers' 
main complaints about the old Masters and Servants Law was 
that it did not lend legal weight to the defence of the ' kraal-
head system', since it did not prescribe th~t the 'unit of 
employment'was a married man together with his wives and 
offspring. The long-demanded 1932 Native Service Contract 
Act, however, did do SOi moreover, it provided that 'native 
juveniles' from the white countryside could not be employed 
by outside employers except with the written consent of both 
their 'guardians' and their landlords. It is significant that 
Nicholls, in strongly supporting the Native Service Contract 
Bill in parliament (even though the bill was of little value 
to the sugar industry), elaborately explained how such 
provisions were welcomed by tribal authorities who, like farmers, 
were deeply troubled by 'social disintegration' and urban-
isation.
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Second, once the 'kraalhead contract' had been 
made, farmers reinforced its tribal nature by resisting the 
'individualism' of sons who demanded to be paid individually 
for work performed outside the six-month term of free labour 
service. Instead, farmers paid an 'aggregated wage' to 
homestead heads; this bolstered patriarchal authority and enabled 
the patriarchs to take their 'commission' in the course of 
d ' 'b' h h' 'd d 233 , re lstrl utlng t e money to t elr epen ants'. Thlrd, and 
perhaps most illustrative, farmers looked upon chiefs as a 
means of tracing deserters and returning them to the farms. 
Deserters could not be efficiently trac ed by means of the 
extant pass l aws , and, since the ~asters and Servants Law 
did not r ec ocnise a 'kraalhead contract' as binding except 
in respect of the homestead head himself , most deserters could 
not be prosecuted in court. As Harwi ck reported to parliament, 
Katal's farmers favoured the employment of chiefs 
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to combat desertion since this represented "an inexpensive 
form of carrying out the Masters and Servants Act in Natal 
where it is practically a dead letter". Marwick was 
justifiably accused of condoning the use of chiefs as "spies" 
among their own people.
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Indeed, farmers' attempts to 
coerce 'retribalisation' by enforcing the 'kraalhead system', 
in which process they implicated tribal authorities, also had 
the effect of generating further tensions within the tribal 
structure - a paradox that farmers evidently did (or would) 
not recognise. 
Like Natal's farmers, the sugar planters were well aware that 
the preservation of the tribal order was in their interests 
as employers of labour. Empangeni planter George Higgs, for 
example, lamented the decline of "self control" that was 
evident even among the rural Zulu. Since Africans had "lost 
their nice old ways", he continued, their respect for whites 
had ebbed,and employers found difficulty in controlling their 
labour forces. He related this to the growth of a stratum 
of "semi-educated natives" in the rural areas.
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Planters 
generally regarded the process of detribalisation to be closely 
associated with the increasing incidence of desertion. Moreover, 
as on the Natal farms, the cheapness of the plantation labour 
supply was based on the survival of homestead production - which 
detribalisation threatened. Duncan Eadie, a leading miller-
cum-planter who gave evidence before the Native Economic 
Commission, justified the low wages on the plantations by 
arguing that migrant labourers were "tribal": only the labourer 
himself needed to be paid, fed and housed since it was "quite 
feasible that his family may be fully supported from his tribal 
h ld ' "236 o lng. 
It is significant that planters were becoming increasingly 
concerned about detribalisation at the same time as their 
demands for Zulu labour were becoming more urgent. Moreover, 
planters knew that Zulu tribal authorities were also concerned 
about detribalisation, since the latter were anxious that 
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migrants returned their wages to the reserves to be re-
distributed in a tribal fashion. Planters and Zulu tribal 
authorities thus had common cause against detribalisation 
and the social influence of the urban areas; and planters came 
to realise that this 'accord' could be of service in resolving 
their chronic difficulties with the supply of and control over 
plantation labourers. For the planters, the possibility of 
a 'labour alliance' with tribal authorities became particularly 
attractive after 1925. 
By the mid-1920s~ planters had become thoroughly disenchanted 
with both the system of labour recruitment itself, and the 
suitability of most recruited labour for plantation work. To 
compete with the gold mines' recruiters, the sugar industry's 
labour agents were forced to offer advances considerably in 
excess of the £2 maximum prescribed by the 1921 Native Advances 
Regulation Act.
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All that the recruiter, and subsequently 
the employer, held as security against the advance was the 
recruited labourer's pass book. The expense of this system 
rose dramatically in the mid-1920s, since plantation labourers 
had learnt that they could, either themselves or through a 
local accomplice, buy replacement pass books at local 
magistracies; this enabled them to desert, be 'Fe-recruited', 
and accumulate advances - while the planters accumulated pass 
books. On top of this development, planters found that a 
significant proportion of recruited labourers were 'rejects' 
from the mines (some were suffering from miners' pth~sis, 
venereal diseases or tuberculosis), increasing numbers were 
succumbing to 'sugar belt' fever, and, as was emphasised during 
the 1925 season, the industry 's recruiters were simply unable 
to supply enough labourers. It was for these reasons that 
Mr c. W. Dent, secretary of the Zululand Planters' Union, 
argued in late 1925 that the "serious labour troubles" always 
endured by Zululand planters had now become "acute".238 
Zulu labourers were seen to offer the remedy to the expensiveness, 
insufficiency, poor health and low fever-tolerance of recruited 
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labourers. Although more Zulu labourers had begun to arrive 
on the plantations in the wake of evictions from the white 
countryside and reserve congestion, they neither arrived in 
sufficient numbers nor with any intention of adhering to the 
six-month plantation contracts (which covered the labour 
intensive cutting season). While it was very convenient to 
the planters that Zulu labourers 'deserted' to their nearby 
homesteads when they fell ill, rather than involving the 
planter in hospitalisation expenses (as did recruited labour), 
it was most inconvenient that they deserted whenever they 
239 pleased. Tnus planters sought not only to attract more 
Zulu labourers to the plantations, but also to devise a method 
of ensuring that they adhered to their contracts - which 
extant labour legislation and pass laws did little to ensure. 
Various 'experts' - including Dr G. A. Park-Ross (District 
Medical Officer of Health), C. A. Wheelwright (CNC), and H. S. 
Fynn (Inspector of Native Labour, Natal) - advised the sugar 
industry that increased wages and better food, housing and 
working condi tions were the ways to achi-eve its objectives among 
the Zulu. Such advice was not welcomed, largely on the grounds 
of expense.
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That the sugar industry favoured coercive 
strategies is perhaps most vividly illustrated in the South 
African Sugar Association's proposals to the NAD, shortly 
after the latter began distributing food among the Zulu during 
the famine of 1931/1932. This "scheme" (which the NAD rejected) 
proposed that the NAD require every homestead head \-lho accepted 
food to undertake to supply labour to the sugar industry; in 
return, the sugar industry would assist in defraying the costs 
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of the famine relief. 
The main coercive strategy that the sugar industry favoured 
after the mid-1920s, however, was rather more subtle: it aimed 
to motivate Zulu tribal authorities to force young Zulu males 
onto the plantations. The sugar industry sought to institution-
alise a 'deferred pay scheme'. Under this scheme, plantation 
labourers would only receive small payments for incidental 
expenses while they were working, but would be paid a lump sum at 
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the expiry of their contract and on the eve of their return 
to their reserve homesteads. From the point of view of the 
tribal autho~ities and migrants' dependants, this would ensure 
that plantation labourers would return to the reserves with 
almost six months' wages intact. For their part, the planters 
could rest assured that labourers did not desert before the expiry 
of their contracts. Moreover, it was envisaged that tribal 
authorities would act as the sugar industry's labour agents, 
altering the pattern of zulu labour migration away from the 
towns (where wages were so easily 'squandered' and detribalised 
ideas were learnt) and towards the plantations. G. M. Robinson, 
a sugar planter and representative of the Zululand Farmers' 
Union (to which all local Planters' Unions in Zululand were 
affiliated), expected that deferred pay would also cause 
zulu women to "force" their husbands and sons onto the 
plantations "since the money would be coming home".242 
When notifying the CNC of the proposals relating to Solomon 
and rnkatha which Campbell ~aid before the Minister of Native 
Affairs in early 1928, the SNA appended some indignant personal 
observations. 
The scheme suggested by Mr Campbell is nothing 
more nor less than an attempt to get Solomon 
under the thumb of the employers of labour, 
and to use him against the rcu. They would also 
subject the activities of the magistrate of Nongoma 
and of the Cproposed whit~ private secretary to 
that end, and to complete the picture, the Chief 
Na~ive . co~~3sioner would also be included in this 
obJectlve. 
There was considerable truth in these views. The planters had 
particular cause in 1928 to take such drastic action as offering 
to settle Solomon's debts (which already amounted to thousands 
of pounds) in order to secure Zulu labour. Under the terms 
of the 1928 Mocambique Convention~ the government of Mocambique 
ruled that Mocambique migrants could not take up employment in 
the Union anywhere except on the gold mine s . Hitherto, labourers 
from the Portuguese east coast had formed the largest component 
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of the planters' labour force, and represented the latters' 
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only reliable supply of labour that was ~mmune to rna ar~a. 
It is very likely that the planters' offer to Solomon was 
made in the nature of a bargain for Zulu labour. More broadly, 
however, the aim to assist in the resurrection of the Zulu 
monarchy represented an extension of the planters' and farmers' 
labour policy during the 1920s. This had revolved around the 
preservation of tribalism and the homestead mode of production 
on which it was based, and the use of tribal authorities as 
suppliers and controllers of labour - objectives that had 
become more urgent in view of the rise of the leU. And in the 
context of a 'recognised' semi-autonomous Zulu monarchy and 
lnkatha, planters and farmers undoubtedly would have acted 
as a powerful backstairs lobby in supporting the rebuilding 
of African socio-economic and political life in the rural 
areas, denouncing the social influence of the urban areas, 
and persuading tribal authorities that their interests lay 
in the retention of African labour in Natal's countryside. 
Planters' and farmers' objectives regarding Solomon and lnkatha 
were not only, however, directly related to their labour 
objectives. As has been noted, the spread of 'socialistic' 
and revolutionary ideas among the African population had 
persuaded Natal's rural whites that the whole structure of 
white rule in South Africa was under threat. The ominous 
references to the security of "isolated farms", homes to white 
women and children, that Marwick made during his parliamentary 
denunciations of the leu were not unrepresentative: mortal 
fears among Natal's rural whites lent an urgency to their 
drive to ensure the long-term survival of white economic and 
1 · . 1 245 po ~t~ca supremacy. One response had been to call for more 
vigorous state repression. In this context, it is significant 
that the Natal Agricultural Union (primarily representative 
of Farmers' Associations in the province, but also representative 
of Planters' Unions) made a special deputation to the Minister 
of Native Affairs in 1927 to plead for the banning of all "native 
meetings", except those conducted with official sanction. 246 
323 
Another response, however, was to call for the implementation 
of a thoroughgoing segregationist 'native policy' which would 
meet the expressly political threats that were seen to be 
confronting white South Africa. Solomon and Inkatha, whose 
political objectives were both collaboratory and separatist, 
were seen to be the planters' and farmers' African allies in 
the pursuit of a segregationist 'settlement' of the 'native 
question' in Natal. 
Natal's rural whites were bitterly antagonistic to the tendency 
among African leaders to adopt 'European'political ideas and 
practices. 'British' liberal-democratic notions among the 
African petty bourgeoisie were seen to be as fundamentally 
revolutionary as 'Russian' socialist notions among African 
workers. Hertzog's 1926 'Native Bills', however, were considered 
to give state encouragement to the 'Europeanisation'of 
African politics: they envisaged the establishment of an 
elective Union Native Council and sought to permit Africans 
to elect seven white representatives to the House of Assembly. 
These provisions would give Africans in Natal a voice in the 
central white government for the first time, and, moreover, 
would do so on the basis of the democratic principle. When 
the select committee on Hertzog's 'Native Bills' began touring 
the Union during 1927 to consult public opinion, Farmers' 
Associations and Planters' Unions in Natal mobilised to enter 
into the discourse on the 'political' aspects of 'native policy' 
- and in doing so they rallied to the defence of the Natal 
'Shepstonist'model of political, judicial and cultural segregation. 
The Rosebank Farmers' Association, for example, submitted a 
resolution to its representative body, the Natal Agricultural 
Union, which opined that 
the governance of the Natives in South Africa 
on any principles of democracy is both premature 
and unwise ••. the advancement of the Natives towards 
civilization would be speedier and more satisfactory 
under the more drastic and effective control of their 
own.Native . Chiefs whose status and jurisdiction should 
be lncreased rather than diminished. 241 
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Farmers' Associations and Planters' Unions from allover the 
province authorised the Natal Agricultural Union to express 
their consensus of opinion before the select committee on 
the 'Native Bills' in mid-1927. William Elliot, an Estcourt 
farmer, acted as the leading spokesman before the committee -
whose members included Marwick and Nicholls. Elliot represented 
that it was "extremely dangerous for European civilization 
to be built on a black base and then admit them LAfricanal 
to representation in our supreme governing body". The issue 
was one of "racial preservation". While endorsing the abolition 
of the Cape African franchise, he argued that the proposal 
regarding the election of white parliamentary representatives 
of African interests would effectively extend the African 
"franchise right" throughout the Union. The state should "not 
give the educated native who had left his tribal conditions any 
share in the government of the country so far as the European 
parliament is concerned": these Africans would launch a 
clamour for equality with whites and "make it irnp0ssible 
and intolerable for Europeans to live in this country". And 
referring to the activities of the ICU in both rural and urban 
areas in Natal, Elliot argued that worker unrest could only 
worsen if Africans were given any encouragement to regard 
themselves as equal citizens of a unitary South Africa. The 
situation might then arise that "if we £white§.7 want to hold our 
own we must exterminate them LAfrican~". 
As an alternative, Elliot expounded a scheme of political 
segregation whereby Africans would have no political rights 
in 'white South Africa' - whether in parliament or by way of 
African councils in the urban areas or white countryside. In 
the African reserves, he argued, a structure of local and 
regional representative bodies could be established to train 
Africans in "citizenship" in their "own areas". The reserves, 
which could be amalgamated to form larger territorial units 
should be "native" from top to bottom: reserve'citizens' 
should not be debarred from any professional or executive posts 
there. In this way, he concluded, Africans could "ultimately 
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reach self-government in their own areas, the only point 
we £white~ reserve is that in the last resort the white 
. " 248 man must rema1n master • 
Throughout the 1920s, Marwick and Nicholls were the most 
ardent parliamentary advocates of both the Natal system of 
'native administration' and the tribal system on which it was 
based. They had consistently advocated the extension of the 
powers of chiefs, and, though they approved of the principle 
of African local self-government and political representation 
in the rural areas, they opposed the application of local 
councils policy in Natal on the grounds that it would undermine 
tribalism. 249 And in a long and elaborate speech in early 
1927, Nicholls argued that the democratic principles embodied 
in Hertzog's 'Native Bills' were both dangerous and unnecessary. 
What was necessary, he suggested, was that a more thorough 
understanding of "the psychology of the native" and of tribal 
law and custom should guide the evolution of state 'native 
policy': Africans should be governed in a way which suited their 
particular beliefs, customs and needs. Moreover, Nicholls 
reminded parliament that Africans had a particular economic 
role to play in South Africa, since cheap African labour was the 
foundation upon which white South African civilisation and 
wealth depended; he contende~ that Hertzog had not adequately 
considered thi$ fact when formulating his -political proposals. 
Marwick strongly supported Nicholls' views. 250 
Before taking up their work as members of the select committee 
on Hertzog's 'Native Bills', Marwick and Nicholls developed 
their segregationist ideas in the course of supporting the 
Native Administration Bill. They not only expounded the 
administrative virtues of the Natal Code of Native Law and the 
maintenance of tribalism, but went on to argue that, by prescribing 
the political, judicial and cultural separateness of Africans 
from Europeans, the Bill was founded on anthropological 'fact'. 
For Marwick, the Bill connoted a return to a native policy that 
was in harmony with the "philosophy of the natives". "Native 
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customs and usages iWer~ invested with a national and civic 
value", he noted, but until recently the tendency had been to 
regard them with "mere academic or ethnological interest". 
To support his view that it was the state's duty to uphold 
tribalism, Marwick quoted the similar opinions of an anthro-
pologist who had recently studied tribal society in the 
Sudan. He then detailed how African acculturation of European 
values and practices was neither in the interests of Africans 
nor Europeans; in this context Marwick dwelt on the ideological 
origins and the purpose of the ICu.
25l 
Nicholls argued that 
state 'native policy' had to choose between two alternatives: 
the Natal system which sought to maintain tribalism and 
"develop the native on his own lines", and the Cape system, 
which sought to foster "individualism" and impose European-style 
democracy on the African population. The "vast majority of 
natives in this country", he argued, asked that they "be allowed 
to develop along their own lines and maintain their purity 
of race, and that the administration of the native laws should 
be in the hands of their chiefs". And the proportionately small 
number of "detribalized, Europeanized" Africans who sought 
to develop on the lines of the "selfish individualism" of the 
European - which the Cape system encouraged - would and should 
always be shunned by the majority of whites and Africans alike: 
they threatened both European and African civilisation. Nicholls 
concluded by urging the state to discard the "false conceptions 
of the Victorian era" which regarded every African as a 
potential parliamentary voter and "imitation European"; policy 
should rather be based on modern anthropological knowledge 
and build upon "the sure foundations of tribal custom and 
d . . ,,252 tra l.tl.on • 
By Nicholls' own account, Natal MPs together agreed that he and 
Marwick should represent the 'Natal view' and "act according 
to a plan that was agreed upon" in the select conunittee on 
the'Native Bills,.253 In this context Nicholls emerged as the 
leading ideologue, reinterpreting and elaborating the segregationist 
princip~es which Natal had inherited from the days of Shepstone. 
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While simultaneously negotiating with Solomon and 1nkatha, 
he set out his ideas in a number of illuminating memoranda 
and private letters. Nicholls outlined his policy, which 
he named 'adaptationist' to distinguish it from the Cape 
'assimilationist' alternative, in an undated memorandum 
(evidently written during 1930): 
An adaptationist policy demands as its primary 
concept the maintenance of chieftaindom Las] 
the necessary pivot around which all tribal 
evolution must take place. Lltl assumes a 
difference between the Bantu and the Europeans 
~J some measure of territorial segregation fanqJ 
the growth of a national consciousness among 
the Bantu themselves. The opposite policy of 
assimilation substitutes class for race, and, 
if continued on its present basis, must lead to 
the evolution of a native proletariat, inspired 
by the usual antagonisms of the class war. The 
process of assimilation has already gone very 
far, and unless some effort is made to stern the 
tide of tribal disintegration, it will soon be 
too late. 254 
Perhaps more bluntly, he wrote in a private letter dated May 
1929 that "I do not believe that black and white can continue 
to exist as two separate classes in a South African democracy 
••• we cannot long continue as a white aristocracy and black 
proletariat". Whites were faced with a choice between "a Bantu 
Nation whose evolving civilisation we can advance and respect, 
which shall find its national pride in the cultivation of its 
separateness, or a Black proletariat using all the recognised 
methods for the complete overthrow of the whites on the basis 
of class".255 
As an alternative to a unitary South Africa with African 
representation in the House of Assembly, Nicholls believed that 
state policy should foster self-governing 'Bantu Nations' in 
the Union's reserves. He was determined that 'Bantu self 
government' should operate on the tribal rather than democratic 
principle. "Democracy exists in chieftaindom but it is not 
the Western democracy of the ballot box. We must get back 
to the essence of native life - communalism - LOtherwis~ 
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we will most certainly arrive very soon at communlsm • 
Nicholls disapproved of the Transkeian General Council (Bunga) 
because, he maintained, its elected members tended to adopt an 
-aggressive attitude" to NAD officials. By contrast, a tribal 
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council would be dominated by chiefs who were NAD employees. 
Moreover, Nicholls felt that hereditary chiefs would play an 
essential ideological role in stimulating a sense of 'national' 
loyalty. In an unaddressed and undated copy of a letter, 
probably written in 1929, he related this to the Zulu case: 
The policy of a Bantu Nation ••• obviously brings 
in its train a pride of race. The most race 
proud man I know is Solomon. He glories in his 
race and its past prowess; and there is no native 
in the Union who is so earnestly desiro~s of 
maintaining Bantu Purity ••• There is everything 
to be said for creatins the Inkata the Native Council for Zululand. 2 8 
Although Nicholls mainly emphasised the importance of 
resuscitating paramount chiefs, tribal authorities and tribalism, 
he felt that the African petty bourgeoisie had a leading role 
to play in 'educating' and 'developing' their respective 
'Bantu Nations'. And Nicholls' envisaged'solution' offered 
tangible advantages for the African petty bourgeoisie. In the 
reserves, Africans were to be eligible for all posts in the 
civil service, and were to be encouraged to enter the professional 
and commercial careers that, in practice, were currently 
monopolised by whites. 259 
There was considerable congruity between Nicholls' views and 
those that developed among ideologues of Natal's hamba kahle 
petty bourgeoisie during the late 1920s. The latter, on their 
own account, had become increasingly anxious to stave off a 
'class war' as class antagonisms sharpened both within African 
society and between Africans and whites. Indeed, the petty 
bourgeois establishment hovered uncomfortably in the social 
'grey area' between the dominant social forces - black workers 
and white capitalists - and was keenly aware of the insecurities 
of its position. Dube personally had a foretaste of what seemed 
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to lie in store when, as tension was mounting between African 
workers and whites in Durban prior to the Beer Hall riots 
of mid-1929, a'class skirmish' disrupted his meeting to revive 
the Durban branch of the old NNC. An "amalayita gang", Ilanga 
lase Natal reported, invaded this meeting of "chiefs and 
respectable natives", and turned it into a debacle. The 
editorial related the amalaita action to Dube's recent 
denunciation of the "rotten social conditions" which were being 
fomented in the town "largely by those associated by Csi~ 
all-night dances".260 During the late 1920s, the ideological 
mainstream of Natal's petty bourgeois establishment was infused 
with a powerful new element: a moral indignation for 'foreign' 
(ie. Russian), 'anti-religious' and 'socially divisive' working 
class doctrines. Simultaneously, petty bourgeois ideologues 
further elaborated the ideology of African or, more specifically, 
Zulu nationalism that had underpinned their interest in Inkatha 
since the latter's inception. This ideology came to be more 
explicitly expressed as one of 'national rebuilding', which 
envisaged the construction of a 'new African civilization' 
upon the foundation of its tribal predecessor. Increasing 
moral value was attached to social unity and respect for hereditary 
chiefs. And the latter's residual appeal to vertical tribal 
loyalties was seen to be the key to the reimposition of 'control' 
over a society that was fast falling apart at the seams, and, 
in so doing, was threatening to decapitate itself of both its 
old and new elites. 
After 1928 and until the early 1930s, Ilanga lase Natal 
frequently featured articles which were intended to 'warn our 
people against Bolshevism which is now being freely preached" 
and to counter the "ignorance that makes our people listen 
to these foreigners". Considerable detail was provided about 
social and political conditions in Russia (for example, that 
tax defaulters were "lined up in batches before a firing squad"), 
and the overall conclusion was that communism had "destroyed 
Russia its own mother". These articles sometimes sought to 
predict the consequences of CP, ICU and "Red ANC" policy in South 
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Africa. Readers were advised against joining Gumede's 'League 
of African Rights' because "to hand over the reigns of power 
to the proletariat is for the most savage and ruthless brute 
••• to do absolutely what he likes. Such a prospect might be 
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pleasing ••• to one who hates all the moral laws of God". 
Ilanga lase Natal expected that its readers' respect for both 
the 'laws' of the Christian God and those of African tradition 
- which would have been considered as incompatible a decade 
previously - should assist them in their rejection of communism. 
As one editorial argued, communism was inappropriate and 
undesirable since African governments had been "of monarchical 
form from time immemorial".262 The implication was that African 
government shoul d remain so - and while the Russian model had 
proved that communism was incompatible with monarchical forms, 
the British model proved that bourgeois democracy was not. 
The florescence of an inward-looking and tribal-based African 
nationalism among Natal's petty bourgeois establishment was 
not only an ideological response against specific working class 
doctrines. More broadly, the social influence of the urban 
areas was seen to be the root cause of African 'social 
disintegration'. There, it was believed, 'ignorant' and 
'uneducated' Africans picked up the worst of white habits. For 
example, while decrying the activities of urban "amalayita mobs", 
Ilanga lase Natal argued that "Natives were ladies and gentlemen 
before they came under the influence of the criminal element 
of the Whites".263 This question of undesirable white influence 
was a factor in stimulating a separatist or segregationist 
ideological response. 
The evidence of leading petty bourgeois ideologues before the 
Native Economic Commission indicated that the rural areas -
and, more particularly, the reserves - were being regarded as 
the natural domain of 'respectable' African culture. Moreover, 
whereas the petty bourgeoisie had long considered tribal 
'barbarity' and 'primitiveness' as the antithesis of mission-
station 'respectability', great emphasis was now placed on the 
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inherent dignity of hereditary chiefs, their importance as 
inheritors of African tradition, and the value of tribalism 
as a means of ensuring social hygiene. Chief Simon Majozi 
of the Indaleni mission community, a member of Inkatha's 
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executive committee and a keen tennis player, dwelled on 
the value of the "hlonipa" custom which prescribed "respect". 
He argued that the tribal system was "in essence representative", 
as was so clearly illustrated in the action that chiefs took agains 
, 265 h 1 h' f h M" d D' k S' k "ag1tators". K 0 wa C 1e s Step en 1n1 an 1r 10 a 
(both of whom had been stalwarts of the old NNC) endorsed 
Majozi's call for the extension of chiefly authority. Mini 
spoke of chiefs as the "heritages of the distant past of 
Zulu culture", and of tribalism as the "rational feeling of the 
people i,J which calls for conservation".266 Mrs Violet 
Makanya, secretary of the 'progressive' rural 'Bantu Youth 
League', strongly supported chiefly rule because it encouraged 
a sense of social unity and cooperation - even though chiefs 
had hampered her organisation's objectives. She was particularly 
concerned about the social effects of migrancy, and saw 
tribalism as a remedy. "But it should be guided in the right 
lines fanqJ not assisted when it stands in the way of progress."267 
In all these ideological developments, Natal's petty bourgeois 
establishment had been influenced by white liberals. After 
1925, while the CP was developing a network of night schools 
in the urban areas to offer an 'appropriate' education to 
African workers, Christian and liberal organisations established 
a variety of educational and social institutions designed 
primarily to assist the petty bourgeoisie to take up roles 
of social leadership. The ideological dissimilarity between 
CP and liberal night schools was very clear. In the former, 
Roux relates that pupils "struggled with complicated political 
doctrines at the same time as they learnt their letters", and, 
by contrast, the Bantu Men's Social Centres offered up to Junior 
Certificate classes in the interests of "development and civil-
isation" and bookkeeping classes for "business pursuits".268 
332 
As African education flourished so too did African newspapers, 
stimulating an unprecedented spirit of African public enquiry 
into the question of social engineering - which state legislators 
h ' l' d ' 269 had been anxious to preserve as t elr exc USlve omaln. 
The guidance that liberals/Christians offered to the petty 
bourgeo~ in this context was illustrated in the address 
that Rev. R. E. Phillips of the Johannesburg Bantu Men's Social 
Centre presented to the Natal Missionary Conference in 1929. 
This address, which was entitled "Communism or Christianity: 
The present-day question for Native youth", was dominated 
by a measured denunciation of the moral evils of communism. 
But it went further, and, having outlined the socio-economic 
ills that were seen to be communism's breeding-ground, urged 
Christians to take positive action in "moulding and shaping 
the new Bantu Society". To this end, he favoured the encourage-
ment of African commercial and agricultural cooperative 
societies - or 'self-help' schemes - through which media 
Africans themselves were to play a leading role in their own 
, '1 '" "1' 2 70 SOCla reconstructlon on progresslve lnes. D. R. o. 
Thomas, the tutor of the Durban 'Workers' Educational Association' 
(ie.a liberal institution) in 1931 clearly enunciated why the 
'self-help' strategy was particularly appropriate in the African 
context. He addressed himself to the questions of "how the Native 
people may advance, yet not adopt the disastrous individualism 
of the European ~anqJ how they may not lose the valuable 
attributes of the tribal unit, and yet combat its conservatism 
" . .. . The answer, he concluded, lay in cooperative societies 
which were compatible with "the tradition of the Native people 
to look to communal prosperity". Thus tribal communalism, 
which was morally applaudable, was to be a positive advantage 
in the transition from a redistributive subsistence economy 
to one of "industrial progress" - or capital accumulation. 271 
The burden of liberal guidance to petty bourgeois leaders was 
therefore that they should grapple with the social problems 
of their day with their own hands, and go out among'their own 
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people' with the express purpose of building a progressive 
new African society on the old tribal base. In this context 
it is significant that J. D. Rheinallt Jones, editor of 
the anthropolo~ical journal Bantu Studies, instituted a weekly 
seminar within the Bantu Men's Social Centres wherein the 
"African who aspires for leadership among his people" could 
"discuss Native Law and Custom and Economics".272 Although 
liberals/white Christians still tended to verbalise a fondness 
for a liberal-democratic solution to the political 'native 
question', in practice they were now coming to explore a solution 
that closely accorded with the anthropological/segregationist 
, , 1" 1 ' 1 273 ideas of Natal's lead~ng 'nat~ve po ~cy eg~s ators. 
In 1929, Seme began a campaign through the columns of Ilanga 
lase Natal to publicise the newly-established "Native Land 
and Trust Company of Africa, Limited". The latter in practice 
represented part of his political manifesto in his election 
campaign for the presidency of the ANC. And Seme, a Natalian 
in Johannesburg, largely owed his successful replacement of 
the 'red' Gumede in 1930 to the strong support of the Natal 
petty bourgeois establishment. The purpose of the company was 
described to Ilanga ~ase Natal's readership as follows: 
Our main object should be to develop our people 
and the Native Reserves to the very best extent 
of which they may be capable, commercially and 
industrially, and to inspire into our people the 
spirit of cooperation and self-help - to form 
model modern Townships for the tribal Natives after 
the style of the Mission Reserves in Natal ••• Our 
main object must be to help create for each Lnativ~ 
a home such as can appeal to his heart. Then and 
not until then can we Africans hope to develop a 
civilisation which shall be our own, a civilisation 
which shall be more spiritual and humanistic Lthan 
the Europeans' - by implicatioti7. 
Seme argued that if Africans were "to achieve their economic 
independence and self help" they had to have more land than the 
"Union Landless Natives Act" had set aside as reserves. More 
land, moreover, would curb the "drift of landless Natives to towns 
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where they become demoralised". It was therefore especially 
important that Africans subscribe to the company's "Trust Fund 
•.. for the purpose of buying our country back". Indeed, 
Africans were "most silly"to imagine that whites would ever 
leave the country or give Africans more land "free of charge". 
Seme then begged that all African leaders - including those 
of the ICU - unite in this matter of rebuilding a land-based 
African civilisation, since it was beneficial to the whole 
African people as opposed to any particular "section" of the 
. l' 274 Afrlcan popu atlon. 
Throughout the 1920s and until 1929, Seme had played a low-
profile role in African politics while focussing his attention 
on his legal practice in Johannesburg. Nonetheless, he had 
maintained his personal and professional links with Swazi and 
Zulu royalty during this period; in making his political comeback 
in the late 1920s, he was to display an inclination to interpret 
African nationalism not in a pan-Africanist sense but in a 
narrower ethnic sense. And on his election in 1930 to the 
presidency of the ANC, which supposedly embodied a pan-SouthAfric~ 
African nationalism, he simultaneously expressed unprecedented 
1 . . k h 275 persona lnterest ln In at a. Although the 'self-help' 
proposals that Seme publicised through Ilanga lase Natal in 
1929 did not refer to the 'Zulu people' as a special case, in 
all other respects they exemplified the main features of Natal 
petty bourgeois ideology as it had developed in the late 1920s. 
Within an African nationalist context, the proposals referred 
to the problem of 'intra-national' class struggle; the immoral 
or demoralising nature of African life in the urban areas; the 
futility of merely relying on the state to implement reforms; 
and the need for Africans to take it upon themselves to 
reconstruct African society in the rural areas. It is very 
significant, furthermore, that Seme used the word 'civilisation' 
in a purely African context: hitherto it was always assumed 
that 'civilisation' could only be European. 
The reconstituted Inkatha of 1928, which can be regarded as a 
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Zulu national self-help scheme, made the implicitly segregationist 
ideology of 'national rebuilding' explicit: Inkatha sought 
state 'recognition' as the representative organ of a self-
governing Zulu nation. In giving evidence before the Native 
Economic Commission, representatives of the Natal petty 
bourgeoisie clearly outlined the practical objectives that 
underlay their interest in a more thoroughgoing segregationism. 
Great emphasis was placed on the desirability of encouraging 
'progressive careers in the African reserves, while at the 
same time ensuring that the career opportunities there should 
be reserved solely for Africans. In particular, frequent calls 
were made for the opportunity to trade 'among our own people' 
- an often repeated phrase. As kholwa Chief Josiah Mqwebu 
of Stanger complained, Christianity and education had "aroused 
in certain of the reserve Natives a liking for business pursuits" 
but they were denied opportunities even in the African reserves 
since whites monopo11sed the trading stores.
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More bluntly, 
Seme argued that "segregation" should mean the dispossession 
of all white storekeepers in the African reserves.
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Both 
W. W. Ndhlovu and Dube expressed similar views.
278 
Dube's evidence, furthermore, envisaged a thorough 'modernisation' 
of the reserves: he advocated the introduction of state-assisted 
irrigation schemes, and foresaw the establishment of large-
scale commercial agriculture (including sugar plantations), 
business concerns, and "centres of industry" (including furnitute 
factories and leather tanneries). Thus the reserves were to be 
"a stepping stone towards civilisation". Dube emphasised at 
length the necessity of more land for African occupation. Turning 
to the political development of the reserves, he stated that he 
"believed in the tribal system" - particularly in view of the 
problem of social disintegration. Tribalism was to be a 
progressive force under "an educated chief who is open to progress, 
and educated councillors who are going to support forward 
movements"~ in this way Africans could "have a degree of freedom 
in exercising intelligence in-their own areas". "Progressive 
committees" were to be the main decision-making bodies,"with the 
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chief made a mere figurehead, so that he could not be an 
obstruction f,J and the councillors of the chief must be people 
who are progressive in their ideas".279 In effect, Dube's 
evidence identified why Natal's petty bourgeoisie was so 
anxious to ' secure Inkatha's control over the reserves in 
zululand and Natal proper. As a 'progressive committe~', 
Inkatha had laid down in its 1928 constitution that Solomon 
was to be a 'mere figurehead'. Inkatha's practical objectives 
were attractive to all of the disparate elements within the 
Natal petty bourgeoisie, 'establishment' and 'unfulfilled' 
alike - including members of the urban petty bourgeoisie who 
were disillusioned with African prospects and quality of life 
in the towns, the stifled petty bourgeoisie in the white 
countryside, and the aspiring petty bourgeois stratum that had 
developed within the reserves. 280 
The common political ideas among Natal's 'native policy' 
legislators/representatives of white rural employers and 
representatives of Natal's African petty bourgeoisie had been 
elearly expressed in the context of Solomon and Inkatha in e~rly 
1928. The ZNTI speech that Nicholls had written for Solomon, 
the letter that Dube had written to Marwick, and the constitution 
that Nicolson and Thorpe had prepared for Inkatha, all endorsed 
a tribal-based political and cultural segregation and a reserve-
based territorial segregation. All of these statements had 
applauded the disciplinary virtues of tribalism, but had 
maintained that the preservation of tribal socio-political 
traditions did not preclude African political and economic 
'modernisation'. Moreover, all had referred to the historical 
and inherent separateness of the 'Bantu' or Zulu 'nation', and 
asserted that the latter should 'develop on its own lines,.281 
The objectives of the reconstituted Inkatha can be summarised 
as fourfold. First, to inspire a sense of united Zulu nation-
hood among all African inhabitants of the province of Natal, 
thus defusing 'intra-national' class antagonisms. Inkatha's zulu 
nationalism was to be underpinned by 'traditional' patriarchal 
authority and tribal discipline. Second, to entrench the 
petty bourgeois and tribal elites as zulu national leaders. 
Third, to effect fundamental socio-economic and political 
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'reforms'within the tribal system. The rural areas, and particularl~ 
the reserves (which Inkatha aimed to enlarge), were to be 
the focal point of the 'new African civilisation'. 
Fourth and most important, to press the South African state to 
confer upon the 'Zulu nation', under the figurehead of Solomon and 
the practical leadership of Inkatha, a large measure of autonomy 
in attending to its 'own affairs'. Inkatha was not only 
advocating that a geographically and demographically 'stretched' 
version of the rural local council pqlicy should be implemented 
in the province of Natal: it was also promoting the further 
development of the ideology and practice of segregation. Whereas 
the architects of the local council policy tended to regard local 
councils as mere administrative instruments of the NAD, the 
officially-recognised Zulu national council that Inkatha 
envisaged would be an embodiment of the Zulu nation's desire 
to maintain its political and cultural separateness - from both 
whites and other African 'nations' or 'ethnic groups' within 
the Union. And although it was not made explicit in Inkatha's 
calls for official recognition, Inkatha ultimately sought 
greater political autonomy from 'white South Africa' than was 
currently endorsed by the consensus of segregationist opinion 
at state level. Inkatha's leading exponents clearly looked 
upon the neighbouring High Commission Territories as attractive 
models for the settlement of Zululand; Basutoland and Swaziland 
were effectively Southern Sotho and Swazi 'nation-states', in 
which British sovereignty was superimposed upon the authority 
of the indigenous monarchs and central representative councils 
(pitso and libandla respectively). In this context it is 
important to note that although Nicholls' and Dube's interests 
lay primarily within the province of Natal, both envisaged that 
the implementation of a thoroughgoing policy of zulu political 
and territorial segregation might serve as a guideline for 'native 
policy' throughout the Union. 282 
CHAPrER 6 
STATE RECOGNITION FOR INKATHA AND THE ZULU KINGSHIP? 
The official response to Solomon and Inkatha, 1928-1929 
The drive for official recognition was the most crucial of 
lnkatha's objectives; indeed, the realisation of any of lnkatha's 
objectives was largely dependent upon its being accorded 
official status. The question of how the state should respond 
to lnkatha lay in the hands of the NAD. Under the terms of 
the 1926 and 1927 Native Affairs (Amendment) Acts, and the 1927 
Act's definition of the powers of the 'Supreme Chief', the CNC 
and SNA could call upon the Governor-General to proclaim modified 
and larger councils than were envisaged under the 1920 Act. 
The NAD was thus empowered to establish a council such as 
lnkatha at its own discretion. 
Although the SNA and CNC knew (or suspected) in 1928 that white 
rural employers aimed to use Solomon and lnkatha to secure 
greater control over African labour, they were not cognisant 
of the broader political objectives pursued by either the 
leading white or African exponents of the reconstituted lnkatha. 
Nicholls' 'adaptionist' views were not expressed in public until 
the 1930s, and the NAD was ill-informed of the political ideas 
that were being discussed among the 'African intelligentsia' 
in such institutions as the Bantu Men's Social Centres. Moreover, 
the negotiations between white and African leaders that led 
to the reconstitution of lnkatha had been strictly secret. For 
the NAD, the question of Inkatha's recognition was purely an 
administrative question. 
As has been noted, the CNC had come to regard lnkatha in an 
unprecedentedly favourable light in the two months prior to 
the crucial June 1928 lnkatha meeting - and he had urged that 
the organisation be accorded official support as a counterblast 




the CNC's requests during April to nominate an NAD represent-
ative to attend the 1928 meeting, and to instruct magistrates 
to inform their districts that the 1928 meeting had official 
sanction. 1 The SNA's attitude changed dramatically, however, 
when he heard of Campbell's proposals to the Minister of Native 
Affairs. In early May 1928, the SNA wrote a personal note 
to the CNC (Wheelwright) suggesting that the drive for the 
. recognition of Solomon and Inkatha was being orchestrated by 
white rural employers. The latter "outside influences", he 
argued, sought to subject the Natal NAD to their control. In 
the light of this possibility, the SNA instructed the CNC to draw 
up a carefully considered statement of his views on the 
questions of both Solomon's status and Inkatha's recognition. 
In an accompanying official minute, the SNA argued that the NAD's 
council policy in Zululand had not yet "matured", and that 
there should not be "any hurry to give Linkathg] official 
.. " 2 recognltlon • 
The CNC was clearly taken aback by the SNA's changed attitude. 
He did not reply to the SNA's two letters for nearly a month 
(by which time the Inkatha meeting was already underway), and, 
when he did reply, he requested that the NAn postpone discussion 
of the matter until some two months after the Inkatha meeting. 3 
The SNA, however, responded by reiterating his instruction that 
the CNC immediately draw up a memorandum on policy towards 
Solomon and Inkatha. There were two reasons why the SNA 
regarded the finalisation of policy to be a matter of urgency. 
First, Wheelwright was due to retire at the end of 1928, and 
the SNA did not wish the 'recognition question' to be unresolved 
when a replacement CNC assumed office. Wheelwright was the NAD 
official most responsible for appointing Solomon as chief of 
the Usuthu in 1917, and, furthermore, had been closely acquainted 
with Inkatha since its formation. Second, Nicolson and Thorpe 
had issued the NAD with a draft of Inkatha's new constitution 
in April, implicitly inviting the NAD to suggest amendments and 
hence become involved in the organisation. The SNA was aware 
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that once the new constitution had been executed as a legal 
Deed of Trust, which the 1928 Inkatha meeting had now instructed 
Nicolson and Thorpe to arrange, the NAn could expect Inkatha 
. 1 ., 4 to submit a formal request for offic1a recogn1t1on. 
In preparing his statement of proposed policy, the CNC was 
heavily influenced by the opinions that local Natal NAn officials 
expressed regarding the 1928 Inkatha meeting. The very 
favourable report submitted by Oscroft, who had acted as the 
NAn's observer and was the only NAn official to attend the 
meeting, was an exception to the rule. E. N. Braatvedt, the 
magistrate of Emtonjaneni, was clearly displeased that the CNC 
had sanctioned the meeting. He informed the CNC that the power 
of Solomon and Inkatha directly undermined the authority of 
magistrates, and noted that the members of Inkatha's newly-
elected executive committee carne from allover the province 
- which reflected Inkatha's expanding ambitions. Inkatha was 
being revived, he suggested, primarily because Solomon was 
being pressed by creditors. In this context he reported that 
the Zulu had not benefitted from the money accumulated during 
the extensive Inkatha collections of 1925. Braatvedt was 
convinced that a resurgence of Inkatha's activities would cause 
rebellious rumours, like those of 1925, to begin circulating among 
the Zulu once more. 5 H. L. Gebers, the magistrate of 
Nongoma, remarked that it was impossible to predict whether 
Inkatha's new "fire" would "warm people or burn them up". But 
he referred to a particular source of potential danger. The 
nI-1andlakazi Tribe" had not attended the 1928 meeting, he 
reported, and it seemed that Chief Bokwe had deliberately arranged 
h o • b 6 . t 1S consp1CUOUS a sence. N. W. Pr1ngle, a member of the 
CNC's personal staff at the Natal NAn's Pietermaritzburg 
headquarters, felt that the possibility of re-awakening the 
Usuthu/Mandlakazi feud should receive particular consideration 
when refo~mulating policy towards Solomon and Inkatha. While 
the CNC was absent from his office for a few days in mid-June, 
Pringle took it upon himself to write directly to the SNA to 
say so. He also commented that the CNC was shortly to visit 
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Nongoma to discuss the matter with Gebers. 7 Nicholls 
justifiably commented in his autobiography that his attempts 
to resurrect the Zulu monarchy were confronted by Natal 
magistrates of the "Zulu war, plus Bambata Ll90q} rebellion, 
1
. ,,8 
menta 1 ty. •• • 
In mid-July 1928, the CNC submitted two memoranda to the SNA. 
The first, which was the most detailed, addressed the question 
of Solomon's recognition: the CNC concluded that "it would 
be extremely undesirable to approve of any extension of Solomon's 
present status of Chief of the Usutu LsicJ". 9 The second 
focussed on policy towards Inkatha: "on further consideration", 
the CNC reported, he was now "constrained to withdraw" his 
recent suggestion that Inkatha be given official support. 10 
Regarding Solomon, the CNC reported that General Botha had 
expressly intended to make Solomon a "big man" in Zululand 
if he proved to be a responsible chief over the Usuthu. And 
Solomon's political conduct had been commendable: recently he 
had maintained an "attitude of ~oofness" towards various 
African political organisations, which had been of great value 
to the NAD during a difficult period. However", the CNC felt 
that Solomon had displayed a number of weaknesses of character. 
Solomon was now suffering the physical consequences of "self-
indulgence", and the financial consequences of "spendthrift 
ways" - two firms of Durban solicitors had been employed to 
"unravel the tangle" of Solomon's heavy debts. In this context, 
the CNC reported that it had become clear that Solomon and his 
advisers had purloined"many thousands of pounds" from Inkatha, 
and certain Inkatha members were currently attempting to recover 
some of these extorted funds. Apart from Solomon's character 
and financial corruption, the CNC offered four other reasons 
why the Zulu monarchy should not be officially revived. First, 
it would be strongly opposed by the majority of Natal whites. 
Second, the Mandlakazi absence from the 1928 Inkatha meeting 
suggested that the civil war was not yet over in the minds of 
the Zulu. Third, while it might have been wise to establish 
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the monarchy "under full European control" in 1879, the "whole 
idea now is antiquated". Fourth, "Native political bodies" 
and "a certain small section of the Europeans" had inspired 
in Solomon a desire to be recognised as king of the African 
population throughout the province of Natal rather than only 
in Zululand. Indeed, the CNC continued, whereas formerly 
Natal Africans had feared the Zulu, all African inhabitants 
of the province now regarded themselves as Zulu people and 
looked upon Solomon as "the chief race representative of their 
Nation". The CNC categorically opposed this pan-Natal Zulu 
o t 11 unl y. 
The CNC concluded his 'Solomon memorandum' by suggesting that 
the NAD attempt to persuade Solomon, first, to renounce all 
claims to political authority except in Zululand, and, second, 
to repudiate Inkatha. It was desirable that the NAD establish 
a single council for the whole of Zululand, based on the model 
of the Pondoland General Council. Solomon's support for the 
establishment of a Zululand General Council, as opposed to the 
recognition of Inkatha, could be won if Solomon was informed 
that such a council would pay him a f'considerable grant ll from 
its annual revenue. Furthermore, the CNC continued, Solomon 
could be accorded the privilege of nominating most of the 
members of this council by virtue of his royal blood - though 
Solomon would still not be recognised as paramount chief or king. 
Finally, the CNC suggested that Solomon and a large deputation 
of Zululand chiefs be sent to observe the Pondoland Session 
of the Transkeian Bunga, so as to awaken their enthusiasm 
for the project. In a strictly personal note to the SNA of the 
same date, the CNC recommended that the NAD bribe Solomon to 
undermine Inkatha and support the proposed Zululand General 
Council by presenting him with a "blunt offer to take over his 
1 0 bOlO 0 " 12 la 1 ltles • 
The CNC's 'Inkatha memorandum' laid particular emphasis , on two 
points. First, the current drive for the recognition of Inkatha 
was "nothing more nor less than a deliberate attempt on the part 
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of the 'die hard' Usutu LsiG} supporters to build up the power 
of Solomon" - which the CNC had already stated to be undesirable. 
Second, the 1928 Inkatha meeting had indicated that Inkatha 
wished to become the General Council for the whole province 
of Natal. The CNC therefore regarded Inkatha as "a prime 
obstacle to the establishment of the contemplated General 
Council for Zululand". When Inkatha submitted its formal Deed 
of Trust to the NAD, the CNC recommended that the NAD should 
unambiguously reply that Inkatha would not be recognised, and, 
furthermore, that "Native Chiefs and people of Zululand should 
await the LNAD's councitl proposals which will be submitted to 
them in due course". In the meantime, he recommended that 
magistrates be reminded of the NAD's ban on Inkatha collections, 
and that "a vigorous and intensive campaign of council 
propaganda" be arranged for Zululand. 13 
During the six weeks between the 1928 Inkatha meeting and the 
submission of his memoranda, the CNC had thus unequivocally 
reversed his attitude towards Inkatha: he no longer defined 
Inkatha as an ally which should be nurtured and officially 
incorporated into the NAD's administrative structure, but as 
an opponent which the NAD should actively attempt to destroy. 
Before giving an account of the consequences of - the CNC's 
memoranda, it is essential to identify some of the inconsistences 
contained within them- and attempt to explain why the CNC redefinec 
his policy in the way in which he did. 
Fourteen months previously, while giving evidence in the court 
case that Solomon brought against the Natal Mercury (re. Solomon's 
alleged insult to the Prince of Wales), Wheelwright had 
commended Solomon's action in healing the Usuthu/Mandlakazi 
rift. 14 In his 'Solomon memorandum', however, he suggested 
that the recognition of the Zulu monarchy could rekindle the 
zulu civil war. Furthermore, Wheelwright and other Natal NAD 
officials had at various times in the past seven years reported 
(and complained) that 'educated natives' from Natal proper were 
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the dominant influence in Inkatha. Yet in his 'Inkatha memo-
randum', Wheelwright reported that 'die-hard Usuthu supporters' 
were the prime movers behind the resurgence of Inkatha in 1928. 
(In itself, this statement contradicted the 'Solomon memorandum's' 
comments on the role played by 'native politicians' and 
'certain Europeans'.) The fallacies of these assertions in 
Wheelwright's memoranda were illustrated in August 1928 (three 
weeks after the memoranda were submitted), when fourteen thousand 
Zulu mustered at Nongoma for an indaba with Hertzog. At the 
forefront of the Zulu mass sat Solomon and Bokwe, side by side. 
The leaders of Inkatha were strongly represented, headed by 
Dube. And whereas Solomon gave a short speech expressing Zulu 
loyalty to the government, Dube gave a long political speech 
"on behalf of the Zulu people". Significantly, Dube stressed 
that the Zulu were wholeheartedly in support of the "conceptions" 
in Hertzog's 'Na~ive Bills', since it was their earnest desire 
to "develop along the lines of their own traditions".15 In 
his memoranda, Wheelwright tended to conceptualise Zulu politics 
in an anachronistic tribal mould. This was inconsistent with 
Wheelwright's understanding, which he had demonstrated during 
the first half of 1928, that class divisions were the major 
o f 1 1 0 0 16 dynam1c 0 current Zu u po 1t1CS. 
Wheelwright's proposals regarding the establishment of a Zululand 
General Council would seem to be extra~ely ill-considered. 
Solomon's official status was to remain no more than that of 
an ordinary chief. And yet Solomon was to have the unique 
privilege of appointing members to, and being financially 
supported by, the Zululand General Council. In both memoranda, 
vlheelwright had emphasised Solomon's personal weaknesses as a 
reason for refusing to recognise Solomon and Inkatha. However, 
Solomon would clearly have far greater control over Wheelwright's 
proposed Zulu land General Council - which, in effect, would be 
Solomon's personal ibandla - than he had over Inkatha. Inkatha's 
1928 constitution had defined Solomon's role as that of a 'patron', 
and had accorded him no right to influence the membership or 
policies of the executive committee. 
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Of all the reasons that Wheelwright assembled to condemn the 
recognition of Solomon and Inkatha, perhaps the most plausible 
were those relating to Solomon's character: 17 before mid-
1928, the Natal NAD was unaware of the extent of Solomon's 
financial malpractices, indebtedness, and debilitating addiction 
to liquor. Indeed, while Solomon had overspent consistently, 
drawn upon Inkatha's funds, and drunk freely since the early 
1920s, he had done so in a relatively controlled manner until 
1927. However, it seems that there were two main reasons why 
Wheelwright reversed his attitude towards Inkatha and instead 
proposed the establishment of a Zululand General Council - and 
neither of these were made explicit in his memoranda. 
First, in proposing that Inkatha be accorded official support, 
Wheelwright had advocated that the NAD adopt a policy which was 
unprecedented and somewhat adventurous. Hitherto the NAD had 
been 'creating' councils, as opposed to 'recognising' councils 
that Africans themselves had created. And Wheelwright had 
suggested that the NAD conduct its first experiment with none 
other than Inkatha - when independent Zulu power and the Zulu 
royal family still conjured up fearsome associations in the 
corporate consciousness of the Natal NAD. Wheelwright had 
incorrectly assumed that his proposal would be supported by 
the SNA, but instead found that it was condemned throughout the 
NAD. In 1916, his tentative suggestion that Solomon be 
recognised as chief of the Usuthu was fully supported by General 
Botha (Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs). The latter 
had thereupon recognised Solomon and the 'Usuthu tribe' with 
such swiftness that Wheelwright had no time to reconsider - and 
no-one else in the Natal NAD had had the opportunity of considering 
the question at all. Undoubtedly Wheelwright recalled the 
subsequent clamour that had been raised in white Natal and the 
Natal NAD; the same could be expected were Solomon to be 
recognised as Zulu king in 1928. In preparing his 1928 memoranda, 
it would seem that Wheelwright was partly motivated by a desire 
to extricate himself from his beleagured position. Thus he simply 
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expressed the corporate Natal NAD views on Solomon and Inkatha -
which the CNC had explicitly condemned ten months previously 18 
_ rather than his own. At the same time, realising that 
Solomon's influence could not be ignored and that administrative 
change had to be implemented in Zululand, he hurriedly sketched 
out a capricious proposal which he opportunistically described 
as a 'council' policy. Wheelwright did not submit the well-
considered statement of his views on the 'recognition question' 
that the SNA requested; instead he submitted a statement which 
would cause least controversy, and, in practice, leave the 
policy-making to the new CNC. 
Second, it would seem that, in the aftermath of the large 1928 
Inkatha meeting, Wheelwright had genuinely come to doubt that 
the recognition 0; Inkatha was reconcilable with the admin-
istrative interests of the NAD. Wheelwright had supported 
Inkatha for reasons that were political (ie. it was an'anti-dote' 
to the ICU) rather than administrative. In his 'Inkatha 
memorandum', Wheelwright alluded to the problem of Inkatha's 
independent will: if Inkatha was recognised as a Zululand Council, 
he observed, it would work to extend its authority over the 
whole province regardless of government instructions. The 
assumption that Inkatha had built up so much independent 
power that the NAD would be unable to control it 
clearly underlay Wheelwright's support for the establishment 
of an alternative Zululand General Council. This was manifest 
in the statements Wheelwright made to Fynney, his erstwhile 
colleague who was now a 'patron' of Inkatha, when the latter 
visited the Natal NAD headquarters in November 1928 to enquire 
why Inkatha had not yet been officially recognised. Wheelwright 
replied that he could not see "any purpose" in doing so; the 
government had the necessary legislation to establish its own 
council in Zululand, and it expected that "in the course of 
time" the Zulu would accept what they were offered.19 
The CNC's memoranda defined the NAD's policy in Zululand; none 
of the judgements contained within them were queried by the SNA. 
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When Inkatha's formal Deed of Trust was submitted to the NAD 
in August 1928, however, it was not accompanied by a request for 
official recognition. This seems to have been a very astute 
tactical move on the part of Inkatha's leaders and advisers. 
A request would force the NAn to give a direct answer. If 
the NAD officially informed Inkatha in 1928 that it would 
not be recognised, the NAD would be disinclined to re-open the 
'recognition question' at a later date should it wish to 
reconsider. And if the NAn wished to recognise Inkatha in 1928, 
it would not have to be directly requested to do so - the Deed 
of Trust was sufficient a prompt. Having received the Deed 
of Trust, the SNA instructed the CNC merely to acknowledge 
receipt - and not, as the CNC had recommended, to divulge 
that Inkatha would not be recognised. An acknowledgement was 
all that was necessary, the SNA argued. 20 In view of the SNA's 
instructions, Wheelwright was placed in an uncomfortable position 
when he was unexpectedly visited by Fynney in November 1928; 
Wheelwright emphasised to Fynney that his observations regarding 
Inkatha were strictly unofficial, and were purely his personal 
opinions. At no stage was Inkatha officially informed that 
the NAn had decided against recognition. 
21 
When the new CNC, T. W. C. Norton, took office in 1929, both 
he and the SNA immediately acted on Uhee1wright's proposals 
relating to the establishment of a Zu1u1and General Council. 
The first step that they took was to send Solomon and a large 
deputation of Zu1u1and chiefs, in the charge of F. W. Ahrens 
(magistrate of Nqutu) and H. L. Gebers (magistrate of Nongoma), 
to Umtata in April 1929 so that they could observe how the 
council system operated in the Transkei. Although Dube also 
accompanied this 'Zu1u1and deputation', evidently at the instance 
of Solomon, the whole e~isode received markedly low-key coverage 
. 22 
1n I1anga lase Natal. The chiefs were under instructions 
to call a meeting of chiefs and headmen on their return to 
Zululand, and discuss how council policy should be implemented 
there. 
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The second step taken by the SNA and CNC was to call a conference 
of all native commissioners in Natal in May 1929. At this 
conference, the SNA argued that the time was "ripe" for the 
implementation of council policy in Natal, and that Natal's 
councils should take the form of the 'chiefs' councils' in 
Pondoland. The CNC explained that the government wished to 
form two large councils in the province, .one for Natal proper 
and one for Zululand. Certain Zululand magistrates, most 
notably Braatvedt, expressed strong misgivings about the 
extension of council policy to Zululand, whatever form it might 
take. Gebers reported that Solomon was shortly to make a 
statement regarding his visit to Umtata. He intimated that 
this statement would determine whether the Zulu would accept the 
NAD's council proposals, since "everything" that happened in 
zululand only happened after a word from Mahashini. Summing up, 
the CNC stated that the conference had proved itself to be 
favourable towards the government's proposals, and draft 
proclamations for the establishment of Natal's special councils 
would therefore be drawn up. 23 
In his 1928 memoranda, Wheelwright had proposed that Solomon and 
other Zulu chiefs be taken to observe the Pondoland Session of 
the Transkeian Bunga. By what can only be assumed to be grossly 
inept planning on the part of the NAD in 1929, the'Zululand 
deputation'attended the General Session of the Transkeian Bunga. 
Thus the Zulu chiefs observed the deliberations of a council that 
was made up of elected members - and 'new men' rather than chiefs. 
Some of the speeches were given in English, and were consequently 
incomprehensible to the visitors from Zululand. On their return 
to Zululand, Solomon and the Zulu delegates who had accompanied 
him to Umtata held a large meeting of zulu chiefs and headmen 
outside the Nongoma magistracy. This meeting, which conducted 
no more than a preliminary discussion of the 'council system', 
did not support the establishment of government councils in 
24 
Zululand. 
Very ironically for the NAD, the main discussions on this matter 
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took place during the two Inkatha meetings of 1929: first, 
at the annual general meeting in June, and, second, at the 
special Inkatha chiefs' meeting in September. The latter had 
primarily been called to discuss the question of land congestion 
and evictions - it was this meeting that elected Maling as a 
member of the'Inkatha land committee' which sought permission 
to visit Pretoria. 25 Inkatha's leaders, both petty bourgeois 
and tribal, clearly believed that the government intended to 
establish in Zulu land a council like the Transkeian Territories 
General Council - as opposed to the Pondoland General Council. 
They felt that this was too 'advanced' for Zululand, and, 
moreover, that it would cause a political division between 
educated Zulu and tribal authorities. The Inkatha annual general 
meeting, which was chaired by Bhulose, resolved that "the 
European standard of Government is not known by the ordinary 
kraal Natives" and therefore that the council system was 
unsuitable. The "presiding Magistrate" would effectively control 
the council, the resolution cbntinued, and this would "defeat 
the ends intended to be focussed £achieved£? by the Council". 
If council policy was to be implemented, Inkatha suggested that 
local councils be gradually introduced at mission stations where 
the Zulu "have an inkling of the Western civilisation and are 
sufficiently educated to follow the debating rules". The Inkatha 
report also stated that Solomon had "personally attended" this 
meeting, and "contributed to the deliberations and resolutions 
26 
herein". The subsequent Inkatha chiefs' meeting, which was 
chaired by Chief Nkantini, resolved that 
it is difficult for us to agree to this Council 
of the Cape Province at Umtata, we see that this 
might come right and even be fitted to our children 
if the Government would teach them so that they 
understand the procedure of the white people, for 
ourselves we see that this bead ornament will fit 
us not at all. 
While rejecting the Umtata-style 'bead ornament', the chiefs 
affirmed their support for Inkatha. Furthermore, they pleaded 
that the government take notice of the "head" of the Zulu people, 
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Solomon and "we his fl3olomon'f[j izinduna who support him in 
, 27 
his control on behalf of the Government". 
Zulu petty bourgeois and tribal leaders thus united to block 
the NAD's alternatives to the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha. 
In the ensuing deadlock, the NAD deferred the implementation 
of its council policy in the whole province of Natal, although 
draft proclamations for the establishment of a Zululand General 
28 
Council and Natal General Council had already been prepared. 
Inkatha's leaders, for their part, made no further attempts to 
'politely prompt' the NAD to recognise Solomon and Inkatha -
although the drive for official recognition continued to be 
their overriding objective. 29 By early 1929, when the NAD had 
made no move to recognise Inkatha but instead sent the 'Zululand 
deputation' to Umtata, it had become clear that Inkatha's drive 
for recognition required new strategies. 
The frustration of Zulu 'self government': Solomon's drunken 
confrontation with the Governor-General, 1930 
After mid-1929, the leaders of Inkatha adopted two strategies in 
their drive for the official recognition of the Zulu kingship 
and Inkatha. The first strategy was mainly passive: Inkatha merely 
affirmed that it still existed despite the NAD's unfavourable 
attitude, and that it had the power to frustrate any 'alternative 
settlement' that it deemed to be unacceptable. Indeed, Inkatha 
was undoubtedly the most influential representative organisation 
of the Zulu people. Furthermore, Inkatha affirmed that Zulu petty 
bourgeois and tribal leaders wished to be the conjoint leaders 
of the Zulu nation, and, more particularly, that Inkatha and 
Solomon were inseparable. Moreover, it continued to verify that 
it was a committed opponent of militant political action, and 
pronounce that it was a loyal servant of the Crown and Union 
Government. All of these points were expressed - obliquely or 
explicitly - in the Inkatha "Yearly Report'" which Bhulose 
submitted to the CNC in July 1929. 30 
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The second strategy, which was the more important, was to enlist 
the assistance of lnkatha's influential white allies in taking 
lnkatha's cause to the highest councils of state, thus circum-
venting the obdurate officials of the NAD. The basic reason why 
lnkatha had had white allies after 1927 was because it had common 
cause with the latter against the influence of the lCU - an 
organisation whose activities, from the white perspective, not 
only sought to subvert capital accumulation in the towns and 
countryside, but also signified the breakdown of tribal control 
and respect for authority, the 'Europeanisation' of African politic: 
and the evolution of powerful revolutionary forces. In short, the 
lCU was seen to threaten the economic predominance of white 
rural and urban employers,together with the socio-cultural and 
political segregationist ideologies that underpinned it. In 
accordance with the priorities of lnkatha's white allies, lnkatha's 
appeal for recognition after mid-1929 dwelled on grounds that 
were primarily 'political' (lnkatha presented itself as an 
antidote to the lCU, and as an embodiment of the 'Zulu nation's' 
concordance with segregationist ideology and policy) rather than 
administrative - as it had been during 1928, when lnkatha had 
presented its case for recognition as one of 'administrative 
reform' consistent with the essence of local council policy. And 
indeed, it was MPs, ministers of state and the Governor-General 
upon whom lnkatha based its hopes for recognition after mid-1929, 
rather than NAD officials. 
As MPs, members of the select committee on native affairs and 
leading parliamentary spokesmen on 'native policy', Nicholls and 
Marwick were to be Inkatha's key white allies in the context of 
its redefined drive for official recognition. There were, however, 
other important though less influential individuals, most notably 
Charles Adams, an Eshowe general dealer and arguably Zululand's 
most prominent businessman. Adams had become involved with the 
affairs of the Zulu royal house when Solomon fell heavily into 
debt in 1928, in the first instance because he was one of Solomon's 
creditors. Having then adopted the role of Solomon's financial 
advisor, Adams soon took an active interest in Zulu royal politics 
and became a keen supporter of the recognition of Solomon and 
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Inkatha. Evidently at the invitation of Solomon, he attended the 
mid-1929 meeting of Zulu chiefs and headmen outside the Nongoma 
magistracy which discussed the 'Zululand deputation's'recent 
visit to the Transkeian Bunga. 31 Subsequently he addressed the 
1929 Inkatha annual general meeting, and, according to Bhulose's 
report, made "certain suggestions" which "encouraged and greatly 
inspired" the assembly.32 Adams' evidence before the Native 
Economic Commission in September 1930 disclosed the segregationist 
principles that underlay his concern for the political future 
of Solomon and Inkatha: he lamented that whites generally 
neither understood the "native mind" nor, more specifically, the 
"soul of the Zulu", and that they tended to regard chiefs as 
mere administrative instruments of the government. While he did 
allude to the administrative advantages that might accrue from 
Solomon's recognition, Adams' main emphasis lay on its 
significance as an affirmation and extension of segregationist 
ideology and policy.33 As a personal friend of Nicholls, Adams 
acted as a vital means of communication between Inkatha's leaders 
and most influential white allies. 34 In this respect, mention 
must also be made of the role played by Oswald Fynney, Inkatha's 
white patron since 1928. Although his contacts and influence 
lay in the first instance within the NAD hierarchy of which he 
was once a part, the also had the confidence of representatives 
of the sugar industry - clearly so in the case of William 
Campbell. And indeed, as was manifest in his statement to the 
Natal Witness in 1931, Fynney was not squeamish about using his 
'inside knowledge' of both the NAD and Inkatha to authoritatively 
castigate the attitude which the former had adopted towards the 
latter. 35 
The strategy of circumventing the NAD and appealing for the 
recognition of Solomon and Inkatha on political or ideological 
rather than administrab.ve grounds was, in practice, the only 
strategy that had any hope of success after mid-1929. Solomon's 
drunkenness and irresponsible habits worsened after his return 
from Umtata, and this doused any possibility that the NAD would 
of its own volition reconsider the 'recognition question'. Indeed 
even if Solomon had fully supported the NAD's proposals for a 
Zululand General Council, it is unlikely that the NAD would have 
proceeded to implement this policy after mid-1929 if it entailed 
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any official extension of Solomon's powers. Before expanding 
on Solomon's personal decline - and its political implications -
however, it is first necessary to comment on the causes of this 
development. 
Contrary to the prevailing oplnl0n within the NAD, Solomon's 
personal decline - which can be dated from early 1928 - was not 
simply indicative of weakness of character, self indulgence or 
'intoxication' with personal power: it was directly related 
to the frustrations of Solomon's political position which had 
become so acute by 1928. The latter may be summarised as three-
fold. First, Solomon's main objective, particularly since the 
indaba with the Prince of Wales in 1925, had been to secure the 
official recognition of himself as Zulu king and Inkatha as the 
'Zulu National Council'. Although Solomon had successfully made 
great efforts to ensure that the NAD could find no fault with 
his political behaviour, and both he and Inkatha had provided 
ample proof of the administrative and political advantages that 
could be reaped from their incorporation into the structure of 
indirect rule in Zululand, the overall policy that the NAD 
had adopted towards them had been one of 'studied neutrality'~ 
Moreover, as when Inkatha collections were banned in 1926, the 
NAD was also seen to attempt to undermine their influence and 
support. The stance that the NAD took regarding the royal 
petition of 1927 and Inkatha after its recognition in 1928 
could only serve to compound Solomon's sense of political 
frustration. 
Second, the class antagonisms that developed within the Zulu 
in the late 1920s eroded the populist Zulu national unity that 
Solomon personally had worked so hard to foster. But Solomon 
had not only been forced to witness the disintegration of his 
drive for Zulu unity after 1925; he had also found little 
alternative but to 'take sides' in the newly-developed class 
conflicts, and thus, ironically, to accentuate them further. 
Solomon clearly saw himself in the traditional - and somewhat 
vague and mythological ~ political role of 'head of the house 
of Zulu', and, more broadly, head of the whole 'family' of the 
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Zulu: a figure who simultaneously represented and guided the 
Zulu as a whole, and was a physical embodiment of their national 
unity. Solomon did not perceive his role as that of a politician 
fighting in the first instance for the interests of a particular 
class within the Zulu - a role that better fitted men like Champion 
Dube and (less influential but equally as illustrative in this 
context) the conservative Chief Kula. And as much as the suppressio 
of Solomon's 'easy-going populism' of 1925 by the class conflicts 
of the late 1920s was politically irksome for Solomon, it was 
also personally irksome. By nature Solomon was a conciliator 
and not a fighter; such a nature, which had played so important 
a role in securing the succession of Solomon rather than David 
in 1913, and, subsequently, the resurrection of a strong sense 
of Zulu national unity around the figurehead of the heir to 
the Zulu royal house, ill accorded with the belligerence between 
social classes and their representatives that characterised 
Zulu politics in the late 1920s. 
Third, Solomon had clearly lost the initiative in Zulu royal 
- or 'national' - politics by the late 1920s. Previously, while 
working to re-establish the position of the Zulu royal family 
in tribal Zululand and spearheading the broader Zulu 'unity 
movement', Solomon had managed to retain a large measure of 
autonomy from 'outside' political influences - mainly the African 
bourgeoisie, acting through the media of the NNC and nascient 
Inkatha. This was not so after 1927. In 1928, when police and 
NAD officials were perturbed that Solomon might become a 'tool' 
of ICU activists, Solomon had in reality already become a 'tool' 
of two other interest groups: Natal's African petty bourgeoisie 
and white rural employers. And in the process, Solomon was having 
to acquiesce to policies he would rather oppose - perhaps the 
most illustrative example being the 1928 decision to 'democratise' 
Inkatha. 35 
That Solomon's fondness for spirits had become a physical illness 
by mid-l928 must be understood in the context of the tensions , 
contradictions and frustrations of his public life. In a rather 
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self-recriminatory and desperate letter, significantly written 
from his sick-bed during the overwhelmingly petty-bourgeois-
dominated Inkatha meeting of 1928, Solomon had pleaded with the 
magistrate of Nongoma that he be given a permit of exemption from 
the liquor law (which did not permit Africans to purchase 
'European liquor'). Evidently setting aside personal pride, 
Solomon confided that he needed liquor; he also argued that he 
would drink less if he had a permit since he would no longer be 
continually afraid that his illegal supply would be interrupted. 
Solomon's request was granted. 37 There is no doubt, however, 
that Solomon's consumption of liquor increased after the permit 
was issued. And by mid-1929, Solomon's conciliatory, gentle and 
somewhat self-effacing nature was increasingly less in evidence 
- both in his interaction with NAD officials and his 'subjects'. 
A series of incidents in the Eshowe district in late 1929 provided 
evidence of Solomon's deteriorating condition, and simultaneously 
illustrate why the NAD's opinion of Solomon was becoming 
increasingly negative. In September Solomon visited Chief 
Mehlwana's homestead near Eshowe, having angered the local NAD 
official for omitting to report his arrival in the district. 
The police District Commandant reported that Solomon then 
sent messangers out to a number of Eshowe chiefs' wards to 
conduct collections for him, so that he could pay an instalment 
on his car. Solomon also established an illegal supply of 
liquor (his permit was only valid in the Nongoma district), the 
Dii? strict Commandant continued, and was in the habit of having 
"immoral relations" with girls sent to him with food. Moreover, 
Solomon took a number of Eshowe girls with him to Nongoma when 
he left, on the pretext of intending to marry them, but it 
transpired that he had not cared for them - with the result that 
they had become "destitute wanderers".38 
The District Commandant subsequently reported that Solomon 
returned to the Eshowe district during the following month, 
accompanied by a party in a number of cars. He visited Chief 
Mfungelwa's homestead where he addressed a gathering of between 
two and three thousand, speaking about the benefits of education 
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and the need to avoid "faction fights". Although the gathering 
gave Solomon fourteen head of cattle and £40/6/3, Solomon 
indicated that he felt this was insufficient. That evening 
Solomon selected two young women from Chief Mfungelwa's ward 
to sleep with him. When the latter refused to have sexual 
intercourse, they were required to drink utshwala mixed with 
brandy which induced them to do so.39 
On being required to explain himself, Solomon wrote to the CNC 
denying all the allegations regarding his behaviour in the 
Eshowe district, and added that he had never been under the 
40 influence of liquor either in Eshowe or anywhere else. Solomon 
thereafter called upon the native commissioner at Eshowe and 
expressed irritation that he had been reported to the CNC. In 
the course of this interview, however, Solomon admitted that he 
was indeed at fault. Before leaving, he unsuccessfully asked 
the native commissioner to supply him with some liquor. Solomon 
was subsequently permitted to have one bottle on the authority 
of the District Surgeon in Eshowe. 4l 
The official view of Solomon, already at a low ebb on account 
of the way in which he was treating his 'subjects' in the Eshowe 
district, together with the administrative disruption his 
activities were causing (which led the native commissioner 
at Eshowe to submit a formal memorandum of complaint to the CNC42 ), 
was worsened when Solomon wrote to the CNC simply lying about both 
his recent actions in the Eshowe district and his problems 
with alcohol. And official opinion was hardly improved when 
Solomon approached the NAD six weeks later, in January 1930, 
with the request that the government settle his debts 43 - which 
amounted to an admission that even the most reputable legal firms 
in Durban had been unable to repair the consequences of, or 
halt, the spendthrift habits and financial corruption of the 
Zulu royal house. Solomon's activities in the Eshowe district 
not only earned him the displeasure of NAD and police officials. 
To the "annoyance" of local white farmers, Zulu farm labourers 
had abandoned their work to attend Solomon's meetings. 44 Further-
more, some local Zulu were clearly aggrieved about the way in which 
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Solomon had used them - and especially the young women among 
them. In November 1929 the native commissioner at Eshowe called 
an indaba with local chiefs to emphasize to them that Solomon 
was Chief of the Usuthu ward alone, and was not entitled to 
exercise authority over Eshowe chiefs or their followers. During 
this indaba, Chief Mehlwana commented that Solomon had shown 
by his own actions that he was not paramount chief of the Zulu: 
if he were, Mehlwana asserted, "he would have been killed for not 
going to Nkata ka Zulu [sis] meetings ... " Such sentiments, 
which might have been fairly representative of those of 
Mehlwana's ward generally, could not have been expressed in 
19~5.45 
While Solomon was proving himself to be a positive hindrance 
to the administration and, in the eyes of the NAD, a most 
unattractive candidate for the appointment as Zulu king, however, 
an unprecedented upsurge of African worker militancy in Durban 
was fostering a political climate very conduc~ve to Inkatha's 
redefined drive for official recognition. For the year following 
the desecration of the Grey town cemetery in early 1928, which 
had provoked a violent and somewhat devastating white backlash 
against ICU branches in the Natal midlands, African political 
militancy had remained at a comparitively low ebb. But towards 
the end of May 1929 the boycott of the Durban municipal beer 
halls began, coordinated - but by no means spearheaded - by 
Champion's ICU yase Natal. 
State and Durban municipal officials as a rule incorrectly ascribed 
the boycott to the 'agitation' of 'shebeen queens' (independent 
brewers whose livelihoods were undercut by the municipal 
utshwala monopoly) and, more especially, the political influence 
of Champion. As La Hausse has evidenced, however, the dockside 
togt (daily work) labour barracks were the cradle of the 1929 
beer hall boycott and ensuing disturbances, and the protests were 
directed against the oppressive and exploitative nature of the 
whole 'Durban system' of municipal 'native administration'. 
Indeed, the decision to boycott the beer halls, whose revenue 
financed 'native administration' in the city, showed that the 
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connection between the beer monopoly and the municipal 'native 
affairs' bureaucracy had been closely identified. That instances 
in which workers stoned municipal property, called for strike 
action, and assaulted white civilians, took place during the 
few months preceding the boycott emphasised that the protests 
could only be understood in the context of the Durban workforce's 
heightened militancy and sharpened perception of its political 
opponents. Moreover, while the ICU yase Natal provided workers 
with an organisational structure, Champion's role in the protests 
was very ambivalent. He clearly did not identify closely with 
the togt workers' cause: rejecting strike action as a strategy, 
he opined that togt workers were earning a "very good salary". 
And living conditions in the togt barracks were "good for the 
class of people they are provided for", though they were 
inadequate for "other classes of natives". At one stage, further-
more, he agreed to call off the boycott - without consulting the 
workers - when subjected to municipal pressure. Champion, always 
keen to use his polemical skills and to rouse support, had hoped 
to garner Durban's militant political constituency under the 
ICU yase Natal banner while guiding the protests along 
'reasonable' and relatively moderate lines. But the struggles 
assumed a momentum which Champion could not contain, particularly 
since local activists appreciated the ICU name to their more 
radical objectives. In the eyes of whites and the African petty 
bourgeois establishment generally, however, Champion's image 
ironically remained that of a gangerous agitator. 46 
A major riot erupted in Durban in mid-June when five hundred white 
civilian 'vigilantes' - outraged because of the large demonstration: 
of worker solidarity that had been occurring in various parts 
of the city, including a clash between police and armed ICU 
pickets - besieged the ICU hall in the city centre. The besiegers 
were then attacked by two 'relief columns' of irate workers , 
and the police found that their intervention was violently opposed 
by both the conflicting factions. When the two thousand combatants 
dispersed they l eft several dead behind them, and over a hundred 
had been injured. The speed with which the specially-appointed 
'De Waal Commission' began its work of inquiring into the origins 
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of the beer hall disturbances reflected the extent and 
force of the latter's political impact. While political violence 
on the streets of Durban died away, the beer hall boycott 
persisted (with crippling consequences for Durban's 'Native 
Revenue Account') well into 1930 - sustaining a considerable 
state of class/race tension in Durban itself, and political 
anxiety throughout white Natal as well as at state level.
47 
White Natalians, state officials and politicians were not the 
only groups to be gravely alarmed by the 1929 beer hall boycott 
and related disturbances; so too was Natal's African petty 
bourgeois establishment. Immediately after the beer hall boycott 
came into force, and when worker demonstrations were still 
comparatively low-key, Ilanga lase Natal came out in strong 
support of 'law and order' and clearly enunciated its disapproval 
of the '.'processions l1 that were taking place in the streets of 
Durban. Such protests were not I1constitutionall1 behaviour on the 
part of the ICU yase Natal, the newspaper's editorial argued: 
there were many alternatives to the adoption of a I1militaristic 
and defiant attitude l1 towards authority.48 Significantly, this 
Ilanga lase Natal editorial was published in English; its 
function was not simply to provide a statement of the petty 
bourgeois establishment's position regarding worker militancy 
in Durban, but also to communicate the latter to the petty 
bourgeoisie's white allies - so as to reaffirm the basis and 
purpose of their mutual alliance, consummated .in the context of 
Inkatha in early 1928. And, against the background of the 
beerhall boycott and disturbances, the 'Inkatha alliance' did 
indeed draw together once more and reanimate, representing to 
members of the Union Gdvernment that the official recognition 
of Solomon and Inkatha would counter the sort of political unrest 
that was currently exemplified in Durban. 
The 'Inkatha alliance'~'first move came in early September 1929, 
while the De Waal Commission was still busy with its invest-
igations, and was spearheaded by Dube and Marwick. Ilanga lase 
Natal's coverage of this development was necessarily somewhat 
oblique and uninformative: both the African and the white political 
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leaders who acted together in the context of Inkatha had always 
been determined that their relationship with each other should 
remain secret, or at least understated. Ilanga lase Natal's first 
edition for September 1929 included a small stop-press report 
noting that Dube and Marwick had made a "deputation" to 
Pietermaritzburg to have discussions with the Minister of 
Native Affairs. 49 One week later, the newspaper published 
a report of the discussions that had taken place. The CNC was 
also in attendance, it was reported, and Dube was accompanied 
by Francis Xulu and Gilbert Nxaba (evidently members of the 
resuscitated Durban branch of the NNC) , but no mention was made 
of Marwick's involvement. Significantly, the Minister of Native 
Affairs was the newly-appointed E. G. Jansen, MP for Vryheid 
(Hertzog had relinquished this portfolio after the 'black peril' 
general election of 1929). Marwick and Jansen had long acted 
together in parliament - despite their party political differences-
as representatives of Natal farming interests, particularly in 
regard to control over farm labour. 50 Clearly Marwick had 
~pulled strings ' to arrange Dube's consultation with Jansen 
and while doing so had undoubtedly intimated to Jansen that 
the political organisations which Dube represented could play 
a leading role in quelling the resurgence of militancy in Natal. 
At this consultation, Ilanga lase Natal reported, Dube told Jansen 
that he had corne to speak about what"was foremost in his mind": 
"the state of the people in Durban". Not once did Dube mention 
any of the grievances that caused the disturbances, however, but 
instead focussed on methods of containing militancy. While 
expressing disapproval for the Riotous Assemblies Bill that was 
then before parliament, he proposed two courses of remedial action. 
First, the establishment of an African council in Durban. Second, 
and most important, the appointment of Solomon as "Paramount 
Chief"of the Zulu. If Solomon was placed in a position where he 
could influence all Zulu, Dube explained, Solomon would be able 
to quieten the "umsindo" (literally 'noise', meaning disturbance) 
and be a "great help" to the government. Dube made no mention of 
Inkatha - but in practice the recognition of Solomon necessarily 
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included Inkatha, just as much as the recognition of Inkatha 
included Solomon. The purpose of Dube's representations, which 
Marwick had facilitated, was clearly to persuade the new Minister 
of Native Affairs to redefine his department's policy towards 
Solomon and Inkatha. It seems, however, that Dube's representations 
did not succeed in doing so - although both the Minister of 
Native Affairs and the CNC reportedly responded to them with 
considerable interest during the consultation itself. 51 
The 'Inkatha alliance's' second move, which was by far the more 
important, came in mid-1930 and was spearheaded by Nicholls. It 
took place against the background of three parallel developments, 
all of which seemed to indicate to increasingly fearful white 
observers that a revolutionary mood was growing within the 
African population throughout the province of Natal, spanning 
town and countryside and embodying a sense of unity and purpose 
greater than that of the 1906 rebellion. 52 Durban itself became 
more politically explosive in the months following the meeting 
between Dube and Jansen - even though a riot comparable to that 
of June 1929 did not recur. By November 1929, for example, it had 
become evident that African residents were not only boycotting 
the municipal beer halls but also refusing to pay the state poll 
tax, a refusal which signified that the state was being rejected 
as illegitimate and served to reawaken memories of the 1906 
rebellion. An armed battalion responded by making African Durban 
the testing ground for a novel method of social control: the 
deployment of tear-gas against civilians. Despite this demonstratioJ 
of state power, Durban's ricksha-pullers went on strike in early 
1930, so indicating that militant spirits were not going to be 
repres~ed easily. African political militancy, however, was no 
longer confined to Durban: it was also developing in the small 
population centres of the predominantly rural hinterlands. In 
September, for example, the beerhall at Weenen was attacked by 
local Africans.
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At about the same time, the Empangeni branch 
of the ICU (which had been dormant since the Empangeni 'anti-
ICU' indaba of 1927) held a well-attended meeting - which was 
disrupted by the intervention of the local police. Summoned to 
Empangeni police station, the local ICU organiser was informed 
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that "abelungu bayesaba" (the whites are frightened) and that the 
h Id t . t 54 meeting s ou erm1na e. 
Perhaps most disturbing for the state, however, was the clear 
evidence of interconnections between the rising tide of militancy 
in the urban areas on the one hand and the rural areas on the 
other. The evidence that George Hulett, a prominent Stanger 
sugar planter, gave before the Native Economic Commission in 
October 1930 illustrated that the rural rank-and-file was 
sympathising with and being inspired by events in Durban - and 
by the political doctrines that were being disseminated there. 
Moreover, Hulett's evidence indicated that Zulu nationalism 
and the figurehead of Solomon was being independently appropriated 
by the militants. The prospect of such a development had deeply 
concerned Natal NAD and police officials in early 1928. Hulett 
reported that Africans on his estate sometimes asked to borrow 
money, saying that they wished to go and khonza to Solomon on the 
Cartwright Flats in Durban. Hulett observed that Solomon "always 
picks a Sunday, and you will have the whole tribe go down there 
giving this money. He [Solomoq] does this periodically; he goes 
55 ·to Durban and gets pots of money." Hulett was gravely mis-
informed. The ICU yase Natal and the CP's Durban branch 
(established in 1929) regularly held Sunday-afternoon rallies on 
the Cartwright Flats - whereas Solomon never did so, Hulett's 
tenants and employees undoubtedly did not wish to tell Hulett whose 
meetings they were attending in order to 'khonza to Solomon', and 
had omitted to mention that these meetings were never attended 
56 by Solomon. The interconnections between the urban and rural 
areas were clearly evidenced in June 1930 when a number of chiefs 
and headmen from Natal's countryside attended a meeting of the 
ICU yase Natal in Durban. Champion, who had invited them to Durban -- . 
to discuss the ricksha strike, subsequently claimed that their 
attendance "showed that now the District and Rural areas would 
canbine with them in one general movement". As La Hausse has 
observed, Champion's statement confirmed the NAD's worst fears. 57 
In July 1930, against the background of the above developments, 
Nicholls despatched a series of three letters to the Minister of 
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Native Affairs, E.G. Jansen, arguing that the recognition of 
Solomon and the "Zulu National Council" (Inkatha) had become an 
urgent necessity. At the same time he was confidentially in 
communication with the Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone, to 
whom - it subsequently transpired - he expressed similar 
sentiments. 58 The signs that African militancy in the province 
of Natal was to escalate, however, did not comprise the only 
reason why Nicholls' representations bore a note of urgency. 
The Governor-General was to tour Zululand between late July and 
early August, and Nicholls hoped to persuade the Minister of 
Native Affairs and the Governor-General to make use of the 
autocratic powers vested in the Supreme Chief, on the occasion 
of the Governor-General's scheduled 'Zulu indaba' at Eshowe, to 
unilaterally initiate 'political reform' among the Zulu. 
For Nicholls, the Governor-General's tour of Zululand represented 
a key opportunity to secure the official recognition of Solomon 
and Inkatha. Most obviously, the Governor-General, in his capacity 
of Supreme Chief, was empowered to rule the African population 
by proclamation. And this "edictal system" of 'native admin-
istration', whose operation had been extended from Natal to other 
parts of the Union by the 1927 Native Administration Act, was 
commended in ruling circles specifically because it allowed the 
state the "flexibility" to legislate according to the "varied 
needs of natives in particular areas." In practice the Supreme 
Chief's powers were most frequently exercised in response to 
recommendations that had issued from regional NAD officials and 
were endorsed by the SNA and Minister of Native Affairs. However, 
the 'Governor-General-in-council' (ie. in conSUltation with 
ministers of state) had the power to override or simply bypass the 
NAD when proclaiming regional 'native legislation,.59 And since 
the Minister of Native Affairs was likely to be the most 
influential individual alongside the Governor-General within this 
decision-making body, together they were the two individuals most 
able to introduce changes in regional 'native policy' which were 
not advocated by regional NAD officials. 
Nicholls could also feel assured that both Jansen and Athlone would 
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consider his representations with great care - and even a certain 
a priori partiality. Jansen, whose Vryheid constituency adjoined 
Nicholls' Zululand, had for many years been an active member 
of the Natal planter/farmer parliamentary alliance which 
Nicholls and Marwick jointly spearheaded. And although Jansen 
had not frequently addressed the house on the more theoretical 
aspects of 'native policy' prior to his appointment as Minister 
of Native Affairs, the occasions on which he had done so proved 
that he adhered to the 'Natal view' on 'native affairs'- of which 
Nicholls was the leading spokesman. 60 Athlone, for his part, 
had long shown a special concern for the interests of agricultural 
industries in the Union, including the Natal sugar industry, 
and for this reason he was made especially welcome in white 
Natal when he visited the province in July 1930. 61 Moreover, 
it seems that Nichol.ls and Athlone were personally acquainted; 
and Nicholls not only arranged the itinerary for Athlone's 
Zululand tour, but acted as Athlone's guide and companion when 
62 the tour took place. 
Not least important, it could be expected that Athlone's tour 
would inspire in the province of Natal, among the majority of 
the African as well as the white population, an emotional and 
celebratory atmosphere similar to that which the Prince of Wales' 
'royal progress' had inspired in 1925. Indeed, a high-ranking 
member of the British aristocracy himself, Athlone was King 
George V's personal representative in South Africa; furthermore, 
this was Athlone's 'farewell tour', for he was shortly to return 
to England. More particularly, it could be expected that a spirit 
of Zulu unity beneath Solomon, and of Zulu loyalty to the British 
Crown, could characterise the 'Zulu indaba' at Eshowe - which 
would therefore be an appropriate occasion on which to initiate 
official moves to resurrect the Zulu monarchy and devolve upon 
the Zulu a measure of self-government. 63 
. 
In his correspondence with the Minister of Native Affairs during 
July 1930, Nicholls focussed on the 'political' advantages that 
could be gleaned from the incorporation of Solomon and Inkatha 
into the structure of indirect rule in Natal. And the ideas 
that Nicholls expressed drew heavily on those that he had developed 
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while supporting the 1927 Native Administration Bill in 
parliament, and had subsequently expounded more formally while 
setting out his 'adaptationist policy' proposals in private 
letters and memoranda. 64 The recognition of Solomon and Inkatha, 
Nicholls argued, would appeal to the most "conservative elements" 
in Zulu society, and would "strengthen the chiefs in their fight 
against communism". Referring to the recent leU meeting with 
chiefs in Durban, Nicholls opined that some chiefs were beginning 
to "imitate the agitator" because the government did not accord 
either them or their king sufficient status. "Fearful combinations" 
were therefore taking shape. Solomon, who stood at the apex of 
the Zulu tribal hierarchy and who the Zulu perceived as their 
"natural leader", was the means by which the state could 
reassert political and administrative control over the whole 
Zulu population: "We can guide the head of the nation when we 
can do nothing to guide the mass". Nicholls also passionately 
denounced the disinclination of NAD officials to change extant 
policy towards the Zulu royal house. While Solomon certainly 
did have personal "disabilities", Nicholls admitted, it was not 
Solomon's character but the ideas that Solomon stood for in the 
"native mind" that should be the sole consideration of policy-
makers. 
Nich.olls further emphasised that his proposal was in line with 
both official policy towards tribalism, as was embodied in the 
1927 Native Administration Act, and the ideology and practice 
of segregation. Indeed, the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha 
would serve to "counter the disintegrative process against which 
tribalism is fighting", while at the same time ensuring that 
Zulu self government would be firmly based on the Zulu's"own 
institutions". In this context, it is illuminating that Nicholls 
requested the Minister of Native Affairs to reschedule the main 
'Zulu indaba' so that it took place at Nongoma since the Nongoma 
district was the "focus of Zulu loyalty" whereas Eshowe was a 
white town: "the emphasis of all native development should be in 
the native reserve".65 
In his first letter Nicholls proposed that the Minister of Native 
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Affairs and the Governor-General should summarily recognise 
Solomon during the Governor-General's forthcoming tour of 
Zululand. 66 To this suggestion the Minister of Native Affairs 
replied simply that his department had already considered the 
question of extending Solomon's status, and that he was 'not 
prepared to depart from the policy the NAD had adopted. 67 Perhaps 
realising that he had expected too much, Nicholls subsequently 
withdrew his initial proposal and merely requested that 
"chieftaindom" be emphasised and Sblomon be paid special attention 
during the Governor-General's tour - with a view to taking action 
on the recognition issue soon thereafter. 68 On the grounds of 
these subsequent representations from Nicholls, the Minister of 
Native Affairs then reopened the 'recognition question' in the 
NAD. He sent all three of Nicholls' letters to the SNA, who in 
turn submitted copies to the CNC. Simultaneously, as the Under-
SNA wrote to the CNC in late July, the Minister of Native 
Affairs informed the NAD that he favoured the establishment of a 
Zululand Council whose membership was confined to Zulu chiefs 
and the latter's nominees. 69 While the Governor-General was 
touring Zululand therefore, the NAD was reconsidering policy 
towards Solomon and lnkatha. 
The Minister of Native Affairs - and the NAD - was unaware that 
Nicholls had communicated similarly with the Governor-General 
as the latter was preparing to venture into the heart of the Zulu 
country. And the Governor-General keenly espoused Nicholls' 
views and proposals, as was most clearly revealed in the 
memorandum on Zululand policy that he submitted to members of 
the Union cabinet in the month following his return from 
Zululand (hereafter referred to as the 'Athlone memorandum'). 
Indeed, once the Athlone memorandum had been received at the 
office of the Minister of Native Affairs, the minister's private 
secretary was so struck by the congruity between Nicholls' writings 
and Athlone's expressly secret treatise - primarily in terms of 
content and only occasionally in phraseology, for the latter 
was shorn of Nicholls' polemical style - that he made special 
comment: "Vir my lyk dit asof 'iemand wat ons goed ken' met sy 
Eskell. destyds gesels het!" (To me it seems that 'someone we 
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know well' has been speaking with H.E. !).70 Although the 
Athlone memorandum was drawn up during the few weeks after the 
completion of the Governor-General's Zululand tour, it is 
useful to note its main assertions at this stage. 
Athlone engaged the question of political reform in Zululand 
in a spirit of clinical detachment that had long evaded those 
who were directly responsible for the day-to-day administration 
of the region. The unassuming forthrightness of his memorandum 
distinguished him as a dispassionate yet concerned outsider; and 
it contrasted with, on the one hand, the inate timidity and 
red-tape pettyness of the NAD bureaucracy, and, on the other 
hand, the overblown and sometimes acerbic rhetoric of Nicholls. 
At the outset, the Athlone memorandum indicated that it would 
not address itself to Solomon's personal behaviour, but to 
"Solomon's position" in the context of 'native policy' in Zululand. 
And in doing so, it examined the ways in which a redefinition 
of Solomon's status could, with regard to the administration 
of the Zulu, revitalise the operation of indirect rule in Zululand, 
and, with regard to the political life of the Zulu, quell the 
growth of disrespect for authority and of militancy. 
Having made an appraisal of the tribal system and chiefly 
authority, and their interrelationship with the theory and 
practice of indirect rule, Athlone inferred that the Zululand 
administration was based ultimately on the Zulu's adherence to 
"the idea of personal leadership". To the Zulu, he proceeded, 
Solomon was the "material manifestation of this idea, to which 
their allegiance and unqualified obedience are due". It was thus 
questionable whether the administration's policy of denying 
Solomonts status as king was consistent with its policy of 
preserving tribalism and chiefly authority. Like Nicholls, who 
favoured the encouragement of a sense of 'nationhood' among the 
Zulu, and unlike the Zululand administration,whose policy had 
been one of 'divide and rule' since 1879, Athlone felt that 
there was nothing to fear from Zulu unity. He concluded that "so 
long as 'indirect Government' is the accepted system, efficient 
administration can be assumed only by the fullest use of tribal 
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custom and organization, at the head of which, whether we like 
it or not, stands Solomon and the Zulu royal house". Athlone 
then turned to consider the recent spread of "revolutionary 
and subversive influences" among the African population, which 
he ascribed to the rapid process of African social change. But 
the Zulu's adherence to tribalism and devotion to their royal 
house, he contended, were "natural obstacles" to the spread 
of "bolshevism" among them. Athlone concluded that the choice 
seemed to lie between "the recognition of a Paramount Chief" 
and the "disintegration of the Zulu Nation through the influence 
of the lCU and kindred organizations". 
Athlone did not simply propose that Solomon, after a supervised 
"probationary period" and under the "tutelage of a Government 
Agent", be recognised as Zulu king with overarching authority 
above all other Zulu chiefs. Convinced that the Zulu were not 
ready for the 'council system' as the state had originally 
envisaged it, he also proposed that official use be made of 
lnkatha - which he saw as the only basis on which a "popular 
Native Council" could be established in Zululand. Furthermore, he 
' proposed that the responsibility for administering Zululand be 
removed from the NAD, and vested primarily in the Governor-
General (in his capacity as Supreme Chief); and, similar to the 
arrangements made for the High Commission Territories of 
Basutoland and Swaziland, the Governor-General would then in 
practice make Solomon and lnkatha responsible for governing the 
Zulu, only intervening if they did not do so "reasonably well". 
While emphasising that the finer details of his envisaged Zululand 
policy were subject to negotiation, Athlone summarised his 
proposals as follows: 
lFirst.~J the recognition of Solomon as Paramount 
Chief, administering the present laws and customs 
and responsible to the Supreme Chief for good ' 
order and government in Zululand, and watched 
over by a Government Agent, who would be answerable 
direct tofue Minister of Native Affairs without 
reference to the Chief Native Commissioner of 
Natal. Zululand to be regarded as administratively 
separate from Natal. 
fSecond,J the institution of a Native Council for 
Zu~uland on a foundation of the present 'Nkata, in 
whlch,the Paramount Chief would preside. Such a 
Councll,to have ~egislative functions, subject to 
the advlce and flnal Jrecommendation' of the Govern-
ment Agent direct to the Governor-General-in-Counci17 l 
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Athlone's objectives in Zululand closely correlated with those 
of Nicholls. Both sought to preserve the system of tribal rule 
among the Zulu, and, recognising its conservative and 
authoritarian qualities, use it as a base on which to build 
overarching and reinforcing national political institutions. 
The latter, which would be derived primarily from the monarchical 
traditions of preconquest Zululand but would also accord with 
the'tribal'and 'council' traditions that had evolved in 
state segregationist policy during the 1920s, were to guide 
the reconstruction of a reserve-based and inherently conservative 
Zulu nation. More important, they were to assume the responsibil~ 
ities of Zulu self government. 
Athlone's proposals differed from those of Nicholls insofar 
as they were solely concerned with the political future of 
Zululand; and his response was effectively to advocate that the 
Zulu land administration be made independent from the structure 
of 'native administration' operative in the rest of the Union, 
and that the Zulu be governed more on the model of the neighbouring 
High Commission territories - by way of a Crown representative 
watching over the activities of a 'traditional' monarchical 
political structure. Athlone's proposals were in these respects 
similar to the 'Basutolandization' proposals made by Zululand's 
Resident Commissioner Sir Marshal Clarke during the l890s; the 
latter, if heeded, would have caused Zululand to be 'settled' 
along the lines of a High Commission Territory rather than being 
simply incorporated into the Colony of Natal and therefore, 
subsequently, the Union. 72 Although Nicholls' special concern 
was for 'political reform' among the Zulu, as a leading Union 
'native policy' legislator he also hoped that the practical 
application of his 'adaptationist policy' in Zululand would 
encourage similar initiatives elsewhere in the Union. Further-
more, Nicholls had at no stage considered that the Union 
Government should permit as large an influence over a 'self 
governing' Zulu nation as was envisaged in the Athlone memorandum 
to fall into the hands of a potentially independent authority 
such as the Governor-General - who might not always be amenable 
to white settler interests. 73 
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Yet the differences between Athlone's and Nicholls' ideas 
should not be overemphasised here. Indeed, although Nicholls 
had in May 1930 already begun formally to expound his 
'adaptationist policy' proposals before the select committee 
on 'native affairs' (without, incidentally, divulging that he 
was also making efforts to have his ideas practically applied 
in Zululand), the focus of his attention fell on the basics 
of- his policy: the extension and development of the reserves, 
and the theoretical considerations that underlay his scheme 
for socio-cultural and political segregation. He was less concerned 
with describing in detail the relationship that might obtain 
between his envisaged 'self governing Bantu nations' and the 
Union Government. 74 It seems that Athlone, for his part, had 
only been alerted to the question of Zululand policy in early 
July 1930, and his opinions had barely become inflexible by the 
time his Zululand tour took place. Moreover he only formally 
drew up his memorandum in the few weeks after his Zululand tour; 
and in it he emphasised that he did not wish "to stress points of 
detail or method" concerning his proposals, but hoped that the 
"most earnest attention" be paid to the principle of his "main 
contention" which was that Solomon's hereditary position be 
officially recognised. 75 
Immediately prior to the Zulu indaba, Athlone and Nicholls were 
clearly in agreement about the central points of their ideas. 
In practice these meant the official recognition of Solomon 
and Inkatha as the responsible political institutions of a 
limitedly self governing Zulu nation - which accorded precisely 
with the central pOints of Solomon's and Inkatha's long-standing 
hopes. From the point of view of all those who were seriously 
concerned with how these objectives might be realised, the Zulu 
indaba with the Governor-General scheduled for 24 July was an 
event of some promise. It could be expected to be a showcase of 
Zulu national unity and discipline, of Zulu loyalty to Crown 
and government, and of the pre-eminent importance of Solomon and 
his advisers in the political life of the Zulu. And even if the 
Governor-General was not going to announce far-reaching political 
reforms for the Zulu at the indaba, as NichoJls had originally 
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hoped, it was his intention to make subtle initiatives in that 
direction and to pay special attention to Solomon during his 
tour. 76 Perhaps most important, the indaba might serve to 
impress the Minister of Native Affairs and the NAD with the 
value of Solomon's political influence among the Zulu and the 
conduct of a large mass of Zulu people when in Solomon's 
presence. Indeed, the Minister of Native Affairs, the SNA and 
the CNC were the most influential individuals who had yet to be 
convinced of the wisdom of the 'recognition strategy'. 
In late July the Governor-General, accompanied by his wife and 
daughter, Princess Alice and Lady May Cambridge, and a number 
of aides-de-camp, entered Zululand to a rapturous welcome from 
white Zululanders. As Nicholls relates in his autobiography, 
the tour was quite unlike earlier 'political' tours undertaken 
by even such nationally and internationally esteemed dignitaries 
as Smuts; it was more in the nature of a royal progress, 
similar to that of the Prince of Wales in 1925, punctuated 
by grandiose social functions at each siding at which the White 
Train hesitated. 77 Yet the principal engagement of the Governor-
General's tour was unquestionably to be his Zulu indaba at 
Eshowe - on the golf links, as the Prince of Wales' indaba had 
been in 1925 - to which every chief in Zululand, with followers, 
had been officially invited. This event, which was to take place 
during the afternoon of 24 July, overshadowed the Governor-
General's formal reception in white Eshowe during the morning -
when the somewhat unglamarous person of the chairman of the 
Eshowe Town Board declared that Eshowe specially welcomed H.E. 
because of the particular interest H.E. had always shown in 
(white) agriculture.78 
Unbeknown to anyone but NAD offiCials, however, it had become 
clear in the few days before the indaba that the Zulu were 
unlikely to welcome the Governor-General in the same way as they 
had welcomed the Prince. It seemed that they regarded the Governor-
General less as King George V's representative and 'their' 
Supreme Chief than as a representative of the state which had 
not long previously tear-gassed their relatives in Durban. 
372 
Additional and contributory to this hostile attitude, however, 
was the influence of Solomon: he ironically seemed to 
identify the Governor-General as the head of the NAD that had 
refused to recognise .his hereditary position, and made efforts 
to ensure that both his own and the Zulu's consequent displeasure 
was expressed on the day of the indaba. 
In the week prior to the indaba, unmistakable evidence had come 
to light that the royal nucleus nearby Nongoma was the epicentre 
of Zulu disaffection. On 20 July, the NC at Nongoma telegraphed 
the NC at Eshowe that, for various reasons, every chief in 
his district had indicated that he was unable to attend the 
indaba. A personal message from the CNC to every Nongoma chief 
transmitted on the same day, advising them that "their absence 
would be regarded as a very serious affront to His Excellency 
unless unimpeachable reasons for absenting themselves existed", 
seemed to make no impact. Indeed, when the CNC arrived in Eshowe 
on 23 July he learnt from Nongoma that Solomon would definitely 
not be present. Moreover, he was informed by the NC at Eshowe 
that a rumour was in circulation among the Zulu to the effect 
that "~olomo~ would not attend, and that therefore others need 
not attend". Having been advised that it was the Governor-
General's special desire to see the head of the Zulu royal house 
at Eshowe, the ENC made a number of urgent attempts to contact 
Solomon. Solomon, however, simply gave out that he was "ill in 
bed with gout, and could not move". The CNC consequently felt 
that he would be forced to explain to the Governor-General that 
Solomon would be absent from the indaba on account of illness. 79 
Officials were astonished and perturbed when Solomon nonetheless 
arrived in Eshowe on the morning of 24 July. Not only was he 
extremely drunk, but he was - in the CNC's words - "very impudent 
and truculent" with every official with whom he came into 
contact.
80 
He had left Mahashini by car the previous evening, 
and had allegedly been drinking ever since. A subsequent enquiry 
into the records of the Nongoma bottle store, incidentally, proved 
that nearly sixty bottles of spirits and twenty bottles of wine 
had been bought on Solomon's account between 1 and 23 JUly.81 
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Even though neither NAD officials nor Solomon's advisers could 
induce Solomon to "behave properly", the CNC decided that he 
had no choice but to allow Solomon to attend the indaba since 
those Zulu who were already assembled were well aware that the 
royal party had arrived from Nongoma. 82 Solomon's attitude 
was soon reflected in the disposition of the assembled Zulu. 
On the arrival of the Governor-General at the indaba, so the NC 
at Eshowe observed, a "very large number of natives" shouted 
"Bayeza" (literally 'they are coming', a traditional rallying 
83 
call) at him in the place of the royal salutation 'bayede'. 
The Governor-General was thus threatened rather than welcomed. 
The proceedings were to commence with a speech of welcome to 
the Governor-General, given by a Zulu chief on behalf of the Zulu 
people; in practice this representative could only be Solomon. 
Solomon clearly evidenced his feelings toward~ the NAD in the 
course of his speech. Although it had been arranged that the clerk 
at the Eshowe magistrate's office was to act as interpreter during 
the indaba, Solomon summarily rejected the services of this 
NAD interpreter and instead used his own. The speech as a whole 
was as a result barely comprehensible to anyone present, since 
Solomon was almost incoherently drunk and his interpreter was not 
fluent in English. 84 
Those parts of the speech that were decipherable were of consider-
able interest, however, indicating that Solomon had completely 
lost faith in the value of making representations to any 
quarter of the South African state. Instead he called upon 
members of the British royal family in England to assist "the 
country", saying that they were the Zulu's only hope, and 
requested that the Governor-General transmit this plea to his 
relatives in the mother country. Solomon ironically appeared to 
believe that it was they alone who could cause his hereditary 
position to be officially recognised. His speech at the same time 
indicated that he respected only the authority of the British 
monarch, and not that of the South African Government. Indeed, 
whereas it was customary on such occasions to express loyalty to 
'the British Crown and the Union Government' as though they were 
inseparably interlinked, Solomon on this particular occasion 
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was heard only to express loyalty to the former. Furthermore, 
he entered into a somewhat convoluted discourse on the merits 
of monarchs as opposed to elected authorities: they were 
unequal, Solomon asserted, "because a King was a member of a 
h b ·" 85 royal family and crowned by God and not by any uman elng . 
Such sentiments compounded Solomon's disgrace in the eyes of the 
NAD.
86 
Mnyaiza, who was the only other Zulu officially to make a speech, 
reiterated Solomon's request for the intervention of the British 
royal family. And significantly, it was Chief Nkantini and not 
Solomon who made the presentation of a Zulu knobkerrie and shield 
to the Governor-General, which could be interpreted either as 
f f S I ,. . t t· d· ff t· 87 a re lection 0 0 omon s lncapaCl a 10n or lsa ec lon. 
Seated at the forefront of the Zulu assembly, Solomon once more 
made his views readily apparent during the course of the Governor-
General's address. He repeatedly shook his head at various 
points of the address, the NC at Eshowe reported, to demonstrate 
his disagreement with statements that were being made. This 
was particularly marked when the Governor-General pronounced 
that "in your CNC and NCs you have men to look after your 
welfare ... go to them with your troubles and difficulties", and 
warned the Zulu to beware of "mischief makers" who denigrated 
88 the government's "good works". But for the subsequent display 
of Zulu dancing, which H.E. and Princess Alice apparently enjoyed, 
Solomon had succeeded in transforming the indaba into a display 
of Zulu antagonism arguably unparalleled in the history of formal 
meetings between the Zulu and white authorities since Piet Retief's 
unfortunate indaba with Dingane in 1838. 
It was a measure of the Governor-General's determination to keep 
alive a hope for the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha that he 
visited Nongoma two weeks after the indaba, and held a private 
interview with Solomon. Here his purpose was not merely to 
reprimand but also to express his great personal disappointment 
about the manner in which Solomon had behaved; and, hinting 
that the Zulu royal house might yet be rewarded should its image 
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improve, he urged Solomon to "show yourself worthy of the 
posi tion · you hold in [!lulu] eyes". 89 Having secured an apology 
from Solomon, the Governor-General evidently felt that no 
further action need be taken on the matter of Solomon's behaviour.
91 
The Governor-General's attempts to keep open the possibility of 
'recognition', however, were in practice futile. 
On his return to Pietermaritzburg from Zululand, the CNC simply 
dismissed the 'reopened recognition question'. Referring to the 
correspond~nce between Nicholls and the Minister of Native 
Affairs which NAD head office had forwarded for his consideration, 
he succinctly replied that Solomon's behaviour on 24 July "was 
such to preclude any thoughts of improvement in Solomon's official 
status".9l Neither the SNA nor Minister of Native Affairs 
questioned this view. Indeed, Solomon had deliberately insulted 
the head of state in the full view of a large mass of Zulu people, 
and had encouraged the antagonistic attitude of the Zulu at the 
indaba. Both the NC at Eshowe and the CNC (the highest ranking 
NAD officials present at the indaba) for these reasons urged that 
the government severely punish Solomon. 92 They were strongly 
supported by the Minister of Native Affairs: "it is imperative 
that £Solomo~ be punished", he wrote to the Governor-General 
in early August, and that immediate action be taken. 93 
The Governor-General had only just returned from Zululand, and 
was in the process of formalising his 'Athlone memorandum', when 
the Minister of Native Affairs began pressing him to authorise 
some form of concrete punishment for Solomon. Referring to the 
suggestions in this regard made by the NC at Eshowe and the CNC, 
the Governor-General argued that Solomon was "drunk and 
irresponsible (original emphasis) at the indaba, and that he 
should not be punished for "discourtesies" that were a "natural 
t f h·· . bl d··' 94 ou come 0 1S 1rresponS1 e con 1t10n'. In this view, 
Solomon's sole misdeed was that he had appeared drunk in public. 
Moreover, the Governor-General intimated to the Minister of Native 
Affairs, "I have reasons for not wishing any too drastic treat-
ment to be meted out to Solomon" - reasons which were to be 
embodied in the forthcoming Athlone memorandum. And in his 
attempts to minimise Solomon's culpability, he attempted to argue 
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that inadequate arrangements on the part of the NAD were partly 
responsible for the public debacle. 95 Within a month after 
the indaba, however, the Governor-General had bowed to ministerial 
and NAD pressure to punish Solomon: he authorised the 
cancellation of Solomon's liquor permit,and the reduction of 
Solomon's stipend by half for a probationary period of one 
year. Both of these 'punishments' were implemented by 8 Sept-
ember,96 and, in effect, they made absolutely final the CNC's 
dismissal of the 'recognition question' immediately after the 
indaba. 
By the time that the Athlone memorandum was submitted to members 
of the Union cabinet ten days later, therefore, the recognition 
issue was no longer a political reality. It was nonetheless 
significant, as an illustration of the Governor-General's very 
different perspective from those of the Minister of Native 
Affairs and NAD officials, that the Athlone memorandum presented 
its proposals as all the more cogent in view of the spirit of 
"discontent and mistrust" evident in not only Solomon but a number 
of Zulu at the indaba. Furthermore, it included a 'final resort' 
clause recommending that, should Solomon's official status remain 
unimproved after a period of two years, the government then 
undertake to recotisider the whole issue. 97 However, as will be 
noted below, when the NAD did reconsider the 'recognition question' 
in 1932 it did little more than routinely dismiss the proposals 
once more. From the point of view of the Governor-General, 
Nicholls, Solomon and Inkatha, and all those who supported their 
common purpose, the Athlone memorandum would remain simply as 
testimony to a lost opportunity. 
Solomon's conduct during the indaba with the Governor-General 
in 1930 sharply contrasted with the masterful way in which he 
had, in effect, taken charge at the indaba with the Prince of 
Wales in 1925: rising above local officials and NAD policy, 
Solomon had entertained and consorted with the Prince on a level 
of royal equality. At the indaba of 1930, Solomon eroded rather 
than enhanced his political status among the Zulu, and frustrated 
rather than furthered his aim for official recognition as Zulu 
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king. He proved not only that he was physically ill, but that 
he had lost his sense of political judgement and direction. 
Ironically, he failed to contain his resentment for the NAD - or 
to distinguish between the NAD and the Supreme Chief - at a time 
when his life-long ambition to be recognised as zulu king was 
most likely to be realised. The Governor-General and Nicholls, 
acting together with such powerful African allies as Solomon and 
Inkatha, and with the qualified acquiescence of both the Minister 
of Native Affairs and the NAD (which seemed likely prior to the 
indaba), would certainly have spearheaded a formidable pressure 
group in pursuit of the ideal of Zulu self government. Solomon 
further evidenced his political ineptitude in the pleas for 
assistance he made to members of the British royal family in 
England, whom Solomon might already have realised were palpably 
incapable of influencing South African politics. And in making 
these pleas, he simultaneously rejected the assistance of his 
most influential poss~ble allies - in the presence of whom 
he was then standing. Perhaps most ironically, though with less 
long-term consequences, Solomon failed even to give political 
direction to the restiveness of the Zulu assembly at the indaba. 
Solomon's conduct at the indaba of 1930 effectively terminated 
his political career, as well as the possibility of official 
'political reform' among the Zulu during his lifetime. Indeed, 
Solomon's activities during the remaining few years of his life 
served, on the one hand, to render his longstanding and vital 
alliance with the African petty bourgeoisie increasingly 
unworkable, and, on the other hand, to confirm to the NAD that 
his official status could not be improved. 
Tbe Decline of Solomon and Inkatha 
Inkatha had always defined itself as the Zulu 'royal party', and 
its political fortunes were inseparable from those of the Zulu 
royal house. As Solomon's hopes of recognition died in the 
aftermath of the indaba, so did those of Inkathai the organisation 
was thus forced to accept that, at least in the short term, its 
overriding political objective had been defeated. 98 Solomon's 
personal and political decline accelerated after mid-1930, and this 
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too was inevitably reflected in Inkatha. Indeed, Solomon had 
barely two and a half years left to live following the indaba 
debacle, and, in terms of practical politics, Inkatha had 
considerably less. 
At Mahashini three weeks after the indaba, Inkatha's annual 
general meeting of 1930 proved to be one of the best attended 
in the organisation's history, comparable in size to the 1928 
meeting. The 1930 meeting had already been widely advertised prior 
to the indaba: as well as in the province of Natal, printed 
notices were in circulation in urban and rural localities as far 
afield as the eastern Transvaal, Johannesburg, and even parts 
99 of the Orange Free State. It had undoubtedly been keenly 
anticipated by Inkatha's organisers, since it was an occasion 
on which the populist Zulu nationalism that the' indaba seemed sure 
to inspire could be politically consolidated under Inkatha's 
organisational umbrella, just as the 1925 meeting had done after 
the celebrated indaba with the Prince of Wales. The occasion 
of the 1930 meeting, however, wa§ in reality scarred by internal 
dissension and recriminations, and lacked either optimism or any 
clear sense of purpose. Ilanga lase ' Natal's authorised report 
made no reference to any discussion of the recent ' indaba having 
taken place during the meeting - at which, ~ignificantly, no white 
official or observer was present. 100 
The private deliberations of the general committee (comprising 
all chiefs and certain appointed ministers of religion) and the 
executive committee, which took up the first two days of the 
meeting as was customary, focussed on two main issues. First, 
the desirability of making representations directly to the Union 
Government rather than through the 'unfavourable' NAD hierarchYi ' 
and second, a scheme whereby Inkatha's income would ,be put to 
practical use by buying up land to alleviate Zulu land pressure. 
The first resolution upon which unanimous agreement was reached, 
however, advocated that Solomon be sent to England for specialist 
medical treatment. This resolution also noted that "the change 
to another place would do LSolomoQ1 good". Solomon's absence 
would certainly do Inkatha good, especially if he returned a 
reformed person, and it was not unlikely that such reasoning 
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underlay this resolution. 
When Solomon appeared before the public assembly on the final 
day of the meeting, he made a somewhat startling proposal: 
neither he nor any member of the Zulu royal family, he moved, 
should continue to hold positions on the executive committee 
(Solomon personally had been treasurer since 1928). Solomon was 
evidently acting on the 'advice' of petty bourgeois leaders who 
foresaw that Solomon would have to be dissociated from the practice 
affairs of Inkatha if the organisation was to survive. Although 
this proposal was initially approved by Inkatha as a whole, 
Chief Mathole spearheaded sufficiently strong resistance to the 
measure to prevent it being formally accepted. In the ensuing 
deadlock, the meeting was unable to elect a new executive 
committee - which, under the terms of the 1928 constitution, 
was one of the central functions of an Inkatha annual general 
meeting. Inkatha thus had no legally-constituted leadership after 
the 1930 meeting. 
Another of the central constitutional functions of an Inkatha 
annual general meeting was to ratify the organisation's annual 
financial statement. Describing the atmosphere as "tense", Ilanga 
lase Natal reported how detailed revelations were made regarding 
unauthorised 'Inkatha collectors', whose collections were not 
forwarded to Inkatha, and the misappropriation of Inkatha funds. 
That the unauthorised collectors were able to produce official 
Inkatha receipts and photographs of King Solomon conclusively 
indicated that the corruption was internal. Although Solomon was 
not - and could not - be implicated at the meeting, it was clear 
that he, in conjunction with his private secretary, Simpson 
Bhengu, who also held the office of secretary to Inkatha, was 
primarily responsible for both the fraudulent collections and the 
. . t' f f d 101 h' . mlsapproprla lon 0 un s. Ms lyenl, Solomon's full brother 
who worked as a labour supervisor on the gold mines and, as a 
practising Christian, identified more with the petty bourgeois 
than the tribal elite, was especially outraged at the evidence 
of gross corruption in Inkatha. So too was Bhulose, the chairman, 
who charged that various chiefs were retaining Inkatha 
subscriptions for their own use. At the 1930 meeting, it seemed 
that not only the petty bourgeoisie's relationship with Solomon 
380 
but its alliance with the tribal elite had become strained. 
This development, combined with lnkatha's problems with finances 
and an untrustworthy constitutional monarch, and deficiencies 
in respect of a legally-constituted leadership and a sense of 
. h' d' .. t 10: political purpose, s1gnalled that lnkat a s em1se was 1mm1nen • 
Ten days after the 1930 lnkatha meeting, Solomon, deeply in debt, 
went to Durban to consult his lawyers on financial matters. In 
Durban, he also held a meeting with dock workers resident in 
the municipal togt labour compounds, evidently in an attempt 
to consolidate his urban support. On the completion of this 
meeting at the Bell Street Compound beer hall, one of the 
institutions that the lCU yase Natal had long boycotted, 
Solomon immediately thereafter attended a meeting of the ICU 
103 yase Natal. 
Solomon's purpose in 'dropping in' on Champion's meeting at the 
ICU Hall on 3 September was evidently to stake a claim to the 
organisation's revenue. The ICU yase Natal had been wilfully 
invoking Zulu nationalism at its meetings on the Cartwright 
Flats over the past year, and much of the tribute that would 
have been paid to Solomon had undoubtedly been paid in 
subscriptions to the ICU ~~ Natal. 104 And during his 
discussion with Champion, Solomon advocated that the present 
division between the ICU yase Natal and the NNC should be 
healed; to this end, he suggested the calling of a conference 
at which both organisations would be represented, with Solomon 
h · lf . d' 105 l' d 1mse pres1 1ng. So omon s expresse concern for Zuly unity 
in this context should not be taken at face value - and not only 
because it was resoundingly hollow in view of the particular 
class position he had adopted since late 1927. For Solomon in 
1930, the fact that political divisions among the Zulu caused 
the loss of royal revenue was more immediately important than 
political issues. Indeed, Solomon's decision on 3 September to 
commit himself to an open and direct association with the ICU 
yase Natal was utterly i ncompatible with his own and lnkatha's 
'anti-lCU' policy since 1927 - a policy which had played a central 
role in their mutual drive for official recognition. It seemed 
that Solomon's desparate need for revenue had overcome in him 
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any sense of political purpose beyond cultivating Zulu national 
allegiance to the institution of zulu kingship. In meeting with 
Champion, however, Solomon was apparently hoping to reassert 
not only his own political position, but also the rights of 
the whole rural-based 'tribal' order, together with the values 
and obligations of 'tribal' tradition. The latter after all 
underpinned the political status of the Zulu 'ancien regime'. 
Explaining to .the mc the reasons why he met Champion, Solomon 
stated that he wished to complain that workers in Durban came 
from "us" (evidently referring to tribal authorities in the rural 
areas) to earn money to pay taxes, but then "you get them".106 
A weakening of political loyalties to the 'tribal' order as a 
whole meant a diminished cash flow in the rural areas. 
Following their meeting, which caused great excitement in ICU 
quarters, Champion and Solomon arranged to appear together at 
a specially convened Zulu mass meeting at the ICU Hall on 
6 September. The event was widely publicised by way of ICU 
handbills, which also advertised that Dube and "all the educated 
people of Durban" would be in attendance. l07 This was barely 
likely; it was more likely that Solomon had implicated Dube 
without having consulted him. Significantly, the advertisement 
published in llanga lase Natal made no reference to Dube: "King 
Solomon will be greeted by the ICU ya'se Natal at a resounding 
meeting of African workers", it said, "Come Zulus and see the 
108 head of the nation meeting his people." Needless to say, 
neither Dube nor any other representative of the NNC attended 
the meeting. Neither did Solomon. He had one of his increasingly 
frequent attacks of alcohol-induced illness and refused to leave 
his quarters at Depot Road Native Location. It was clear, however, 
that he had also become alarmed about the publicity that the event 
had attracted, and feared NAD and police retribution. When 
Champion and three thousand ICU yase Natal supporters thereupon 
congregated outside Solomon's quarters on the evening of 
6 September, Solomon remained in hiding, but nonetheless accepted 
a cash gift. He left for Eshowe shortly afterwards. 109 
The most immediate consequences of Solomon's brief association 
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with the ICU yase Natal was the banishment of Champion from the 
province of Natal under the terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. 
Roux has incorrectly asserted that Champion was banished 
simply for his involvement in the beer-hall disturbances.
1OO 
More recently, La Hausse has astutely suggested that while 
Champion's banishment should be understood in the context of 
the beer-hall protests as a whole, the Union Government also 
regarded banishment as "a means of preventing the emergence of 
fa militant? 'general movement' encompassing town and countryside, 
a possibility which had been suggested by the presence of Solomon 
in Durban. ,,111 Indeed, in calling for this repressive response, 
the Commissioner of the South African Police informed the Minister 
of Justice that 
Champion, by reason of his association with 
Solomon Dinuzulu rsi~ and with other Zulu 
Chiefs, has greatly gained in prestige amongst 
the natives of Durban, particularly amongst 
members of the I.C.U. and that he is, 
consequently, at present a very much greater 
menace to Law and Order than he has ever been 
in the past ••• this prestige is bound to increase 
and a conflict between Europeans and Natives 
seems to be more than a probability in the near 
future. 112 
The banishment of Champion in the first instance reflected the 
government's sensitivity to the dangerous political role Solomon 
could play in the context of militant African opposition. The 
action caused something of a political controversy: the mayor 
of Durban, Rev. A. Lamont, who was supported by certain "leading 
citizens" of the city including the MP for Durban County A. H. J. 
Eaton, petitioned the Minister of Justice to delay the banning 
order until protests had been considered. " Ilanga las~ Natal also 
objected. These protests, however, were not directed against 
the banishment of Champion specifically, but against the Riotous 
Assemblies Act which was seen to subvert liberal-democratic 
principles: the rights of freedom of speech and association,the 
sovereignty of parliament, and the rule of law. Marwick and the 
Natal Mercury, however, vigorously endorsed the banning order. 113 
The banishment of Champion effectively decapitated the ICU yase 
Natal, and the organisation went into an abrupt political decline. 
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This was so, even though unpaid local activists had always 
spearheaded the most telling protests to be made under the ICU 
banner in the province of Natal; and Champion's provincial 
leadership had in practice (if not in terms of rhetoric) tended 
to be irresolute and somewhat 'moderate' - and so not duly 
representative of its claimed political constituency. Champion 
had often displayed the class ambivalence of a man who, 
vengefully disillusioned about the expectations implanted by 
a petty bourgeois background, had made his career as a political 
organiser of the more volatile 'working class,.114 Yet Champion 
had played a vital role in the articulation of popular protest 
in the province of Natal. His skills as an organiser and 
propagandist had been largely responsible for the growth of a 
mass movement there. He was moreover a rousing and apparently 
fearless orator who, while appealing to popular 'Zuluness', had 
captured popular imagination with innovatory political doctrines 
and strategies, and a vision of a somewhat utopian future free 
of class and racial oppression. In the five years since his 
return from the Transvaal to Natal as provincial ICU organiser, 
Champion had virtually corne to personify popular protest in the 
region. And although opportunities had long existed for a more 
radical popular leader to displace Champion from his niche in 
popular politics, or at least to significantly challenge him, 
no-one had done so by the time he was exiled in 1930. In early 
1931, the Department of Justice was pleased to report that the 
ICU yase Natal had become an organisation of "little consequence" 
since Champion's departure. Its leadership was wracked with divisivE 
quarrels, and attendance at its Cartwright Flats meetings had 
plunged from averages of two thousand to two hundred and fifty. 115 
Its political role, moreover, had become increasingly distanced 
from popular protest. Indeed, by 1932 the Natal Workers Club 
(an ICU centre for social activities and political education, 
founded by Champion in 1925) had attracted moral support from 
Dube and financial assistance from Natal Estates Limited; the 
latter had been implacable opponents of the ICU in the late 
1920s.11 6 
Champion meanwhile lived out his exile in Johannesburg. Irrevocably 
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a Natal-based politician, he withdrew from political life. He 
nonetheless did occasionally pen self-pitying reflections on 
his political martrydom and exile for the ANC newspaper 
h 117 h'l ' 1" h' r 'th the Abantu-Bat 0, w ~ e earn~ng a ~v~ng as a cas ~e w~ 
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colonial Banking and Trust Company. On his return to Natal, 
after his banning order was lifted by Smuts in early 1933, 
Champion occupied himself with political objectives which 
were fundamentally 'respectable', conciliatory and petty 
, 'h 119 
bourgeo~s ~n c aracter. 
If the ICU yase Natal was not to play a significant role in the 
articulation of popular protest after 1930, it seemed in late 
1930 that Champion's absence would enable the Durban branch 
of the CP to rise in influence as a potent embodiment of the 
more radical elements within the spectrum of popular consciousness. 
Johannes Nkosi, the organiser of the Durban CP, had previously 
always deferred to Champion as the city's 'elder statesman' of 
popular protest, and, according to ROux, had customarily sought 
Champion's permission before hawking the CP organ Umsebenzi at 
the regular Sunday-afternoon political rallies at Cartwright 
120 Flats. Perhaps partly because Nkosi refused on principle 
to invoke ethnic loyalties, the Durban CP's meetings were never 
so enthusiastically attended as those of the ICU yase Natal. 121 
But in the same month as Champion was banished, the Durban CP 
acquired a new hall; and it was from there that Nkosi 
orchestrated the Durban workforce's exceptional response to 
the communists' union-wide call for a one-day general strike 
and pass-burning demonstration. On 'Dingaan's Day' (16 December) 
1930, however, the demonstration at Cartwright Flats was attacked 
by the police, and four Africans including Nkosi were fatally 
wounded. Many arrests of communist sympathisers immediately 
ensued, while police forestalled the regeneration of the Durban 
CP by simply deporting those officials sent by CP headquarters 
to replace Nkosi. Durban's Detective Sergeant R. H. Arnold, 
who had been a prime mover in the banishment of Champion in 
September, boasted with considerable justification that he was 
now crushing the communists just as he had crushed the ICU yase 
Natal.
122 
The strategies he adopted were indeed identical: " 
for the police, Champion~s banishment under the terms of autocratic 
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'enabling legislation' had set a precedent which they were not 
,123 1 ' t' 'th Ch' h' h shy to expl01t. So omon s mee 1ng W1 amp10n, w 1C 
ironically had seemed to promise much for the popular movement, 
had in practice set in motion a train of events which ultimately 
served to repress large-scale and effective popular protest 
in Natal until the defiance campaign of the 1950s. 
The consequence of the 'Solomon-Champion episode' for Inkatha 
was to increase concern and unease among Inkatha's petty 
bourgeois leaders. Following so soon after the indaba debacle 
of July 1930, Solomon's association with Champion forced petty 
bourgeois leaders to the realisation that they could not 
maintain a working political alliance with so unpredictable 
and irresponsible a constitutional monarch. That the Riotous 
Assemblies Act was first used in Natal as a consequence of 
Solomon's political behaviour was a cause for great embarrassment 
on Inkatha's part: one year previously, Dube had confidently 
told the Minister of Native Affairs and the CNC that such 
repressive legislation would be unnecessary if Solomon were 
'd 1 h' f 124 I th h f recogn1se as Zu u paramount c 1e • n e mont a ter 
Solomon's meeting with Champion, Ilanga" lase Natal published an 
oblique article which, while ostensibly addressing the question 
of Solomon's health, in reality expressed the petty boureois 
leadership's disillusionment with Solomon. It was reported that 
Solomon had been given wise and caring advice by Dube, Bhulose 
and Seme (the newly-elected president of the ANC, who was taking 
a special interest in 'Zulu affairs'). Continuing, the article 
said that "however much they miss him £Solomoll7", it was indeed 
not right that Solomon "lying down and ill should be aroused for 
our affairs of the Zulu nation.,,125 The article illustrated 
the anxiety among petty bourgeois leaders generally that Solomon 
should be persuaded to bow out of an active role in Zulu politics. 
In practice, however, representatives of the Natal petty bourgeois 
establishment did not resolutely take action to constrain 
Solomon's political role. Realistically perceiving that Solomon 
was barely tractable and that Inkatha was inseperably identified 
w1th Solomon, they instead distanced themselves from Inkatha , 
no longer regarding it as a viable representative organisation 
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for petty bourgeois politics. In 1930 Solomon demonstrated that 
he was no longer only a financial liability from Inkatha's 
point of view, but also - ironically - a political liability. 
As much as the 'royal party' - Inkatha - could not exist without 
Solomon, Solomon thus effectively ensured that Inkatha could not 
survive with him. But although Natal's petty bourgeois leaders 
clearly decided during late 1930 that Inkatha's role as their 
representative political organisation was over, they neither 
made their views explicit in public nor made any attempt to 
dissolve the organisation which had been established and sustained 
primarily through their own efforts. Significantly, neither 
did they ever hint that Solomon should be persuaded to 'abdicate' 
from his essentially passive role as Zulu national figurehead. 
Because a tradition-based Zulu nationalism remained central to 
petty-bourgeois ideology, petty bourgeois ideologues perceived 
that 'Solomon and Inkatha', as a single image, still had an 
important cultural - if not directly political - role to perform 
as an embodiment of Zulu nationalist concepts. 
Before considering Inkatha's 'cultural initiative' after 1930, 
however, it is necessary to relate how Inkatha's political 
decline was accelerated by an important factor which was 
unrelated to Solomon's political unreliability and the organ-
isation's chaotic financial state. Seme, who had recently replaced 
the radical Gumede as ANC president, mounted a campaign in 
October 1930 to rejuvenate the Natal branch of the ANC and so 
firmly bring Natal back into the national Congress' fold. 
Following the 1924 'militant coup' in the NNC, the majority of 
the Natal petty bourgeois establishment had simply dissociated 
themselves from their provincial and national Congress organ-
isations and had regrouped in Inkatha. Notwithstanding the 
existence of Inkatha, Dube had also resuscitated the Durban 
branch of the 'old' NNC during the late 1920s - this acted as a 
congenial forum for the most conservative elements of the city's 
African establishment. And despite its radical leadership, the 
'new' NNC (later renamed the Natal African Congress, and then the 
Natal branch of the ANC) had not become an influential political 
organisation; its promised role in popular politics had instead 
been performed by the Natal branch of the ICU and, subsequently, 
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126 'd the lCU yase Natal. The concept of a united Union-w1 e 
Congress o~gan.i sa tion, which Seme and Dube had played so leading 
a role in institutional ising in 1912, had thus died in the 
province of Natal during the 1920s. 
During his 1929 election for the ANC presidency, Seme had 
expounded in llanga lase Natal an ideology of African national 
unity, encompassing educated Africans, tribal chiefs, 'commoners' 
and recently-politicised 'working class' elements; on the 
practical basis of co-operation and 'self-help', this ideology 
foresaw the reconstruction of a new and independent 'African 
civilisation'. The way in which Seme had equated African national 
unity with the ethos of 'cooperation', and 'cooperation' with 
'self-help' schemes, and 'self-help' with social reconstruction 
or 'progress', correlated closely with ideas current among 
the Natal petty bourgeois establishment - though the latter 
interpreted African national unity in a narrower zulu ethnic 
sense. 127 But Seme himself was not unreceptive to the call of 
a Zulu ethnic nationalism, as was illustrated in his campaign 
in late 1930 to unite African politics in the province of Natal 
under the ANC umbrella (and, therefore, his leadership). 
Lamenting the "divisions in Natal" in an open letter to Ilanga 
lase Natal in October 1930, the president of the ANC announced 
that a "conference" was to be held in Durban to secure "progress 
and unity for our Native people", and the election of officials 
for the Natal branch of the ANC. Seme also emphasised that his 
wife "Princess Harriet ka Dinuzulu LWoulq] be in Durban for 
the first time in the interests of the African National Congress", 
and that if the latest news of Solomon's health was good, she would 
be the hostess at a "Grand Concert and Dance" for local ANC 
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members. 
Seme's efforts seemed to be rewarded when the Natal branch 
of the ANC was formally reconstituted in October 1930; and 
Bhulose, who had been Inkatha chairman since 1924 and had acted 
as a vital mediator between Inkatha's petty bourgeois and 
tribal elites, accepted a position on the new provincial 
t ' , 129 execu 1ve comm1ttee. Bhulose nominally remained Inkatha 
chairman, but he henceforth directed his political energies into 
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the ANC. His shift away from Mahashini reflected a general 
withdrawal of petty bourgeois support for Inkatha. Yet the Natal 
petty bourgeoisie as a whole did not simply transfer its 
political alleg~ance to the Natal branch of the ANC along with 
Bhulose, as Seme had hoped. Dube, the most prominent petty 
bourgeois leader in the province, remained aloof: having accepted 
office mn the ANC National Executive when Seme became president 
in April 1930, Dube had soon disagreed with Seme's somewhat 
autocratic attempts to reclaim Natal for the ANC. Dube and many 
of his most hamba kahle supporters thus determinedly retained 
their independent NNC stronghold - which white authorities 
appreciated. 130 The third most prominent local petty bourgeois 
leader after Dube and Bhulose, Inkatha's vice-chairman, Chief 
Majozi, meanwhile maintained a low profile in the emerging 
power struggle between Seme and Dube (although he clearly favoured 
the latter). Majozi instead focussed his attention on Inkatha's 
'1 1····' 131 cu tura lnltlatlve. 
Seme's frustration with the NNC's obstinant separation, together 
with his determination to unite even ICU yase Natal supporters 
under the ANC, was reflected in his attempts to come to terms 
wi th Champion soon af ter the latter's banishment. He wrote .. to 
Champion in late October 1930, proclaiming the ANC's drive 
for African national unity and stating that the ICU yase Natal 
was representative of only "a section of the community". In 
order to present himself as an ally, Seme played o~ Champion's 
long-standing antipathy for Dube by intimating that the ANC 
too wished to "drive Ilanga out of Natal". Seme also played on 
the exiled ICU yase Natal leader's insecurity, arguing that 
the ANC could assist Champion to avoid further disastrous 
confrontations with the government. "You must realise that I 
have written as President General of a senior organisation", 
Seme wrote, "I must command all under me".132 That Champion in 
133 
typical fashion rejected Seme's appeal, however, undoubtedly 
saved Seme from a severe setback in the context of Natal petty 
bourgeois politics. An alliance between Seme and Champion in 
1930 against Dube could only have accentuated the new political 
disunity among the Natal petty bourgeoisie, and rebounded 
ultimately to Dube's advantage. 
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The abrupt collapse of Inkatha as a viable political organisation 
in 1930 had shattered petty bourgeois political unity in the 
province of Natal. Many petty bourgeois individuals were left 
politically homeless, not knowing whether to focus their 
allegiance on Dube's NNC or Seme's Natal branch of the ANC. 
Inkatha's p~actical disintegration was manifested in May 1931 
when the CNC, concerned about numerous complaints from NCs 
regarding the activities of alleged Inkatha collectors and about 
evidence of gross mismanagement within Inkatha, held a meeting 
with members of the organisation's executive committee. The CNC 
had pressed for this meeting since February 1931, but had been 
delayed by the reticence of Inkatha office-holders - primarily 
Bhulose. Significantly, Fynney had desparately attempted to 
persuade the CNC to cancel the meeting; evidently he was anxious 
to prevent revelations being made that could lead the CNC to 
order Inkatha's dissolution. Furthermore, it is significant that 
Seme had contrarily encouraged the CNC to hold the meeting, 
possibly because he wished to embarrass Dube and usurp the latter's 
position of influence over Inkatha. In the event, Inkatha's 
chairman, Bhulose, and vice-chairman, Majozi, appeared before the 
CNC; Seme, at his own insistence, was also in attendance, as was 
a member of the legal firm J.H.Nicholson and Son (which had 
drawn up Inkatha's 1928 constitution), attending as Inkatha's 
solicitor at the insistence of Fynney. 
At the meeting it was openly disclosed for the first time that 
Solomon was misappropriating Inkatha funds. Bhulose informed the 
CNC that his own position in Inkatha was "most difficult", and 
that on one occasion alone a sum of £2000 had been taken from 
Inkatha to settle Solomon's debts. The CNC noted that, after the 
formal meeting was over , he was confidentially advised that 
"upwards of £10,000 had been disposed of for Solomon's benefit." 
When Bhulose agreed to supply the CNC with a written statement 
that Inkatha had not appointed any itinerant collectors, Inkatha's 
solicitor intervened to advise Bhulose to be "cautious in this 
connection". It was then revealed that Bhengu, Inkatha's 
secretary who had emerged as Solomon's right hand man, had had 
new Inkatha receipt books printed without Bhulose's knowledge, 
and that these were being used by fraudulent co,llectors. The CNC 
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observed that Bhu10se "appeared to know very little of what 
was go-ing on" in Inkatha. Majozi played little part in the 
meeting's proceedings, while Seme sat "mostly shaking his head 
d · 1 " 134 in disapproval of the lSC osures • 
Since Bhu10se undertook to terminate Inkatha collections and to 
cause the Inkatha executive committee to draw up a financial 
statement for submission to the NAD, the CNC decided that 
immediate intervention was unnecessary. Bhu1ose, however, was 
successful in neither of these undertakings. In the first place, 
he was powerless to halt collections that were being made on 
the authority of Solomon and his corrupt accomplices rather than 
that of the Inkatha executive committee. In the second place, it 
seemed that Dube and his clique, perceiving the demand for an 
unavoidably damning financial statement as a part of Seme's 
drive to discredit his political opponents in the province, united 
against Bhu10se to ensure that no such statement was procured. 
The Inkatha executive committee meeting which, according to 
Bhu1ose's promise to the CNC, was to investigate Inkatha's 
financial affairs took place at Mahashini in July 1931. The 
meeting w~s delayed for a couple of days while committee members 
prayed for Solomon's safety: they had arrived to discover that 
'the king' had been rushed off for urgent medical treatment, 
and shortly thereafter had learnt that the royal car had over-
turned while returning along a precipitous section of the Nongoma 
road. Although Bhu10se chaired the eventual meeting, it was 
Dube, Majozi and Edgar Mini (kho1wa chief of the Edenda1e 
community, and stalwart NNC supporter) who dominated the 
proceedings. No discussion of Inkatha's financial affairs took 
place - at least according to the meeting's authorised report in 
I1anga lase Natal - and no financial statement was ever 
135 produced. 
The NAD for its part took no action when Bhu10se failed to submit 
the promised financial statement. By this stage the NAD had come 
to realise that the Inkatha executive committee was not responsible 
for'Inkatha's' financial and administrative disorders. The fault 
lay in Mahashini itself and in Solomon's unprincipled 'hanger-on', 
and therefore the NAD brought its alarm and concern to bear 
directly on the Zulu royal house. 'Inkatha t 
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continued to exist, even if only in name and in the minds of 
those who surrendered money to 'Inkatha collectors'. Dube, the 
most tenacious of Solomon's petty bourgeois advisers, tendered 
his formal resignation from the organisation personally to 
Solomon in October 1932136_by which time the name 'Inkatha' 
had become synonymous with such gross corruption that Dube 
could no longer endure association with it. Inkatha was formally 
dissolved only after Solomon's death, on the instructions of 
the regent Mshiyeni who was embarrassed and indignant about the 
image of the Zulu royal house that he had inherited.
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But 
Inkatha had long previously ceased to function as a viable 
political organisation: its demise dated in the first instance 
from the Zulu indaba debacle of July 1930. 
It was in the context of the sudden political disunity, political 
insecurity and sense of directionlessness among the Natal petty 
bourgeoisie, consequent on Solomon and Inkatha's abrupt political 
decline, that Inkatha's 'cultural initiative' was set in motion 
in late 1930. It is to be emphasised that the political divisions 
that developed within the Natal petty bourgeoisie in 1930 were 
largely superficial, being the result of inter-personal power 
struggles to fill the political vacuum that Inkatha's decline had 
left. Ironically, there was a strong consensus of political 
opinion among the Natal petty bourgeoisie: the ideal of Zulu 
unity was wholeheartedly embraced, and all endorsed the ideology 
and practical purpose of the 'nation-building' policies that 
Dube and Seme had separately come to advocate in the late 1920s. 
The latter policies themselves had always been interpreted in 
a Zulu nationalist context in the province of Natal. The broader 
purposes of Inkatha's cultural initiative, whose central material 
objective was to organise the construction of a national memorial 
to Shaka, may be summarised as threefold: first, to nurture, 
sustain and further develop a sense of nationhood among all Zulu 
people; second, to forge among the Zulu an awareness of a cultural 
heritage which was suitable to petty bourgeois sensibilities 
and conducive to ethnic pride in terms of both traditional and 
'western' values; third, to define Zulu nationalism as a social 
force which was rousing yet 'respectable', and somewhat inward-
looking and self-congratulatory, as opposed to one which was an 
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emotional spur to popular militancy. For the Natal petty 
bourgeoisie, therefore, the function of the cultural initiative 
was not simply to assuage practical political disappointments 
by celebrating 'Zuluness' and constructing security in the cosy 
interiors of an inclusive Zulu nationalism. There was also 
a covert political purpose: to assert socio-political control 
over the 'Zulu nation' by defining the ideological 'content' 
of an ethnic nationalism to which all Zulu were susceptible. 
The 'Shaka Memorial' project was not the only project to be 
endorsed by the cultural engineers that acted under Inkatha's 
name from 1930, but it was the only one to be energetically and 
effectively promoted. A separate project, for example, aimed 
to collect money to buy the lands in the Babanango sub-district 
known as 'Emakhosini' - 'the place of the kings', the main 
burial grounds for heads of the house of zulu since the ttlrn 
of the seventeenth century. Apparently this sacred preserve of 
the Zulu was to be owned communally by the nation as a whole, 
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and held in trust by zulu royalty. The decision to put the 
Shaka Memorial project into practice was first made at the 
Inkatha annual general meeting of 1930 (the 'original' Inkatha's 
last annual general meeting).139 Subsequently, at a special 
Inkatha executive committee meeting at 'Mahashini on 16 December 
1930 (the day of the Durban CP's pass-burning demonstration 
at Cartwright Flats) , arrangements were made for the official 
launch of the publicity and fundraising campaign. 140 Before 
describing the main features of this project, however, it is 
important to note that the idea of a Shaka Memorial was not new 
in 1930: it was discussed and supported by delegates at the first 
'real' Inkatha annual general meeting in 1924. 141 That the 
project had remained dormant for six years before being revived 
in 1930 reflects the importance that the Natal petty bourgeoisie 
attached to their ostensibly 'apolitical' drive for cultural 
reconstruction, at a time when Natal petty bourgeois political 
unity - and, therefore, political power - had been fractured, 
and militant popular movements were threatening to appropriate 
and thus 'radicalise' Zulu nationalism. 
At the Inkatha executive committee meeting in December 1930, it 
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was resolved that a 'Shaka Memorial Fund Organising Committee' 
be established. Chief Majozi became organising secretary and 
treasurer, and the committee included Bhulose, Dube and W. W. 
Ndhlovu - reflecting that the project was not simply a party 
political manoeuvre on the part of Dube's NNC. Special provision 
was also made for "Native ministers and the Teachers" in the 
b h . 142 B f province to appoint further mem ers to t e commlttee. e ore 
any action was taken, however, the committee sought NAD approval 
for its project. Realising that the NAn would ban any project 
organised by Inkatha which involved the making of further public 
collections, Majozi emphasised to the CNC that "the movement is 
apart and strictly distinct from any existing organization of 
whatsoever kind or any political organization".143 Subsequently, 
emphasising that the Shaka Memorial Fund was independent of any 
other fund, Majozi assured the CNC that the names of all sub-
scribers together with the sums they had subscribed would be 
published in Ilanga lase Natali and that all monies were to be 
144 deposited in the Richmond branch of Barclays Bank. The 
committee thus focussed great attention on the delicate issue 
of financial management. 
The original project was simply to erect a stone monument 
dedicated to Shaka, as founder of the Zulu nation, on his grave 
at Dukuza (Stanger). As money flooded into the fund, however, 
instructions were given to leading monumental stonemasons to carve 
monuments,to not only Shaka but also to Mpande, Cetshwayo and 
. 1 145 . . 1 d d b b Dlnuzu u. Dlngane was not lnc u e , pro a ly because petty 
bourgeois morality could not be identified with a royal usurper 
who had murdered his incumbent brother, and had suppressed 
missionary endeavour among the Zulu. Furthermore, a metal bust 
of Shaka was ordered from Italy.146 The project was also expanded 
to include the erection of a public building on the site of the 
monuments, which would serve as a "Rest House" for travelling 
Z 1 d · . . 147 Th 1 d' u u 19n1tarles. e atter eClsion illustrated an important 
aspect of the whole project's purpose: to promote interchange 
and unity between 'royal and tribal' Zululand and 'petty bourgeois 
and detribalised' Natal proper. It was probably partly for this 
reason that the committee had selected the Dukuza site for the 
monuments, rather than the geographically remote (i.e. from Natal 
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proper) Emakhosini - which was unquestionably the Zulu nation's 
spiritual heartland in terms of traditional ideology. The Dukuza 
site was thus not intended to be a venue for inert and enigmatic 
monuments to the past. Indeed, it was clearly designed to become 
a modern Zulu cultural centre, manifesting the unity of Zulu 
past and present; and beckoning quietly to a future Zulu 
civilisation wherein the (perceived) logic of Zulu national 
development since the rise of Shaka would be vindicated. Long 
before the monuments were even carved, the Shaka Memorial organisi 
committee was carefully defining the activities which would be 
part of the unveiling ceremony. The programme would begin in 
Durban with a sports gala, followed by a concert in Durban city 
hall. Thereafter Durban Zulu would board special trains to Dukuza 
where, along with local Zulu, they would build huts in which 
to shelter during the ceremony itself. Appropriate addresses 
would be made by various dignitaries, including the Governor-
General, a representative of the Union Government, Solomon, two 
other Zulu chiefs (one from Natal proper and the other from Zulu-
land), and a "representative educated Native". A traditional 
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"war dance" would then ensue. 
Public subscriptions to the Shaka Memorial Fund were first called 
for in May 1931, when large appeals signed by Solomon were 
published in Ilanga lase Natal. Having emphasised that the project 
was fully supported by the government, Solomon continued: "Here 
is nobleness, Zulus! There is no nation whose ' great ones do not 
have memorials. Let us also make something by which our people 
will be famed." All Zulu people, wherever they lived, were in 
this way invited to create a heritage which "the future gen-
erations of Zulus will always remember. ,,149 The Zulu editorial 
in which Solomon's appeal first appeared described Shaka's 
greatest .achievement:uniting the Zulu speaking peoples as one 
zulu nation. Specifically naming the clans which Shaka had united, 
the editorial significantly referred not only to large pre-
Shakan power blocs north of the Tugela (the Mthethwa, Qwabe, 
'Nrlwandwe), but also to the Cunu and Nyuswa clans south of the 
Tugela - which Shaka had in reality plundered in military 
exercises. As a further indication that Zulu history was being 
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consciously reconstructed, it is significant that the editorial 
omitted to mention the large (but comparatively unaggressive) 
Buthelezi pre-Shakan polity; perhaps, particularly since a 
central achievement of Solomon's 'unity movement' had been the 
reconciliation of the houses of Zulu and Buthelezi after their 
post-conquest differences, it was incorrect to record that the 
Zulu and Buthelezi had once been completely separate. The 
editorial then described the repercussions which the rise of the 
Zulu nation had had for other African peoples in the Union and 
beyond - in East Africa and Rhodesia. And it was the creation of 
the Zulu nation, so the editorial went on to suggest, that had 
prepared the Zulu for the Bible and for progress. For these 
reasons it was imperative that a monument be erected "above where 
CShak~ sleeps to show to everybody that here lies a man who did 
f 'h' ,,150 great eats 1n t 1S country. 
From the outset, the project had been a petty bourgeois initiative. 
Although chiefs throughout the province were circularised with 
lists to record the subscriptions collected from their wards,15l 
most of .the fund-raising work was carried out by ministers of 
religion. When Majozi called a meeting of ministers in June 1931 
to discuss the Shaka Memorial Fund's financial arrangements 
(whereafter "ministers rejoiced at his well organised bookkeeping") 
he also invited them to advise him on the nature of the ceremonies 
to be held at the Dukuza site. 152 Soon after the project was 
first announced, the CNC had circularised NCs in Zululand to 
ascertain whether "any general desire" existed in their districts 
for the proposed memorial. NCs generally had responded that such 
a desire did not exist, except among 'educated natives,.153 But 
once set underway, the project proved to appeal to all strata 
of Zulu society. In Durban, indeed, the institutions which 
responded most enthusiastically with subscriptions were the 
Bell Street Compound (which housed togt workers) and the ICU 
yase Natal. Subscriptions also poured in from rural areas whose 
inhabitants had not long previously been threatening to combine 
with the militant movement in Durban, and appropriate Zulu 
'1' 1 154 nat10na 1sm to popu ar protest. 
Just as part of the attraction of the Shaka Memorial Project for 
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the Natal petty bourgeoisie was that it offered a celebratory 
cultural refuge from the political tribulations of 1930, it seems 
that this too was the case for those who had been left directionle : 
following the decapitation of the lCU yase Natal - and the harsh 
repression of the subsequent attempts on the part of popular 
elements to reorganise. For togt workers, the Zulu nationalism 
of the Shaka Memorial Fund may have appeared as a welcome opiate, 
simultaneously numbing despair and inducing pride. And the 
subscriptions that they paid to Majozi signified that it was the 
moderate petty bourgeois interpretation of Zulu nationalism, as 
opposed to the militant popular interpretation, which had 
triumphed as the dominant ideology. Subscriptions also poured in 
from the Johannesburg gold mining labour compounds, and the 
, b Af' h " h T 1 155 perl-ur an rlcan towns lpS ln t e ransvaa • 
The project also attracted considerable support from white 
quarters. Perhaps most striking was the attitude of Zululand and 
Northern Natal NCs as a whole - even though only two went so far 
as to explicitly commend the idea. While concern was expressed 
that (as the NC at Nqutu put it) the subscriptions would be 
squandered "paying Solomon's numerous debts and extravagance brough 
about by the purchase of expensive Motor Cars, petrol and throat 
lubricants", not one official expressed concern on the grounds 
that the project would reinforce zulu national unity around the 
figurehead of Solomon. lS6 By the early 1930s, the Zululand 
administration had finally come to realise that the Zulu 
nationalism that Solomon inspired was not a subversive force p 
Inde.ed, so long as the Zulu royal house exercised its authority 
through officially recognised tribal authorities (as it did in 
the context of the Shaka Memorial project) rather than independent 
royal emissaries, its political influence could positively 
buttress the administration. Concrete support came from various 
other sectors of the white establishment. The Native Welfare 
Officer attached to the Durban muniCipal Native Affairs Department, 
which had recently been plagued by the Zulu nationalism of 
Cartwright Flats, contributed to the fund. lS7 So too did the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association. lS8 In Zululand, Oscroft 
took an active interest in the project, while George Armstrong, 
a prominent sugar planter and apparently the largest landowner 
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in central Zululand, became a financial benefactor and behirtd-
the-scenes administrative adviser. And in mid-1932, when it seemed 
that the fund was almost fully subscribed, Nicholls petitioned 
the NAn encouraging them to assist the preparations for the 
unveiling ceremony. He also contacted the Governor-General 
(the Earl of Clarendon) describing the importance of the latter's 
prospective role on the day of the unveiling. Clarendon, further-
. 1 ' . 159 B more, responded favourably to N1Cho Is suggestl0ns. y 
the early 1930s, there was thus a growing consensus of white 
opinion that the Zulu royal family's appeal to a conservative 
Zulu nationalism was ideologically, politically and administrative ] 
advantageous - and was therefore to be supported. The Shaka 
Memorial project, which at face value appeared to be politically 
'innocent', played a crucial role in broadening this base of white 
support. 
The CNC, SNA, Minister of Native Affairs, and the Governor-General 
resolved in early 1932 to lend formal support to the unveiling 
ceremony, as was requested by the organising committee, but on 
condition that Majozi furnished proof beforehand that the costs 
of the monuments had been settled in full. 160 Majozi, however, 
never submitted the Shaka Memorial Fund's financial records to 
the NAD for official approval (as the CNC requested in May 1932161 ) 
he suddenly died in early July, having just completed a month-
long fund-raising campaign in the Transvaal. And the CNC in the 
meantime ascertained that the monumental stonemasons were still 
owed £3309 on the memorials. 162 It seemed that the organising 
committee had been overambitious, ordering numerous memorials 
without ensuring that enough money could be collected to pay for 
them before bhe scheduled date of the unveiling ceremony - which 
therefore had to be postponed. 
\Uthin a few weeks of Majozi' s death, a meeting of the Inkatha 
executive committee (which was in practice the Shaka Memorial 
Fund organising committee) was held at Mahashini to make new 
arrangements for the administration of the fund. For reasons which 
cannot readily be understood, the custody of the remaining money 
in the fund, together with that which was still corning in from 
local collectors, was handed over to Solomon. Solomon announced 
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in Ilanga lase Natal that he had arranged for the money to be 
banked - at the same National Bank in which Inkatha's much-
plundered assets had been invested since 1924.
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This was the 
last that was heard of the money belongi.ng to the Shaka Memorial 
Fund: it seemed to vanish into thin air. It remained unclear 
who precisely was responsible for misappropriating the funds. 
That no witch-hunt for the thieves was ever conducted, however, 
suggests that the Zulu royal house was directly implicated. As 
the financial scandal unfolded, Dube simply resigned from the 
Shaka Memorial Fund organising committee; his resignation was 
privately tendered directly to Solomon.
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In late 1932, Ilanga 
lase Natal - which had played a leading role in the project's 
publicity and fundraising campaign - was subjected to a flood 
of queries from the Zulu public as to why the unveiling ceremony 
had not taken place. Apparently acting in self-defence, the 
newspaper responded by arguing somewhat weakly that _.only Bhulose 
was in a position to explain. Bhulose in turn responded just as 
weakly, saying that he had been unable to trace the money which 
165 had been accumulated while Majozi was in charge. 
After November 1932, Ilanga lase Natal evidently repressed any 
further public discussion of the fate of the fund and the memorial~ 
which, in the newspaper's own ashamed final words, had led "poor 
people who are suffering from starvation LEo part? with their 
little tickeys in order that their project may prosper." 166 
Indeed, the Zulu had been called upon to make subscriptions in 
the midst of a devastating rural famine; 167 and it was very 
probable that the shrouded monument at Dukuza was, in effect, not 
only Shaka's gravestone. The memorial to Shaka subsequently 
"remained covered wi th sheeting for a long time", Nicholls 
recorded in his unpublished memoirs, "until the wind and the rain 
and the sun rotted it Lthe sheeting.! and disclosed a Grecian urn" .1, 
The monumental stonemasons, who were still in possession of the 
three monuments to Mpande, Cetshwayo and Dinuzulu, continued to 
press the government and the Zulu royal house to settle the 
outstanding debts until the eve of the second world war. The 
government disclaimed all responsibility, however, while the Zulu 
regent, Mshiyeni, indignantly (in the CNC's words) "kept aloof 
from the whole business".169 The government even rejected a request 
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from the South African Historical Monuments Commission in 1937 
for permission to proclaim the Shaka Memorial as a protected Union 
monument: the issue was a matter of "delicacy", it was said, from 
d h ' ,170 Th Sh k the points of view of both the NAD an Ms 1yen1. e a a 
Memorial project cannot, however, he simply dismissed as a failure, 
The publicity and fund-raising campaign had itself succeeded in 
defining, both among the Zulu as a whole and for whites, Inkatha's 
late-1920s interpretation of Zulu nationalism as the dominant 
ideology of Zulu nationalist politics - thus fighting off the 
'militant challenge' of 1929-1930. This was to prove to be an 
enduring success. 
The history of the Shaka Memorial project is also the history of 
the post-1930 'Inkatha' - which, neither having a constitutionally 
elected executiv.e committee nor calling any annual general meeting£ 
was substantially different from the representative political 
organisation of the same name which had existed before 1930. In 
the post-1930 period, however, the names of 'Solomon' and 'Inkatha' 
were also associated with a practical project which was quite 
separate from the Shaka Memorial project: the establishment of 
the independently-administered African 'Clermont Township', on 
the outskirts of Durban, in which Africans could purchase 
residential and business lots on the basis of freehold tenure. 
Although Inkatha's executive committee neither initiated nor 
played a leading administrative role in the Clermont Township 
project, the scheme represented a practical application of the 
self-help 'nation-building' ideology promoted by Dube and Seme in 
the late 1920s, as was embodied in the reconstituted Inkatha and 
expressed in a cultural context in the Shaka Memorial project. 
Significantly, the 'Clermont Township Company' advertisements 
which appeared in Ilah<Ja" la"se" N"a"tal from late 1931 spoke the 
language of an inclusive Zulu nationalism while urging Zulu to 
purchase lots at Clermont - whereas it could ~e expected that 
Zulu purchases would be almost exclusively petty bourgeois. The 
dominance of the petty bourgeois interpretation of Zulu nationalism 
was strikingly reflected in the support that the rcu lase Natal 
(now led by James Ngcobo) gave this essentially petty bourgeois 
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prOJect. And Champion too was actively involved as a prime 
mover and subsequently an administrator; in Johannesburg in late 
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1931 he took up work as the Clermont Township company's Transvaal 
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sales representat1ve. 
The 1500-acre property on which the freehold African township of 
Clermont was to be established once belonged to the Lutheran 
Berlin Missionary Society. It was put on the property market in 
the late 1920s; and because it fell under the jurisdiction of 
the Natal (colonial) law for mission glebe lands, it could be 
purchased freehold by Africans. The Afriqan petty bour~eoisie 
and permanently urbanised Africans in Natal had long sought the 
opportunity, particularly since the turn of the century, to 
purchase real estate in the urban areas - to free themselves of 
the expense and insecurities of a rented tenancy, and to attain 
an independent stake in the urban areas on which to pursue a 
stable 'civilised' lifestyle. This desire, which attracted 
increasing support among white liberals/Christians as the 'native 
policy' debates and 'race relations industry' grew in the late 
173 f d b h b .. l' 174 B t 1920s, was not avoure y t e Dur an mun1c1paJ1ty. u 
the original impetus for the transformation of the mission 
property into the Clermont freehold African township, rather than 
being 'developed' as a white residential or light industrial 
area, came perhaps ironically not from a leader of the petty 
bourgeois establishment nor a white liberal but from Champion. 
In 1929, shortly after the Durban beer hall disturbances, 
Champion urged his lawyer, J.W.Van Aardt, to arrange the formation 
of a private company to buy the mission property for subdivision 
and resale to Africans. Champion presented the project to Van 
Aardt (a National Party supporter who was a close friend of 
Hertzog, and was well connected in governing circles) as a 
"practical attempt to settle the Native Unrest": "to have advanced 
Natives buy freehold plots of land ... will give such Na~ives 
security of tenure arid will create that happy feeling of indep-
endence in the minds of Natives and generally make them forget 
many of the irritative LSiqJ bye-laws ••. that are a source of 
petty ill-feeling which at times grow to the degrees which cause 
h · 1 175 w at 1S not ca led Unrest." It was a measure of Champion's 
political opportunism that he had only recently been attempting 
to give political direction to popular militancy through the reu 
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yase Natal's promotion of the beer-hall boycott; but by late 
1929, it seemed that Champion had begun to feel uncomfortable 
in his role as militant popular leader. 
By 1931, the 'Clermont Township (Pty) Ltd' had been formed, as 
Swanson relates, involving Van Aardt and his legal colleagues 
Rossouw and Brink; E.G.Jansen,Minister of Native Affairs; Col. 
W.R.Collins, Minister of Agriculture, MP for Ermelo and Orange 
Free State land speculator; and possibly personnel of the Colonial 
Banking and Trust Company for whom the exiled Champion worked 
as a junior clerk.
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The primary purpose of this company was 
the pursuit of profit through land speculation. The white 
interests which the company embodied, however, were not only of 
a commercial character. As Champion had emphasised to Van Aardt, 
the project was also politically attractive as an experiment 
in the amelioration of urban unrest. More crucially,perhaps, it 
was to be a practical application of state segregationist thinking 
which seemed likely to attract considerable support from influentia 
African quarters. The Clermont Township project indeed strikingly 
manifested a confluence of white and African opinion in the 
context of segregationist policy. Moreover, as was illustrated 
by the explicitly zulu nationalist language in which the project 
was promoted, it also manifested a confluence of white and African 
opinion regarding a class-inclusive but ethnically exclusive 
'self-help' interpretation of Zulu nationalism. 
Government authority to sell Clermont to Africans was confirmed 
in 1931, and a large publicity campaign was set underway in 
llanga lase Natal in October of that year. The recurring advert-
isements of the Durban-based Clermont Township Company cited 
a list of influential African "gentlemen who support this project": 
J. L. Dube of Ohlange, the "Agent Enkulu" (Agent Extraordinary); 
Chief Majozi of lndaJ.eni; W.W.Ndhlovu of Vryheid; M.H.Gumede 
of Amanzimtoti; J.Ngcobo of the lCU yase Natal; and W.Bhulose 
of lnkatha. It is significant that Dube was not cited as 'of the 
NNC' and Bhulose was not cited as 'of the Natal branch of the ANC': 
like the Shaka Memorial project, the Clermont Township project 
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underplayed party political divisions among the Natal petty 
bourgeoisie, and appealed to an inclusive Zulu nationalism. The 
advertisements a!so carried a letter from Solomon, encouraging 
Zulu to come forward and buy their lots at Clermont; the Clermont 
Township Company further arranged for Solomon to attend two 
promotional meetings, one on Dingane's Day 1931 in Pinetown near 
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Clermont, and the other on New Year's Day 1932 1n Johannesburg. 
The newspaper advertisements proclaimed that "THE HEAD OF THE 
ZULU NATION WILL BE IN PINETOWN TO PRAISE THE BLACK TOWNSHIP, 
HAVING CHOSEN FOR HIMSELF HIS OWN STANDLlotJ". 
It is hoped that eve'ryone who likes the forward 
progress of our nation will ••. see the Great King 
Solomon, and buy for themselves a stand in the Great 
Bantu Town which is established. It is pleasing to 
see that the King is supporting with all efforts 
the upliftment of the 'Black Stem' ••• FIND THE DOG AND 
CATCH THIS YOUNG ONE Cthis young towQ7! THE DOG IS 
MONEY. THERE h~LL BE BUILT A TOWN OF REST, AND YOU 
WILL GET YOUR STAND IN IT. 
It was also emphasised that no "whites, Indians or Coloureds" 
would be permitted to buy lots in Clermont: 
This town will be the Bantu's town, as Durban and 
other towns are the white's towns. Bantu people will 
••. come out of the little tin houses of the Indians 
for which they have to pay rent. A good thing is that 
they will elect their own 'Mayor and Town Council. 
Encapsulating the segregationist principles which the Clermont 
Township project embodied, and which the white government as well 
as Zulu political leaders endorsed, the advertisements exalted 
that "Everything to do with this town will be for indigenous 
people. It is necessary that Bantu people should identify what 
they are aiming for, and the LWhit~ people in authority have 
resolved that there should be a town for Bantu only.,,178 
The only opposition to the project came from the embattled Durban 
branch of the CPo On Dingane's Day 1931, communists distributed 
circulars announcing that "Chief Solomon and the lCU have betrayed 
the Natives in advising them to buy land", since the land should 
be simply given back to its rightful African owners. 179 Sales of 
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lots in Clermont were initially slow, partly no doubt as a 
consequence of the Great Depression. But particularly after a 
facsimile of the first Clermont title deed to be issued to an 
African purchaser was published in Ilanga lase Natal in late 
1932,180 sales soon gained momentum. During the mid-1930s, Clermont 
rapidly developed into the self-administering freehold African 
. . . d d b 181 
townsh~p that ~t was ~nten e to e. 
hbile the Clermont Township project was important in itself 
because it was an unequivocal practical success, it had an 
overriding ideological and political significance. Zulu political 
leaders (including all of the most prominent leaders, as well 
as the head of the Zulu royal house) had openly allied themselves 
with influential white segregationists (including ministers of 
state) to implement a segregationist scheme for the settlement 
of urban Zulu. Beyond the jurisdiction of 'white Durban', Clermont 
had been set aside exclusively as an outlet for the aspirations 
of 'progressive' Zulu who sought stability and permanency in an 
urban setting, and who, in acoordance with Inkatha's ideology 
of Zulu nationalism, regarded segregation and self-government as 
necessary springboards for the reconstruction of a proud 'Zulu 
civilisation'. The existence of Clermont provided the first 
concrete evidence that the ideology of Zulu nationalism which the 
reconstituted Inkatha had formalised in 1928 was directly 
reconcilable with state segre gationism. It also provided concrete 
evidence that 'Inkatha's Zulu nationalism' had unquestionably 
become the dominant Zulu nationalist ideology since 1930 - a 
development in which the Shaka Memorial project had played a 
major role. It was perhaps ironic that the township of Clermont, 
which embodied so many of Inkatha's objectives, was established 
only after Inkatha's political demise. But at the same time, 
it signified that the ideological constructs and the political 
concepts which Inkatha had nurtured during the 1920s had 
independently taken root in Zulu political consciousness. And 
indeed, the ideas and political alignments pioneered by the 
'original' Inkatha of the 1920s can be traced through the 
subsequent twentieth century history of not only Zulu politics, 




Solomon's last few years until his death in March 1933 were marked 
by the disastrous consequences of his alcoholism, physical and 
emotional instability, and large cash needs. On a few notable 
occasions during this period, however, Solomon was capable of 
recovering sufficiently to present a public image befitting 
his role as 'Zulu king', and to represent the Zulu national 
interest (at least as he defined it) to state authorities with 
both dignity and clarity. The evidence he gave before the Native 
Economic Commission in April 1931, for example, reflected a 
sensitive awareness of the difficulties confronting rural Zulu 
182 as a consequence of rapid socio-economic change. Directly 
after giving evidence, incidentally, he addressed a meeting of 
Zulu at a Pietermaritzburg beer-hall and spoke against the 
1 d . 183 And' influence of the ICU yase Nata an communlsts. ln 
September 1931, Solomon took up his traditional role at the head 
of a large assembly of Zulu chiefs and people which had gathered 
at Nongoma for an indaba with the SNA. This indaba focussed on 
Zulu local tax arrears - which totalled £80,000 - and the growing 
rural famine. Solomon also took the opportunity to speak at 
length with a Natal Witness journalist, emphasising the value 
of officially recognising a "council composed of the Zulu chiefs 
.•• as the mouthpiece of the Zulu nation." And Solomon asserted 
that "I personally have never had anything to do with the ICU". 
The journalist came away considerably impressed with every aspect 
f S 1 ' h t d l' t' l' 184 f o 0 omon s c arac er an po 1 lca Vlews. But apart rom 
these occasions, and those on which he publicly gave support to 
the Shaka Memorial and Clermont Township projects, Solomon mainly 
lived out a withdrawn and private life after 1930, at Mahashini. 
There he sought comfort in alcohol, fancy clothing and motor 
cars, and the company of corrupt royal sycophants, while exploiting 
Zulu devotion to royalty in a vain attempt to cover the 
extravagance of the royal clique. 
Solomon's more controlled extravagance during the 1920s had a 
clearly defined political purpose. Through his luxury cars, 
stylish clothing, well-presented wives, magnificent royal residence 
at KwaDlamahlahla, large supply of liquor, and his generous 
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provision of food and accommodation for the thousands who 
attended the Inkatha meetings, Solomon had fashioned an image 
for the Zulu royal house which was appropriate to its claimed 
socio-political status. But after 1930, royal extravagance 
could only be associated with nepotism and corruption, and an 
often sordid personal breakdown of a 'Zulu king' who seemed 
to sink ever deeper into a despairing nihilism. In July 1931, 
Solomon appeared in Melmoth courthouse to answer to a criminal 
charge of having "wrongfully and unlawfully publicly and 
indecently, exposeLaJ his penis and whilst dancing around relieved 
himself" on the forecourt of a local garage. This had allegedly 
been the way in which an ill-tempered and drunk Solomon had 
expressed his irritation that his Buick's puncture could not 
be repaired immediately. A charge of criminal injuria brought 
d ' , 1 185 by the garage proprietor was also pen lng agalnst So omon. 
Earlier in the year, Solomon had had a confrontation with Melmoth 
police when he allegedly refused to stop drinking from a Johnny 
Walker bottle in public, and atte~pted to grab a rifle from a 
policeman before disappearing in the royal car. For diplomatic 
186 reasons, the police had decided against pressing charges. 
Such reports, together with news of his sudden bouts of dangerously 
poor health,187 were a feature of Solomon's last few years. 
Once Inkatha's funds were exhausted, Solomon's main source of 
income after 1930 lay in a network of royal collectors, some of 
whom seemed to collect as much for themselves as they did for 
Solomon. The most prominent among these collectors were Simpson 
Bhengu (Solomon~ s private secretary, and his principal accomplice 
in ransacking Inkatha funds); Daniel Vilakazi (a royal induna 
in the Vryheid district, previously secretary to the late Dinuzulu 
and a minor official in Inkatha); Lymon Maling (previously an 
ALU leader and chiefs' representative in Inkatha); and two 
whites, A.S.B.Blackhurst (previously the messenger of the 
Nongoma court); and Mr Pretorius (a cattle broker from Babanango). 
As a consequence of the Great Depression and the famine, which 
placed an additional burden on the cash resources of ordinary 
Zulu homesteads, royal collectors found difficulty in accumulating 
considerable cash tribute in Zululand and Northern Natal. For 
this reason, the main 'currency' which the collectors handled 
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was nat cash but cattle. Although precise figures could not be 
obt~ined, various officials' reports indicated that the Zulu 
offered up cattle numbering in the tens of thousands to the 
188 
Zulu royal house between 1931 and early 1933. 
Two separate cattle-collecting schemes were in operation under 
Solomon's name from 1931. One was organised by Pretorius, a man 
of dubious character whose career as a small-time entrepreneur 
in Northern Natal had included periods of employment as Solomon's 
chaffeur, and Daniel Vilakazi. The latter collected cattle in 
Northern Natal on Solomon's behalf; the former then sold the 
cattle and handed over a proportion of the proceeds to Solomon.
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The more important scheme, which took effect mainly in the 
Zululand reserves, was organised by Blackhurst. As messenger of 
the Nongoma court, Blackhurst had first become involved in the 
financial affairs of the Zulu royal house in the course of 
serving summonses on Solomon for debt. Blackhurst had advised 
Solomon to aggregate all royal debts 'under one head'; and had 
arranged for H.J.Brook, a Durban livestock dealer, to advance 
£2000 to pay Solomon's numerous creditors on the basis of an 
agreement whereby Solomon would repay Brook's loan in regular 
instalments. But when Solomon did not honour this agreement, 
Blackhurst (who was receiving a retainer from Solomon for 
financial services) began to repay Brook on Solomon's behalf. 
Then, as writs for debts not settled by Brook's loan continued 
to flow into Mahashini, and Solomon went on to incur new debts 
after the 'Brook agreement', Blackhurst agreed to loan Solomon 
further capital for the settlement of royal debts. Under the terms 
of a new 'Blackhurst agreement', Solomon would authorise Blackhurst 
to conduct 'royal cattle collections' throughout Zululand; 
Blackhurst would then sell the cattle through Brook and other 
Durban livestock dealers; and the proceeds would go towards the 
settlement of Solomon's debt to Blackhurst. 
It seemed that Blackhurst had initially set out to earn some 
commission, and to establish himself in a new career as financial 
agent and cattle dealer among the Zulu, in the course of assisting 
the Zulu royal house in its financial difficulties. But as 
Blackhurst personally had become increasingly entangled in 
Mahashini's web of financial chaos, his attempts to recoup his 
losses - and to extract some profit for his efforts - became 
increasingly desperate, corrupt, and extortionate. And it was 
the already famine-stricken Zulu 'commoners' who bore the burden 
of Blackhurst's and the royal clique's combined exploitative 
practices. In the wake of the 1931 drought, when Zulu crops had 
failed and cattle had begun to succumb to starvation, more and 
more Zulu had made use of the newly-introduced NAD-organised 
livestock auctions to sell their cattle for money to buy food 
and pay taxes. 190 But Blackhurst, Bhengu, and the royal izinduna 
Mnyaiza and Gilbert, all of whom acted under Solomon's authority, 
instructed the Zulu instead to hand over their cattle to 
Blackhurst, who would sell direct to Durban dealers and so raise 
higher prices than were obtainable locally. Blackhurst and the 
royal clique also - so NAD sources in Zululand alleged - prevented 
the establishment of an independent Zulu cooperative which aimed 
to sell Zulu cattle directly to urban abbatoirs. It transpired, 
however, that Zulu received considerably less for cattle sold 
through Blackhurst than through the local NAD auctions - most 
of the proceeds appeared to go towards the repayment of Solomon's 
debts, and into the pockets of Blackhurst and his assistant 
'middle men'. There were other indications that the royal cattle 
collections were being made under false pretences: some Zulu 
understood that their cattle were to be sold for the benefit 
of the Shaka Memorial Fund, while others believed that Solomon 
was establishing a 'national fund' to buy Vryheid farms for the 
resettlement of dislocated zulu. 191 But the majority of the Zulu 
who responded to the royal cattle collections certainly knew that 
they were contributing towards the repayment of Solomon's debts. 
And they were generous indeed. 
The cattle collections proved to be an extremely inefficient 
method of reducing royal debts. In November 1931, the NC at 
Nongoma uncovered what seemed to be incontrovertible evidence 
of administrative and financial malpractice on Blackhurst's part. 
The NC had ascertained that Blackhurst, plus two Vryheid whites 
named Buys and De Witt whom Blackhurst employed on Solomon's 
behalf, drew salaries from the proceeds of the sale of Zulu cattle. 
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Blackhurst also charged 'expenses' for "collecting"; "herding, 
grazing, and dipping"; and "castrating" the cattle while their 
sale was negotiated with Durban-based purchasers. Instancing 
a case of four hundred and seventy-one cattle collected from 
Chief Nkantini's ward in october 1931, the NC reported that 
Blackhurst had already prepared a charge of over E130 for the 
latter 'expenses' - and the cattle had not yet been sold. They 
were still on Blackhurst's farm near Babanango, apparently still 
incurring 'expenses'. The NC went on to recount how Blackhurst's 
'expenses' for a particular previous consignment of cattle had 
exceeded the consignment's market value: in this case, the sale 
of forty-;ive head of cattle to the'Union Cold Storage Co., of 
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Durban increased Solomon's debt to Blackhurst by about Ell. 
While there was little reason to disbelieve such reports regarding 
particular consignments of cattle, Blackhurst's dealings as a 
whole were clearly to Solomon's financial advantage. Official 
attempts during 1931 to curtail Blackhurst's activities among the 
Zulu certainly did not endear the NAD to Solomon.
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The extent of the Zulu response to Solomon's appeal for financial 
assistance can be guaged from the "List of cattle offered to Chief 
Solomon" (and yet to be collected) which royal staff at Mahashini 
drew up in November 1932 - when the royal cattle collections had 
already been underway for about eighteen months. Recording the 
number of cattle offered by each of fifty-four Zulu chiefs who were 
domiciled in eighteen different magisterial districts, most of 
~ch fell in Zululand but including several in Northern Natal 
and some in Natal proper and the eastern Transvaal, the list 
indicated that a total of two thousand one hundred and ninety-
194 
six cattle had still to be collected. Perhaps more revealingly, 
the NC at Nkandla reported in January 1933 that, according to 
his records (which were very probably incomplete), his district 
had recently handed over a total of EI04 and one thousand and 
forty-one head of cattle to royal collectors; while a further 
sixty-three head of cattle had still to be collected from local 
"b 195 contrl utors. But despite Zulu generosity throughout 1931 and 
1932, the total debt of the Zulu royal house increased during this 
period. While writs for pre-1931 debts originally unknown to 
Blackhurst continued to arrive at Mahashini, new debts were being 
400 
incurred faster than the old debts were being settled. In May 
1931, when royal cash and cattle collections had already 
discharged some royal debts, Blackhurst informed the NAD that 
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the total debt of the Zulu royal house was E1564. But the 
NAD ascertained in June 1931 that Eshowe general dealer Charles 
Adams, who had been attempting to repair the royal house's 
financial problems since they had become grave in 1928, was 
separately owed E13oo. 197 Then in November 1931, Blackhurst 
drew up a statement, which was approved by Bhengu as well as 
Solomon and Dube, indicating that the total royal debt was 
£3783. 198 And in July 1932, a statement drawn up by the NAD which 
neither took into account Solomon's remaining debt to Blackhurst 
(Solomon was unable to specify the amount Blackhurst was still 
owed) nor any new debts incurred after 31 January 1932 (which 
alone amounted to thousands 199 ) set the total royal debt at 
E4174.
2OO 
Although Solomon personally did not incur every 'royal debt' (some 
were incurred under Solomon's name by royal advisers), he was 
certainly responsible for incurring the majority. Indeed, the 
largest and most numerous debts related to Solomon's motor car 
expenses, whether purchase, repair, or running costs. Another 
major source 6f debt was doctors' fees and pharmacists' claims, 
largely a consequence of Solomon's alcohol-induced illnesses. 
Liquor costs, incidentally, which might have been the royal 
house's largest routine expense, were never reflected in royal 
debts because after 1930 royal liquor had to be bought illegally 
and therefore for cash. Lawyers' fees and court costs were also 
included in the three largest single sources of royal debt. Some 
of these , legal expenses related to actions arising from Solomon's 
behaviour (eg. the 'pub~ic indecency' and 'criminal injuria' 
cases of 1931), and others, ironically, arose from Solomon's 
attempts to forestall h i s creditors' taking him to court. Other 
debts were owed to numerous retailers throughout the province of 
Natal and on the Rand, i ncluding Durban's leading high-street 
fashion houses 'hbolfsons' and 'Greenacres', and Johannesburg's 
exclusive 'Brimson and Rough , Specialite Outfitters,.201 Such 
were the royal expenses that the famine-stricken Zulu were still 
attempting to subsidise, and which various white individuals 
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(ranging from Blackhurst and his associates to Charles Adams), 
Natal politicians (including Dube and Nicholls) and NAD officials 
were attempting to curtail. 
The major part of the fraud and corruption within the royal 
clique thus did not take the form of royal 'hangers on' running-
up debts under Solomon's name. Royal 'hangers on' instead 
misappropriated a large proportion of the income from the royal 
cash and cattle collections. And Solomon, who could not fail 
to identify such flagrant dishonesty, on these grounds frequently 
denounced his fraudulent collectors - even though he was in 
practice dependent on their voluntary services. On different 
occasions during 1931 when attempting to explain his financial 
affairs to white authorities, Solomon made specific accusations 
of fraud against Leonard Ncapayi (Bhengu's predecessor as 
Solomon's private secretary), Simpson Bhengu, and Lymon Maling 
(whom Solomon had appointed as a royal collector in Northern 
Natal, alongside the local Inkatha officials Daniel Vilakazi 
and Timothy Mathe).202 Valid though such accusations might have 
been, they were singularly hollow coming from a man who himself 
represented the quintessence of Zulu financial irresponsibility. 
In purely personal terms, Solomon's predicament in the last few 
years of his life was a very unenviable one: he was surrounded 
by courtiers whom he could neither trust nor afford to dismiss. 
Added to this, there were indications that Solomon was growing to 
be unpopular among Zulu chiefs, upon whom Solomon had hitherto 
been able to rely for support. As royal collections increased 
during the famine, tribal authorities in the Zulu heartlands 
had found that their loyalties to the Zulu royal house increasingly 
conflicted with their traditional roles as 'father' and 
'guardian' to their wards - which felt duty bound to respond 
to Solomon's appeals for assistance. As early as June 1931, the 
CNC had received reports that certain Zulu chiefs had become 
"very perturbed" about Solomon's extortionate activities, and 
were considering means of imposing some form of discipline on 
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Solomon. It was thus not only Solomon's petty bourgeois support 
but, to a certain extent, his chiefly support that ebbed after 
1930. 
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For its part, the NAD too became increasingly concerned - and, 
in the case of NCs near the royal epicentre in north-western 
Zululand, exasperated - during 1931 about Solomon's financial 
difficulties and widespread collections. The reasons may be 
summarised as threefold. First, officials perceived it to be 
unjust that Solomon was making such impositions on the Zulu 
people in the midst of a famine, at a time when the NAD was 
distributing famine relief to the value of £35,800 in Zululand 
and Northern Natal, and when local tax arrears in the Zululand 
inland reserves stood at £80,000.
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Certain Zululand officials 
felt that the Zulu people were being 'fleeced', and were in need 
of protection. Second, officials had cause to complain that the 
frequent presence of royal collectors in their districts was 
interfering with their own and their chiefs' routine administrative 
work. It was nonetheless significant, reflecting the changed 
official perspective on Zulu national unity and the Zulu royal 
house's role in that context, that Zululand officials did not 
argue that such practical affirmations of Solomon's widespread 
influence was inherently undesirable - as they had done until 
the late-1920s. Third and most important, the NAD as a whole, 
always very sensitive to the pervasive influence of the Zulu 
royal house among the Zulu, had been favourably impressed with 
Solomon's political role during the late 1920s period of African 
political turbulence throughout the provinee of Natal. Even though 
the Zulu monarchy was not officially recognised, the NAD (including 
the new Natal CNC, J.Mould Young, who succeeded T.W.C.Norton 
in 1931) was thus apprehensive of the political consequences 
which might follow the sudden collapse of the institution of Zulu 
kingship - which seemed possible in view of the current head of 
the zulu royal family's gross personal irresponsibility. More 
particularly, fears were expressed regarding the political 
consequences should Solomon be imprisoned for debt. It might be 
added, however, that while many NCs were simply annoyed about 
Solomon's lack of self-discipline, some evidenced a human concern 
for his private and public predicaments. 205 
As early as May 1931, the NAD considered the possibility of 
intervening to impose official control over the royal cash and 
412 
cattle collections, and to offer Solomon guidance in the task 
of discharging his debts. Such strategies, which were tentatively 
proposed by the SNA, were initially not favoured by either the 
CNC or the NC at NOngoma. 206 But after Solomon had personally 
implored the CNC in July 1931 for government financial assistance, 
bl h ' 'd 207 Th t' the CNC came to be more amena e to t lS 1 ea. e ques 10n 
of official assistance became more pressing when Solomon anxiously 
informed the NC at Nongoma in October 1931 that "writs of 
execution" had been issued against him, meaning that royal 
property was soon to be attached by the courts. This persuaded 
the NC at Nongoma, the CNC and the SNA that some form of official 
assistance was essential; and it was agreed that the preconditions 
should be that, first, an NAD official should investigate and 
ratify Solomon's statement of debts, and, second, that Solomon 
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should dismiss Bhengu and appoint a trustworthy private secretary. 
But the SNA and CNC still procrastinated, unable to agree about 
the precise form that official assistance should take. It was left 
to the Minister of Native Affairs (whom Nicholls had petitioned 
on Solomon's behalf) to dramatically break departmental indecision: 
"most important that sale in execution [at MahashinV is prevented" 
he telegrammed his department in January 1932, and immediately 
authorised the NC at Nongoma to guarantee to Solomon~s creditors 
that the government would settle Solomon's debts. 209 The SNA then 
arranged for every adult male of the Usuthu ward to pay a £1 
annual levy to the government, until such time as Solomon's 
debt to the government was repaid. 2lO That the Minister of 
Native Affairs and the NAD had cooperated to take so bold and 
unprecedented an action as using public money to repay a state 
employee's private debts reflected the importance which white 
authorities had come to attach to the institution of Zulu kingship. 
On 7 January 1932, the day on which Mahashini was informed of the 
government loan to repay royal debts, Mahashini despatched a 
letter to the CNC expressing Solomon's humble thanks for 
government assistance. "My name would LotherwiseY have been changed 
into the mud" said this letter which, though bearing Solomon's 
signature, was unmistakably written in Dube's handwriting. 2ll 
On 8 January 1932, however, Solomon went to Durban and bought a 
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brand new Chrysler de luxe 8 cy~inder, on hire purchase terms, 
costing a total of £825. Solomon was soon to be seen at Nongoma, 
being driven in his new limosine by a white chauffeur. ~ben 
questioned by the CNC in late February, he denied that the car 
was his. But after 'Colonial Motors Ltd' began legal proceedings 
against Solomon because to had ·.failed to pay the first instalment 
on the purchase, and following further investigations by the CNC, 
the truth leaked out. Officials were astonished, and the CNC 
concluded that Solomon was "nothing more than a spendthrift and 
a liar, whose word is not to be believed even at the moment he 
utters it".2l2 Solomon apologised to the CNC for both his purchase 
and his lie: tin 8 January, Solomon explained, "my mind was more 
occupied by the suggestions of the Government with regards to 
the liquidation of my present liabilities".2l3 It was for 
reasons such as this that total royal debts increased between 
1931 and 1932. 
Although utterly disillusioned with Solomon on account of the 
car issue, the NAD felt that it had no choice but to go ahead 
with the government loan to Solomon for the repayment of royal 
debts: Solomon's creditors had already been informed of the 
government's unrertaking, and the Usuthu ward had already agreed 
to the Usuthu levy. Furthermore, the Minister of Native Affairs 
and the NAD did not cancel the government loan even when Solomon 
proved to be unwilling to abide by any of the conditions that 
were attached to it. Solomon refused to dismiss Bhengu (even 
though he himself had accused Bhengu of fraud not long previously), 
and instead offered the NAD weak excuses as to why Bhengu's 
services had to be retained. Neither did he accept the services 
of Oscroft as his official financial adviser. And although 
Solomon handed over to the NAD all the writs for debts he had in 
his possession, he never submitted the required full and final 
statement of royal debts - evidently because neither he nor his 
staff at Mahashini knew what all the royal debts were. 2l4 The 
Minister of Native Affairs did, however, instruct that the 
government would not settle any of Solomon's debts incurred after 
31 January 1932 - which included the debts on Solomon's new 
car, since the instalments were only payable from February 1932. 
The government paid out a total of £4,266/19/2 to liquidate 
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Solomon's personal debts. This loan, incidentally, was never 
fully repaid: the Usuthu ward continued to pay the annual levy for 
the reduction of Solomon's debt to the government until 1937, four 
years after Solomon's death, when the Minister of Finance 
.. d bt 215 Th t 1 d c d wrote off the remalnlng e. e governmen oan re u e 
but did not remedy Solomon's insolvency and cattle collections -
to which the Zulu people continued to contribute until Solomon's 
death. Solomon himself continued to live under the threat of 
imprisonment for debt, or having his property attached by the 
courts. In September 1932, for example, Charles Adams pleaded with 
the CNC, on Solomon's behalf, for a further government loan to 
liquidate royal debts incurred since January of that year. Adams, 
who was disinterestedly assisting the administration of the royal 
cattle collections, implored the CNC to realise that from the 
~ 
perspective of "a wider vision of things ... it would be disastrous 
to let things drift into a Court 'Messenger's sale". The CNC was 
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unmoved. 
The official attitude to Solomon from 1932 until his death in 
March 1933 was a mixture of concern and contempt - contempt 
because it was felt that Solomon was exploiting both the Zulu 
people's loyalty to their royal family and the government's good-
will. In March 1932, in view of Solomon's purchase of a new car 
and his failure to abide by the conditions of the government loan, 
the Minister of Native Affairs and the SNA decided that Solomon 
should be officially reprimanded at a special indaba attended by 
Solomon, his advisers, Usuthu tribal authorities and Usuthu 
'tribespeople'. The SNA wished this gathering to be informed that 
the government was unable to trust Solomon, and would not "stir 
a finger" to help him meet any new debts "even if it involves his 
detention in gaol under order of civil imprisonment", and that if 
Solomon was ·imprisoned, the government would have to consider his 
replacement with a "reliable chief".217 Such a meeting was held 
at Nongoma in April 1932, and in addition to reading out the 
'message of the government' prepared by the SNA, the CNC expressed 
his own critical opinions about Solomon's behaviour and financial 
predicament. An abashed Solomon replied simply that he was at fault, 
and could say no more. 2l8 
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From 1932, there was little ~~at even the most sympathetic of NAD 
officials could find in Solomon to justify any amelioration of 
official attitudes towards him. Carl Faye, the long-serving 
chief clerk and translator at the CNC's offices who had been 
favourably disposed to the Zulu royal family even in the heyday 
of Natal NAD antipathy,2l9 noted in September 1932 that the "good" 
that was in Solomon was somehow "not dominant in his conduct". 
Elaborating, Faye referred to the recent death of Harriette 
Colenso, a woman who had in a sense been a surrogate 'father' to 
solomon during Dinuzulu's imprisonment and exile after the 1906 
rebellion, and who had played a leading role in securing Solomon's 
succession in 1913.
220 Increasi~glY frail and even somewhat 
disillusioned during the last years of her life, Colenso had 
nonetheless clung with affection to the memories of her association 
with 'Dinuzulu's family'. But, although Solomon had recently 
indicated that he wished to lay a wreath on her grave, Solomon had 
over the past few years ignored Faye's repeated suggestions that 
Solomon should pay her the courtesy of a visit. Solomon had always 
said that he was too busy, Faye recorded. Faye was similarly 
disillusioned with Solomon's "apparent ingratitude" to the many 
Zulu who had responded to the royal cash and cattle collections. 22l 
In the light of NAD attitudes towards Solomon, it may appear 
incongruous that the 'recognition question' was reopened in the NAD 
during July 1932. But, as will be noted below, this occurred solely 
on the insistence of the "Minister of Native Affairs (E. G. Jansen), 
whose interest in the ideological aspects of Solomon's recognition 
had been sharpened by the broad-ranging and highly theoretical 
'native policy' debates then current in ruling circles. And 
although the NAD went through the motions of reconsidering 
official 'elevation', it decisively blocked the minister's 
Solomon's 
, , 't' 222 l.n1.t1.a l.ve. Solomon and his advisers played no part in causing 
the 'recognition question' to be reopened, but they did get wind 
that the issue was being reconsidered - which inspired Solomon to 
make a final attempt to secure the official recognition of the 
Zulu kingship. 
At some stage in mLd-1932, Solomon received an intimation from 
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Adams, who had recently been consulted by the ·Minister of Native 
Affairs on matters concer·ning Solomon's finances and political 
status, that the Zulu royal house could expect to be financially 
and politically rewarded if it redeemed itself in the eyes of 
the NAD. 223 Evidently acting on Adams' advice, Solomon approached 
the NC at Nongoma in September 1932, indicating that he wished 
to reform his behaviour and use his influence to assist the 
224 government. As a consequence of these representations, Solomon 
was granted an interview with the CNC in early October. Before the 
CNC, Solomon stated that the Zulu delighted in living in harmony 
with the government, but that he personally needed greater official 
powers to be able to guide the Zulu to do so. Pursuing his appeal 
for official recognition, Solomon asked "If the Government finds 
itself unable to bring me close to itself, how will the Government 
ever find out what Solomon is like?,,225 Solomon's approaches 
to the NAD came too late to influence the NAD's position regarding 
the 'recognition question', since the SNA, CNC and the NC at 
Nongoma had already suppressed the possibility of Solomon's official 
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'elevation' in late August. But. because Solomon had specifically 
asked that his official powers be extended, which suggested that 
Solomon had become aware that the 'recognition question' had been 
formally reopened, and had for the past eighteen monL~S been 
allowed special privileges above all other Zulu chiefs (~part 
from repaying Solomon's debts, the government had not prohibited 
the widespread royal cash and cattle collections), the NAD deemed 
it essential that Solomon be formally reminded of his official 
status. 
It was thus that Solomon, together with his Usuthu tribal advisers 
Mnyaiza kaNdabuko Zulu, Gilbert kaNgcongcwana Zulu, Franz 
kaDabulamanzi Zulu, and Zinyo kaNtuzwa Mdlalose (one of Solomon's 
227 
maternal uncles) , was summoned to Pretoria on 13 December 1932 
for an interview with tpe ·Minister of Native Affairs. In addressing 
Solomon at .this interview, which was also attended by the SNA 
(J. F.Herbst) , CNC (J. ¥~ Young) and NC at Nongoma (E. N. Braatvedt) 
the minister drew heavily on a draft address that the Natal NAD 
head office at Pietermaritzburg had drawn up specially for the 
occasion. Accordingly, the minister reiterated the conditions of 
Solomon's appointment as chief of the Usuthu in 1916, and proceeded 
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to describe how General Botha's advice to Solomon in 1916 had 
not been satisfactorily heeded: Solomon had not always behaved 
with chiefly dignity, nor had he consistently paid due respect 
to NAD officials; he drank too much, and had led so extravagant 
and unsettled a life that his health had suffered, and he had 
persistently claimed authority over Zulu outside the Usuthu 
ward. Moreover, Solomon had fallen deeply in debt, and had failed 
to reform his financial irresponsibility even when officially 
instructed to do so at the tine of the government loan. Solomon 
was thus informed that, on the one hand, he had not set a good 
example to his own people, and on the other hand, he had often 
been more of a hindrance than a help to the government. Solomon 
responded to these reprimands by restating his desire to use his 
. 228 . f 11' h influence to asslst the government. Agaln 0 OWlng t e NAD-
prepared draft-address, the Minister of Native Affairs replied 
saying that Solomon had not shown the government proof that he could 
be trusted in a posi tion of greater authori ty. ·. But at the conclusion 
of the interview, the minister deviated from the NAD-prepared 
address in a way which reflected his different attitude towards the 
question of Solomon's 'elevation'. Whereas the NAD wished the 
minister to inform Solomon categorically that there was, and 
would be, no "overlord" over Zulu chiefs except the Supreme Chief, 
the minister instead gave out that he still hoped to make use of 
Solomon in the administration of the Zulu people. Solomon first 
had to demonstrate to the government, however, that he was worthy 
of a position of greater authority.229 So ended Solomon's final 
interview with white authorit~es. 
After the unfortunate Zulu indaba with the Governor-General in 
1930, Solomon's attitude towards white authorities and his general 
conduct suggested that Solomon had given up hope of achieving 
the ultimate objective of his political career: the official 
recognition of the Zulu kingship. The news in mid-1932 that white 
authorities had reopened the 'recognition question', which must 
have come as a suprise to those at 'Mahashini, seemed to rekindle 
in Solomon a spark of hope. The overall tenor of Solomon's 
interview with the Minister of Native Affair~ held in the presence 
of the most influential members of the NAD hierarchy in regard to 
policy towards the zulu royal house, doused this spark. Although 
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the minister had closed ~~e interview on a conditionally positive 
note, Solomon himself did not expect to live long enough to 
persuade the government that his expressed desire to reform his 
ways and 'assist the government' was genuine. 
By May 1932, Solomon had already sensed that his death was 
imminent - even though he was barely forty years old. In a letter 
of that month replying to Nicholls' enquiries about the progress 
of the Shaka Memorial project, Solomon had wri tten that" if alive" 
he would certainly be present at the prospective Shaka Memorial 
unveiling ceremony -in July.230 In November 1932, the CNC had 
similarly expressed the opinion that Solomon, as a consequence 
of "dissolute living" and "self gratification", could not be 
expected to survive for much longer. Solomon would continue 
flundermining his constitution", the CNC predicted, "until he shuffs 
himself out like a candle".231 
Solomon collapsed and died suddenly in the first week of March 
1933, less than three months after his intervie\y with the Minister 
of Native Affairs. He died not at Mahashini, but at the homestead 
of Chief Karnbi of the Ngenetsheni, having gone there to act as 
peacemaker in a dispute between two of Karnbi's sons. Particularly 
in view of the severe antagonism that had existed between the Zulu 
royal house and the Ngenetsheni before Solomon's succession,the 
circurrstances of Solomon's death reflected Solomon's dedication 
to the settling of tribal and dynastic disputes which might 
fracture the unity of all Zulu beneath the Zulu 'king'. 
Notwithstanding his personal failings during the last few years 
of his life, and his parasitic activities during the famine, 
Solomon's funeral ceremony at -Mahashini four days after his death 
was the occasion of a stirring display of Zulu mass loyalty to the 
institution of Zulu kingship. Ilanga lase Natal's exclamations on 
the death of "Solomon the King of the Zulu" indeed seemed to 
represent the sense of bereavement felt by the Zulu as a whole: 
"We have died, Zulu people! We have no place to hide! He is no 
more, the honeybird that drinks from deep pools La line from 
Solomon's izibongo/! The giver of rest Lone of Solomon's praise 
names.l has gone!" and, using Christian imagery, "We are like sheep 
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without a shepherd." In page aftter page of appreciative journalism 
on Solomon's life and work, the only hint of criticism came in 
the form of an oblique and somewhat self-righteous aside to the 
newspaper's predominantly petty bourgeois readership. Solomon's 
fatal liver and abdominal complaints, it was mentioned, were 
symptoms of "an illness which is not known at Groutville".23l 
There was no doubt that Solomon died a king in Zulu eyes, and not 
only so in the eyes of the Zulu of the 'old kingdom' but in the 
eyes of Zulu speaking people throughout the province of Natal. No 
longer was it valid to distinguish between 'Zulu' and 'Natal 
African': all were Zulu and, as Wheelwright had observed in 1928, 
all regarded the heir to the Zulu royal house as "the chief race 
representative of b'1eir Nation." 232 The furtherance of such a 
sense of zulu national unity, as well as a pride in 'Zuluness', 
and the resurrection of the political fortunes of the Zulu royal 
house were together Solomon's most enduring achievements. 
Zulu nationalism and state segregationism after 1930 
Earlier in this study, it has been argued that white segregationist 
thinking had an influence on the development of Zulu nationalist 
politics; and that this influence was particularly apparent in 
the reconstituted (i.e. post-1928)Inkatha's ideologies of economic 
'self-help', socio-cultural 'reconstruction', and political 
'self-government', all of which were expounded within an over-
arching ideology of exclusivist Zulu nationalism. 'White 
segregationist thinking', so far as it affected zulu nationalist 
politics, was overtly or covertly expressed in three inter-related 
contexts: first, state segregationist legislation of the 1920s, 
and more especially the policy proposals put forward by Natal's 
key 'native policy' legislators, Nicholls and Marwick; second, 
the findings of the developing academic discipline of 'scientific 
anthropology'; and third, the 'advice' dispensed by white liberals 
• 
and Christians through the 'progressive' African or multi-racial 
institutions that they sponsored, notably the Bantu · ~~n's Social 
C t d J ' ' I · 233 en res an olnt CounCl s. 
Nob.,ri ths tanding the influence of whi te segreg~tionist thinking 
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on the development of Zulu nationalist ideology, Inkatha's drive 
for Zulu 'self-government' during the crucial 1928-1930 period 
of the organisation's history was by no means simply derivative, 
nor simply a part of I nk a t..'1 a 's policy of appeasing - or collaboratin~ 
with - white rule. This drive was in the first instance a Zulu 
initiative, arising from two ideological systems current among 
the Zulu people (including 'Natal Africans') during the 1920s: 
first, the backward-looking and somewhat wistful 'tribal' outlook, 
which celebrated and envisaged a resuscitation of pre-conquest 
1 d 1 "" 1" d d 234 d Zulu economic, socio-cultura an po ltlca ln epen encej an, 
second, the pan-Africanist and black nationalist/consciousness 
doctrines which, having been adopted 'by the educated elite and 
reinterpeted in the particularly Zulu context, were both assertive 
(i.e. seeking to demonstrate black worth in relation to whites) 
and inward-looking, as was especially manifest in the 'search for 
roots,.235 These two ideological systems had always been inter-
twined and embodied in Inkatha, particularly after the organisation 
was formalised in 1924 as a Zulu nationalist alliance between the 
petty bourgeois and tribal elites. White segregationist thinking 
in the late 1920s meshed with and further developed the socio-
culturally and politically separatist inclinations already inherent 
in Inkatha's zulu nationalism of the mid-1920s, gradually guiding 
Inkatha's zulu nationalism of the late-1920s towards a more 
explicitly segregationist position. 
The relationship between white segregationism, as was expounded 
by Natal's leading white 'native policy' ideologues, and Zulu 
nationalist politics was, however, ' a dialectical one. This study 
has already alluded to - though not explored - the influence that 
the latter had on the former. Indeed, it has been shown that 
Nicholls in 1929 set about formalising his 'adaptationist' policy 
proposals, which were based on the recognition of 'traditional' 
African authorities and institutions, and the nurturing of 
politically discrete 'Bantu Nations' within the Union, after having 
been actively involved in Zulu nationalist politics during 1928 
in the capacity of an informal adviser assisting the reconstitution 
of Inkatha. 236 h f " Muc 0 the lmagery and many of the political 
'facts' that Nicholls used to support his draft policy proposals 
were directly derived from his understanding of Zulu nationalist 
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politics, which illustrated the influence that Solomon and 
Inkatha had on the development of Nicholls' segregationist 
ideas. 237 Though a commentary on the development of state 
segregationism does not strictly fall within the scope of this 
study, this subsection will sketch how Zulu nationalism influenced 
the evolution of the 'separate development', or 'parallel 
development', state ideology which was ultimately to be most 
clearly embodied in the apartheid government's 'Bantustans' 
(subsequently 'Homelands') policy after 1948.
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In so doing, it 
hopes to throw some new light on the evolution of state 
segregationism: the extant literature has recognised the important 
role played by Natal white 'native policy' ideologues in the 
refinement of segregationist thinking at state level, but has not 
d b 1 '1' 1'" 239 alluded to ,the role playe y Zu u nat10na 1st po 1 t1c1ans. 
For the history of both Zulu nationalist politics and Natal white 
'native policy' legislators' attempts to implement a settlement 
to the 'native question', the year 1930 was something of a 
watershed. Regarding the former, 1930 was the year in which hopes 
that the NAD could be persuaded to recognise Solomon and Inkatha, 
so securing the implementation of a thoroughgoing policy of Zulu 
political and territorial segregation as a special 'local 
settlement' of the 'native question' in the province of Natal, 
were extinguished among Inkatha's leaders. Yet the disastrous 
Zulu indaba with the Governor-General and the ensuing disintegratior 
of Inkatha as a viable political organisation did not cause the 
segregation ideal to wither among Zulu nationalist leaders. 
Indeed, as has been shown, Inkatha's late-1920s segregationist 
interpretation of Zulu nationalism became more pervasively 
influential among the Zulu after 1930 - following the decline of 
the lCU yase Natal as a militant'working class' zulu nationalist 
organisation (together with the repression of the Durban CP), and 
the success of lnkatha's covertly political 'cultural initiative,.24 
Zulu nationalist politicians continued to support the irnrnedidate 
implementation of local segregationist policy among the Zulu, 
as was illustrated in the Clermont Township project, but it was 
evident that G~ey had realised that their ultimate objective - the 
official recognition of lnkatha, together with the institution 
of Zulu kingship, as the central representative institution of a 
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self-governing Zulu nation - could not be achieved unless 
Nicholls' and Inkatha's thoroughgoing segregationist ideas had 
been formally embodied in Union 'native policy'. Zulu nationalist 
politicians adopted a new strategy for, rather than abandoned, 
the drive for Zulu self-government after 1930: whereas the 
strategy previously was to press the NAD and Union Government 
to implement a special 'local settlement' of the 'native question' 
in the province of Natal by recogni$.ing Solomon and Inkatha, after 
1930 the strategy was to influence a redefinition of Union 'native 
policy' in such a way that Zulu self-government flowed naturally 
from it. It was thus that Dube (who had the full backing of at 
least Chief Majozi and W. W. Ndhlovu) entered into negotiations 
with Nicholls after 1930, seeking to influence the character 
of the 'native policy' decided upon by the 'Joint Select Committee 
on the Native Bills', in whose deliberations Nicholls was playing 
a leading role. Furthermore, as will be noted below, Dube also 
toured the Union to secure the support of African leaders in other 
provinces for the proposals that Nicholls was expounding in the 
Joint Select Committee. 241 
For Nicholls, as the most influential of Natal 'native policy' 
legislators, 1930 was something of a watershed because in May of 
that year he began formally to expound his adaptationist policy 
proposals before the Joint Select Committee, having had his draft 
'Natives' Land Development Bill' and 'Natives' Parliamentary 
Representation Bill' accepted by the committee as bases for 
discussion.
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During mid-1930, Nicholls was also attempting 
to persuade the ttinister of Native Affairs and the Governor-
General officially to recognise Solomon and Inkatha on the 
occasion of the forthcoming indaba with the Governor-General at 
Eshowe;243 if such 'political reform' had been implemented among 
the Zulu, it would no doubt have provided Nicholls with an 
illustrative source of reference for the political proposals that 
he was unfolding before the committee. Following the indaba 
debacle in July, Nicholls focussed his energies on embodying his 
adaptationist ideas in Union 'native policy'. Political conditions 
were favourable for his doing so successfully. The 1925 Natives' 
Taxation and Development Act and the 1927 Native Administration 
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Act, which had been enacted largely through the efforts of Nicholls 
and Marwick, together with the two Native Affairs, 1920, 
Amendment Acts of 1926 and 1927, had already laid on the statute 
book the financial, political and ideological groundwork of 
Nicholls' adaptationism.
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The 1927 Native Administration Act's 
'anti-sedition' Section 29 and the amended Riotous Assemblies 
Act of 1930 (which, again, Nicholls and Marwick had played a 
leading role in enacting) ,245 furthermore, provided the repressive 
rampart from behind which Nicholls' proposals - which necessarily 
involved the controversial removal of Cape Africans from the 
common voters' roll - could be confidently embodied in Union 
'native policy'. (When the disenfranchisement of Cape Africans 
was first mooted in Hertzog's 'Native Bills' of 1926, the 
suggestion had been so decisively condemned by the 1926 annual 
Native Conference that Hertzog omitted to call another Conference 
until 1930 - and in 1930 any discussion of the Bills was 
forbidden.) 246 
Furthermore, Nicholls could draw confidence from the knowledge 
that his adaptationist ideas had a broad base of support from 
both outside and within the Joint Select Committee. When Hertzog's 
'Native Bills' were first referred to Select Committee in 1927, 
Natal MPs had agreed that Nicholls and Marwick should represent 
them on that Select Committee and, by Nicholls' own account, 
247 "act according to a plan that was agreed upon". With this 
Natal backing, Nicholls could with some justification refer to 
the political proposals that he presented to the Joint Select 
Committee in 1930 as a "Natal Bill".248 And with the support of 
Zulu nationalist politicians, together with that of a number of 
prominent African leaders from other provinces of the Union whom 
Dube had canvassed successfully, Nicholls could also assert with 
some confidence that "Natal's effort to find a solution [to the 
native questionJ met with the full approval of a number of the 
1 d ' t' ,,249 h ' ea lng na lves... In t e JOlnt Select Committee, moreover, 
wherein it was agreed that members' party political affiliations 
should not influence their voting, Nicholls found the ready 
support of a cross-section of influential individuals, notably 
Col. Stallard(of the SAP, who had emerged during the 1920s as 
the Union's leading ideologue on urban segregationism) ;250 Col. 
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Collins (also of the SAP, who in 1931 was to become a major 
shareholder of the Clermont Township company);251 'Pen' Wessels 
(of the Nationalist Party, who was to play an important role 
in the formation of the coalition government in 1933);252 and the 
Nationalist Minister of Native Affairs, E. G. Jansen, who acted 
, 1 'tt 253 as chairman of the JOlnt Se ect Comml ee. 
In its work of laying down a uniform Union 'native policy', the 
twenty-seven member Joint Select Committee was faced with essential] 
two tasks. First, to define the form of African political 
representation at central government level. The consultative 
annual Native Conferences established under Smuts' 1920 Native 
Affairs Act had not proved successful: many African leaders, 
including Dube, had already rejected them as powerless, and 
Hertzog had not called a Native Conference since 1926. In the 
Cape province, furthermore, Africans were eligible - if they had 
passed the 'franchise test' - to vote alongside whites for 
members of the House of Assembly, whereas Africans of other 
provinces in the Union did not have the franchise.
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Second, 
to settle the 'land question'. The 1916 Natives' Lands 
Commission and the ensuing Local Land Committees had neither 
produced agreement on the extent of , land to be 'alienated' for 
exclusive African occupation under the terms of the 1913 Natives' 
Lands Act, nor the demarcation of 'scheduled areas' in which 
Africans could purchase property. The 1913 Act had moreover been 
declared ultra vires in the Cape province, since by curtailing 
Cape Africans'previous land-purchase rights it simultaneously 
interfered with their ability to qualify as registered 
parliamentary voters under the terms of the Cape 'franchise 
test,.255 These two tasks thus related directly to the maintenance 
of white control over the central government, and white access 
to land and cheap African labour, which together were the foundation 
upon which white South African society had been built. 
Introducing his adaptationist proposals before the Joint Select 
Committee in May 1930, Nicholls asserted that his aim was to 
"ensure beyond question, and permanently, (1) The dominance of 
the European, (2) While ensuring the dominance of the European, 
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to recognise the native's right to his own developmenn in such 
a way as to win his approval". Nicholls went on to denounce 
the 'assimilationist' political proposals made by the Cape 
'liberal Sir James Rose-Innes (which sought to enfranchise on 
the common voters' roll all Africans who had passed a high 
'franchise test') as "not being practical politics": these 
proposals did not safeguard'European dominance', nor recognise 
"the Bantu as a race, with all its traditions, feelings, and 
customs, and ••• separate tribal ideas •.• ". He similarly denounced 
Hertzog's amended political Bill of 1929 (which sought to place 
Cape Africans on a separate voters' roll and permit them to elect 
three white 'natives' representatives' to the House of Assembly, 
while Africans elsewhere in the Union were to be represented 
solely by a maximum of four white 'natives' representatives' in 
the Senate) ,256 arguing that it did not "ensure the complete and 
perma~ent dominance of the European by the destruction of democracy 
amongst the natives and their exclusion completely from 
participation in the election of members to the Lower House". 
His own adaptationist policy proposals, Nicholls asserted, were 
"based upon the recognition of a separate Bantu Ethos which it is 
our duty to protect and develop" in such a way as to "preserve 
the separateness of the native". In a statement which drew 
heavily on the ideas he had set out in private letters and 
memoranda subsequent to his becoming involved in Inkatha, Nicholls 
argued that the foundations of African political representation 
ought to "go back to the native kraal, to the native family, 
to the tribe, to the tribal council, Land the~ to the Native 
Provincial Council, which would have considerable powers of local 
self-government .•• ", For Nicholls, this separate and "complete 
chain of representation" was the way in which "the Bantu Nation" -
including Africans who were "detribalized, civilized and uncivilized" 
- should express itself politically. In this context, Nicholls 
contended that legislators had not paid adequate attention to 
the establishment of such a 'chain of representation', though he 
did not divulge that he personally had attempted to do so for 
the Zulu by assisting Inkatha's drive for official recognition. 
Nicholls argued that African representation in the "House of 
Democracy" (the House of Assembly) was not only inappropriate, 
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because "democratic institutions are completely alien to the 
Bantu race", but also unnecessary~ because Africans would have 
their own tribal-based national councils through which to 
represent and govern themselves. Yet, conceding that some form 
of African representation in the central government was necessary, 
he argued that African councils should be directly represented 
by African senators in the Senate. Nicholls thus submitted a 
draft 'Natives' Parliamentary Representation Bill', to prohibit 
the registration of Africans as parliamentary voters and provide 
for African representation in the Senate, for the consideration of 
h 'tt 257 t e comml ee. 
Nicholls linked his political Bill to a land Bill, which provided 
for a substantial increase in the land set aside for exclusive 
African occupation. Nicholls proposed that the government make 
£30 million available to an African land fund; half of this sum 
would be used to purchase additional land adjacent to existing 
reserve areas, while the other half would be made set aside 
for "native development in the reserves" through, for example, 
agricultural education and irrigation works. The economic 
development of the reserves, Nicholls noted, would ameliorate 
the 'problem' of African influx to the urban areas: "redundant 
detribalised natives" could be expelled from the towns and 
resettled in their own rural domains on land held in communal 
tribal tenure. To forestall potential fears among committee members 
that white economic interests would be threatened, Nicholls 
further argued that reserve agriculture could be steered away from 
the production of crops which were produced by white ' farmers; 
and, somewhat weakly, that the African l~bour force would remain 
undiminished for at least a "long time to come". 258 In 1931, 
Nicholls' land Bill became the 'Natives' Trust and Land Bill', 
which proclaimed that not less than seven and one quarter million 
morgen be set aside for exclusive African occupation, and that a 
government-funded 'South African Native Trust' be established 
(based on the model of the Natal Native Trust and Zululand Native 
Trust) to acquire this land, and to "develop th~ material, moral 
and social wellbeing" of Africans in the reserves. 259 Nicholls' 
political and land Bills were the bases of the Joint Select 
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Committee's discussions between 1930 and 1934. 
The essence of Nicholls' proposals was that the focus of African 
social, politieal, and, to a certain extent, economic life 
should lie in the reserves. The white countryside and more 
particularly the' urban areas were, by contrast, to be the 
inalienable domain of white South Africa; so too was South Africa's 
central legislative and executive po~itical institution, the House 
of Assembly. The hierarchy of tribal-based African political 
institutions, rooted in the reserves, were to lead different 
African groups within the Union to their separate 'national 
destinies'. Nicholls aimed to encourage Africans to perceive 
themselves as a separate race from 'Europeans', rather than - as 
he expressed it - a 'black proletariat' beneath a 'white 
aristocracy', thus defusing the inter-racial class struggles 
that had so threatened the status quo during the 1920s. Further-
more, he aimed to encourage Africans to perceive themselves in 
the first instance as separate 'Bantu nations' within a separate 
'Bantu race'. It was in the course of his work on the Joint Select 
Committee that Nicholls invoked the concept of 'parallel develop-
ment': in a private memorandum evidently written in 1934, Nicholls 
noted that his Bills embodied "a policy known as adaptation, 
a policy of native development politically and economically on 
parallel lines to our own".
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There was a striking similarity 
between Nicholls' ideology and policy proposals of the early 
1930s and the apartheid government's 'Bantustans' ideology and polic 
after 1948. Through successive 'Bantu affairs' enactments, the 
latter aimed to domicile all Africans in 'their own' reserve 
areas, which were to be 'consolidated' and enlarged - or created 
if none already existed - and subjected to a long-term programme 
of economic development. Furthermore, specifically through the 
1951 Bantu Authorities Act and the 1959 Promotion of Bantu 
Self-Government Act, it aimed to fragment the African population 
into discrete tribal-national entities, introspectively detached 
from each other and 'white South Africa'. And both Nicholls and 
apartheid's ideologues sought to ensure that South Africa's 
whites retained control of the majority of South Africa's most 
fertile agricultural land and the vast mineral deposits of the 
interior, which would continue to be exploited for the purposes 
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of white capital accumulation primarily through the efforts of 
. f' 1 b 261 cheap mlgrant A rlcan a our. 
Dube and Nicholls were in contact with each other during 1930, 
discussing future Union 'native policy'. Although there is no 
direct evidence that Dube played a role in formulating the 
adaptationist proposals that Nicholls expounded before the Joint 
Select Committee, it is not unlikely that Dube did so.262 Early 
in 1931, Dube made arrangements to tour the Transvaal, Orange 
Free State and Cape provinces to solicit the support of African 
leaders outside Natal for the adaptationist political and land 
Bills. Apparently Dube had received financial assistance for his 
travels from the leading Zululand sugar planter G. Armstrong, 
who also financially assisted the Shaka Memorial project. 263 
Writing in February 1931 to inform Nicholls of his intentions, and 
to request Nicholls to "send me your papers to start my campaign", 
Dube added that 
We LDube and NichollsJ are up against a strong fight 
as some big guns of the white race have given lead 
to Native opinion in this matter like Sir James Rose-
Innes and others but I still feel that sane views of 
responsible leaders may be won for our side of thinking 
.•• To have land is uppermost in the minds of our people. 
There are comparatively small sectionfsJ of urban natives 
who no longer wish to be under tribal control. 264 
Later in February 1931, Nicholls supplied Dube with a concise 
statement of his political and land Bills - though he noted that 
"I think that by this time you are fully acquainted with my 
proposals now before the Select Committee". The overriding 
purpose of the land Bill, Nicholls wrote, was "to enable the 
natives to attain a high standard of economic production under 
a system of local self-Government. You can fill in the picture 
of these two principles Lreserve enlargement and development fund~ 
from the conversations we have had together. It will enable 
the native nation to obtain, in their own areas, a state of 
indepenaent economic well-being, which can never be obtained 
by merely remaining a black proletariat of white South Africa". 
Justifying the abolition of the Cape African franchise which the 
political Bill prescribed, Nicholls laid down that "the principle 
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of political representation in the Union Parliament must conform 
to the semi-independent economic and political control by the 
natives in their own areas". On the positive side, however, 
Nicholls emphasised that the political Bill "means the removal 
of the Colour Bar restri ctions as applied to the Senate. Native 
senators will have equal rights in speech and voting with the 
Europeans, and will have the same qualifications and will draw 
the same salaries ..• Th i s great liberal measure is on the 
full lines of development of the Native Reserves, and the chain 
of representation from the kraal to the tribal or district council 
to the Native Provincial Councilor Bunga up to the Senate ... ". 
Nicholls urged Dube to supply a report on the support that these 
proposals received among African leaders throughout the Union, 
because Nicholls wished to produce such a report as evidence before 
the Joint Select Committee.
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Dube and Nicholls kept i n touch with each other throughout 1931. 
In May, for example, Dube wrote to Nicholls reporting on his 
discussions with African leaders of the Transkei and Pondoland: 
"It was quite clear to me", Dube concluded, "that we need have 
no fear of Natives opposing this measure. They all say natives 
want land more than the vote".266 And in July, Nicholls regretfully 
informed Dube that the Joint Select Committee would only agree to 
white representatives of African interests - and not African 
senators - in the Senate. It was necessary that he and Dube met 
for further discussions, Nicholls wrote: "It is not yet too late 
.•. we shall have to fight to get back to the original idea when 
we meet again".267 
Dube drew up a document entitled "The Land Settlement", based 
on the adaptationist political and land Bills, to which he 
obtained the signatures of Chief Majozi, w. W. Ndhlovu (from 
Natal), R. V. Selope-Thema, H. Selby Msimang (from the Transvaal) , 
T. Mapikela and E. K. Royne (from the Orange Free State). Zulu 
nationalist politicians were evidently not alone in supporting 
the adaptationist policy proposals. This document, which was 
clearly drawn up by Dube without Nicholls' assistance, was also 
significant because it provided an insight into Dube's political 
objectives in allying himself with Nicholls. In a statement that 
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reflected Dube's attraction to the ideological and political 
aspects of the adaptationist policy proposals, Dube wrote that 
"in each Province of the Union there should be a large compact 
Native atea like the Transkei, because without such a reserve 
Natives cannot develop a real national life, ie. they cannot 
develop a becoming race-consciousness". On the question of African 
self-government in these 'compact native areas', Dube wrote 
that the governing councils should have "more legislative powers 
and functions than the Transkeian Bungha LSicJ". Dube was thus 
not simply attracted to the prospect of more land being allocated 
to the African population. Sigificantly, Dube added that the 
governing councils were "to be elected by the people" - whereas 
Nicholls envisaged that the councils would mainly comprise tribal 
authorities. Dube also took care to describe the advantages that 
the proposals held for the African petty bourgeoisie: "In these 
reserves the Civil Service to be opened to competent Natives"; 
"Fullest facilities for trading by Natives in the reserves should 
be allowed" i and the Native Trust's funds were to "develop local irrlustries 
etc. in the reserves". Dube virtually dismissed the issue of the 
disenfranchisement of Cape Africans, saying that it was "a matter 
which primarily concerns the Cape Province. But we think the propose 
that those who are on the roll should remain 'until they disappear 
from natural causes' is a concession which should be acceptable 
to the Cape Natives. ,,268 
The political objectives which Dube expressed in his document 
entitled ~The Land Settlement', did not, however, only reflect 
Dub ' l' d . t . 1 . t . l' 26 9 h . e s persona or 1 losyncra lC po 1 lca Vlews. As t lS 
study's analysis of the reconstituted Inkatha has indicated, 
these political objectives were integral to the ideology of Zulu 
nationalism which had been formulated in the context of Inkatha 
after 1928, and which had been the dominant ideology among the 
most influential Zulu-speaking politicians since 1930. 270 The 
signatures of the Transvaal and Orange Free State African leaders 
that Dube obtained for his document suggested, furthermore, that 
the political objectives that flowed from Inkatha's ideology of 
Zulu nationalism held an appeal for some African leaders outside 
the province of Natal, even at the cost of abandoning the demand 
for the vote. It was man i fest, however, that the majority of the 
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latter defined the enfranchisement of the African population 
as their ultimate political objective, for the vote was seen 
to be the key to full African citizenship in a unitary and 
. 1 h f' 271 non-raC1a Sout A r1ca. 
The adaptationist political and land Bills, which had been 
endorsed by Dube at least between 1930 and 1933, and whose main 
advocate in the Joint Select Committee had been Nicholls, exerted 
a considerable influence on the 'native legislation' that was 
placed on statute book in 1936. In so doing, furthermore, the 
adaptationist Bills played a major role in reinforcing and 
developing the South African state's committment to political 
and territorial segregation. The second (1931) draft of Nicholls' 
land Bill was enacted virtually unmodified as the 1936 Natives' 
Trust and Land Act. This Act represented a real committment to 
the prinCiple of race-based territorial segregation,_ particularly 
because, by establishing the South African Native Trust, it 
provided the mechanism whereby lands currently under white 
ownership or held by the state could be set aside for exclusive 
African occupation. The Act also embodied the prinCiple that 
Africans should exclusively look upon the communally-held lands 
of the reserves as their social and economic domain (the 1913 
Natives' Land Act, by contrast, had provided for the demarcation 
of areas in which Africans could purchase property). Indeed, the 
Act specifically favoured tribes or tribal cornmr.aties, rather than 
individuals, as recipients of the extra land or development funds 
that the Native Trust was to make available to the African pop-
ulation.
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The Act thus indirectly prescribed African 
'retribalisation' ,which had grown to be central to the ideology 
and practice of 'political' segregationism. 
Similarly, some of the essential prinCiples of the second (1931) 
draft of Nicholls' political Bill (whose main difference from 
Nicholls' original draft Bill was that it abandoned the proposal 
to 'abolish the colour bar in the Senate') were embodied in the 
1936 Natives' Representation Act. This Act represented a 
committment to the prinCiple of political segregation: Cape 
Africans were no longer permitted to register on the common voters' 
roll, which for the first time gave explicit legislative expression 
432 
to the state's rejection of the Cape's 'assimilationism' in 
favour of segregationism, and four white representatives of 
African interests were to be returned to the Senate. The removal 
of the existing right of Cape Africans to enrol as voters 
alongside whites was especially significant insofar as it laid 
down that Africans should not look upon the central parliament 
as a forum for the representation of African interests, and 
that Africans were to be denied full citizenship rights in 'white 
South Africa'. Indeed, the Act did much to translate more clearly 
the concept of 'white South Africa' into reality. The Act 
nonetheless differed from Nicholls' political Bill in two respects: 
first, it laid down that Cape Africans henceforth be registered 
on a separate voters' roll and be permitted to elect three white 
representatives of Cape African interests to the House of 
Assembly; and, second, it provided for the establishment of a 
'Natives' Representative Council' to advise the government on 
African opinion. Nicholls had opposed both of these provisions 
on the grounds that they conflicted with the principles of h~s 
political proposals: the first because it retained a semblance 
of African representation in the central 'House of Democracy' 
(although the Cape African franchise was henceforth segregated); 
and the second because the Natives' Representative Council was 
to represent the Union's African population as a whole (Nicholls 
sought to fragment African political representation into separate 
provincial and tribal/ethnic units), and all of those members of the 
Council not appointed by the government were to be elected by 
the African people (Nicholls sought to ensure that African 
political representation was conducted mainly through the medium 
of tribal authorities and their representatives). It was significant 
however, that the system of voting for the elected African 
members of the Natives' Representative Council was carefUlly 
designed strongly to favour rural and tribal interests. The Act 
therefore did embody the state's cornrnittment to the preservation 
of'tribalism,.273 
That the 1936 Natives' Representation Act differed from the 
adaptationist political Bill in the above two respects was a 
great disappointment for Nicholls. Nicholls ascribed the 
modification of his political Bill to developments in white party 
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politics. The coalition between Hertzog's National Party and 
Smuts' South African Party ripened into fusion in 1934; and, with 
Smuts alongside him in the cabinet, Hertzog felt that he had to 
compromise with the more 'liberal' wing of the South African 
Party which Smuts himself spearheaded. Smuts had consistently 
opposed the disenfranchisement of Cape Africans. With fusion, 
Nicholls further argued, the "political force" of the small but 
united group of Natal MPs within the South African Party was so 
diluted that "the influence of Natal,where the real Africa lies 
and where the destiny of South Africa will ultimately be 
determined, vanished."274 
From Nicholls' perspective, the 1936 Natives' Representation Act 
did not make provision for the implementation of - and it even 
conflicted with - the adaptationist policy of 'parallel 
development'. The latter essentially sought to establish a number 
of discrete self-governing African polities within the Union, 
each rooted in the reserves, and each represented and admintstered 
through their particular hierarchy of tribal-based political 
institutions. Instead of encouraging the establishment of such 
structures of African political representation and self-government, 
the Act established a single Union-wide Natives' Representative 
Council whose sole function was to comment on the policies pursued 
by a government over which it had no decisive influence. The Act 
also deviated from the adaptationist principle that the only 
avenue for the representation of African interests to the central 
government should be through the Senate. Dube too was disappointed 
with the 1936 Natives' Representation Act, correctly perceiving 
that the Natives' Representative Council would be largely 
impotent, and dominated by representatives of tribal interests. 
But Dube had already withdrawn his support for Nicholls' 
adaptationist Bills as early as 1934. There seemed to be two 
reasons for Dube's about-turn. After fusion, he possibly sensed 
that the full ramifications of Nicholls' politicai proposals, 
particularly those concerning African self-government, would not 
be accepted as state policy. It was probably this that led him 
to doubt the wisdom of continuing to back African self-government, 
at the expense of condoning African disenfranchisement. In addition, 
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Dube was subjected to the scorn of many Union African leaders 
during 1935 because of the 'soft' public line that he was taking 
with regard to the prospective disenfranchisement of Cape Africans. 
And indeed, not all Natal leaders were prepared to forego their 
own demands for the franchise, even if it did enhance the likelihood 
of African self-government in the reserves. In mid-1935, Dube 
publicly returned to the principle of democratic African represent-
ation in parliament: "We want to be represehted in the Lower 
House", he pronounced in Cape leader Tengo Jabavu's pamphlet 
entitled 'Criticisms of the Native Bills', "preferably by our own 
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people". 
That both Nicholls and Dube were dissatisfied with the "native 
legislation" of 1936 does not alter the fact that the adaptationist 
political and land Bills , which Nicholls and Dube had together 
promoted, played a leading role in determining the character 
of the 1936 Acts; nor that, through their influence on the 1936 
Acts, the adaptationist policy proposals did much to reinforce 
and develop state segregationism. Largely on account of those 
adaptationist prinCiples which had been embodied in the 1936 
Acts, in conjunction with the Nicholls/Stallard-inspired 1937 
Native Laws Amendment Act (which restricted African access to the 
urban areas according to the demand for labour), Lacey concludes 
that "by 1937 the main struts of the modern Apartheid state had 
come into being".276 The ways in which the zulu nationalism of 
the late-1920s and early-1930s influenced state segregationism 
may at this stage be summarised as threefold. First, Zulu nationalisr 
and its leading exponents in Inkatha played an important role 
in the development of Nicholls' segregationist thinking during the 
period 1928-1930. Second, Nicholls sought and obtained Dube's 
advice and support between 1930 and 1934 for the adaptationist 
policy proposals before the Joint Select Committee. Dube's 
support was clearly an important source of inspiration and 
confidence for Nicholls, and also served to fracture the unity of 
African opposition to the elaboration of state segregationism. 
Third, as has been noted above, the adaptationist policy proposals 
had considerable influence 0n the uniform Union 'native policy' 
that was laid on the statute book in the mid-1930s, particularly 
in regard to the territorially and politically segregationist 
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principles that the latter embodied. 
There is a further - though more indirect - way, however, in which 
the Zulu nationalism of the late-1920s and early-1930s played 
a part in the evolution of state segregationism. It has already 
been noted that there was considerable congruity between, on the 
one hand, the adaptationist policy proposals which were being 
discussed in ruling circles during the 1930s (and which were 
closely related to the'recognition question' regarding Solomon 
and Inkatha), and, on the other hand, the 'Bantustans' and later 
'Homelands' political schemes which the apartheid government put 
intp practice after 1948. Indeed, those 'political' aspects 
of the adaptationist policy proposals which were not implemented 
in the 1930s were implemented in the 1950s: the apartheid 
government did establish hierarchies of tribal-based African 
political institutions in the reserves, and also set about 
devolving a measure of self-government upon the ethnic or African 
'tribal'/language groups to which these hierarchies were attached; 
it moreover abolished the Natives' Representative Council and 
Cape African representation in the House of Assembly. These 
striking similarities between the policy proposals of the 
1930s and the policy that was implemented in the 1950s were not 
coincidental. 
The principles of the adaptationist policy proposals were widely 
publicised among state policy-makers during the 1930s, as were 
the principles underlying Solomon and Inkatha's'self-government' 
ambitions (Nicholls had communicated this information to various 
state officials and members of the Union Government; the Athlone 
memorandum had been circulated through Hertzog's National Party 
cabinet in late-1930; and the Minister of Native Affairs between 
1929 and 1933, E. G. Jansen, who was the National Party MP 
for Vryheid, had taken a special interest in 'Zulu national 
affairs'). There is evidence that these principles acted as 
ideological seeds which, having been 'hybridised' by Afrikaner 
nationalist ideologues, eventually germinated as state policy 
following the rise to power of Dr. D. F. Malan's (Afrikaner) 
National Party in 1948. Significantly, after Malan's 'purified 
(Afrikaner) nationalists' had broken away from Hertzog at the time 
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of fusion in 1934, the first major parliamentary confrontation 
between Malan's National Party and the newly-formed United 
South African National Party of Hertzog and Smuts was over the 
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issue of Cape African representation in the House of Assembly. 
Malan's National Party played a crucial role in the development 
of Afrikaner nationalism as a political force during the 1930s 
and 1940s, as did the rapid growth of numerous inward-looking and 
self-help Afrikaner agencies in the political, cultural and 
economic fields. Included among the latter were the Afrikaner 
Broederbond, the 'Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings' 
(which, in the decade before the outbreak of the second world 
war, became the coordinating body for about three hundred cultural 
organisations) and the 'Suid-Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie' 
(South African League for Racial Studies).278 It was during this 
.period that Afrikaner nationalism, which had originally risen 
as a cultural and political defence against British imperialism, 
nurtured its systematic racial ideology of apartheid. In asserting 
that the 1930s ideologies of Zulu nationalism and adaptationism 
were an influence on the evolution of apartheid as a political 
model, it is illustrative to sketch the intercamecting role played 
by a single Afrikaner nationalist politician and 'native policy' 
ideologue: E. G. Jansen, who was to become the Malan Government's 
first Minister of Native Affairs, charged with putting the 
apartheid policy into practice. 
Jansen had been in close touch with Zulu nationalist policies 
since the second half of the 1920s. He had acted alongside Nicholls 
and Marwick as a parliamentary representative of the Natal 
planter/farmer alliance in labour and 'native policy' matters for 
several years prior to his appointment as Minister of Natives in 
1929, during which period Natal's white rural employers became 
increasingly interested in the political potential of the tribal 
authorities and Inkatha. Shortly after taking ministerial office, 
he was (in the course of an interview arranged by Marwick) given 
personal advice by Dube regarding the political advantages of 
officially recognising the Zulu kingship. In the following year, 
following persuasive representations from Nicholls, Jansen and 
ordered the 'recognition question' to be reopened in the NADi and 
in the aftermath of the indaba debacle of 1930, he of all ministers 
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of state was most tlosely acquainted with the reasoning that 
underpinned the Athlone memorandum's call for far-reaching reforms 
in the admini-stration of Zululand. Similarly, as chairman of the 
Joint Sel~ct Committee on the 'Native Bills' from 1930, Jansen 
became familiar with the principles of the adaptationist policy 
proposals - which he supported. It was a reflection of Jansen's 
special interest in the political future of Solomon and Zulu 
nationalism that, mainly through his intervention, royal debts 
were discharged by a government loan in early 1932. Shortly 
thereafter Jansen assented to Chief °Majozi's request that the 
Minister of Native Affairs and the Governor-General be present 
at the Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony. Moreover, Jansen played 
the leading role in causing the recognition question to be 
reopened in mid-1932 - a role which deserves further investigation 
here. 279 
Between early-1931 and mid-1932, Jansen had been encouraged to 
reopen the recognition question- notwithstanding Solomon's 
worsening irresponsibility and Inkatha's political decline - by a 
broad spectrum of white opinion. Perhaps most significantly, in 
February 1931, Jansen was for the first time subject to a written 
appeal for the recognition of the Zulu kingship from his own 
Afrikaans-speaking Vryheid constituents. Previously Solomon and 
Ihkatha's white political supporters had been exclusively English-
speaking. The reasoning that underpinned the'Vryheid represent-
ation' was substantially similar to that of both Nicholls and 
Athlone. But whereas Nicholls and Athlone intended Solomon and 
his advisers to have a considerable measure of real independence 
in the administration of Zulu affairs, C. J. Vermaak, the author 
of the Vryheid representation, clearly envisaged that the currently 
"ongekroonde koning [uncrowned kinqJ Solomon ka Dinusulu II was to 
be a puppet directly subject to the control of the central 
government. A. N. Steenkamp, a local resident whom Vermaak wished 
the government to appoint as Solomon's secretary and treasurer, 
rather than Solomon or any of Solomon's advisers was in practice 
to be the greatest influence over the "Sulu volk". 280 
In late 1931, furthermore, the possibility of officially recognising 
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Solomon and Inkatha received ext~sive favourable coverage in 
the Natal English-language media. This coverage, so markedly at 
variance with the consensus of Natal white opinion regarding 
the Zulu royal family since 1879, had been stimulated by two 
developments. First, Zulu suffering as a consequence of the drought 
and famine had already focussed media attention on the living 
conditions of the Zulu inhabitants of north-western Zululand and 
the southern regions of Northern Natal. Second, immediately after 
the indaba between the SNA and the Zulu at Nongoma in September 
1931, which focussed on Zulu local tax a~rears and the growing rura ] 
famine, Solomon had impressed a Natal Witness journalist by 
explaining the role that the Zulu kingship, Zulu tribal authorities 
and Inkatha wished to play in the administration of the Zulu - and 
Solomon particularly emphasised his disapproval of the ICu.
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In the same edition in which this interview with Solomon was 
published, the Natal Witness' editorial urged the government 
to heed Solomon's words: 
What other body ["than Jnkath'!7 could more efficiently 
bridge the hiatus between white and black in this Province? 
..• 'the official recognition of the Inkata LsicJ as 
presently constituted would be a gesture of encouragement 
to a people who ••. are manfully striving, as evidenced 
in the Inkata, to solve their difficulties on lines as 
nearly approximating to those which our own example holds 
before them, as their present social system will allow. 
If Inkatha were officially ignored, the editorial questioned, 
lIat whose door must the blame be laid for the birth in our midst 
of societies more potent for evil than the I.C.u.?1I 282 In the 
same month, Fynney made a lengthy and detailed public attack on 
the policy that the NAD had adopted towards Solomon and Inkatha 
since the early 1920s. Fynney accused the NAD of refusing to 
recognise the Zulu king, at the cost of alienating Zulu goodwill, 
but nonetheless using the influence of Solomon and Inkatha when 
it suited the NAD to do so.283 Fynney's attack caused something 
of a political storm within the NAD, which responded by attempting 
to explain itself through the columns of the Natal Witness. 284 
The Natal Witness nonetheless continued to publish articles that 
questioned official treatment of Zulu economic problems and 
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political development - which undoubtedly continued to be an 
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embarrassment to the state department of which Jansen was 
ministerial head. 
Two other influences on Jansen in the period early-1931 to mid-
1932 must be mentioned. On the one hand, while not specifically 
urging that the recognition question be reopened, Nicholls 
petitioned Jansen to ensure that official support was given 
to the Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony, and that official 
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assistance was given to Solomon to settle royal debts. In so 
doing, Nicholls kept alive Jansen's interest in the political future 
of Solomon and Zulu nationalism. On the other hand, the Governor-
General (the Earl of Clarendon) became personally interested in 
the question of official policy towards the Zulu kingship in 
early-1932, after Nicholls had spoken to him about the importance 
of the Shaka Memorial project. Evidently as a result of his 
conversation with Nicholls, Clarendon consulted a copy of the 
Athlone memorandum - which contained a clause recommending that 
the recognition question be reconsidered in 1932. Hertzog referred 
Clarendon's enquiries regarding Solomon's official status to 
Jansen; and Jansen thereupon informed Clarendon in May 1932 that 
arrangements had already been made for the official reopening 
of the recognition question. 287 Jansen delayed divulging to the 
NAD that the recognition question was to be reopened, however, 
until July 1932. 288 
That Jansen personally favoured the recognition of Solomon and 
Inkatha was illustrated by Jansen's attempts to ensure that the 
NAD would not simply reject the recognition question in 1932, 
as it had done in 1928 and 1930; and it was also illustrated by 
Jansen's efforts to consult authoritative white opinion which was 
favourable to Solomon's'elevation'. As early as January 1932, 
Jansen requested Nicholls to meet with him to discuss policy 
towards Solomon.
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Some months later (but before he had informed 
the NAD of his reawakened interest in Solomon's political future), 
Jansen similarly consulted Charles Adams. With Jansen's connivance, 
Adams subsequently made secret contact with Solomon, and urged 
Solomon to attempt to redeem himself in the eyes of the NAD. 290 
Jansen then held secret discussions with Fynney at Pretoria. When 
the NC at Nongoma belatedly discovered that these discussions had 
taken place, he was outraged - and the CNC also appeared to be 
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annoyed. 29l In August 1932, furthermore, shortly before he formally 
consulted current NAD opinion on the recognition question, Jansen 
discussed the history of the Zulu royal family, Inkatha, and 
the zululand administration with J. Y. Gibson, an accomplished 
d 1 1 d . t t 292 scholar of Zulu history and a retire Zu u an mag1s ra e. 
Jansen's purpose in conducting these discussions, it seems, was 
to reassure himself that his desire to make official use of the 
institution of zulu kingship had a broad base of authoritative 
support. And his considerable efforts to consult 'outside' (ie. 
non-NAD) opinion in the first half of 1932, at a time when the 
administrative interests of the NAD could barely have been less 
reconcilable with Solomon's official 'elevation', signified that 
his interest in the recognition strategy did not lie in 
'administrative reform' in Zululand: Jansen was primarily 
interested in the overriding ideological and political 
significance that the official recognition of the Zulu kingship 
would have. Jansen's manifest keenness to experiment with 'native 
policy' in Zululand, however, was decisively blocked by the NAD. 
In the course of a formal meeting in late August 1932 between 
.the Minister of Native Affairs, the SNA, the CNC and the NC 
at Nongoma, the latter three officials declared themselves to be 
categorically opposed to any official extension of Solomon's 
status or authority, particularly in view of his recent behaviour. 
Indeed, they desired that further royal cash and cattle collections 
be forbidden, and that Solomon be officially punished if he had 
not dismissed Bhengu within a month. 293 Jansen evidently felt 
that he could not override such united and resolute opposition 
from his own department of state. The recognition was thus closed 
294 once more. 
After 1932 Jansen by no means lost interest in the political 
future of the Zulu kingship and Zulu nationalism. And between 1934 
(when Jansen left the office of the Minister of Native Affairs, 
in the course of a cabinet reshuffle at the time of fusion) and 
1948, during which period Jansen held the position of speaker 
of the House of Assembly, Zulu leaders continued to press for 
the official recognition of the Zulu kingship. At Solomon's ihlambo 
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ceremony in August 1934, for example, both Chief Nkantini and 
Dube appealed for the appointment of Solomon's heir as Zulu king. 
This ceremony was attended by large numbers of whites, including 
social anthropologists, NAD officials, and representatives of 
the Durban municipality, the Transvaal Chamber of Mines and the 
Union Government. 295 In September 1935, during a meeting with 
the SNA, the CNC and Natal NCs at Pietermaritzburg, chiefs from 
throughout the province of Natal (including the zulu regent, 
Chief Mshiyeni kaDinuzulu) urged the Union Government to establish 
in the province a "Bantu Ibandla ftounci!J" led by "our hereditary 
Zulu head ... to unite us and place matters affecting us before 
us and enable us to place our matters before the Government." 
This resolution also intimated that the Zulu people were not 
296 interested in representation in the central government. 
Reflecting the continuing concern among the African petty 
bourgeoisie in the province of Natal for ·Zulu 'traditionalism', 
Zulu nationalism and the Zuly royal family, the Natal Bantu 
Teachers' Union established the "Ibandla likaZulu" or "Zulu 
Society" in January 1936. This organisation's main object was 
to preserve and promote the culture, laws and customs of the Zulu 
nation; and its Zulu patron was liThe Scion of the Zulu Principal 
House, Regent Mshiyeni kaDinzulu", while its white patron was 
the incumbent Minister of Native Affairs. 297 Similarly, the 
lengthy succession dispute between Solomon's heirs, which was only 
settled by a specially-appointed 'Government BQard of Inquiry' 
that began sitting in 1945, kept Zulu nationalism and the political 
significance of the insti tution of Zulu kingship firmly in the 
eyes of white authorities. 298 
During the period 1934-1948, Jansen clearly developed his political 
ideas, drawing on his personal knowledge of Zulu nationalist 
politics and the adaptationist policy proposals of the 1930s. 299 
He did so in the context of the rapid development of Afrikaner 
nationalist ideology into an embracing socio-political ideological 
system, and in the process Jansen's ideas were disseminated 
among fellow Afrikaner nationalist ideologues. Significantly, 
Mrs E. G. Jansen was chairman of the 'Suid-Afrikaanse Bond vir 
Rassestudie' during the mid-1930s, while M. C. De Wet Nel was 
secretary. This Afrikaner 'native policy think tank' was the 
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predecessor of the'Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse Aangeleentheid' 
(South African Bureau for Racial Affairs, commonly known as 
SABRA), which was formed in 1948 to further develop the 
intellectual foundations of the apartheid concept. M. C. De Wet Nel, 
as a member of the 'native affairs group' in Malan's National 
Party caucus, was to be a leading promoter of the apartheid 
policy after 1948. 300 Jansen himself was the key speaker at the 
1944 Afrikaner 'Volkskongres' (People's Congress) of Afrikaner 
cultural organisations, and in the course of his address he 
accounced that "it is time the Afrikaner policy of separate 
development be given a chance to be put into practice .•. whites 
and non-whites should develop separately and be treated 
301 separately". This statement reflected how the ideology of 
'separate development' or 'parallel development' was being woven 
into the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism; and it simultaneously 
illustrated Jansen's role in interweaving these two ideologies, 
a development which was crucial for the evolution of apartheid 
ideology. 
It was no mere coincidence that in 1948 E. G. Jansen was selected 
to be the apartheid government's first Minister of Native Affairs. 
Nor was it a coincidence that a couple of years later the NAD 
officially recognised the head of the Zulu royal house, Cyprian 
kaSolomon Zulu, as paramount chief of the Zulu. The aim to secure 
the official recognition of the institution of Zulu kingship, 
which had preoccupied Solomon and Inkatha during the 1920s, was 
thus achieved only some two decades later - when the South African 
Government began to implement its policy of apartheid. 
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OVERVIEW 
In its account of Zulu politics between the Act of 
Union and the early-1930s, this dissertation focusses 
on essentially two closely interrelated topics. First, 
the political role of the Zulu royal family, and 
particularly the hereditary 'Zulu king' whom white 
authorities denied official recognition. Second, the 
political functions and significance of Zulu nationalism, 
whose most emotive rallying point and most powerful 
exponent was without question the 'traditional' institution 
of Zulu kingship. 
While the political histories of the Zulu royal family 
and Zulu nationalism remain the essential focus, however, 
the dissertation also explores concurrent Zulu socio-
economic and cultural change, particularly investigating 
the evolution of new social divisions (or class 
formation) among the Zulu, for it is only within 
this broader context that developments in the expressly 
political sphere of Zulu life can be understood. 1 Further-
more, attention is given to various 'extraneous influences' 
that played a major role in the development of Zulu royal 
and nationalist politics. Among these 'extraneous 
influences', four were the most important. 
First, the pan-Africanist and black nationalist/consciousness 
doctrines which, having been developed primarily by 
black American intellectuals as a response to their own 
experience of racial oppression in the USA, were adopted 
by the African petty bourgeois educated elite in the 
province of Natal and reinterpreted in the particularly 
Zulu context. The drive for pan-African unity and 
nationalism thus became a drive for Zulu unity and 
nationalism; and, instead of turning their backs on the 
'backwardness' and 'barbarousness' of their tribal past, 
the African petty bourgeoisie 'searched for roots' and 
sought to include the Zulu royal family and 'traditional' 
institutions in an embracing programme of Zulu social, 
economic, cultural and political 'redevelopment'. This 
ideological shift away from the 'British' liberal-democratic 
values which members of the African petty bourgeoisie 
had imbibed primarily from their missionary mentors, and 
which had led educated Africans to strive (vainly) for 
the franchise and inclusion as full citizens in a non-
racial South Africa, was a very marked development of 
the 1920s. And it was a seminal ideological shift for 
Zulu nationalist politics, as was manifest in the 
African petty bourgeoisie's role in !ormalising .and 
developing Inkatha as a Zulu national 'self-help' scheme 
and representative political organisation.2 
Second, the Marxist-derived theories of apocalyptic 
class struggle which, seeming especially meaningful in 
view of the recent successful revolution in Russia, 
caught the imagination of the provinces of Natal's 
urban African workers and rural African 'rank-and-file' -
a deliberately loose term used by this dissertation 
to describe the broad African underclass in the rural 
areas. The latter developed a certain self-identity 
during the course of the late-1920s, based on a common 
experience of impoverishment, exploitation and insecurity; 
and reinforced bY,a shared frustration with 'the system', 
whether this was represented by state officials and the 
laws that they enforced, conservative tribal authorities 
and demanding parents, employers or landlords. Moreover, 
there developed a basis of shared political attitudes: a 
predisposition to reject established structures of 
authority and the modes of political representation that 
that worked through them, a tendency to abjure acquiescence 
and 'polite pleading' in favour of organisation and 
action, an impatience with piecemeal reIorms, and an 
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enthusiasm for fundamental changes in property relations 
and the distribution of political power. 
The lCU (lCU yase Natal after 1928) and, in Northern Natal, 
the ALU played a leading role in disseminating the radical 
message in the rural areas, and so politicising the rank-
and-file. While making use of Marxist political theory, 
bOoth of these organisations sought to integrate 
'traditional' Zulu ideas and symbols into militant 
popular protest. Both appealed to Zulu nationalist 
sentiments, and looked to the institution of Zulu king-
ship for moral support, inspiration and patronage. While 
these popular movements were important in themselves, their 
main significance for this dissertation is that they 
represented a 'common enemy' which led the sDmewhat 
tenuous alliance between the Zulu tribal and petty bourgeois 
elites in lnkatha to become more united; and, moreover, 
which catalysed 8 new alliance between lnkatha and 
representatives of Natal white propertied and employer 
interests. These developments were together crucial 
to the redefinition of Inkatha's political role and 
political objectives from 1928.3 
Third, the influence of Natal's leading white 'native 
policy' legislators and representatives of rural white 
propertied and employer interests, who intervened in 
Zulu politics in early 1928 and allied themselves with 
Inkatha. lnkatha's white supporters in the first 
instance represented, on the one hand, the Natal sugar 
planting interest, and, on the other hand, the Natal 
commercial farming interest. These two 'fractions' of 
Natal rural capital had, while acting in alliance at 
parliamentary level throughout the 1920s, sought to 
retain the province's rural labour resources in the 
rural districts (stemming the drift of labour towards 
the towns and gold mines) and shackle African labour 
more securely to the province's rural employers. A 
vital facet of the Natal planter/farmer alliance's labour 
policy was the maintenance of the 'tribal system', 
together with the web of social obligations that under-
pinned it and the homestead mode of production which 
was its material foundation, and the use of tribal 
authorities as suppliers and controllers of labour. 
That 'socialistic' and revolutionary ideas spread amopg 
the African population in the province during the second 
half of the 1920s, mainly through the influence of leU 
activists, emphasised to Natal's rural whites that the 
maintenance of the tribal order had an expressly political 
value. Natal's rural whites, moreover, felt that 'British' 
liberal-democratic notions among the African petty 
bourgeoisie were as fundamentally revolutionary as 
'Russian' socialist notions among the African workforce, 
and were . thus dismayed with Hertzog's 1926 'Native Bills' 
which sought to permit Africans of the Union to elect 
white 'native representatives' to -the House " of Assembly. 
They responded by rallying to the defence of the Natal 
'Shepstonist' model of political, judicial and cultural 
segregation, which was based on the maintenance of 'tribalism'. 
In supporting and advising lnkatha from 1928, Natal's 
white segregationist thinkers further developed the 
socio-culturally and politically separatist inclinations 
already inherent in lnkatha's Zulu nationalism of the 
mid-1920s, gradually guiding Inkatha's Zulu nationalism 
of the late-1920s towards a more explicitly segregationist 
position. At a diplomatic level, lnkatha's white 
supporters played a vital role as intermediaries between 
lnkatha arid the South African Government. Most importantly, 
they were the means whereby Inkatha communicated to 
government personnel its desire for Zulu national 'self-
government' under the figurehead of the Zulu king. The 
history of Solomon and Inkatha from 1928 until Solomon's 
death and Inkatha's collapse in the early-1930s cannot be 
considered as simply 'Zulu history', such was the impact 
of white intervention.4 
Fourth, but not least important, the influence of the NAD. 
It was the NAD, and more particularly the Natal NAD, which 
in practice defined official policy towards Solomon and 
Inkatha - and official policy exerted considerable 
influence on the political histories of the Zulu royal 
family and Zulu nationalism. Indeed, Solomon throughout 
his life appealed for official recognition, initially (and 
successfully) as chief of the Usuthu ward and subsequently 
as king of the Zulu nation. For Solomon, the official 
recognition of the Zulu kingship_was an end in itself: he 
wished all the Zulu people to be united as a nation beneath 
himself as their king, just as they had been in the days 
of his predecessors. His official status as chief of the 
Usuthu was parochial and inadequate - and it was not 
sufficient that the Zulu people recognised his claim to 
kingship if white authorities did not. The drive for 
official recognition was similarly Inkatha's overriding 
concern. The realisation of any of Inkatha's social, 
economic, cultural and political objectives was largely 
dependent on the organisation's being accorded official 
status and authority, in the capacity of the Zulu nation's 
representative political organisation and instrument for 
national 'self-government'. 
The NAD's role in the history of Zulu nationalist politics 
was not simply to deny Solomon and Inkatha official 
recognition, which was essential if Inkatha's Zulu 'self-
. government' and 'national reconstruction' policies were 
to be put into practice. In numerous ways, the NAD 
succeeded in hindering Solomon's and Inkatha's political 
activities, whether by persuading Solomon not to get 
involved in the independent church movement; refusing to 
hear deputations from the 'Zulu nation' led by Solomon; 
preventing Inkatha from purchasing land for development 
in the Vryheid district; or banning Inkatha collections. 
And by publicly rebuffing Solomon and Inkatha, the NAD was 
to a certain extent able to undermine the latter's Zulu 
support: while the institution of Zulu kingship was on 
occasion perceived to be a rallying point for rebellion 
against white rule, subjugation and dependency had so 
pervaded Zulu political consciousness that most Zulu as a 
rule desired their leaders to command the approval of their 
white overlords. The Natal NAD jealously guarded its 
'expertise' in the administration of the Zulu, and never 
quite lost its apprehensiveness for Zulu unity beneath 
Cetshwayo's and Dinuzulu's heirs. It perceived itself to 
be a 'disinterested' and independent authority - which, to 
a limited extent, was true. It certainly was not simply a 
slave to white interests and the government.5 Part of the 
reason why the appeal for the recognition of the Zulu 
kingship was rejected in 1928, for example, was that the 
NAD regarded th€ appeal as integral to an improper 'plot' 
furthered by Natal's rural white employer interests to 
gain greater control over Zulu labour. And the Natal NAD, 
Solomon and Inkatha together succeeded in resisting the 
implementation of the government's (elective) local council 
policy in the province of Natal, on the grounds that it 
would undermine the 'traditional' tribal system of government -
'traditional' to both the Natal NAD and the Zulu themselves. 
Ultimately, however, the Natal NAD took such pride in its 
own 'administrative tradition' and so ensnarled itself in 
red tape that it was loathe to consider any adjustment to 
the administrative system it had inherited from the days 
of Shepstone. And Solomon's personal behaviour during the 
five years before his premature death (by which time Natal 
officials had become more sympathetic to Solomon's royal 
claims and Zulu national un i ty), together with Inkatha's 
internal corruption, doused any possibility of the Natal NAD 
supporting the resurrection of the Zulu monarchy.6 
The way in which Zulu' royal and nationalist politics 
developed in the early post-Union period cannot, however, 
be solely understood in terms of the roles played by the 
above four 'extraneous influences'. The conquest of the 
Zulu kingdom in 1879 transformed the Zulu royal family and 
Zulu nationalism into, in essence, little more than 
anachronistic political remnants of past Zulu independence. 
The Zululand administration successfully prevented Cetshwayo 
and his heir, Dinuzulu, from taking up the role of head of 
the Zulu nation, as preconquest kings had done; and the 
violent internecine rivalries of the Zulu civil war 
effectively shattered Z~lu national unity. But, at the 
ideological level, Zulu identification with the central 
royal family and a united Zulu nationalism did not simply 
disappear, however divorced the latter concepts were from 
the realities post-conquest Zulu politics. Monarchical 
and nationalist sentiments clearly remained embedded, if 
often hidden, in Zulu consciousness, sustained by the Zulu 
people's respect for tradition and their memories of 
past Zulu independence and imperial power. The main 
inheritors, custodians, and exponents of Zulu tradition and 
oral history were the hereditary Zulu tribal authorities -
including the royal family which had stood at the apex of 
the Zulu tribal heirarchy. Particularly after Solomon's 
drive for tribal reconciliation had healed the dynastic rifts 
of the Zulu ' civil war, Zulu chiefs and izinduna together 
acted as Solomon's closest allies in working towards the 
reunification of the Zulu nation under the leadership of 
the Zulu king. In the 1920s, however, the Zulu tribal elite's 
interest in the resurrection of Zulu nationhood and the Zulu 
monarchy did not simply flow from a somewhat wistful nostalgia 
for the 'good old days' of the Zulu kingdom: the political 
role of Zulu tribal authorities had undergone considerable 
change since 1879, and so too had their political priorities. 
With accelerated effect after the declaration of Union, the 
Zulu experience of and response to white overrule progressively 
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eroded tribalism and all that it encompassed: an agricultural 
and pastoral subsistence economy socially ordered by a 
redistributive rationale, a social ethos of reciprocal 
obligation, and a political ideology that defined rulers 
as organic components of the society that they ruled but as 
inherently authoritative. The status and power of tribal 
authorities' was threatened by the evolution of new classes 
within the Zulu, notably the 'westernised' petty bourgeoisie 
and the ~etribalised' abagafi - the 'selfish' youthful 
stratum which renaged on their tribal responsibilities, and 
which was to form the backbone of the militant rank-and-file 
of the late-1920s. Tribal authorities no longer represented 
the unity of their 'followers', as they had done in precolonial 
times. Socially, culturally and politically, the trend -
especially during the 1920s - was for the tribal elite to 
distinguish themselves as a separate class, drawing their 
economic power from their control of land, their salaried 
public office, and from their own and their wards' agricultural 
pursuits in Zululand, and monetary earnings in the urban 
areas. In espousing the cause of Zulu national unity beneath 
Solomon from the 1920s, the Zulu tribal elite sought to 
mobilise Zulu nationalism as a profoundly conservative 
social force, which would safeguard the privileges of the 
'ancien regime' - including the privileges that the tribal 
elite enjoyed under white overrule. The Zulu tribal elite, 
under the leadership of the Zulu royal family, thus themselves 
played a leading role in the history of Zulu royal and 
nationalist politics.7 
This dissertation attempts to combine a narrative and a 
thematic approach to the subject matter. In structuring 
the sequence of chapters, however, the dominant concern has 
been with chronology and the narrative rather than with 
analytical themes. Indeed, an important objective of this 
study has been to establish a narrative framework of Zulu 
history during the early post-Union period, for none 
already exists. 
Thus Chapter one, which is simply and introductory chapter, 
sketches the history of the Zulu royal family and official 
policy in Zululand from the conquest of the Zulu in 1879 
until the death of Dinuzulu in exile in 1913. Chapter two, 
having examined socio-economic change among the Zulu 
during the first few years after the Act of Union (1910), 
deals with the re-establishment of the Zulu royal family 
in Zululand, under Solomon's leadership, in the years 1913 
and 1914. Chapter three covers the years 1914 to 1920, 
during which Solomon was officially appointed as chief of 
the Usuthu ward, following a prolonged confrontation between 
Zulu royalists and the Natal NAD. It also refers to 
developments in the sphere of African petty bourgeois and 
worker politics, and Union 'native policy', which together 
were to be a dynamic influence on Zulu nationalist politics 
in the decade to follow. Chapter four in turn covers the 
years 1920 to 1927, and describes how two concurrent political 
processes caused Zulu nationalism and the Zulu royal family 
to develop into potent political forces among the Zulu-speaking 
people as a whole. On the one hand, there was the increasing 
fraternisation between the Natal African and Zulu petty 
bourgeoisie and the Zulu tribal elite, which was expressed 
in the formalisation of the Inkatha organisation; and, on 
the other hand, there was the drive for tribal or dynastic 
'reconciliation' which was successfully promoted by Solomon. 
Tensions between the petty bourgeois and tribal elites, 
together with the NAD's adverse attitude towards Zul~ unity 
beneath Solomon and Inkatha, however, left Inkatha in a 
near moribund state by 1927. The focus of Chapter five 
falls on the crucial year 1928, in which Inkatha's petty 
bourgeois and tribal elites together allied themselves with 
white interest groups, and opposed the growing militancy 
of the urban African workforce and rural African rank-
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and-file. These political developments are placed in the 
context of accelerated socio-economic and ideological change 
within the Zulu, together with increased fears among Natal 
whites for their own economic and political security; so too 
is the reconstitution of Inkatha in 1928, and the 
organisation's new drive for Zulu national 'self-government' 
under the figurehead of Solomon. The concluding Chapter 
six covers the period 1928 to 1933, which ends with Inkatha's 
collapse and Solomon's death. It begin~ by tracing Inkatha's 
attempts to secure the official recognition of the Zulu 
kingship and the implementation of Zulu national 'self-
government', leading up to the disastrous Zulu indaba 
with the Governor-General in 1930. Particular emphasis is 
placed on the role played by Inkatha's white supporters, 
and the proposal made by the Governor-General, the Earl of 
Athlone, that Zululand be separately administered along the 
lines of the neighbouring High Commission Territories. 
Thereafter it traces Solomon's and Inkatha's decline, while 
indicating how the ideologies and policies developed by 
Inkatha and Inkatha's white supporters during the late-1920s 
had an enduring influence on Zulu nationalist politics - and 
state segregationism. 
Considering the dissertation as a whole, the central theme 
is the resuscitation of Zulu national identity and the 
resurrection of the political status of the Zulu royal house. 
These two concurrent and interrelated developments, indeed, 
are absolutely crucial to the history of Zulu politics 
between the Act of Union and the early-1930s. The Zulu 
display that Solomon had arranged to greet the Prince of 
Wales in 1925 represented the apogee of a united Zulu nation-
alism beneath the Zulu kingship. Largely through Solomon's 
own diplomacy, the rifts between the ·Usuthu and the dissidents 
of the civil war period (Mandlakazi, Ngenetsheni and 
Buthelezi) had been healed; and the gulf between 'tribal' and 
'kholwa' had been bridged. However, the populist nationalism 
of 1925 proved incapable of containing the class divisions 
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that had crystallised within Zulu society during the 1920s. 
Both the alliance of petty bourgeois and tribal elites 
in lnkatha, on the one hand, and the rural rank-and-file 
and urban working class (mainly. represented by the lCU), on 
the other hand, appropriated Zulu nationalism to their class 
interests. The former sought to define Zulu nationalism 
as a conservative, hamba kahle and collaborative social 
force, and encouraged the state to implement for the 'Zulu 
nation' a thoroughgoing policy of political and territorial 
segregation. The latter sought to interweave Zulu nationalism 
with militant and revolutionary ideologies of working class 
action. Solomon identified himself and the Zulu royal family 
with lnkatha's interpretation .of Zulu nationalism, which 
thus became the mainstream of Zulu nationalism. 
The ambiguities that emerged within Zulu nationalism during 
Solomon's period, however, have not disappeared. While 
Zulu workers were mobilising under the cry 'Usuthu' during 
the 1973 Durban strikes, for example, the incumbent Zulu 
monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, and his royal council 
were intriguing with Pretoria to dislodge the less compliant 
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi from control over Zulu politics.8 A 
similar ambiguousness has been expressed by the present 
lnkatha: the organisation operates from within the structure 
of apartheid, but has acted as the most outspoken critic 
of South African Government policy to have emerged from 
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7, is incorrect. 
Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, p. 250. 
See Ch. 4, below. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/31, O. Fynney, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 
9/5/1917. The Governor-General, in his capacity as 
Supreme Chief, approved these appointments. See SNA 
to CNC, 20/11/1917. 
See Reyher, Zulu Woman, p. 44. 
The CNC attempted to persuade Solomon to rid himself 
of Maphelu - whom the CNC described as a "criminal". 
CNC PI-1B 92, 64/3, minutes of interview between CNC, 
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30 CNC 219, 1488/1915, Magistrate Nongoma to ONC, Zululand, 
3/2/1916, forwarding copies of various reports of 
interviews. The particular quotation is a statement 
made by a "native constable". 
31 CNC 219, 1488/1915, CNC telegram to all magistrates 
in Zululand and Natal districts nearby Zululand, 
24/1/1916. In this file is a huge wad of telegram 
copies, as described by the CNC. 
32 See Shula Marks' co~~ents in Reluctant Rebellion, p. 230. 
33 CNC 219, 1485/1915, Magistrate Nkandla to ONC, Zululand, 
23/3/1916. 
34 Ibid. 
35 CNC 219, 1488/1915, CNC to SNA, 27/1/1916. 
36 CNC 219, 1488/1915, CNC to SNA, 4/5/1916, pp. 2, 3. 
37 CNC 219, 1488/1915, notes of meeting held at magistrate's 
office, Nongoma, 28/4/1916, in connection with an 
attempt by Solomon kaOinuzulu to hold an unauthorized 
hunt. Re. attendance figures, see CNC to SNA, 4/5/1916. 
38 CNC 219, 1488/1915, notes of meeting at Nongoma, 28/4/1916, 
pp. 2, 3. 
39 Ibid., pp. 3, 4. 
40 CNC 219, 1488/1915, CNC to SNA, 4/5/1916. 
41 CNC 219, 1488/1915, notes of meeting at Nongoma, 
28/4/1916, pp. 5, 6. 
42 Unpublished collection of zulu Praise Poems, 'Izibongo 
sika Solomon kaOinuzulu'. 
43 CNC PMB 72, 57/29. This letter is dated 25/2/1916. It 
was submitted to the CNC with meticulous observation of 
the bureaucratic procedures of the NAO. In the first 
instance, it was handed to the assistant magistrate of 
Babanango for transfer to the magistrate of Vryheid. 
Thereafter it was passed on to the ONC of Zululand 
and eventually to the office of the CNC in Pietermaritzburg. 
Its contents were summarized in English in Assistant 



























CNC 219, 1488/1915, reports of Native Constable 
(Political Messenger) at Nongoma, 3, 19, 20/7/1916. 
Ibid., report dated 20/7/1916. 
CNC 219, 1488/1915, Magistrate Ngotshe to CNC, 25/7/1916. 
State Archives, Pretoria, Archives of the Commissioner 
of the South African Police (hereafter SAP) 36, 
6/592/18, Dh1angyaan Ngema, Native Chief, Wakkerstoom 
District, to Director of Prisons, Pretoria, 26/6/1918, 
reporting earlier events, cf. Director of Prisons to 
Commissioner of Police, 12/7/1918. 
SAP 35, 6/499/17/2, Ben Machume1a, Rosebank, Transvaal, 
to Solomon kaDinuzu1u, 9/3/1917, translated by CNC's 
office, Natal. See also SNA to CNC, 9/5/1917. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 4/4/1916. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, SNA to CNC, 28/4/1916. 
CNC 219, 1488/1915, CNC to SNA, 4/5/1916, relating his 
activities and impressions gained at Nongoma, 28/4/1916, 
pp. 4, 5. 
Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
See Ch. 4 and 5 below. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 19/7/1916. The CNC refers 
to this in his opening remarks. 
Ibid. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/8/1916. 
Ibid. 
Natal Mercury, 3/10/1916. 
Ibid. 
The scheme's opponents in the House of Assembly raised 
the question whether all French women were "honourable". 
See, for example, the speech of Mr Fichardt (~ybrand), 
Cape Times, 21/3/1917. 
Natal Mercury, 7/10/1916. 
Cape Times, 21/3/1917. 
CNC 248, 1254/1916, P. Seme to CNC, 11/8/1916. Telegram. 
CNC 248, 1254/1916, CNC to P. Seme, 12/8/1916. 
CNC 261, 1881/1916, CNC to SNA, 3/11/1916, reporting 
events associated with Solomon and recruitment for the 
Native Labour Battalion. 
MS ~~R, Newscutting Book, KCM 3196, p. 46, undated 
newscutting from Natal Advertizer, reporting Dube's 
open letter to the Zulu people published in I1anga. 
The phrase is used by E. Roux in Time Longer than Rope 
U1adison, 1964), Ch. XV, to describe the policies of 
moderacy, 'gentle persuasion' and non-militancy that 
were such features of African politics in the early 
post-Union period. 
Until Solomon's objectives and strategy are understood, 
the documents relating to his involvement in the NAD's 
attempts to recruit for the Native Labour Battalion 
















CNC 261, lS81/1916, CNC to SNA, 3/11/1916. 
Ibid., referring to ?1agistrate Mah1abatini' s report. 
Account of Maphelu, p. 108. Maphelu's account is a 
problematical source on this issue. As a man keenly 
proud of his martial expertise, he was personally 
keen to join the first world war, and was actually 
aware that Zulu resistance to recruitment was being 
construed as cowardice. At no stage does he implicate 
Solomon in this 'cowardice', but chooses instead to 
argue (rather inconsistently) that whatever Solomon 
may have done to encourage recruitment, the Zulu would 
not have responded because they were angry with the 
government for refusing to recognize Solomon as a 
chief. See Ibid., p. 109. 
Ibid., p. 10S:--This incident is not recorded in the 
CNC's correspondence. The available evidence suggests 
that it took place during October 1916. See also Pers. 
Comm., Ndesheni, part I, p. 12. Further, during 
the civil case Solomon brought against the Natal 
Mercury for libel in 1927 (see Ch. 4 below), C. A. 
Wheelwright gave evidence on this event whilst in 
the witness box. When the counsel for the defence 
suggested that the Zulu's refusal to eat the meat was 
symbolically "repudiating Solomon", Wheelwright replied 
"No. That was repudiating us. They thought that if 
they touched the meat they would be sent ••• overseas ••• ", 
Natal Mercury, 6/5/1927. 
The Zulu in any case needed little encouragement to 
refuse: rumours of Dinuzulu's collusion with Germany 
were still among them, and they were apprehensive 
of traversing the seas to a distant continent. See 
Account of Maphelu, pp. 108, 109; and CNC 261, 1881/ 
1916, CNC to SNA, 3/11/1916, p. 2. 
See CNC 261, 1881/1915, CNC to SNA, 3/11/1916, p. 1. 
Political capital was made from this issue by Transvaal 
members of the House of Assembly. See Cape Times, 
5/4/1917, 21/4/1917. 
Account of Maphelu, p. 108. 
Records of the Church of the Province of South Africa, 
Diocese of Zululand, Diocesan Offices, Eshowe (henceforth 
DZ), classification S/2c, Minutes of meeting of the 
Diocesan Synods, 26/6/1917. 
HS !>".aAR, File 21, KCM 3185 (b). This manuscript was 
translated from Samuelson's Zulu original by H. C. Lugg, 
and the translation bears the date 27/6/1917. 
CNC 254, 1557/1916, SNA to CNC, 12/10/1916. For Solomon's 
application, see Assistant Magistrate Babanango to 
Magistrate Vryheid, 21/9/1916, and CNC to SNA, 3/10/1916. 
CNC 261, 1881/1916, CNC to SNA, 3/11/1916, pp. 2, 3. 
CNC 261, 1881/1916, CNC to Magistrate Vryheid, 13/11/1916 . , 













CNC 261, 1881/1916, CNC to SNA, 3/11/1916, p. 3. 
Wheelwright also added that it would "be a great pity 
if the Zulus cannot be got to Europe ••• since the 
educational influence of the trip would be lost", 
which illustrates his generally more broad-minded 
approach - which set him apart from many white South 
Africans. 
Faye, Zulu References, p. 90. Carl Faye travelled with 
the royal party to Pretoria, and acted as interpreter 
at the meeting itself. In the book cited here, he 
published his record of the meeting. 
Ibid., pp. 91-96. 
Two reasons can be volunteered for this. First, 
Solomon's appointment came too late. He was officially 
installed in January 1917, and the Battalion left 
for Europe in February. Incidentally, the troopship 
'Mendi' that carried it was sunk by a mine before 
reaching Europe and the majority of the recruits 
drowned. Second, Solomon's appointment aroused intense 
opposition among Natal whites and local officials 
of the Natal NAD. Wheelwright was singled out for 
public condemnation: NAD head office found it necessary 
to attempt to prevent the publication of commentaries 
appearing in the Natal Mercury and also to issue a 
statement emphasising Solomon would have no jurisdiction 
whatsoever outside the Usuthu ward. Under these 
conditions, Solomon could barely be used in a 
recruitment campaign. See RCAL, Sir Marshall Campbell 
Collection, File 4, RCM 32591, T. Watt, Department of 
Public Works, to Senator The Hon Sir Marshall Campbell, 
15/12/1916; and below for comment on the reaction of 
white Natal. 
See Ch. 2 above. 
Significantly, there is no record of the sort of lengthy 
official correspondence that might .be rexpected 'on 
this issue - whic~he 'undoing' of what the Natal 
NAD under Addison had so determinedly and pointedly 
done barely two years previously. The Report of the 
Union Auditor and Controller-General, 1917-1918, 
UG 42-'18, p. 40, refers to an individual sum of 
£142/6/5 "being the cost of the transfer of certain 
native from Endulendi LSi~ and his reestablishment 
at the Usuthu kraal in Zululand". 
Similarly, there is no record of any negotiations 
on the matter within the NAD in the four weeks prior 
to the Pretoria meeting. 
See Chs. 4 and 5 below for further details on Fynney. 
The quotations are taken from articles published in 
the Natal Mercury, 18/12/1916 and 27/12/1916. 
Natal Advertizer, 3/1/1917. 


















Natal Advertizer, 3/1/1917. 
Natal Mercury, 5/1/1917. Harwick suggested that if 
Solomon had to be made a chief, he should have been 
summarily appointed to some 'government tribe' some-
where far away from the Usuthu and which consisted 
of persons who weren't interested in Solomon's royal 
'pretensions'. Other 'authoritative' opinions published 
in Natal newspapers were equally absurd, ego Solo~on 
was not the accepted heir to Dinuzulu, in view of the 
claims of Manzo1wandle and David. See Natal Mercury, 
18/12/1916' and Natal Advertizer, 3/1/1917. 
When Solo~on was pressing for his elevation to the 
status of Paramount Chief in the 1920's, the precise 
wording of Buxton's address became a matter of 
controversy. See Ch. ~ below. 
See Swart, "Harriette Co1enso", pp. 149-152. For 
details on the split in the Anglican Church in Natal 
see B. B. Burnett, Anglicans in Natal (Durban, n. d.), 
pp. 62-123. 
The Net, September 1926, p. 9, Walters' historical 
overview of CPSA activities at Nongoma. For a detailed 
account of the CPSA's activities in Zu1u1and until 
the 1930's, see C. Lewis and G. E. Edwards, Historical 
Records of the Church of the Province of South Africa 
(London, 1934), pp. 659-704. 
CNC 144, 1985/1913, Bishop of Zu1u1and to Minister of 
Native Affairs, 5/2/1914. Various other letters on 
this matter occur in this file. 
CNC 144, 1985/1913, DNC, Zulu1and, to Bishop of Zu1u1and, 
9/1/1915. See also SNA to CNC, 4/1/1915. 
For evidence of negotiations during 1916, see DZ/H/4, 
Zu1u1and Mission Report, 1916, p. 4. The quotations 
cited corne from the Bishop's letters published in 
The Net, June 1917 and March 1918. 
DZ/M/4, Zu1u1and Hission Report, 1916, p. 4. 
DZ/S/2c, meeting of Diocesan Synods, 26/6/1917. 
DZ/B/3, Minute book of Bishop's Council, 1914-1937, 
meeting of Bishop's Council, 20 and 22/3/1917. 
The Net, June 1912, p. 22. 
SNA 11/5/2, evidence of Rev. Archdeacon Johnson, Nqutu, 
Zu1u1and, 17/3/1917. 
Apart from the inequitable apportionment of lands, the 
Church was particularly upset by the restrictions on 
African land purchase. For Dube's attitudes to the 
principle and practice of segregation, see D. J. 
MacKenzie, "Dube and the Land Issue, 1913-1936" (un-
published B. Soc. Sci. dissertation, University of 
Natal, 1980); and Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", 
pp. 175-176. 
The Net, December 1920. 
DZ/B/3, meeting of the Bishop's Council, 20, 22/3/1917; 














The Net, March 1918;and see DZ/B/3, meetings of the 
Bishop's Council, 23/3/1920 and 8/12/1920. The CPSA 
would continue to pay Oscroft for his missionary work 
in the Nongoma district. See CNC PHB 102, 73/46, 
Bishop of Zu1u1and to CNC, 11/3/1919; and DZ/B/3, 
meeting of the Bishop's Council, 20/3/1920. 
Pers. Comm., Mr Basil Oscroft, son of Rev. L. E. 
Oscroft, letter dated 24/11/1981. The jockeying for 
control over the adviser and educator to the Zulu 
establishment was not confined to the CPSA and NAD. 
Rev. H. Cotton, Chairman of the Natal District Wesleyan 
Methodist Church, protested to \vhee1wright about 
Oscroft's appointment. Wheelwright replied that the 
ZNTI was not to be denominational and Oscroft had been 
selected on the grounds of his "close touch with 
Solomon". CNC PMB 102, 73/46, notes of meeting between 
Rev. H. Cotton and CNC, 9/10/1917; and Rev. H. Cotton 
to CNC, 10/10/1917. The CPSA nonetheless reaped 
considerable evangelical advantage from its association 
with the ZNTI and Solomon. See Ch. 4 below. 
D2/M/4, Zu1u1and Mission Report, 1920; and DZ/B/3, 
meeting of the Bishop's Council, 13/3/1918. 
The Net, March 1918. 
The Net, December 1922, p. 13, "The Premier at the 
Training School". 
Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1919-1921, UG 34-
1922, p. 22. See also Report of the Controller and 
Auditor-General, 1920-1921, UG 43-'21, p. 370. 
The Net, September 1922, p. 10. 
NAD Report, 1919-1921, UG 34-1922, p. 22;and DZ/H/4, 
Zu1u1and Mission Report, 1922 and 1924. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC's memorandum for the information 
of the Minister of Native Affairs, 15/8/1932, p. 4. 
This memorandum is an historical overview of Solomon's 
. quest for a 'higher status', and was prepared when the 
NAD was considering his 'elevation' in 1932. See below, 
Ch. 6. 
Ibid. 
This statement was made by Wheelwright during evidence 
at the libel action Solomon brought against the Natal 
Mercury in 1927. Natal Mercury, 6/5/1927. 
See Faye, Zulu Interpreters, p. 51, who lists the 
different names but offers no explanation of the cause. 
The details of the 1918 ukubutbwaare drawn from G.W.K. 
Mahlobo and E. J. Krige, "Transition from childhood 
to adulthood amongst the Zulus", Bantu Studies, Vol. 8, 
1934, pp. 182-187. The authors' sources were persons 
who were enrolled in 1918. Their reconstruction of 
the event has to be read with care since their anthro-
pological approach leads them to focus upon social 


















for these flavours or renders inaccurate their 
reconstruction of the ukubuthwa of 1918. Only 
information that is presented as 'fact' or as the 
accounts of the participants of 1918 are recorded 
here. 
Mah10bo and Krige, "Transition", pp. 182, 183. 
Literally, this means 'the place where the branches 
were devoured'. According to Mr. J. K. D1adla 
(Cultural Affairs Officer, KwaZulu Government), the 
homestead was so named in memory of a nearby engagement 
between Natal Government forces and Zulu rebels 
during the 1906 rebellion. The Zulu took cover in 
the trees, and the bullets of the government soldiers 
merely struck (devoured) the branches overhead. Pers. 
Comm., J. K. Dladla, U1undi, 10/11/1981. 
Mahlobo and Krige, "Transition", pp. 183-185. 
CNC 349, 453/1919, evidence of Nyosana Tshangase 
k~~asiphula reo Solomon's claims, taken before R. D. 
Lyle, Magistrate Mahlabatini, 23/1/1920. 
CNC 349, 453/1919, Magistrate Nkandla to CNC, 22/2/1919. 
Ibid. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC's memorandmn for the Hinister 
of Native Affairs, 15/8/1932, p. 5. Solomon's request 
made during his interview with General Smuts on 29/11/1920 
was refused. 
Whilst all the children of Dinuzulu were attractive, 
Magogo stated, there were three who "hit us over the 
head" with their beauty. They were Solomon, Phikisile 
and Roselina. Pers. Comm., Magogo, part II, p. 8. 
See Haphelu's account of meeting Solomon on the road 
to Nobamba. Account of Maphelu, p. 109. 
CNC 332, 2337/1918, Bishop of Pretoria to CNC, 21/5/1919. 
CNC 332, 2337/1918, CNC to Lord Bishop of Pretoria, 
27/4/1919. The CNC's investigations revealed Mvuyana 
to be domiciled at Ifafa on the Natal coast. 
This was particularly apparent during the inquiry into 
the matter which the CNC conducted in May 1920. See 
below. 
P. Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920:. 
The radicalization of the black petty bourgeoisie on the 
Rand", in Marks and Rathbone, Industrialisation and social 
change, pp. 270ff. 
Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1919-1921, 
UG 34-1922, pp. 4, 5, 10. 
For the broad details of the increasingly militant action 
adopted by Africans after the first world war, see 
Roux, Time Longer than Rope, especially Cbs. XII, XV, 
and Davenport, South Africa, pp. 178-180. 
CNC 359, 1558/1919, Mr. Pritchard, Director of Native 



















Grievances brought to notice of Chief Solomon Dinuzu1u 
during stay on Witwatersrand, and enclosures. 
Ibid., enclosure listing the grievances brought to 
Solomon's attention at each mine, together with a precis 
of each inspector's report. 
SNA 1/9/5, notes of interview between CNC and Joel 
Maduna, representative of David kaDinuzulu, 
Babanango court room, 25/5/1920. Maduna refers, 
incidental1y,to his having "met David at Johannesburg" 
in the course of replying to the CNC's questions about 
the recent unrest in Zu1u1and. 
CNC PMB 92, 64/3, Magistrate Eshowe to CNC, 10 May 1920. 
When the CNC requested that Manzolwand1e use his 
influence to stop the rumours concerning Dinuzu1u, 
Manzo1wand1e replied he would do so and added "John 
Dube does not represent the responsible people of 
Zu1u1and. He was not born to represent people." 
Although Dube certainly was not associated with the 
rumour, Manzo1wandle's comment in this context suggests 
Manzo1wand1e knew the rumours to issue from outside 
influences - the townspeople. SNA 1/9/5, notes of 
interview between Chief Manzo1wand1e and CNC, 24/6/1920. 
CNC PMB 92, 64/3, Magistrate Ngotshe to CNC, 3/5/1920; 
and Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 20/5/1920. 
Ibid. 
CNC PHB 92, 64/3, Magistrate Nkandla to CNC, 10/5/1920; 
and SNA 1/9/5, notes of CNC's enquiry into the visit 
of David to Cetshwayo's grave, Nkand1a, 20/5/1920. 
SNA 1/9/5, enquiry into David's visit to Cetshwayo's 
grave, 24/5/1920. 
SNA 11/5/5, J. S. Marwick, Manager, Municipal Native 
Affairs Department, to Mr. Clayton, member of the 
Natal Local Land Committee, 16/4/1918. 
JUS 270, 4/267/18, report of meeting of Natives called 
by John Dube, 10/8/1918, made by police Detective 
Robb. 
Ibid. 
JUS 270, 4/267/18, copy of petition, as cited. 
Ibid. 
CNC 379, 3265/1919. Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 2/3/1920. 
Solomon made this request during his interview with 
Smuts on 29/11/1920. See CNC PMB '84, 58/7/4, CNC's 
memorandum for the Minister of Native Affairs, 15/8/1932, 
p. 5. 
CNC P!-1B 92, 64/2, minutes of interview between CNC, 
Magistrate Nongoma and Solomon, Manku1umana, Mnyaiza 
and others, 31/5/1920. 
See references in Ch. 2 above. 
Calculated from Zu1u1and Native Trust statements of 
annual expenditure published in NAD Report, 1919-1921, 














Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 
1903-l905,paras 218, 233. 
Report of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1906-
1907, Cd 3889, pp. 16-18. Despite these statements, 
the report also emphasised the value of tribalism 
as a means of social control. 
CNC 215, 1185/1915, CNC to Percy Binns, Chief Magistrate 
Durban, 17/9/1915. 
See Ch. 2 above. 
SNA 11/5/4, minutes of evidence taken before the 
Natal Local Lands Committee, evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, 
CNC, 12, 13/4/1918. 
Harks, "Ambigui"ties of dependence", quoting Howard Pim 
to Secretary, Aborigines Protection Society, 4/12/1922. 
In particular, he opposed the establishment of local 
councils in Zululand as envisaged by the 1920 Native 
Affairs Act. For details of the Act, see below, and 
for Wheelwright's opposition to its application in 
Zululand see Ch. 4 below. 
These are general features of interviews conducted at 
the CNC's office. For specific examples, see records 
filed in SNA 1/9/4 and 1/9/5. 
SNA 1/9/4, notes of interview between CNC and Chief 
Mathole with followers, 22/5/1922. 
See the debates in the House of Assembly on the 1917 
Bill as published in the ca~e Times, 3/4/1917, 5/4/1917, 
17/4/1917, 20/4/1917 and 21 4/1917, and the evidence 
taken before the Select Co~~ittee on Native Affairs 
dealing with the 1917 Bill, SC6A-19l7. The omissions 
in its treatment in current literature are particularly 
notable in Lacey's Boroko,which focusses on the interests 
represented by the white state and the political and 
ideological means it employed to secure these ends 
berween 1910 and 1932. Lacey primarily treats the 1917 
Bill as a failed 'Land Bill', and no attempt is made 
to explain the 'tribal' administrative provisions and 
the extension of the Natal system to the rest of the 
Union, beyond commenting that they were intended to 
expand a "national coercive system". See Lacey, Boroko, 
pp. 17, 86-94. Precise details of the 1917 Bill are 
difficult to assemble for it was evidently not published 
by the Union Government on account of war-time economy 
measures. Much, however, can be gleaned from the debates 
in the House of Assembly as published in the Cape Times. 
A full explanation of the political and ideological 
significance of the 1917 Bill cannot be attempted here. 
For a broad overview of 'liberal' criticism, see Botha's 
"Replies to his critics", in ca,eTimes, 5/4/1917. 
See, for example, Cape 'Times, 1 /4/1917, speech of 
Minister of the Interior {Sir Thomas Watt, the HP for 





















Cape Times, 3/4/1917. 
See ca,e Times, 17/4/1917, Rev. L. Vorster's speech; 
and 21 4/1917, Botha's speech. 
Cape Times, 21/4/1917, Botha's speech. 
Natal petty bourgeois Africans were appalled by the 
land provisions of the 1917 Bill, and for this reason 
never got as far as pondering the attractions that 
the envisaged local councils might offer. See evidence 
given by representatives of the Natal Native Congress 
before the Select Committee on the Native Affairs 
Administration Bill, 1917, SC 6A-1917, pp. 618-623. 
For Dube's response, see also Natal Hercury, 19/2/1917. 
NAD Report, 1919-1921, UG 34-1922, p. 4. 
South African Sugar Journal (hereafter SASJ) (official 
organ of the South African Planters' Union), Vol. 3, 
No.7, July 1919, p. 483. 
SASJ, Vol. 4, No. 10, October 1920, p. 871, report on 
the 'Native Labour problem' by A. E. Parkin, Super-
intendent, N. C. L. R. C., Ltd. In the course of a 
lecture given in Durban on the subject of Africans in 
the urban areas, J. S. Marwick notes the dangers of 
'socialist propaganda'. In this context he refers 
to "Miss Colenso", and in so doing provides an intriguing 
sidelight to the ideological influences acting on 
African workers. Marwick refers to a recent article 
she published in the International Socialist Review in 
which she strongly supports socialist action among the 
African workforce. After noting that no propaganda 
is available in any 'native tongue', she reports that 
a pamphlet entitled "Wage Labour and Capital" is in 
the process of being translated into Zulu. See MS ~~R 
2.08.1, File 1, RCM 2541, pamphlet copy of "A lecture 
on the Natives in the larger Towns" by J. S. Harwick, 
delivered in Durban, 7/8/1918. 
Cape Times, 27/5/1920. 
Ibid. 
See ibid., and Native Affairs Act, No. 23 of 1920, 
Section 2. 
For precise details of the Native Affairs Commission, 
see Rogers, Native Administra"tion, Ch. III. 
Ibid., pp. 179ff. 
cape Times, 27/5/1920. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
cape Times, 27/5/1920 and 29/5/1920. 
Cape Times, 3/6/1920. 
For an analysis of the 1923 Act and the development of 
segregation in South Africa, see P. B. Rich, "Hinistering 
to the white man's needs: the development of urban 
segregation in South Africa", African Studies, 37, 2, 1978. 
Select Committee on Native Affairs, 1920 SC6A-'20 
evidence of Rev. J. L. Dube, 14/6/1920, ~p. 11-12.' 
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Footnotes to Chapter 4 
1 This somewhat impressionistic overview is an explicitly 
comparative one. See the beginning of Ch. 5 below 
for a survey of socio-economic developments in the late 
1920s. 
2 The phrase is Fynney's, the Uagistrate of Nongoma. In 
this context it clearly included those resident in the 
Vryheid district and those who - like Simelane - were 
now resident in the Zululand reserves but had not been 
born and brought up there. See S~P 41, 6/953/23/4, 
CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924, transmitting Fynney's reports 
on Inkatha, during which he quotes his correspondence 
dated 8/5/1920. 
3 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/2/1921. 
4 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, notes of interview between CNC and 
Rev. Simelane, 31/3/1921. 
5 Ibid.; and CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Magistrate Nongoma to 
CNC, 14/2/1921. See below for details. 
6 The trend among Congress leadership to 'turn to the 
chiefs' after 1920, as will be documented below, was 
not confined to Natal. For the Transvaal case, see 
Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920", p. 
304. 
7 CNC Pl1.B 92, 64/2, notes of interview between CNC and 
Albert Zulu, from Chief Solomon, 31/3/1921. 
8 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Inspector CID, Johannesburg, to 
Deputy Commissioner (Dep. Comm.), SAP, 12/6/1922, 
reporting NNC meeting, Durban, 7/6/1922. 
9 For comments on the 'transatlantic connection' and 
its political consequences, see (for the earlier period) 
Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", pp. 167fLi and (for 
the 1920s), T. Couzens, "l1.oralizing leisure time: The 
transatlantic connection and black Johannesburg, 1918-
1936", in Marks and Rathbone, Industrialisation and 
Social Change, pp. 315ff. Aggrey's visit in 1921 was 
instrumental in the formation of the inter-racial Joint 
Councils, in the interests of 'racial cooperation' and 
'mutual welfare'. For details see J. W. Horton, "South 
Africa's Joint Councils: Black-White Cooperation between 
the two world wars", South African Historical Journal, 
No.4, 1972. 
10 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, CID report, 12/6/1922, of NNC meetings, 
Durban, 7/6/1922, and Pietermaritzburg, 8/6/1922. 
11 See SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Dep. Comm. SAP, Natal, to Dep. 
Comm. SAP, Pretoria, 18/7/1923, reporting NNC meeting 
Pietermaritzburg, 15/7/1923; for further examples see 
below. 
12 See below. For reference to the initial Mahashini 
meeting, see NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/11/1923, 
quoting earlier correspondence with magistrate of Nongoma. 
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13 SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, T. H. Hedges, District Commandant, 
SAP Eshowe, to Dep. Comm., Natal Division SAP, 6/9/1923, 
quoting propaganda pamphlet. 
14 NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/11/1923; quoting 
Magistrate of Nongoma's report, 28/10/1923. See also 
SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, SNA to Dep. Comm. SAP, Pretoria, 
28/2/1924. 
15 NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924. 
16 NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/11/1923, quoting 
Magistrate Nongoma's report, 28/10/1923. 
17 NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924. 
18 Ibid. 
19 NEC Box 7, evidence of Acting Chief Gebemeweni Qwabi 
(Mah1abatini district), Durban, 1/4/1931, p. 6194. 
Although speaking in 1931, Gebemeweni refers to the 
artefact inkatha rather than the organisation. He 
argued that the Zulu no longer had an inkatha since they 
had been subjugated by Queen Victoria, who subsequently 
held 'supreme power' over the Zulu. He was therefore 
of the opinion that King George \l now had the Zulu 
inkatha. 
20 Webb and Wright (eds.), The James Stuart Archive, Vol. I, 
evidence of Ba1eni kaSi1wana, 17/5/1914, pp. 40, 41. 
21 Apart from the sources cited above this summary is also 
drawn from Krige, Social System; Fuze, Black People, 
pp. 90, 91; H. C. Lugg, ' A Natal Family 'LooksBack 
(Durban, 1970), pp. 3, 4, 15; C.de B. Webb and J. B. 
Wright (eds.), The James Stuart Archive, Vol. II 
(Pietermaritzburg, 1979), evidence of Mangati kaGodide, 
13/6/1920, p. 203. Ba1eni kaSi1wana's assertion that . 
the ritual vomiting took place only during preparations 
for war is contradicted by all other sources. Natal 
chiefs also kept an inkatha to bind their tribes together. 
The notion that inkatha refers to the grass rings worn 
on the heads of Zulu women to support pots of water -
where Inkatha (the organisation) alludes its role 
in 'bearing the load of the nation' - is incorrect. 
22 Webb and Wright, The James Stuart Archive, Vol. I, 
evidence of Hoya kaSoxa1ase, 16/9/1921, p. 171. Hoye 
was Solomon's imbongi (bard who recited izibongo) and 
was sent by Solomon to assist Stuart. Ibid., p. 167. 
23 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Inspector CID, Johannesburg, to 
Deputy Comm. SAP, Johannesburg, 12/6/1922, reporting 
Gumede's address to Congress at Nancefie1d Location, 
Johannesburg, 11/6/1922. See also various NNC circulars 
and pamphlets dated 1922 and 1923 . a1so contained in this 
file, and SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, various CID correspondence 
on NNC activities between February and July 1923. Gumede's 
second initial is sometimes cited as'S' • 
24 CK 9A, 2:XB16: 91, biographical notes on W. F. Bhu1ose. 
For further details of Bhu10se - in the context of Inkatha 
- see below. 
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25 Ibid., biographical notes on W. W. Nnhlovu; and CNC 
PMB 92, 64/2, NNC circulars and pamphlets dated 1922 
and 1923. 
26 SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, report by Detective Sergeant Arnold, 
CID Durban, 13/10/1923, covering NNC meeting, Durban, 
1/10/1923. 
27 See NTS 7205, 20/326, memorandum by Magistrate Nongoma 
for information of CNC, 14/1/1924. For further 
comment on this scheme, see below. 
28 Natal Archives Depot, Carl Faye Papers, Box 12/29, 
'Account of the visit of HRH Prince Arthur of Connaught, 
Governor-General of the Union etc. etc., to Zululand, 
15-23/7/1923' (at which Faye was the interpreter), pp. 
10-12. 
29 NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924, 
reporting interviews with Solomon and Mankulumana. 
30 See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/11/1923, quoting 
Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 28/10/1923; and SAP 41, 6/953/ 
23/4, T. H. Hedges, District Commandant, SAP Eshowe, 
to Dep. Comm. Natal SAP, Pietermaritzburg, 6/9/1923. 
31 For further details of Solomon's land-buying activities, 
his 'cultural eclecticism' and manipulation of different 
cultural forms, see below. 
32 For Fynney's view, see NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate 
Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924, particularly p. 2, and for 
the CNC's view, see CNC to SNA, 14/2/1924. In the latter, 
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to its support. In the meantime he aimed to keep in 
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communist propaganda. He specifically mentioned the 
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34 For a penetrating analysis, see P. Bonner, "The Transvaal 
Native Congress 1917-1920", pp. 270-313. 
35 For a brief account (which asserts that the petty bourgeois 
nature of ICU leadershipwas a reason for the Union's limited 
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see H. Bradford, "Mass movements and the petty 
bourgeoisie: The social origins of ICU leadership, 1924-
1929", Journal of African History, 25, 1984, pp. 295-310. 
36 In particular, see Bonner's introductory and concluding 
remarks in "The Transvaal Native Congress 1917-1920", 
pp. 271-272 and 305-306, and Bradford's concluding 
remarks (the source of the quotations) in "Mass movements 
and the petty bourgeoisie", p. 310. 
37 Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress 1917-1920", p. 
272. 
38 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Senior Inspector, Natal SAP, to Dep. 
Comm., Natal SAP, 23/4/1924, reporting NNC meeting, 
Estcourt, 18/4/1924, and related developments. 
39 Ibid. 
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NNC and also became "adviser to Natal and O.F.S. chiefs." 
In 1906 he was a member of a delegation to Britain over 
the land laws of the Orange Free State, and in the same 
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a pass. He was a founder member "of the SANNC, and 
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'First International Conference against Imperialism' in 
Belgium. See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 359, 360. 
For further reference to Gumede, see below. 
41 These are detailed in SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, series of 
SAP reports on 'Congress Meetings', Natal, dated February 
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42 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Senior Inspector, Natal SAP, to Dep. 
Comm., Natal SAP, 23/4/1924. 
43 Natal Witness, 19/8/1924, report of NNC meeting, date 
and venue not cited. 
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Comm., Natal SAP, 23/4/1924. In 1906, whilst Johannes 
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Reluctant Rebellion, p. 332. For a summary of Stephen 
Mini's Wesleyan Methodist background and role in the 
early history of the NNC, see also Marks, Reluctant 
Rebellion, pp. 69, 72. 
45 SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, report of meeting of 'Nkata ka Zulu', 
Mahashini, 8-10/10/1924, made by Rev. L. E. Oscroft, 
13/10/1924, p. 1. The dual appointment to the office 
of chairman is unusual. In practice, Bhulose took on 
the duties of chairman - it seems Dube's appointment was 


















The CNC proudly saw this as an indication of the 
"effectiveness of the contact that is being made 
iDy Fynney and Oscroftl". NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to 
SNA, 26/11/1924. 
See SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of Inkatha 
meeting, 13/10/1924, p. 3 (for Oscroft); Fynney's 
report of Inkatha meeting,n. d., enclosed in CNC to SNA, 
3/11/1924 (for Fynney); and CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924 
(Oscroft and Fynney). 
Even more ironically, the motion was passed. In his 
report of the meeting, Fynney emphasised the importance 
of this motion and urged government cooperation. SAP 
41, 6/953/23/4, Fynney's report of Inkatha meeting, n.d., 
enclosed in CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924. 
SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924. 
SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Fynney's report of Inkatha meeting, 
n.d., enclosed in CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924. 
SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 
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SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 
13/10/1924, p. 1. 
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See Ch. 2 above. 
SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 
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time of the 1906 rebellion. The Zulu Congregational 
Church was itself a secession from the American Board 
Mission. B. G. M. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South 
Africa (London, 1961), p. 45. See p. 53 for Sundkler's 
comments on the essentially nationalist/political character 























SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 
13/10/1924, p. 2. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
The Mandlakazi had not attended the meeting. Fynney was 
requested to assist the reconciliation. Ibid., and. 
SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Fynney's report of Inkatha meetlng, 
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SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 
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See NTS 7205, 20/326, T. J. Robinson, Sub-Inspector, 
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19/1/1925. 
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Johannesburg, 9/7/1926. 
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SNA, 14/8/1926, enclosing J. T. Boast's special report 
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Ibid. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 23/9/1925, enclosing 
minutes of interview between CNC and William Bhulose, 
27/8/1925. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to eNC, 2/10/1925. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, F. E. Trenchell, Detective Head 
Constable, Dundee, to District Commandant, SAP, Dundee, 
4/12/1924, reporting on rumours and events in Northern 
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NTS 7205, 20/326, T. J. Robinson, Sub-Inspector, SAP, 


















For excellent analyses of the African petty bourgeois 
social and cultural milieu, see Brian Willan, "An 
African in Kimberley: Sol. T. Plaatje, 1894-1898", 
in Marks and Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social 
Change, pp. 238-258; and Couzens, flMoralizing leisure 
t.ime" • 
See Ch. 5 below for further comment on ' Zulu chiefs. 
\'Vebb and Wright (eds.), The James Stuart Archives, Vol. 
I, p. 167. 
For details of Solomon's imbongi, the traditional context 
of his activities and their ideological significance, 
see ibid., pp. 168-171. For a thorough exposition of 
the role of the imbongi and izibon'go, see A. T. Cope (ed.), 
Izibongo: zulu Praise Poems (Cambridge, 1968). 
There were many deaths even among those who had access 
to expert European medical care. The CPSA lost several 
of its African clerics and teachers, and it was 
necessary to close certain schools. See DZ/M/4, 
Zululand Hission Report, 1918 , p. 3, DZ/E/l, 
MacKenzie Memorial College Log Book, 1896-1937, entries 
dated 1918, p. 56; and The Net, March 1919, Bishop's 
letter, p. 2. 
For details on the relationship traditionally seen to 
exist between illness and the ancestral spirits, 
together with the traditional role of the king in times 
of public crisis, see Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, p. 21. 
Ibid., p. 23. 
' Reyher, zulu Woman, pp. 90-92. Solomon's kholwa wife, 
Christina, sometimes accompanied Solomon in dispensing 
medicines and used her influence as an educated person 
and Ndhlovukazi (wife of the king) to overcome tribal 
resistance to European medicine. Ibid., p. 92. 
D. Reitz, No Outspan (London, 1943r;-pp. 27ff., 44. 
As previously, o the request was refused. 
I refer here to Solomon's personal preferences. Since, 
however, Zulu marriage has political functions, Solomon 
could not confine his attentions to kholwa women. See 
below. 
For an excellent account of the ideological and cultural 
influence of missionary endeavour on African women, see 
D. Gaitskill, "Wailing for purity: prayer unions, African 
mothers and adolescent daughters,19l2-1940", in Marks 
and Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social Change, pp. 344ff. 
This account if gleaned substantially from Christina's 
own recollections, as recorded by Rebecca Reyher. For 
Elizabeth Sibiya's social attitudes and lifestyle, see 
Reyher, Zulu Woman, pp. 20-22. 
Ibid., pp. 27-29, 35. 
Ibid., pp. 36-38. 
Ibid., pp. 39, 4lff, 50ff. This illustrates the way in 
which the tribal set of patriarchal relationships were 
transposed to the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the mission 





















Eckenbrens and 'Elizabeth Sibiya were appalled. Solomon's 
royal status nonetheless overcame their moral objections 
to his uncertain 'civilized' credentials. 
Ibid., p. 45. 
Ibid., p. 49. 
Ibid., pp. 51-52. For details of traditional marriage 
customs, see Lugg, "The practice of lobolo in Natal", 
pp. 24ff; and H. P. Braatvedt, "Zulu marriage", pp. 
554ff. 
Reyher, ~ulu Woman, p. 57; Braatvedt, "Zulu marriage", 
p. 563. 
Solomon's profligate and dissolute lifestyle later in 
the 1920's, together with his parental irresponsibility, 
were other factors, as Reyher's reconstruction catalogues. 
See also Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part II, p. 3. 
Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part I, p. 17 (70); Thandayiphi, 
part I, p. 3 (30)~ Magogo, part II, p. 8 (40). 
Pers. Comm., Magogo, part II, p. 7. Although a daughter 
of Paramount Chief Sigcawu of Pondoland took up 
residence at one of Solomon's homesteads (see Ch. 3 
above), the union was never formalized. Ibid. 
Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part I, p. 19. 
For specific details, see ibid., pp. 19-20. 
Ibid. ----
Ibid.,part II, p. 1. 
For the bare details, see KCAL, B. W. Martin Papers, 
3.09, KCM 2668, Manuscript autobiography entitled 'Old 
Soldiers Never Die', pp. 60-61. Martin was the chairman 
of the Board of Inquiry - which decided in favour of 
Cyprian. See also Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part II, p. Iff. 
During the inquiry Mahaye placed his extensive knowledge 
of Zulu history at the disposal of Mshiyeni (Solomon's 
brother and regent after Solomon's death) who supported 
Thandayiphi's claim. 
MS MAR, File 50, KCM 2761 (d), 'Zulu Chieftainship 
dispute', Inquiry, 7/2/1945 - 19/4/1945, evidence of 
Magogo Buthelezi, pp. 103, 104. 
Pers. Comm., Hahaye, part I, p. 19. The magistrate's 
murderer was never found. For further important details 
of Mayatana' s activities, see Harks, Reluctant Rebellion, 
pp. 296-298. 
Ibid. 
Pers. Corom., J.1agogo, part I, pp. 18-20; part II, pp. 
1-6. Significantly, in the course of her account of 
the meeting, Magogo refers to her brother, Solomon, 
not by his name nor as 'the king' as she usually did, 
but as "my father". 
Ibid., part II, p. 5. 
Ibid., p. 1. 












The following account of Magogo's marriage is drawn 
primarily from Magogo's own accounts - evidently it 
is her favourite story - made on various occasions. 
First, during my interview with her, part I, pp. 17-
20~ part II, pp. 1-6. Second, in her evidence to the 
Board of Inquiry into the 1945 succession dispute, MS 
MAR, File 50, KCM 2761 (d), pp. 105, 106. Third, further 
details were gleaned during conversations wi th t-1r. 
J. E. Ndhlovu, Secretary of Education and Culture, 
KwaZulu Government, at Ulundi, 12/11/1981, 4/1/1982. 
Mr Ndhlovu had heard tell the same story at various 
public ceremonies. Magogo is not an unproblematical 
source for she, as a daughter of Dinuzulu who married 
a grandson of Mnyamana (it was the disagreement between 
these two in 1888 that initiated the Usuthu/Buthelezi 
rift), refused to admit that any rift ever existed 
and therefore that Solomon had no political purpose 
in arranging her marriage. See the lengthy deadlock 
during our interview, Pers. Cornrn., Magogo, part I, 
pp. Ilff. This is of course untrue as her own evidence 
suggests, as does that of Mkandandhlovu (Magogo's 
sister who was at Mahashini and aged about eleven at 
the time of the wedding), Pers. Cornrn., Mkandandhlovu, 
pp. 11, 12. See also Pers. Cornrn., Mahaye, part II, p. 
9. 
MS MAR, File 50, KCM 2761 (d), evidence of Hagogo to 
Board of Inquiry, 1945, p. 105. 
Ibid., p. 106. 
Pers. Cornrn., Magogo, part II, pp. 1, 2. 
See Ch. 2 above, and for their marriage, see Ch. ~ above. 
Particularly after the late 1920's during Solomon's 
years of financial ruin. 
For Seme and the Swazis, see below. The Swazi state's 
tributary relationship to the zulu state had fallen into 
abeyance after the subjugation of Zululand. The last 
instance of formal contact between the two (until recent 
times) was the marriage of one of Cetshwayo's daughters 
to King Sobhuza I of Swaziland. The date of marriage 
is not known. Webb and Wright (eds.), The James Stuart 
Archive, Vol. I, evidence of H~ye kaSoxalase, 16/9/1921, 
p. 171. 
For similar observations - relating to the cultural 
context of Solomon's upbringing - see Ch. 2 above. 
They thus all becru~e 'Christians'. See Pers. Corom., 
Ndesheni, part II, p. 13; Magogo, part II, p. 10; and 
Mahaye, part I, p. 18. See also the revealing observation 
in Reyher, zulu Woman, p. 33. 
See The Net, March 1928, Bishop's letter, p. 6; and 
Pers. Co~~., Mahaye, part I, p. 18. Solomon's children 






















The Net, September 1922, article by A. W. Lee, p. 10. 
Incidentally, this was of great value to the CPSA since 
it sidestepped the NAD's injunction that the ZNTI be non-
denominational. 
See DZ/B/3, Meetings of the Bishop's Council, 20/9/1922, 
13, 14/12/1922, 7/3/1923, 10/10/1923, 2/5/1924, 21/9/1927; 
and DZ/P/4, Zu1u1and Diocesan Magazine, June 1922, Bishop's 
letter; and The Net, June 1925, Oscroft's letter. 
The Net, September 1925, article by F. W. Walters. 
The Net, D~cember 1929, Bishop's letter, p. 3. 
The Net, September 1922, article by A. W. Lee, p. 10. 
DZ/M/4, Zu1u1and Mission Report, 1926, p. 2. 
The Net, December 1929, Bishop's letter, pp. 1, 2. 
DZ/M/4, Zu1u1and Mission Report, 1924, p. 6, and 1926, p. 2. 
The Net, June 1923 and September 1923, Bishop's letters. 
Mkungo had fled Zu1u1and during the civil war of 1856 
and had returned after 1879. As a consequence of his 
stay in Natal he "lent towards Christianity" - in the words 
9f a missionary - after his retur~and his death in 1916 
and was followed by a "Christian burial". The Net, 
September 1917, p. 15. 
The Net, March 1925, p. 6. 
DZ/M/4, Zu1u1and Mission Report, 1926, p. 2. The wave of 
expansion only died during the depression years when 
funds from England decreased in value because South 
Africa's adherence to the gold standard reduced the rate 
of exchange. See ibid., reports for the years 1930-193~ 
for the consequences in Zu1u1and. 
See The Net, September 1922, article by A. W. Lee, p. 10; 
and December 1923, Bishop's letter, p. 4. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to Native Commissioner (hereafter 
NC) Nongoma, 27/10/1932, in which he refers to Solomon's 
earlier problems with cars and debts. 
CNC 341, 3268/1918, Commanding Officer, 3rd SAMR, to CNC, 
3/10/1918 and 6/10/1918. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC's memorandum for the information 
of the Minister of Native Affairs, 15/8/1932, p. 5. 
JUS 575, 9491/30, CNC to Col. Douglas, CID, 26/5/1922. 
The sale of European liquor to Africans was illegal. 
Ibid. 
Pers. Comm., Magogo, part II, p. 3. Professor Eileen 
Krige (author of the classic work, The Social System of 
the Zulus and one of the white guests at Solomon's 
ih1ambo ceremony in 1934) suggested that accepting and 
arinking European liquor was one of Solomon's royal 
duties. Pers. Comm., Prof. Eileen Krige, Durban, 6/10/1981 . 
Pers. Comm., F. B. Oscroft, letter dated 24/11/1981. Basil 
Oscroft's home during his schooldays was the ZNTI. 
See Ch. 3 above. Solomon's imbongi referred to these in 
the course of his interview with James Stuart in 1921. 
Webb and Wright (eds.), The James Stuart Archive, Vol. I, 
evidence of Hoye . kaSoxa1ase, 10/9/1921, p. 171. 
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146 H. Kuper, Sobhuza II: Ngwenyama and King of Swaziland 
(London, 1978), p. 101. See also the incidental 
reference to Solomon and Seme's land-buying activities 
in Johannesburg in SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, T. H. Hedges, 
District Commandant, SAP, Eshowe, to Dep. Comm., 
Natal SAP, 6/9/1923. Seme was introduced to the 
Queen Regent of Swaziland in 1912 by Richard Msimang, 
co-founder of the SANNC. Thereafter, Queen Labotsibeni 
financed Seme's paper, Abantu Batho and Seme became 
adviser to the young Sobhuza. Apart from the Sophiatown 
purchases, Seme's influence is reflected in the 
successful recruitment of young Swazi for the Native 
Labour Con tingen t dur ing \vor Id War I, t.he numerous 
petitions (drawn up by Seme) and deputations (including 
Seme) to England on the Swazi land issue and as protests 
against Swaziland's prospective inclusion into the 
Union of South Africa, Sobhuza's concern with education 
and the employment of funds from the 'Swazi National 
Fund' to establish a high school. Just as Seme had 
married into Zulu royalty, he also married one of 
Sobhuza II's maternal aunts. Sobhuza, incidentally, 
was educated at Lovedale in the Cape (Seme had wished 
Solomon and David to go there) and other high ranking 
Swazi's sons went to Dube's Ohlange Institute or 
Amanzimtoti College in Natal. That Sobhuza II was 
formally invested as Swazi king in December 1921 was 
undoubtedly a spur to Solomon's concurrent activities. 
There is a correlation between Seme's relationship with 
the Zulu and Swazi royal families. See Kuper, Sobhuza II, 
pp. 48-50, 64, 75-96, 104. 
147 For Oscroft, see, for example, CNC 509, 17/2, Rev. L. E. 
Oscroft to CNC, 24/1/1924. For Mr Grassi, see Pers. 
Comm., Ndesheni, part II, p. 16 (Ndesheni emphasises 
the financial burdens the house occassioned); and Mahlobo 
and Krige, ItTransition~, foo_tnote on p. 185 • . -
148 The following account is drawn primarily from my own 
visit to KwaDlamahlahla in 1982, · and the conversations 
I had with the caretaker andelderly persons resident 
nearby. Additional information was gained through 
correspondence with Mr. F. B. Oscroft, letter dated 
24/11/1981. Early photographs published in Ilanga 
lase Natal (eg. edition of 17/3/1933) prove that the 
KwaDlamahlahla I saw had not been altered since its 
construction. KwaDlamahlahla is now maintained as one 
of the residences of the present Zulu king, King Goodwill 
Zwelethini Zulu. 
149 KCAL, Killie Campbell Newscutting Book No. 30, ref. 
22160, Cape Times, 14/9/1946. 
150 Pers. Comm., F. B. Oscroft, letter dated 24/11/1981, and 
see also Reyher, Zulu Woman, p. 124. Interestingly, Reyher 
writes that Solomon had his children baptized so that they 
















Pers. Comm., Magogo, part II, pp. 11-14. 
G. R. Naidoo, "Buthe1ezi - the Man with the Key to 
Zu1ustan: the Rebel Chief of Zu1u1and", Drum, May 1964, 
p. 13, reporting Chief Buthe1ezi's account of his 
upbringing. 
Pers. Corom., Magogo, part II, p. 16. 
The Net, December 1922, p. 13~ and Pers. Comm., Ndesheni, 
part II, p. 12. Ndesheni was a student there at the 
same time. See CNC 509, 17/7, Rev. Oscroft to CNC, 
3/10/1922, enclosing list of pupils. 
CNC 509, 17/7, Rev. Oscroft to CNC, 21/12/1922, 
forwarding ZNTI Report, 1922. 
CNC 509, 17/7, Rev. Oscroft to CNC, 3/10/1922; and 
The Net, December 1922, 'Premier at the Zulu's Training 
School', p. 13. 
Pers. Comm., Ndesheni, part I, p. 5. 
JUS 575, 9491/30, T. H. Hedges, Sub. Inspector, SAP 
Nongoma, to District Commandant, Eshowe, 18/2/1922. 
See also Sergeant M. Monger, SAP Nongoma, to District 
Commandant, Eshowe, 7/1/1922. 
JUS 575, 949/30, CNC to Col. Douglas, CID, 26/5/1922. 
There was a further period of tension in mid-1923. 
See SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Dep. Corom., · CID Pretoria, to 
Dep. Comm., Natal SAP, 26/8/1923, forwarding Defence 
Department minute of 17/8/1923; and T. H. Hedges, 
Inspector, SAP Eshowe, to Dep. Comm., Natal SAP, 
30/8/1923. See also Reitz, No Outspan, pp. 64-66~ 
See CNC 509, 17/2, CNC to Rev. Oscroft, 14/1/1925; 
and 17/3, Rev. Oscroft to CNC, 18/1/1928, enclosing 
'ZNTI, Nongoma, General Report for the Year 1927'. 
Account of Maphelu, p. 110.; Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part 
II, p. 9 (Mahaye specifically states that Solomon 
'putting' Bokwe at the ZNTI healed the rift)~ Mkandandhlovu, 
pp. 10, 13; Ndesheni, part I, p. 5. Since the formation 
of the present-day Inkatha in 1976, the most important 
achievement of Solomon's reign has been held to be 
'his' formation of the first Inkatha. This is now 
taught to Zulu primary and secondary school pupils as 
a part of a compulsory course entitled 'The National 
Cultural Liberation Movement'. Mr. J. K. Dladla, 
Cultural Affairs Organizer, KwaZulu Government, kindly 
gave me a copy of the Department of Education and Culture's 
first draft syllabus for this course, dated 1978. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 17/3/1933, 'Ukufa kweNkosi USolomon: 
Nokungcwatsha kwake': and Pers. Comm., Ndesheni, part 
II, p. 5. 
For the earlier period see Ch. 2 above, and for the later 
period, see Ch. 5 below. 













As the son of Cetshwayo's elder half brother, it is 
likely that he was in his seventies during the 1920's. 
Although this was not a particularly great age, Kambi's 
constitution had been sapped by the bottle. 
Ahrens, From Bench to Bench, pp. 70, 74. For further 
details of the arrangements made for Kambi's 
domicile and the financial burdens to which the 
Ngentsheni were subject, see ibid., pp. 64-65. 
G. S. Moberley, A City Set on a Hill: A History of 
Eshowe (Pietermaritzburg, 1970), pp. 77-79. 
See the NNC evidence given before the Select, Committee 
on the 1917 Native Affairs Administration Bill, SC6A-'17, 
pp. 618 ff (note particularly the phrase " Queen 
Victoria, in her wisdom ••• ", frequ'ently repeated by none 
other than Josiah Gumede); and Natal Natives Land 
Committee, UG35-'18, pp. 699 ff. 
For clear and representatlve statements~ see SNA 11/5/4, 
Natal Local Lands Committee, evidence of Philip Ntaba, 
Ixopo, 6/10/1917; and Select Committee on the (1926) 
Native Bills, SC 10-'27, evidence of Natal kholwa 
chiefs, pp. 263ff. 
See Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 110ff; and 
CO 879/114, correspondence regarding appeals and 
deputations to the High Commissioner and British 
Government on the subject of the 1913 Act. John Dube, 
Rubusana, Sol Plaatje, Saul Msane and Thomas Mapikela 
were the leading figures. For Dube and Solomon's 
plans for a deputation to England after World \llar I, 
see Ch. '3 above. 
'Willan, "An African in Kimberley", p. 242. 
See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, part IIi and the comments 
in Ch. 1 above. 
NAD Report, U17-l911, p. 18. See also 'Su~~arized 
reports by Magistrates/Commissioners', pp. 335ff. 
Reyher, Zulu Woman, p. 224. 
No record of the visit of the Prince of Wales could be 
located in the NAD archives. The main source for the 
following account is the evidence given before court 
during the libel case Solomon brought against 
the Natal Mercury in 1927. The grounds of the case 
were the allegations of the magistrate of Eshowe, 
A. D. Graham(alias 'Zithulele'), published in the 
Natal Mercury of 13/6/1925, that Solomon's behaviour 
during the royal indaba had "constituted a direct insult 
to HRH". The evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, CNC, and 
Carl Faye, CNC's clerk and interpreter to the Prince in 
1925, are comprehensively reproduced in the Natal Mercury, 
6/5/1927 (hereafter Wheelwright's evidence and Faye's 
evidence). The evidence of o. Fynney, magistrate of 
Nongoma, is recorded in KCAL, Mrs. Mary Tyler Gray's 
Collection of Press Cuttings, Book 4, ref. 19958, p. 132, 
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unsourced cutting, n. d. (hereafter Fynney's evidence). 
(All these NAD officials, incidentally, gave evidence 
for the prosecution and contributed substantially to 
the successful outcome of the action: Solomon was 
awarded £600 damages with costs.) Other useful sources 
include The Net, September 1925, 'Zululand Welcomes 
the Prince', pp. 3ff; Moberley, .Eshowe, pp. 76ff; T. 
Aronson, Royal Ambassadors in South Africa, 1860-1947, 
pp. 9lff: and the authorized history of the Prince's 
tour, G. Wardprice, Through South Africa With the Prince 
(London, 1926), pp. l78ff. 
176 See the description in Wardprice, With the Prince, pp. 
179-180. 
177 Moberley, Eshowe, p. 78~ The Net, Sep~ember 1925, p. 4. 
l7B Fynney's evidence. 
179 Wheelwright's evidence. 
lBO This spontaneous display was one of many similar 
instances which together persuaded the magistrate of 
Eshowe (and other white witnesses) that Solomon should 
be punished. See the leading article by UZithulele' 
(magistrate of Eshowe) entitled 'The Royal Visit to 
Eshowe: Solomon's significant behaviour - Saluting the 
'King' - Whole Affair Premeditated", Natal Mercury, 
13/6/1925. 
lBl See Wardprice, With the Prince, pp. l79-lB2; and 
~'Jheelwright's evidence. During the libel case, the 
counsel for the defence sought to suggest that Solomon's 
dress itself was an affront to the Prince. 
lB2 Aronson, Royal Ambassadors, p. 92; l-10berley, Eshowe, p. 
Bl. 
183 See Wardprice, With the Prince, p. lB4; Aronson, Royal 
Ambassadors, p. 93; and Moberley, Eshowe, p. Bl. 
lB 4 Wheelwright ,. s evidence; and Moberley, Eshowe, p. Bl. 
lB5 Faye's evidence. Faye translated Solomon's statement 
for the Prince. 
186 Fynney's evidence. 
187 ~'Jheelwright' s evidence. 
lBB Fynney's evidence; Wheeh.,right's evidence. 
lB9 See below. 
190 See the various accounts in \'lhee1wright' s evidence; 
Aronson, Royal Ambassadors, pp. 92, 93; !v1oberley, 
Eshowe, pp. Bl, 82; Wardprice, With the Prince, pp. 185, 
186. 
191 It was the ambiguity of Solomon's actions that so 
infuriated certain white observers. That the court 
case was resolved in Solomon's favour is a measure of 
the subtlety with which he conducted himself. 
192 NAD officials were unaware of the enrolment of the 
Phondowendhlovu, and information regarding the precise 
time of its enrolment is unavailable. Ndesheni, for 
example, merely reports that it took place "at the time 
of the Prince of Wales' visit". Pers. Com.'ll., Ndesheni, 
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part I, p. 5. It seems, however, that a rudimentary 
ceremony was performed on the evening or day after the 
indaba, before the crowds dispersed. 
193 The issue of the rumour has many nuances and ramifications 
that can only be sketched here. The rumour is still 
alive today. For a clear statement, see Pers. Corom., 
Mahaye, part I, pp. 1-6. Mahaye, who fervently believes 
the appointment to have occurred (as a youth he attended 
the indaba), embellishes the legend by arguing that 
Solomon was appointed king in 1916 as a "foil" to the 
disloyal Boers during World \,lar I, but it was only in 
1925 that Solomon was officially informed of this. 
He incorrectly argues that Solomon's stipend was paid 
from England and not South Africa - and hence that 
Solomon had a special relationship with British royalty. 
It transpired that this inaccuracy sterns from the role 
of the Governor-General as 'Supreme Chief' (ie. the 
payer of stipends) in Natal, where the Governor-General 
in Solomon's time was always a member of the British 
aristocracy. Mahaye further argues that the real 
reason for the court case after the indaba was a Natal 
attempt to prevent "the truth" of Solomon's appointment 
from leaking out. See ibid., part I, pp. 11, 12; 
part II, pp. 13, 14. Ndesheni (who also attended the 
indaba) states that he was too young to tru~y understand 
the proceedings, but it was clear that the Prince and 
Solomon"were in agreement in their talks about this 
country. The Prince of Wales said something about it 
belonging to the Zulus and to Solomon." Pers. Corom., 
Ndesheni, part I, p. 7. At the time, the rumour was 
sometimes expressed with a subtly different emphasis: 
the Prince had not so much 'restored Solomon to 
Zululand' as 'restored Zululand to Solomon', with the 
implication that Europeans would be turned out. See 
NEC, Box 4, evidence of Sir Charles Saunders, Melmoth, 
29/9/1930, p. 1897, and below. 
194 A copy is to be found in NTS 7205, 20/326, together with 
NAD correspondence on the matter. 
195 See CK 9A 2: XB 13: 91, biographical notes on Bhengu; 
and 1-18 MAR, File 50, KCM 2761 (d), Zulu Chieftainship 
Dispute, 1945, Board of Inquiry, evidence of Simpson 
Bhengu, pp. 92, 109. In the latter Bhengu seems to 
suggest that he had nothing to do with Solomon before 
1929. He had good cause to attempt to minimize his 
association with Solomon since he was deeply implicated 
in the financial scandals that characterized Solomon's 
later life - and though Solomon ignored the NAD's 
repeated injunctions to sack him, the more compliant 
Mshiyeni (Zulu regent after Solomon's death) fully 















Nongoma district in 1934. Leonard Ncapayi was a kholwa 
Zulu from Groutville, and had once served Dinuzulu 
as a secretary. He replaced Simelane in 1926. NTS 
7205, 20/326, report of the Annual Meeting of the Inkata 
kaZulu, 1926, by Rev. L. E. Oscroft, 6/10/1926, p. 4. 
The front-page advertisements referred to here appeared 
frequently on Ilanga lase Natal's editions during 1929 
and 1930. 
JUS 408, 4/323/25, Capt. L. Smith to District Staff 
Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 21/7/1925, enclosing copy 
of correspondence received from a "reliable" source. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, R. M. Tanner, Magistrate Lower Umfolosi, 
to CNC, 28/9/1925. 
Ibid. His informant here was Chief Hsiyana (Msiyane) 
of his district. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate Eshowe to CNC, 21/9/1925. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, E. N. Braatvedt, Magistrate 
Mtunzini, to CNC, 8/10/1925. For NAD correspondence 
in a similar vein, see CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925, and 
enclosed minutes from magistrates in Zululand; and 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925 and enclosures 
(the same letter, but with additional accompanying 
material) • 
JUS 408, 4/323/25, Divisional Staff Officer, No. 6 
Military District, Standerton, to Chief of General 
Staff, Union Defence Force, 11/7/1925. 
Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, p. 103. For Solomon's earlier 
association with Mvuyana, see Ch. 3 above." 
Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, p. 103. The Hymn quoted is 
Hymn number 116 of the 'Nazarite Hymnbook'. See also 
Sundkler, Zulu Zion, p. 168. 
In this regard, see the sympathetic and perceptive 
com:raentary entitled 'A Nation Without a Leader' in 
The Net, March 1927, pp. 12, 13, which identifies the 
"new desire for real unity" among the Zulu that followed 
the indaba. 
The key documents in this regard are NTS 7205, 20/326, 
CNC to SNA, 10/11/1923, enclosing transcription of 
Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 28/10/1923~ Magistrate 
Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924: and the two vital inter-
changes CNC to SNA, 7/2/1924 and SNA to CNC, 28/2/1924. 
See also SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of 
Inkatha meeting, n.d., enclosed in CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924; 
and the remarks in SAP 41, 6/953/23/1, Dep. Corom., 
Natal SAP, to Secretary, SAP, Pretoria, 25/11/1924. 
This was clear from the CNC's attempts to delay the 
interview with Sime1ane in 1921. See in particular 
CNC PMB 92, 64/2, CNC to Magistrate Nongoma, 15/4/1921. 
The opposition was not confined to the Natal NAD. Senator 
Schofield, for example, questioned the Minister of 









recognise it. NTS 7205 20/326, unsigned memoranduM 
reo 'Questions asked of the Minister of Native Affairs 
in the Senate', 14/7/1925; and accompanying minute 
CNC to SNA, 10/7/1925. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to CNC, 12/11/1924. Herbst 
astutely compared the development of Inkatha to 
developments in the Transvaal. "Here in the Transvaal 
The Congress has done untold harm in the Locations 
Lreserve~and are LsicJ fast undermining the authority 
of the Chiefs. They are clever enough in Natal to begin 
on the side of the chiefs, but as soon as they find their 
feet, oyer will go the Chiefs." Ibid. 
See the CNC's extensive memorandum on the subject in 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 28/11/1924, especially 
pp. 2-5. Both the SNA and CNC were far more in favour ' 
of establishing councils in Natal on the lines of those 
existent in Pondoland. These offered the advantages 
of integrating the tribal order directly with the 
composition and operation of the councils (in effect 
'chiefs councils' l, and retaining considerable power 
in the hands of the local NAD official. However, the 
Pondoland councils were modelled on the Transkeian 
Proclamations that followed on the Cape Colony's Glen 
Grey Act - and not the Union's 1920 Act. If they were 
to be implemented in Natal, the NAD would have to make 
special arrangements with the Native Affairs Commission 
and calIon the Governor-General, as Supreme Chief, 
to utilize .his powers to rule by proclamation. Faced 
with these 'difficulties', together with the prospect 
of establishing 'deviationist' precedents, the prospect 
of practical action dissolved. As the CNC put it, there 
was the "practical difficulty in overcoming that 
sentiment which mistakenly regards the 119207 Act as 
the Magna Carta of the South African Natives". Ibid., 
p. 4. See alsoSNAtoCNC,12/11/1924 and 6/1/1925. 
CNC PMB 84, 88/7/4, CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925, p. 4. 
This is evident in Wheelwright's and Faye's evidence 
before the court case that followed the indaba, Natal 
Mercury, 6/5/1927. For an impression of the CPSA 
view, see the tenor of the leading report of the indaba 
in The Net, September 1928, 'Zululand tvelcomes the 
Prince', pp. 3ff. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/7/1925, p. 1. 
CNC PMB 84, 88/7/4, CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925. 
For the basic purposes and provisions of the 1925 Tax 
Act, see Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 99, 100. 
The purposes are more clearly stated in the relevant 
Native Affairs sessions in the House of Assembly. See 
Debates of the House of Assembly, speeches by Payn 
(Tembuland), Marwick,and the Minister of Finance, 9/7/1925, 


















(Newcastle), 13/7/1925, cols. 5974-5980. 
CNC PMB 84, 88/7/4, CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925, p. 1. 
Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
Ibid., p. 4. 
See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 30/11/1925, in which 
the CNC refers to this meeting. No record of the 
proceedings appears to survive. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 30/11/1925 and 5/2/1926 
(re. stopping of Inkatha collections); and CNC's 
circular to all magistrates in Natal, 21/1/1926 (re. 
Solomon's present and future status). 
See below. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, extract from Natal Mercury, 31/10/1925, 
reporting Inkatha meeting of 6-8/10/1925. Interestingly, 
the meeting is referred to as .. the sixth annual meeting, 
which suggests that Inkatha was inaugurated in 1920, 
a year before Simelane and Mnyaiza approached the NAD. 
Ibid. Previously the NAD had kept itself informed through 
its own officials acting in the capacity of 'government 
spies'. 
This was featured on the Inkatha leaflet advertising 
the 1925 meeting, a copy of which is to be found in 
NTS 7205, 20/326. 
Natal Mercury, 31/10/1925, report of Inkatha meeting. 
These responses can not be exclusively regarded as 
forms of active protest, for they were also a reflection 
of the breakdown of 'old tribal disciplin~. The formal 
political organisations that blossomed in the later 
1920's did not supersede these responses as much as they did 
not halt 'social disintegration'. See also Ch. 5 below. 
H. Bradford, "Lynch Law and Labourers: the ICU in 
Umvoti, 1927-1928" (presented at the History Workshop, 
University of Witwatersrand, February 1984), pp. 3-11. 
Marks, "Ideology of Segregation", p. 185. 
The most comprehensive source on Champion is M. W. 
Swanson, The Views of Mahlati (Pietermaritzburg, 1983), 
(Mahlati was Champion's journalistic nom-de-plume). 
The outlines of his life are recorded in Karis and 
Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 4, pp. 18-19, 
and some of Champion's own reminiscences are located 
in A. W. G. Champion Collection, Documentation Centre 
for African Studies, University of South Africa, Pretoria 
(hereafter AWGC) • 
For the 'African Workers' Club' (after 1928 the 'Natal 
Workers' Club') see AWGC Box 3, Files 4.l,and 5.1 to 
5.3, and for a brief account of the Bantu Social Centres, 
see Couzens, "Moralizing leisure time", pp. 318, 329ff. 
For the initiation of this scheme, see University of the 
Witwatersrand, Department of Historical and Literary 
Papers, Champion Papers (hereafter MS CHAM), A 922/A, 














white politicians and land speculators. Some of the 
material I collected on Champion and Clermont has 
been analysed by M. W. Swanson in "The Rise of Clermont" 
(presented to the workshop on African urban life in 
Durban, University of Natal, Durban, 1983). For 
Champion and the 1929 Beer Hall riots, see Paul La 
IIausse's forthcoming "The struggle for the City: Alcohol, 
Ematsheni and popular Culture in Durban, 1902-1936" 
(unpublished r1A thesis, University of Cape Town, 1984). 
(I was able to see a section of this thesis while it 
was still being examined.) 
The phrase used is in Bradford, "Social or ig ins of ICU 
leadership", p. 295. For further reference to ICU 
activities, see Ch. 5 below. 
Specifically, this was reflected in the ICU's 
campaigns for a minimum wage .in East London and 
Bloemfontein, and the race riot that erupted in 
Bloemfontein following a police liquor raid. See Roux, 
Time Longer than Rope, pp. 157, 158. 
CNC PMB 92, 64/2, J. Gumede, President NNC, to CNC, 
17/3/1926, forwarding resolutions of NNC meeting. 
JUS 408, 4/323/25, Staff Officer,No. 6 ~ilitary District, 
Standerton, To Chief of General Staff, Union Defence 
Force, Pretoria, 11/7/1925, also reporting the feelings 
of local magistrates. 
Ibid. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 1/3/1926. 
Ibid. 
Joel Msimang (founder of the Independent Methodist 
Church of South Africa, circa 1910), Z. r.1simang (pastor 
and member of the Wesleyan l-1ethodist District Committee, 
Natal, 1909), Selby Msimang (prominent in the SANNC 
and also ICUduring the 1920's), and Richard Msimang 
(son of Joel, graduate of Dube's Ohlange Institute, 
British-trained solicitor, founder-member and legal 
adviser to the SANNC, and principal author - in 
collaboration with W. W. Ndhlovu - cf the 1919 
SANNC constitution). See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 
p. 70; Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 
Vol. 4, p. 106. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, 'Inkata kaZulu, Zulu National Council', 
Constitution dated 5/2/1926 at Durban, authorized by 
W. F. Bhulose, President Elect, p. 1, enclosed in CNC 
to SNA, 1/3/1926. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., pp. 2-5. 
Ibid., pp. 3, 4. Although the constitution set out 
rules for the election of office-bearers, discussion 
of subjects introduced from the assembl~ and voting 
on motions put to the assembly, it did not make it 
clear that the executive was necessarily responsible 
to the assembly. 
~o 
244 A copy is to be found in KCAL, George Heaton Nicholls 
Collection (hereafter MS NIC) 2.08.1, File 2, KCM 
3305 (a),'Mnyayiza ka Ndabuko and Franz Zulu 
[signatories], By Authority of the Nation', to the 
Rt. Hon. Gen. Hertzog, Prime Minister and Minister 
of Native Affairs, n. d. NAD correspondence relating 
to this petition is located in CNC PMB 81, 88/7/1, 
notes of interview between CNC and Solomon, 13/1/1927; 
memorandum by Magistrate Nongoma, 29/1/1927; and CNC 
to SNA, 14/2/1927. 
245 See NTS 7205, 20/326, report of the'Annual Meeting of 
the Inkata ka Zulu~ 1926, by Rev. L. E. Oscroft, 
6/10/1926, p. 3. The Native Recruiting Corporation 
covered all expenses connected with Mankulumana's 
death and the return of his body to Zululand - although 
it subsequently reclaimed its £115/14/2 outlay from 
Solomon. Solomon instructed Franz to conduct a collection 
in Johannesburg mining compounds for this purpose. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, H. M. Taberer, Native Labour 
Adviser, Johannesburg, to Major H. S. Cooke, Director 
of Native Labour, Johannesburg, 4/3/1930. 
246 See, for example, Reitz's glowing account of the way 
in which Mankulumana transformed the tension between 
the Usuthu and Mandlakazi into jocularity on the 
occasion of a public gathering in 1922. Reitz, No 
Outspan, pp. 65-67. --
247 MS NIC 2.08.1, File 2, KCM 3305 (a), royal petition to 
Hertzog, p. 1. 
248 See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, CNC to SNA, 14/2/1927: and 
memorandum by Magistrate Nongoma, 29/1/1927. 
249 Evidently Lord Buxton's translator on the day of the 
1917 indaba did not faithfully translate all the nuances 
and subtleties of the official address, and this 
provided the opportunity for the petitioners to 
misrepresent the facts. See Solomon's further 
communication on this issue, CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, 
Solomon kaDinuzulu to Magistrate Nongoma, 4/7/1927 
(Zulu typescript and NAD translation). Fynney (whose 
views must be treated with some caution for he was 
not an unemotional supporter of Solomon and Inkatha in 
the late 1920 s) held that Buxton's interpreter ended 
the address with the words "obey him" (meaning Solomon) 
unbeknown to Lord Buxton. Natal Witness, 17/9/1931, 
'Ex-Magistrate's Opinion: Inkata Ignored by Government.' 
250 MS NIC 2.08.1, File 2, KCM 3305 (a), royal petition 
to Hertzog, pp. 2, 3. 
251 Ibid., p. 2. 
252 See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 1/3/1926; SNA to CNC, 
25/3/1926;and CNC's printed circular to all Natal 
magistrates, 8/4/1926. 
511 
253 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, memorandum by Magistrate Nongoma, 
29/1/1927. 
254 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, CNC to SNA, 14/2/1927. 
255 NTS 7205, 20/326, report of Inkatha meeting, 1926, by 
Rev. L. E. Oscroft, 6/10/1926, pp. 1, 3. 
256 Ibid., p. 4. 
257 Ibid., p. 3. Unfortunately Oscroft does not comment on 
the substance of their differences. 
258 Davenport, South Africa, p. 206. 
259 NTS 7205, 20/326, report of Inkatha meeting, 1926, by 
Rev. L. E. Oscroft, 6/10/1926, p. 3. 
260 It is likely that M. L. E. Maling (sometimes referred 
to as 'Malinga')was related to the P. Maling who was 
a founder member of the NNC. The latter also acted 
as a representative to the kholwa Chief Gule of a 
Wesleyan Methodist community near Newcastl~, Northern 
Natal. See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 71. This 
summary of M. L. E. Maling's activities has been pieced 
together from a number of sources: NEC Box 4, evidence 
of M. L. E. Maling, 'exempted Native~ Vryheid, 20/9/1930, 
pp. 1563ff; evidence of C. A. W. Wheelwright, former 
CNC,Mtubatuba, 25/9/1930, pp. 1762-1764; and NTS 280, 
227/53, "Matters concerning Northern Natal land and 
labour", which contains official correspondence on the 
subject of Malin~s activities, particularly during 
1927 and 1928. 
261 See references in NTS 280, 227/53, CNC's report on 
'Labour Conditions in Northern Districts of Natal -
Malinga 1 , 9/2/1928, pp. 1,2. 
262 NTS 280, 227/53 ,CNC to SNA, 23/9/1927. 
263 NTS 7205, 20/326, report of Inkatha meeting, 1926, by 
Rev. L. E. Oscroft, 6/10/1926, p. 2. 
264 Ibid~, pp. 3,4. 
Footnotes to Chapter 5 
1 The figure is calculated from the table cited in 
Lacey, Boroko, appendix A.l, p. 380. It does not 
only represent the natural increase of the reserve 
population, for considerable numbers of Zulu moved 
from the white-owned farms to the reserves during 
this period (see below). "Inland" in this context 
refers to the Nongoma, Mahlabatini, Emtonjaneni 
(Melmoth), Eshowe, Nkandla and Nquthu districts. 
2 See NEC Box 4, evidence of Archdeacon A. W. Lee, 
Vryheid, 18/9/1930, p. 1414; Chief Mgixo (kaZiwedu 
kaMpande Zulu), Nongoma, 24/9/1930; G. M. Robinson 
(representative of Zululand Farmers' Union), 
Empangeni, 26/9/1930, pp. 1842-3; and, on the need for 
stock reduction, Box 7, evidence of John Dube, Durban, 
2/4/1931, p. 6266. 
3 The percentage is calculated from a comparative statement 
of African cattle holdings in Northern Natal between 
1925 and 1927, compiled by the NAD. NTS 280, 227/53, 
CNC's report entitled 'Labour Conditions in Northern 
Natal - Malinga', 9/2/1928, Annexure 2, 'Stock'. 
4 Pers. Comm., Ndesheni, part III, p. 21. 
5 Natal Witness, 17/9/1931. 
6 Oscroft observed that "famine and lack of employment 
is working sad havoc amongst the people". MS NIC 
2.08.1, File 5, L. E. Oscroft to G. H. Nicholls, 
14/5/1932. See also SASJ, Vol. 15, No. 10, October 
1931, p. 653; and Natar-Advertizer, 17/9/1931. 
7 CNC PMB 97, 68/33, SNA to CNC, 25/1/1932. 
8 Ibid. 
9 This represents a fundamental depature from the 
traditional function of zulu cattle ownership. Part-
icularly in Northern Natal, Zulu had been forced to 
sell their cattle for food even before the famine 
(see below). E. N. Braatvedt (~agistrate Nongoma from 
1931) initiated cattle sales in the reserves. See 
his Roaming Zululand with a Native Commissioner 
(Pietermaritzburg, 1949), pp. 115, 116; the extensive 
NAD correspondence on the matter in CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4; 
and Natal Witness, 16/10/1931, 17/10/1931. 
10 For the sugar industry's efforts to recruit Zulu, see 
SASJ, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1925, pp. 741ff; Vol. 
g;-No. 12, December 1925, pp. 817ff; Vol. 15, No. 12, 
December 1931, pp. 761ff. For poor wages, health and 
working conditions, see SASJ, Congress and Exhibition 
Number, 1924, articles by Dr. G. A. Park-Ross (regional 
Medical Officer of Health), pp. 67ff; C. A. Wheelwright, 
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A copy of the above ICU pamphlet is to be found in MS 
MAR, File 74, KCM 8346. 
LChampiozy, "The Truth about the ICU," pp. 26-27. 
For Gumede's 1924 presidential address, see Ch. 4 above: 
and for NNC invitation to Solomon, see CNC PMB 92, 64/2, 
D. J. Sioka, General Secretary, NNC, to CNC, 19/7/1926. 
See above. 
See Ch. 4 ahove. 
NEC Box 4, evidence of L. E. Oscroft, 22/9/1930~ p. 1636. 
La Hausse, "Struggle for the City," pp. 273, 274. 
Ibid., pp. 222, 274, 275. 
For further details of the ·secession of the Natal ICU, 
see Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 175ff, and P. Wickins, 



























LA. W. G. Champio!y, "Meh1omada1a" (Zulu-English 
pamphlet, n. d.), in which Champion quotes a 17tter he 
received from Kada1ie, dated 5/6/1928, express1ng concern 
that the Natal ICU had seceded from the "Great ICU". 
A copy of this pamphlet is to be found in AWGC Box 2: 
3.2.2. 
See CNC PMB 81, 57/7/3, Head Constable, SAP Ladysmith, 
to District Commandant, Dundee, 13/2/1928; and 58/7/3, 
A. E. Trigger, Divisional CID Officer, Johannesburg, to 
Divisional CID Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 22/2/1928. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Inspector T. W. Hedges, SAP Eshowe, 
to Dep. Comm., SAP Pietermaritzburg, 5/4/1928. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, . A. E. Trigger, Divisional CID 
Officer, Johannesburg, to Divisional CID Officer, 
Pietermaritzburg, 22/2/1928. For Mote, see ROux, Time 
Longer than Rope, pp. 168, 178. 
CNC PMB 81, 57/7/3, handwritten NAD fragment, unaddressed 
and unsigned, 16/2/1928. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Inspector T. W. Hedges, SAP Eshowe, 
to Dep. Comm., SAP Pietermaritzburg, 5/4/1928. 
CNC PMB 81, 57/17/3, Magistrate Vryheid to CNC, 15/2/1928. 
MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, J. H. Nicolson to G. Heaton-
Nicholls, 8/2/1928. See below for further details. 
See below. 
See Ch. 4 above. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 15/11/1927. 
Ibid., and enclosed translation of Mathe's report of 
Inkatha meeting, Mahashini, 31/10/1927. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, Magistrate Emtonjaneni to CNC, 
9/3/1927. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, Solomon kaDinuzulu to Magistrate 
Nongoma, 4/7/1927 (signed by "L. N." - Leonard Ncapayi 
- on behalf of Solomon). 
See Ch. 4 above. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, CNC to Magistrate Nongoma, 9/7/1927. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, CNC to Magistrate Nongoma, 13/7/1927. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, translation of Solomon's views in 
Ilanga lase Natal, 12/8/1927. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Bishop of Zulu land (Vyvyan) to CNC, 
3/9/1927. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 19/10/1927. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to Bishop of Zululand, 8/11/1927. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 20/4/1928. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 23/4/1928. 
See Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1924, 
UG 40-'25, minutes of Native Conference, Pretoria, 27-
29/9/1924, pp. 19-20; and 1925-1926, UG 17-'27, minutes 
of Native Conferences, Pretoria, 2-6/12/1925, pp. 13-21, 
and 2~5/11/1926, pp. 50ff. 
Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1925-1926 UG 17-'27 . , , 
m1nutes of Native Conference, Pretoria, 2-5/11/1926, pp. 
56-73, 83, 84 (for the debate); and p. 74 (Msiyane); 













See P. Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in 
South Africa (London, 1970), especially pp. 113ff. 
For the Transvaal in particular, see Bonner, nThe 
Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920", p. 304i and 
for Natal, see Ch. 4 above. 
Select Committee Report on the Native Bills, SC 10-'27, 
evidence of Rev. Z. R. Mahambane (ANC president), 
1/6/1927, pp. 299, 300. 
Ibid., evidence of Chief W. Khumalo (member of the 
South African Chiefs' Convention), 1/6/1927, p. 289. 
Ibid., evidence of Chief W. Khumalo, Rev. Z. R. 
Mahambane, and Mr. J. D. Ngoso, 1/6/1927, pp. 289, 
295, 299, 300. News of the formation of the Chiefs' 
Convention was not welcomed by all chiefs in Natal. 
See evidence of Chiefs Kula and Swayimana, 15/6/1927, 
pp. 382ff. The latter argued that "we do not feel 
the need to keep in touch with Natives in other 
provinces LP~ to listen to these young people who 
think because they have book learning they know much 
more than I do". Ibid. 
See below. 
This overview of the Communist role in African politics 
has been drawn from the following sources: Roux, Time 
Longer than Rope, especially Ch. XVIIi Davenport,-sDUth 
Africa, pp. 211ff; and N. Weyl, Traitors End: The rise 
and fall of the Communist Movement in Southern Africa 
(New York, 1970), Ch. 5. (Note: Weyl's work must be 
treated with some circumspection. It takes the form 
of an anti-communist polemic written from the 
perspective of the 1960s - in celebration of the 'South 
African David' having shattered the 'Communist Goliath' 
"without abandoning parliamentary government, due 
process of law, or the independence and vigilance of 
the judiciary" cp.~. It is nonetheless a useful factual 
source.) For further details on the Federation of 
Non-European Trades Unions, see J. Lewis, "'The new 
unionism': industrialisation and industrial unions in 
South Africa, 1925-1930", in Webster (ed.), Essays in 
Southern African Labour History, pp. 121ff. 
ROux, Time Longer "than Rope, pp. 211, 212. 
The Missionary Herald, May 1926, p. 194. 
The Net, March 1928, p. 6, Bishop's letter. 
For the resolutions of the 1927 Chiefs' Convention, 
see Select Committee Report on the Native Bills, SC 
10-'27, 'Resolutions of Convention of Bantu Chiefs', 
15/4/1927, pp. 292ff. 
Extant documentation on the history of the NNC/Natal 
African Congress during the mid- to late-1920s is 
extremely scanty. For reference to the formation of 
the Natal African Congress, see Karis and Carter, From 














evidently withdrew from politics in Natal proper in 
order to concentrate on his educational work. See 
Marks, "The ambiguities of dependence". 
Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1925-1926, 
UG 17-'27, minutes of Native Conference, Pretoria, 
2-6/12/1925, pp. 13-18, 21. 
Marks, "The ambiguities of dependence", p. 25. 
R. J. Haines, "The Opposition to General J. B. M. 
Hertzog's Segregation Bills, 1925-1936: A Study in 
Extra-Parliamentary Protest"(unpublished HA thesis, 
University of Natal, Durban, 1978), p. 123. 
Select Committee Report on the Native Bills, SC 10-'27, 
'Resolutions of Convention of Bantu Chiefs', 15/4/1927, 
p. 292. 
Generally, what attractions this conference saw in the 
'Union Native Council Bill' were overshadowed by the 
impotency of the extant Native Conferences the Council 
was to supersede, together with the loss of the Cape 
African fr~nchise. See Report of the Native Affairs 
Commission, 1925-1926, UG 17-'27, minutes of Native 
Conference, Pretoria, 2-5/11/1926, pp. 56-84; and 
comments of Native Affairs Commissioner, pp. 42-49. 
For Mtimkulu, see ibid., p. 72. Mtimkulu was then 
acting as a representative of the 'Cape Native Voters' 
Convention'. See Select Committee Report on the Native 
Bills, SC 10-'27, evidence of Dr. C. T. ~oram, 6/2/1928, 
p. 73; and evidence of Prof. D. D. T. Jabavu, Dr. W. B. 
Rubusana, and Rev. A. Mtimkulu, 30/5/1927, p. 280. 
Despite this 'Cape interlude', he was a solid member 
of the Natal 'old guard'. For further details, see 
A. Luthuli, Let My People Go (London, 1963), pp. 86ff; 
and Haines, "Opposition to Hertzog's Native Bills", 
p. 166 (incorrectly typed as p. 165). 
See Ch. 4 above. 
Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 82, 83. 
Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 7, Hertzog's 
speech on the 'Native Affairs, 1920, Amendment Bill', 
17/5/1926, Col. 3560. 
Rogers, Native Administration, p. 83. 
For the SNA's and CNC's reservations about the 
appropriateness of the 1920 Act in Natal, see Ch. 4 
above; for the NAD's further deliberations on 'local 
council policy' in Natal, see below. 
For a useful an~lysis of the 1927 Act, see Lacey, 
Boroko, pp. 94ff. See below for some comment on the role 
of Natal legislators in this enactment. 
Lacey provides an illuminating contrast between the 
"erosion of the Cape African franChise", and the growth 
of the Natal-based "segregation ideal" in Boroko, pp. 
59-69, and 84ff respectively. See below reo Natal 












In this context, Dube's interest in the Pan-African 
Congress in 1924 is illustrative (see Ch. 4 above). 
For Seme, see for example his publication entitled 
"The African National Congress: is it dead?" (n. d., 
evidently circa 1932), especially pp. 1-6. A copy 
is reproduced in CK Reel l4A, 2: XS14: 84. 
Recently there have been some important commentaries 
on the relationship between anthropology and the 
ideology of segregation during the 1920s and 1930s: 
S. Dubow, "'Understanding the native mind': the impact 
of anthropological thought on segregationist discourse 
in South Africa, 1919-1933" (paper presented at the 
Workshop on Class, Community and Conflict, University 
of the Witwatersrand, February 1984); P. Rich, "The 
South African Institute of Race Relations and the debate 
on 'Race Relations', 1929-1958" (University of London, 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, collected seminar 
papers No. 28, The societies of Southern Africa in the 
19th and 20th centuries, Vol. 12); and see also Couzens, 
"Moralizing leisure time", pp. 3l7ff (which suggests 
but does not explore the existence of interconnections 
between anthropology, white liberals, and educated 
African opinion). The relationship between anthropology 
and the ideology of segregation on the one hand, and 
the changing political ideology of the African petty 
bourgeoisie in the 1920s and 1930s on the other hand, 
has not been explored in the extant literature. The 
main assertions that this dissertation makes in this 
respect are substantiated in the course of the narrative 
that follows; and in the further observations below 
on the development of petty bourgeois ideology in Natal. 
G. Heaton Nicholls,et aI, "Report of Special COI!lInittee 
on Natives' Land Commission: £11,000,000 per annum: 
A permanent asset worth more than the Rand is being 
thrown away" (published by the Zululand Planters' 
Union, 1917). A copy is stored in SNA 11/5/4. 
See MS CAMP, File 4, especially J. L. Dlibe to M. Campbell, 
29/10/1908; and Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", 
p. 174. 
See Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", p. 172, footnote 
50. G. H. Hulett maintained his interest in 'native 
affairs' in Natal in the 1920s - though in the late 
1920s he was one of the few 'sugar barons' who opposed 
an official resurrection of the Zulu monarchy. NEC 
Box 4, evidence of G. H. Hulett, Stanger, 2/10/1930, 
pp. 2002ff. 
See Ch. 4 above. 
See below. 
See Chs. 2 and 3 above. 
Natal Advertizer, 15/8/1917. 
It is interesting, too, that during the first world war 

























influence was behind the worker unrest in Durban in 
1918-1919. See Marks, "Ideology of segregation", p. 182. 
MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, J. H. Nicolson to G. Heaton 
Nicholls, 8/2/1928. 
Select Committee Report on the Native Bills, SC 10-'27, 
evidence of Chief Kula, 15/6/1927, pp. 382ff. 
Natal Advertizer, 7/2/1928. 
See MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, J. H. Nicolson to G. aeaton 
Nicholls, 8/2/1928 - the last paragraph of which made 
a cryptic reference to possible future arrangements. 
See MS MAR 2.08.5, File 74, KCM 8338, statement of 
'Cowley and Cowley' (acting for Kadalie) reo Natal 
Witness, 11/9/1926; Hawthorn, Cameron and Co. (acting 
for the Natal Witness) to J. Marwick, 21/3/1927; 
Marwick to Mr Advocate Carlisle, 16/4/1927; and copies 
of evidence Marwick assembled for the defence. 
MS MAR 2.08.5, File 74, KCM 8337, J. L. Dube to J. S. 
Marwick, 24/2/1928. 
Ibid. 
See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 9/11/1928. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928,reporting 
Campbell's 'recent' interview with the Minister. 
Confidential. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 20/4/1928. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to CNC, 5/5/1928. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, Nicolson and Thorpe to CNC, 25/4/1928. 
See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 30/4/1928; and CNC's 
circular to all magistrates in Natal and Zululand, 
7/5/1928. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, annual report of 'Inkata ka Zulu', 
6/6/1928, by L. E. Oscroft, p. 5. Oscroft's report is 
the main source for the account that follows. 
See above for details of Majozi~ 
NTS 7205, 20/326, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 
6/6/1928, pp. 1-4. For details re. Mahamba,see 
NEC Box 4, evidence of Rev. E. A. Mahamba, Dundee, 
17/9/1930, p. 1363; for Silimane, see also Ch. 4 
above. 
This was completed on 28/7/1928, which is the date that 
appears on the 'official' 1928 constitution. 
F?r an original copy of the 1928 constitution, bearing 
slgnat~res~ see NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 16/8/1928, 
encloslng Deed of Trust and Constitution of the Inkata 
ka Zulu', dated 28/7/1928. See Ch. 4 above for comment 
on the 1926 constitution. 
Ibid., preamble, p. 2. 
See below for an analysis of petty bourgeois interests 
in the 'modernisation' of the reserves. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, Inkatha constitution, 28/7/1928, 
pp. 4, 5. 
See ibid., pp. 5-14. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting 









NTS 7205, 20/326, 'Yearly Report of the Inkata Zulu', 
unsigned, n. d.; enclosed in CNC to SNA, 12/8/1929. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, report and resolutions of Inkatha 
chiefs' meeting, 16/8/1929, enclosed in NC (the term 
'magistrate' was superseded in the Natal NAD in 1929) 
Nongoma to CNC, 10/9/1929. For thorough reports of 
the Inkatha chiefs' meeting and its appointment of 
the "Komi ti ukuyo kala ePi toli" ("',Oommi ttee to wail 
at Pretoria'), see Ilanga lase Natal, 13/9/1929; and 
20/9/1929 (Zulu language reports only). 
NTS 7205, 20/326, report and resolutions of Inkatha 
chiefs' meeting, 16/8/1929, enclosed in NC Nongoma 
to CNC, 10/9/1929. The Zulu of course had fought 
after Cetshwayo's restoration, and it was as a 
consequence of the Boer/Usuthu alliance during the civil 
war that the territory now known as Northern Natal was 
alienated from the Zulu. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to CNC, 26/11/1929; see also CNC 
to SNA, 18/9/1929. 
Maling had conducted a meeting in Northern Natal to 
discuss what he should represent to the Native Economic 
Commission, and while giving evidence he produced 
documentary proof that he worked for Solomon in some 
capacity. The commissioners held that Solomon had 
repudiated any association with Maling. NEC Box 4, 
evidence of M. L. E. Maling, Vryheid, 20/9/1930, pp. 
1563-1568, 1572. 
lQiQ., pp. 1563, 1576, 1593. 
It is outside the scope of this dissertation to offer 
a thorough . commentary of white objectives in their own 
right. The following 'overview' seeks only to sketch, 
first, the deeper reasons for the 'white intervention' 
in Inkatha after 1928 and, second, how white interests 
sought to influence Inkatha's history. Very little 
work has been done on the political economy of Natal as 
a regional sub-system of the Union in the early post-
Union period (Bradford's work is an exception). Moreover, 
no thorough attempt has been made to explain the deter-
minants of the Natal 'native policy' proposals of the 
1920s and 1930s, nor the disproportionate influence that 
these had on state 'native policy' in the crucial period 
1925-1936. This overview, which dips into some of this 
'unexplored territory', is based mainly on the following 
sources: Debates of the House of Assembly; Reports (and 
evidence)of the Select Committees on Native Affairs; 
evidence given before the Native Economic Commission; 
the SASJ; and the G. Heaton Nicholls and J. S. Marwick 
manuscript collections in the KCAL. Footnote references 
are made only to the most illustrative sources. Note: 
The relationship between the 'inter-racial interchange' 
in the context of Inkatha and the Natal 'native policy' 
proposals that Nicholls and Marwick expounded in 
parliament and select committees throws important light on 
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the development of the ideology of segregation. The 
leading role played by Natal leaders, both white and 
African, in the refinement of segregationist thinking 
at state level calls out for detailed exposition. (In 
this regard, see the comments in Marks, "Ideology of 
segregation", pp. 173-177.) At an analytical level, such 
an exposition stands to contribute to the debate in 
South African historiography concerning the origins and 
dynamic of state 'native' and land policy. The evidence 
for Natal would seem to question the extant revisionist 
perspectives which tend to characterise, on the one 
hand, the state and the expressly economic interests that 
it represented as dictatorial and as the virtually 
exclusive progenitors of state policy; and, on the other 
hand, the African population as a passive object of state 
policy. (See, for example, Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap 
labour power"; Legassick, "Gold, agriculture, and 
secondary industry in South Africa, 1885-1970", in Palmer 
and Parsons (eds.), Roots of Rural Poverty; and for a 
'fractionalist' view, Lacey, Boroko, Chs. 4-7. A valuable 
critique of current perspectives is offered by S. Clarke, 
"Capital, fractions of capital and the state: 'neo-
Marxist' analysis of the South African state", Capital 
and Class, 5, 1978.) The Natal 'native policy' proposals 
were the outcome of considerable interchange between 
white and African political leaders - whether as allies 
or as opponents. In the light of Natal's strong influence 
on segregationist policy, it would appear that analyses 
of the origins and dynamic of state policyneed to look 
beyond the (by definition, white) interests whicn were 
dominant within the apparatus of the state, and identify 
more clearly the way in which African class action 
influenced the policy-making process. The confidential 
negotiations between Nicholls and Dube in 1931 regarding 
the former's thoroughgoing segregationist proposals -
which had a considerable influence on the 1936 'Native 
Acts' - is illustrative in this respect. (For reference 
to the Nicholls/Dube 'compact', see Marks, "Ambiguities 
of dependence", p. 178.) 
221 See, for example, MS CAMP, File 10, .. KCM 32795, type-
script report entitled 'Natal Sugar Association', 
unsigned, n. d. (1910?). 
222 For further details of the sugar industry's transition 
to African labour, see J. D. Beall and M. D. North-
Coombes, "The 1913 disturbances in Natal: the social 
and economic background to 'passive resistance'" (paper 
presented at the Workshop on Natal History, 1910-1961, 
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, October 1982), 
pp. 8fL 
223 SASJ, Vol. 1, No. 12, July 1918, p. 863. 
224 In response to a deputation of sugar representatives, 
~he NAD conducted a departmental committee of inquiry 
lnto the supply of labour to industries in Natal _ 
specifically the sugar and coal industries. The committee's 











beyond the province for,its lab~u: supply, was ~f , 
considerable influence ln redeflnlng the sugar lndustry s 
labour policy. See SASJ, Vol. 3, No.6, May 1919, 
pp. 373ff; and the frequent 'labour policy' debates 
in the SASJ throughout 1920. 
Re. the advantages of local labour, see the series of 
four articles in SASJ, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1925, 
pp. 707, 721, 741 and 770; and NEC Bo~ 4, evidence 
of the Zululand Farmers' Union (which mainly represented 
the Zululanu sugar planters), Empangeni, 26/9/1930, pp. 
1815ff. 
Cape Times, 11/5/1921, speeche~ by Marw~ck and N~cholls. 
The following sources are partlcularly ll1ustratlve: . 
ibid.; NEC Box 4, evidence of A. Wood (chairman of 
Ngogo Farmers' Association), Newcastle, 16/9/1930, .PP.1180 • 
Evidence of the Zululand Farmers' Union, Empan~eni 26/9/193C 
Report of the Select Committee on the Subject 
of the Natives Service Contract Bill, SC7-'31, evidence 
of J. P. W. Howden and S. B. Forrest (representing the 
South African Cane Growers' Association), Durban, 
11/3/1931, pp. lff; evidence of J. S. Marwick (rep-
resenting the Beaumont-Eston Farmers' Association, and 
with a "verbal mandate" from other Natal Farmers' 
Associations), Durban, 16/3/1931, pp. 9ff; Debates of the 
House of Assembly, Vol. I, speech by E. G. Jansen (MP 
for Vryheid), 17/3/1924, p. 891; Vol. 3, speech by 
Marwick, 23/3/1925, Cols. 1390ff; SASJ, Vol. 5, No.1, 
January 1921, pp. 55ff; Vol. 9, NO~, June 1925, pp. 
707, 721, 741ff, 770; Vol. 9, No. 12, December 1925, 
pp. 817ff; Vol. 15, No. 12, December 1931, p. 769. 
The Native Service Contract Act, which met many of their 
demands for 'tighter' labour legislation, was only 
enacted in 1932; moreover, it dealt primarily with 
labour tenancy agreements and therefore was of limited 
value to the sugar planters. 
NEC Box 4, evidence of J. A. Graham (spokesman for three 
Farmers' Associations), Dundee, 17/9/1930, pp. 1257, 
1258. 
NEC Box 4, evidence of A. Wood (chairman of the Ngogo 
Farmers' Association), Newcastle, 16/9/1930, pp. 1180, 
1186. 
See the comments abov e on the socio-economic origins o f 
rank-and-file militancy; and see also the treatment g i ven 
to labour tenancy arrangements in Chs. 2 and 4 above. 
Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 18, speech by 
Nicholls, 24/2/1932, Cols. 1401-1406; Vol. 19, speech 
by Nicholls, 9/5/1932, Cols. 4317-4322. For a summary 
of the 1932 Act, see Lacey, Boroko, pp. 169ff. A valuable 
insight into the interconnections between tribal 
authorities, tribalism, familial unity and Natal's 
commercial farmers tha t were embodied in the 'kraalhead' 
labour tenancy contract is provided in NEC Box 4, evidence 
of A. Wood, Newcastle, 16/9/1930, pp. 1180-1186. 
One of the questions that the Native Economic Commission 
asked its consultants in the rural districts of Natal 
related specifically to these practices; evidently they 
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were unique to Natal. See NEC Box 4. 
234 Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 2, speeches by 
Marwick and Mr Kentridge (MP for Troyeville, who 
denounced Marwick's suggestion), 20/8/1924, eols. 723, 
724. 
235 NEC Box 4, evidence of G. W. Higgs, Empangeni, 26/9/1930, 
pp. 1770-1775. 
236 NEC Boc 7, evidence of D. M. Eadie, (secretary, Natal 
Millers' Association), Durban, 2/4/1931, pp. 6197-6201. 
For a consideration of the relationship between homestead 
production in the reserves and the cheapness of migrant 
labour (in the context of state land and 'native' policy), 
see Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour power". 
237 See Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1919-1921, 
UG34-'22, p. 9. The sugar industry's attempts to enforce 
adherence to this Act through the formation of a 
'Recruiters' Association' in 1923 was of little success. 
See SASJ, Vol. 7, No. 12, December 1923, p. 995. 
238 SASJ, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1925, p. 741. Re. problems 
with recruited labour, see also ibid., pp. 707, 770; 
Vol. 9, No. 12, December 1925, pp:-a17-819; NEC Box 4, 
evidence of Zululand Farmers' Union, Empangeni, 26/9/1930, 
pp. 1815-1843; and Report of the Select Committee on 
the Subject of the Native Service Contract Bill, SC7-'31, 
evidence of the South African Cane Growers' Association, 
Durban, 11/3/1931, pp. 1-8. 
239 SASJ, Vol. 7, No. 10, October 1923, p. 802; and Vol. 9, 
No. 11, November 1925, p. 741. 
240 See the series of articles in SASJ, Congress and Exhibition 
Number, 1924, pp. 67-78; and for planters' objections 
to the proposals, see pp. 78-82. 
241 CNC PMB 97, 68/33, CNC to D. M. Eadie (secretary, South 
African Sugar Association), 24/2/1932. This scheme 
represented a homocidal attempt at blackmail for two 
reasons. First, if the homestead refused to comply with 
the labour demands, it could face starvation. Second, 
famine relief was being distributed almost exclusively 
in the worst-hit Zululand inland districts - where the 
inhabitants were just as prone to malaria as labourers 
from inland districts elsewhere in the Union. At the 
time, the SASJ itself reported that non-immune labourers 
were "dying in their hundreds" after working on the 
plantations. SASJ, Vol. 16, No.4, April 1932, p. 201. 
242 NEC Box 4, evidence of G. M. Robinson (representing 
the Zululand Farmers' Union), Empangeni, 26/9/1930, p. 
1830 (a). See also NEC Box 7, evidence of D. Saunders 
(acting chairman, Natal Sugar Hillers' Association), 
2/4/1931, p. 6214. The sugar industry could not 
satisfactorily implement the deferred pay scheme because 
of resistance from the labour force. 
243 CNC PHB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928 (confidential). 
244 For brief details of the 1928 Hocambique Convention see 
Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, No. '14, 
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1931-1932, p. 906. For planters' complaints, see 
for example, SASJ, Vol. 12, No. 12, December 1928, 
p. 737; and V~14, No.3, March 1930, p. 153. 
245 For Marwick, see Debates of the House of Assembly, 
Vol. 9, 20/6/1927, Cols. 5300-5308; see also Natal 
Mercury, 19/8/1927 (re. Kranskop district); Report of 
the Select Committee on the Native Bills, SC19-'27, 
evidence of F. Rowland, 16/2/1928, pp. 136-142 (re. 
Hammarsdale district). See also above. 
246 Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 10, question by 
Mr Nel (Ladysmith), 25/10/1927, Col. 208. 
247 Resolutions of the Rosebank Farmers' Association, quoted 
in Ilanga lase Natal, 3/5/1929, editorial. 
248 Select Committee Report on the Native Bills, SCIO-27, 
evidence of William Elliot, with Alexander Stone and 
August Jansen (representatives of the Natal Agricultural 
Union), 13/5/1927, pp. 86-110. See SASJ, Vol. 12, No.8, 
August 1928, p. 493, where G. H. Hullett states that sugar 
planters in Natal proper had authorised Elliot to 
represent them. 
249 See Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 7, speeches 
by M?rwick and Nicholls, 17/5/1926, Cols. 3560-3561. 
250 Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 8, speeches by 
Nicholls and Marwick, 28/3/1927, Cols. 1910-1917 and 
1927-1930 respectively. 
251 Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 9, speech by 
Marwick, 2/5/1927, Cols. 2990-2997; and MS MAR, File 
74, KCM 8343 (b) and (c), fragments of Marwick's notes 
reo Native Administration Bill, n. d. 
252 Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 9, speech by 
Nicholls, 28/4/1927, Cols. 2921-2929. The similarity 
between these views and those expressed by Solomon to 
the ZNTI is notable. 
253 MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 2, KCM 3307, fragment 
entitled . 'Native Affairs', n. d. 
254 MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 3, KCM 3323, handwritten 
draft memorandum, n.d. (1930?); see also Marks, "Ideology 
of segregation", pp. 180, 181. 
255 MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, G. Heaton-Nicholls 
to J. H. Zutphen, 28/5/1929. 
256 Ibid. 
257 MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 2, KCM 3303 (b); 
memorandum, carbon fragment, n. d. (1933?). 
258 MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, KCM 3362, unaddressed 
carbon fragment, n. d. (1929?). See also Bantu Affairs 
File 3, KCM 3323, handwritten draft memorandum, n. d. 
259 This was most explicitly expressed in the correspondence 
between Nicholls and Dube in late 1930 and early 1931, 
in which Nicholls was soliciting African support for 
the 'Natal' or 'adaptionist' proposal before the select 
committee. See in particular MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs 
File 5, KCM 3350 (a), document entitled 'The Land Settle-
ment', n. d.; and KCM 3350 (b), G. Heaton-Nicholls to 
Rev. John Dube, 11/2/1931. Marks comments on Dube's 





















pp. 178ff, and "Ideology of segregation", pp. 181ff. 
For a thorough exposition of Nicholls' ideas, see MS 
NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 3, KCM 3336, draft memo-
randum on 'native affairs' (35pp.), n. d. (1934?). 
Ilanga lase Natal, 5/4/1929. 
Quotations are taken from editions dated 26/4/1929; 
17/5/1929; and 22/11/1929. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 1/1/1932. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 5/4/1929. 
For details on Majozi, see above. Re. tennis, see Ilanga 
lase Natal, 19/4/1929, Zulu-language letter to the editor. 
NEC Box 4, evidence of Chief S. G. E. Majozi, Pieter-
maritzburg, 9/4/1931, pp. 6709-6718. 
NEC Box 4, evidence of Chiefs S. Mini and D. Sioka, 
Pietermaritzburg, 10/4/1931, pp. 6772-6773. See above, 
and Ch. 4 above for details of Mini and Sioka. 
NEC Box 7, evidence of V. S. Makanya, Durban, 2/4/1931, 
pp. 6303, 6304. See above reo ~eserve chiefs' response 
to the Bantu Youth League. 
Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 346; South African Outlook, 
1/11/1929, 'Bantu Men's Social Centre: Its Aims, Objects 
and Activities', p. 215. 
The deliberations of the select committees on the 'Native 
Bills' between 1927 and the mid 1930s were secret, and 
could not even be divulged to parliament. Re. African 
newspapers, see ROux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 342ff. 
South African Outlook, 1/8/1929, pp. 148-152; see also 
the illuminating article entitled "Communists and 
Christians" in the edition of 2/9/1929, pp. 168-169. 
South African Outlook, 2/11/1931, p. 209. 
South African Outlook, 1/11/1929, p. 215. 
On this question, see also the brief comments above, 
under the sub-heading 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 
1928'; and the relevant footnotes. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 5/4/1929; 12/4/1929. 
See Ch. 4 above reo Seme and Swazi/Zul~ royalty; and 
below for references to his association with Inkatha. 
For some illuminating views on his 'ethnic' interpretation 
of African nationalism, see CK Reel 14A, 2: XS14, which 
contains biographical notes on Seme, and several news-
cuttings. Of particular interest are Seme's obituary by 
J. K. Ngubane, Inkundla ya Bantu, 30/6/1951; and an 
article by Z. K. Matthews, Imvo, 25/11/1961. See also 
R. V. Selope-Thema's account of Seme's life in Drum, 
July 1953. ----
NEC Box 4, evidence of Chief Josiah Mqwebu (Umvoti Mission 
Reserve), Stanger, 2/10/1931, pp. 2036-2039. 
NEC Box 8, evidence of Dr. P. KaI. Seme, Johannesburg, 
6/5/1931, pp. 7427-7428. 
NEC Box 4, evidence of W. W. Ndhlovu, Vryheid, 20/9/1930, 
p. 1526; and for Dube, see footnote 280. More broadly, 
regarding commerce as well as craft trades and craft 
industries, see NEC Box 4, evidence of Phillip Mtembu 
(lawyer's clerk), Dundee, pp. 1358-1359; Mose Ntuli 
(spokesman cf the 'Committee' of the CPSA), pp. 1902-1903· 
Chief Josiah Mqwebu, pp. 2036-2039. ' 
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279 NEC Box 4, evidence of J. L. Dube, Durban, 2/4/1931, 
pp. 6228-6269. The most useful sections were pp. 6228-
6237 (land); and 6252-6259 and 6261-6269 (reserve 
development and tribalism). 
280 The plight of the rural petty bourgeoisie receives 
comment mainly in Ch.2; and above under the sub-heading 
'Economic crisis and social stratification among the 
Zulu' • 
281 See above; and refer to the originals of these statements 
for fuller substantiation of the assertions made here. 
282 See below for comments on the proposal to 'settle' 
Zululand on the model of the High Commission Territories. 
For a somewhat superficial but nonetheless illuminating 
overview of the political role of the monarchy and royal 
council in Swaziland during the 1920s and 1930s see Kuper, 
Sobhuza II, pp. 64-104. The Union-wide portent of Inkatha's 
drive for recognition was clearly expressed in the 'native 
policy' proposals represented an elaboration and 
theorisation of the 'local settlement' Nichol~s was 
attempting to implement in Natal through the medium of 
Solomon and Inkatha, and were strongly supported by Dube. 
See Marks, "Ambiguiti es of dependence", pp. 178-179; 
Haines, "Opposition to Hertzog's Segregation Bills", 
pp. 127ff; and Ch.6 below for further comment. 
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See Ch.5 arove,\mier subheading 'The reconsti tution of 
Inkatha, 1928'. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928 (personal note); 
NTS 7205, SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928 (official minute). 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 2/6/1928. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 21/6/1928; see also 
SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928; and NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 
23/4/1928, enclosing draft Inkatha constitution. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, report by E. N. Braatvedt reo Inkatha 
meeting, 11/6/1928. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, report of H. L. Gebers reo Inkatha 
meeting, 4/6/1928. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, N. W. Pringle (office of the CNC) to 
SNA, 15/6/1928. 
G. Heaton-Nicholls, South Africa in my time (London, 1961), 
p. 155. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 17/7/1928 (Strictly 
Confidential), p. 8. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 18/7/1928 (Confidential), 
p. l. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 17/7/1928 (Strictly 
Confidential), pp. 4-10. 
Ibid., pp. 9-10; and for the personal note, CNC to SNA, 
17/7/1928 (Private and Confidential). 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 18/7/1928 (Confidential), 
PP. 1-3. 
Natal Mercury, 6/5/1927. 
Natal Mercury, 7/8/1928. 
This was most clearly ' revealed in NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC 
to SNA, 23/4/1928. Here the CNC spoke of the activities 
of and divisions within the Natal ICU; ICU leaders' 
attempts to. gain Solomon's support; the communist 
penetration of the ANC; the likelihood of an ICU/ANC 
alliance; and Inkatha's opposition to such developments. 
Sections of this letter are quoted above. 
In this regard, see NEC Box 4, evidence of C. A. 
Wheelwright, Mtubatuba, 25/9/1930, pp. 1728-1730. Here, 
Wheelwright argued that, while he was CNC, he had strongly 
favoured the resurrection of the Zulu monarchy (ie. 
under NAD supervision) in principle, but had found that 
Solomon was too unreliable to be recognised. Significantly, 
Wheelwright also complained of the ftprejudices against 
anything in the shape of Paramountcy in Zululand" among 
whites. 
See CNC PMB 81, 57/7/3, 19/10/1927. The CNC argued here 
that it was essential to counter local officials' and 
Natal whites' antagonism towards Solomon, but in 50 
doing the NAD should not appear to be Solomon's 
"protagonist". An extract of this letter is quoted above. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 9/11/1928, reporting his 
interview with Fynney. . 
See NTS 7205, 20/326, Nicolson and Thorpe to CNC, 2/8/28, 
enclosing Deed of Trust and Constitution of Inkatha ka Zulu; 
CNC to SNA, 16/8/1928, forwarding the above; and SNA 












Background information about Norton is unavailable. 
However, he was certainly not a member of the Natal NAD 
'old guard'. It seems that Norton had at some stage been 
employed in the Transkei Territories. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 5/4/1929; 26/4/1929. By contrast, the 
'Zululand deputation' caused considerable excitement 
in the Transkei, and not only in the Bunga. Ahrens 
reported that some Xhosa hid themselves from Solomon, 
saying that they were afraid to look upon the descendant 
of Shaka. See Ahrens, From Bench to Bench, pp. 81-82. 
CNC PMB 108, 94/8, minutes and proceedings of native 
commissioners' conference, Durban, 14-16/5/1929. See also 
CNC PMB 109, 94/4, memorandum entitled 'Local Councils 
on Locations', n. d. L193~, which offers an overview 
of 'council policy' deliberations in Natal, 1929-1933. 
See NEC Box 4, evidence of C. F. Adams (Eshowe businessman), 
Nongoma, 22/9/1930, pp. 1669-1670. For comment on Adams, 
see below. For Solomon's personal views on the Bunga (ie. 
that it was too 'advanced' for Zululand) see NEC Box 
7, evidence of Chief Solomon Zulu, Pietermaritzburg, 
8/4/1931, pp. 6557-6558; and CNC PMB 108, 94/8, minutes 
of conference of native commissioners, 1929, statement by 
Gebers. 
See above. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, 'The Yearly Report of the Inkata Zulu', 
1929, enclosed in CNC to SNA, 12/8/1929. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, resolutions of Inkatha chiefs' meeting, 
13-16/8/1929 (all the quotations are taken from this 
source), enclosed in CNC to SNA, 10/9/1929; and Ilanga lase . 
Natal, 13/9/1929, 20/9/1929 (Zulu language reports). 
CNC PMB 109, 94/9, memorandum reo 'Local Councils on 
Locations', 1933. 
While Inkatha had always aimed to secure official 
recognition, in the period 1921 to 1927 Inkatha's 
leaders had also interested themselves in various 
practical projects (eg. the purchase of farms, 
encouragement of commercial agriculture, establishment 
of a Zulu National Church, and the erection of a monument 
to Shaka). Between 1928 and 1930, however, Inkatha's 
leaders singlemindedly focussed their attention on 
the attempt to secure official recognition - Inkatha 
was merely maintained as a representative political 
body which, in practical or 'self help' terms, was 
inactive. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, 'Yearly Report of the Inkata Zulu', 
1929, enclosed in CNC to SNA, 12/8/1929. 
31 NEC Box 4, evidence of C.P. Adams, Nongoma, 22/9/1980, 
pp. 1669-1670. 
32 NTS 7205, 20/326, 'Yearly Report of the Inkata Zulu', 
1929, enclosed in CNC to SNA, 12/8/1929. 
33 NEC Box 4, evidence of C.P.Adams, Nongoma, 22/9/1930, 
pp.1670-l672, 1616. 
34 Adams' activities in this respect are well documented for 
the period 1930-1933 in CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4. for his 
association with Nicholls since the early 1920s, see 
Nicholls, South Africa in my time, p. 150. 
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35 See Natal Witness, 17/9/1931; and below for further 
details. Re. Fynney and William Campbell, see Ch. 5 
above, under the subheading 'The reconstitution of 
Inkatha, 1928'. 
36 That 'Solomon's speech' to the ZNTI in early 1928 was 
in fact written by Nicholls is also significant in 
this context. See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 
'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928'. 
37 JUS 448, 4/267/28, Solomon kaDinuzulu to M3gistrate 
Nongoma, .9/6/l928; Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 12/6/1928; 
and CNC to SNA, 17/8/1928. 
38 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, District Commandant, Eshowe, to 
Magistrate Eshowe, 27/9/1929. 
39 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, District Commandant, Eshowe, to 
Magistrate Eshowe, 2/11/1929. 
~O C~C PMB 81, 58/7/3, Solomon kaDinuzulu to CNC, 30/11/1929. 
41 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 3/12/1929. 
42 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 26/11/1929. 
43 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Solomon kaDinuzulu to NC Nongoma, 
12/1/1930. The NAD refused this request, and also refused 
to support Solomon's application for an increased 
stipend. See CNC to NC Nongoma, 23/1/1930. 
44 CNC P1-in 81,58/7/3, District Commandant, Eshowe, to 
Magistrate Eshowe, 2/11/1929. 
45 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, untitled memorandum reo Solomon's 
attempts to be recognised as paramount chief, n. d. 
[193217; minutes of meeting between NC Eshowe and Eshowe 
chiefs and izinduna, 8/11/1929. The reaction of Zulu 
in the Eshowe district against Solomon should not, 
however, be overemphasised. The majority of the Eshowe 
chiefs at the above-mentioned indaba, for example, argued 
that they would always pay special respect to Solomon 
because he was 'the child' of preconquest Zulu monarchs. 
46 See La Hausse, "Drinking in a Cage", pp. 70-73. 
47 Ibid.; and Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 190ff.; 
for fuller treatment of the 1929 beer hall disturbances, 
see La Hausse's "Struggle for the City". The role played 
by the beer hall riots in persuading white political 
opinion of the increased urgency of combatting 'agitators' 
and 'communistic propaganda' is amply illustrated in 
the parliamentary debates on the 'Riotous Assemblies 
Bill'; in particular, see Debates of the House of 
Assembly, Vol. 14, speeches by Nicholls and Deane, 
26/3/1930, Cols. 2345-2354. 
48 Ilanga lase Natal,31/5/l929. 
49 Ilanga lase Natal, 6/9/1929 (Zulu language report). 
50 See Ch.5 above, under the subheading "The broader purpose 
of Inkatha's reconstitution". 
51 Ilanga lase Natal, 13/9/1929 (Zulu language report). 
52 See the observations in La Hau'sse, "Struggle for the 
City", especially pp. 220-224. 
53 For reference to this incident, together with the events 
recounted immediately above, see ROux, Time Longer than 
Rope, pp. 191-192. 
54 Ilanga lase Natal, 6/9/1929 (Zulu language report). 




56 Re. meetings on the cartwright Flats, see Roux, Time 
Longer than Rope, pp. 245-246. See above for further 
comment on the role played by Zulu nationalism during 
the beer hall boycott. 
57 Report of the District Commandant, SAP, 16/6/1930, quoted 
in La Hausse, "The Struggle for the City", pp. 222-223. 
La Hausse provides a detailed and illuminating account 
of this meeting, but his assertion that Solomon was 
present is incorrect. Solomon did attend an ICU meeting 
in 1930 - but it was in September. 
58 See below for references to Nicholls' contact with the 
Minister of Native Affairs and the Governor-General. 
59 See Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 19-23. For 
examples of the regional 'native legislation' proclaimed 
by the Governor-General after 1927, see pp. 26ff. 
60 For the Natal planter/farmer alliance including reference 
to the role of Jansen, see Ch. 5 above under the sub-
heading "The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution". 
See also the comments above reo the meeting between 
Dube and Jansen, arranged by Marwick. 
61 Specifically see Natal Witness, 25/7/1920 (re. the 
chairman of the 'Eshowe Town Board's' speech of welcome 
to Athlone, and the latter's reply); Natal Mercury, 
3/7/1930 (re. Athlone's address to the 'Society of 
Agriculture and Industry' in Durban). More generally, 
see the Natal Witness'and the Natal Mercury's coverage 
of Athlone's attendance at the Royal (Agricultural) 
Show, Pietermaritzburg, in mid-1930. 
62 Nicholls relates with some pride his role in the Governor-
General's 1930 tour of Zululand in his autobiography, 
South Africa in 'My Time, pp. 154-158. Significantly, 
Nicholls omits to relate Athlone's meeting with Solomon 
at Eshowe. 
63 For details of the Prince of Wales' tour of the province 
of Natal, together with comments on its significance 
for both the white and African population, see Ch. 4 
above under the subheading "The indaba with the Prince 
of Wales, 1925". Athlone's duties as Governor-General 
of the Union ended in 1930; he was succeeded by the Earl 
of Clarendon in January 1931. 
64 See Ch. 5 above under the subheading "The broader purpose 
of Inkatha's reconstitution". 
65 Summary of Nicholls' correspondence drawn from CNC PMB 
81, 58/7/3, G. Heaton-Nicholls to E. G. Jansen, 4/7/1930; 
16/7/1930; and 18/7/1930, enclosed in Under-SNA to CNC, 
30/7/1930. 
66 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, G. Heaton-Nicholls to E. G. Jansen, 
4/7/1930, enclosed in Under-SNA to CNC, 30/7/1930. 
67 CNC PMB, 58/7/3, E. G. Jansen to G. He.aton-Nicholls, 
12/7/1930, enclosed in Under-SNA to CNC, 30/7/1930. 
68 CNC PMB, 58/7/3, G. Heaton-Nicholls to E. G. Jansen, 




















CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Under-SNA to CNC, 30/7/1930, enclosing 
correspondence between Nicholls and Jansen. 
Institute of Contemporary History, University of the 
Orange Free State, E. G. Jansen Collection (hereafter 
EGJ) , File 140, handwritten covering note addressed to 
Mr Herbst, n.d., enclosing a copy of the Athlone 
memorandum, 18/9/1930. 
EGJ 140, Athlone memorandum, 18/9/1930, pp. 1-8. 
See Ch. 1 above, under the subheading "The'Basutoland-
ization' alternative". 
Before early 1930, Nicholls had not set out his 
'adaptationist policy' proposals formally and presented 
them to members of the house of assembly or government; 
he had only expressed his ideas in private letters and 
memoranda. See Ch. 5 above under the subheading "The 
broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution". After May 
1930, however, he presented his proposals in more 
systematic form before the select committee on 'native 
affairs'. See below. 
Although Nicholls' proposals described clearly how 
African local/national councils - whether tribal or 
elected - would be represented in the central white 
state by representatives in the senate, he did not spell 
out how the central white state would exert influence 
over the activities of the African councils - either in 
terms of which individuals/bodies within the former 
would have the authority to do so, or in terms of the 
powers of 'intervention' that they would have. For 
further details, see below. 
EGJ 140, Athlone memorandum, 18/9/1930, p. 8. 
This was evident in his actions while in Zululand, as 
will be shown below. 
Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, pp. 154-156. Perhaps 
understandably in view of what took place, Nicholls omits 
to describe the Governor-General's meeting with Solomon. 
Natal Witness, 25/7/1930, report of H. E.'s reception 
in Eshowe by Mr. C. E. Hoo-Foster, chairman of the Eshowe 
Town Board. 
EGJ 140, CNC's additional report reo the meeting of His 
Excellency the Governor-General with the Zulu, for the 
information of the Minister of Native Affairs, 15/8/1930. 
Ibid. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/?/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 12/8/1930, enclosing 
extract from Nongoma Bottle Store records. 
EGJ 140, CNC's additional report reo the meeting of His 
Excellency the Governor-General, 15/8/1930. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 8/8/1930. 
For various references to these events, see EGJ 140, 
Athlone's 'Remarks on CNC's Report', 13/8/1930; CNC's 
additional report reo the meeting of His Excellency the 
Governor-General, 15/8/1930; CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC 
to SNA, 9/8/1930; and Natal Mercury, 25/7/1930. 
Natal Mercury, 25/7/1930. The quotations reflect a 
necessarily loose t~anscription of Solomon's address. 
The reporter prefaced his report with the words "Solomon 




















The CNC described Solomon's address as "flagrant and 
insulting"'. CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 9/8/1930. 
Natal Mercury, 25/7/1930. 
See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 7/8/1930; 
and Natal Mercury, 25/7/1930. 
EGJ 140, 'Address of H. E. to Solomon ka Dinuzu1u, 
Nongoma',7/8/1930. 
See, for example, the tenor of his remarks in EGJ 140, 
Athlone to E. G. Jansen, 13/8/1930. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 8/8/1930, submitting 
comments on correspondence between G.H. Nicholls and 
E. G. J ·ansen, and memorandum on Solomon's official 
status. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 7/8/1930; and 
CNC to SNA, 9/8/1930. 
EGJ 140, E. G. Jansen to H. E. the Governor-General, 
11/8/1930. 
EGJ 140, Athlone's 'Remarks on Report of NC Eshowe', 
13/8/1930. 
EGJ 140, Athlone to E. G. Jansen, 13/8/1930; and the 
enclosed 'Remarks on Report of NC Eshowe'. 
See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to Dep. Comm., SAP, 
Pietermaritzburg, 26/8/1930; and Acting SNA to CNC, 
8/9/1930. See also EGJ 140, Minister of Native Affairs 
to Acting SNA reo 'Ex.Co. minute: Solomon ka Dinuzulu' 
(official minute and covering letter), n. d. 
EGJ 140, Athlone memorandum, 18/9/1930, pp. 1, 6. 
See the concluding paragraphs of Ch. 5 above for comment 
on the objectives of the 'reconstituted Inkatha'. 
See NTS 7205, 20/326, NC Piet Retief to SNA, 21/7/1930 
(re. the eastern Transvaal); and Ilanga lase Natal, 5/9/1930 
report of Inkatha meeting, 18-20/8/1930 (Zulu language 
report) • 
Only once previously had no white official or observer 
been present at an Inkatha annual general meeting. For 
details of the comparably directionless 1927 meeting, 
see Ch. 5 above, under the subheading "The reconstitution 
of Inkatha, 1928". 
See directly below; and also below under the subheading 
'Solomon's death'. 
The above overview of the 1930 meeting is drawn from 
Inkatha's authorised report, as published in Ilanga lase 
Natal, 5/9/1930 (Zulu language report). Although this 
report was necessarily circumspect and incomplete, 
particularly since it was 'authorised' by Simpson Bhengu, 
it nonetheless represents a very illuminating source 
on Inkatha's impending collapse. For the constitutional 
functions of Inkatha's annual general meetings, see the 
comments on the 1928 meeting and constitution in Ch. 5 
above, under the subheading "The reconstitution of 
Inkatha, 1928", together with relevant footnote references. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Detective Sergeant R. H. Arnold, 
CID, Durban, to O.I.C., ClD, 16/9/1930, reo Solomon's 
movements between 2 and 9/9/1930; and memorandum by the 
Commissioner of the SAP, Pretoria, for the information of 














See above comments on Hulett's evidence before the 
Native Economic Commission, reo 'Solomon's meetings' 
at Cartwright Flats. 
CNP PMB 81, 58/7/3, Detective Sergeant R. H. Arnold, 
CID, Durban, to O.I.C., CID, 16/9/1930. During an 
interview with the CNC on 22 September, Solomon confirmed 
that he ~nd Champion had spoken about these matters -
but implied that Champion had made the proposals rather 
than he. This was barely feasible: there were considerable 
political differences between the ICU yase Natal, which 
had played a leadership role during the beer-hall protests, 
and the NNC 'gentlemen's club'; and considerable personal 
acrimony existed between Champion and Dube. For Solomon's 
account of his meeting with Champion, see minutes of 
meeting between CNC and Chief Solomon, Nongoma, 22/9/1930, 
reo Solomon's association with the lCU yase Natal. 
Solomon also stated somewhat weakly that he wished to 
reprimand Champion for upsetting the white people during 
the beer-hall disturbances. CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, minutes 
of meeting between CNC and Chief Solomon, Nongoma, 
22/9/1930. 
AWGC Box 2: 3.3.4.1., Zulu language handbill headlined 
'lnkosi u Solomon ka Dinuzulu', signed by A. W. G. Champion, 
Durban, 4/9/1930. 
llanga lase Natal, 5/9/1930 (Zulu language advertisement). 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Detective Sergeant R. H. Arnold, 
CID, Durban, to O.I.C., CID, 16/9/1930; memorandum 
by the Commissioner of the SAP, Pretoria, for the inform-
ation of the Minister of Justice, 19/9/1930; and minutes 
of interviews between CNC and Chief Solomon, Nongoma, 
22/9/1930. 
ROux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 192-193. 
La Hausse, "Struggle for the City", p. 224. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, memorandum by the Commissioner of 
the SAP, Pretor ia, for the information of the Minister 
of Justice, 19/9/1930. Champion himself was well aware 
that he was banished because of his contacts with Solomon. 
See AWGC Box 1: 1.1., short manuscript autobiography 
by Champion entitled "Time is Longer than Rope in the Life 
of Every Man", Durban, 1974, p. 4. 
See MS CHAM A922/A, copy of telegram from "Mayor of Durban 
to Minister of Justice, 26/9/1930; Roux, Time Longer than 
Rope, p. 193; llanga lase Natal, 3/10/1930 (Zulu language 
report); AWGC Box 27: 23:1., various manuscripts reo 
Champion's banishment, 1930-1933. For the 'liberal-
democratic' opposition of Eaton and other Natal MPs 
(notably excluding Nicholls, Marwick, and Deane) to the 
enactment of the Riotous Assemblies Bill, see Debates of 
the House of Assembly, 15/4/1930 (especially Cols. 3229ff); 
and 1/5/1930 (especially Cols. 3606ff). 
See, for illustrative examples, Ch. 4 above under the sub-
heading "The fissures beneath the populist facade: lnkatha, 
1925-1927" (re. his establishment of the 'respectable' 
and elitist' J>.irican {later 'Natal'J oorkers' Club'); 




















among the Zulu and Natal African rank-and-file" (re. 
his refusal to support the spontaneous strikes in the 
province, 1927-1928); and above under the subheading 
"The frustration of Zulu 'self government' : Solomon's 
drunken confrontation with the Governor-General, 1930" 
(re. his role in the beer hall boycott and related 
disturbances). 
Bulletin of the Department of Justice, 22/4/1931, quoted 
in Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 251. 
See CK Reel 15A, 2: XC9: 41/16, fragments of correspond-
ence between J. M • . Ngcobo, secretary of the Natal ~brkers' 
Club, and J. L. Dube, president of the NNC, reo Ngcobo's 
fund-raising efforts, dated September 1932; and secretary 
of the Natal Estates Ltd to J. M. Ngcobo, 13/10/1932. 
Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 193-194. 
See AWGC Box 1: 1.1, Champion, "Time is Longer than Rope 
in the Life of Every Man", p. 5; and see also Box 1: 
1.3.2, further autobiographical fragments by Champion, 
circa 1974; and Box 27: 23.1, various documents reo 
Champion's exile from Natal, 1930-1933. 
See directly below, in the context of the 'Clermont 
Township project'. 
Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 245. 
For Nkosi's opposition to ethnic distinctions, see La 
Hausse, "Struggle for the City", pp. 196 and 274. 
Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 248-250. 
Communist officials were charged under the 1923 Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act, which empowered the police to cause 
an "idle, dissolute or disorderly person" to be deported; 
they were barely allowed the time to be party to a 
'riotous assembly'. 
See above, p. 360. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 17/10/1930 (Zulu language report). 
For references to the 1924 'militaDt coup' in the NNC; 
the subsequent 'new' NNC; and Dube's resuscitation of the 
'old' NNC, see Ch. 4 above under the subheading "The 
formation of Inkatha"; and Ch. 5 above under the sub-
headings "The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928" and 
The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution". 
See Ch. 5 above under the subheading "The broader purpose 
of Inkatha's reconstitution". 
Ilanga lase Natal, 3/10/1930. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 17/10/1930. 
See ROux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 251-252; and Walshe 
African Nationalism in South Africa, pp. 230-281. Dube's 
NNC continued to remain aloof from the national Congress 
long after 1930. In this regard, see CK Reel 15A, 2: 
XC3: 41/5, letters between J. A. Calata, secretary-
general of the ANC, and A. W. G. Champion (who had recently 
been appointed to the ANC 'cabinet' as a Natal represent-
ative), dated 19/5/1938; 19/7/1938; 14/3/1939: and 
27/12/1939. 
See directly below, in the context of the 'Shaka Memorial 
project' • 

























CK Reel 15A, 2: XC9:41/14, A. W. G. Champion to Dr. P. 
Seme, 24/10/1930. 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 2/6/1931, reporting 
confidentially on his investigations reo Inkatha, 
February-June 1931. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 17/7/1931, report of Inkatha executive 
committee meeting, 6-8/7/1931 (Zulu language report). 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, unaddressed handwritten memorandum, 
signed W. R. B. L1J, 8/10/1932, referring to Dube's 
correspondence to Solomon kaDinuzulu, 6/10/1932. 
Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part I, p. 13; and part 11:, p. 8. 
See Ilanga lase Natal, 17/7/1931. This project was not 
an original idea: soon after his succession in 1913, 
Solomon had pressed the NAD for permission to purchase 
the royal burial grounds on behalf of the Zulu people. 
See Ch. 2 above under the subheading "The traditional 
context and the ih1ambo (the washing of the spears)". 
I1anga lase Natal, 5/9/1930. 
See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Chief S. Gilbert E. Majozi to 
CNC, 12/1/1931; and I1anga lase Natal, 12/6/1931, public 
notice reo "Itshe 1esikumbuzo sika Tshaka" ('Commemorative 
Stone of Shaka'), given under authority of Solomon ka 
Dinuzu1u. 
See Ch. 4 above under the subheading 'The formation of 
Inkatha'. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Chief Majozi to CNC, 17/6/1931. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Chief Majozi to CNC, 12/1/1931. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Chief 'M.ajozi to CNC, 17/6/193l. 
See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 18/7/1932. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/12/1931. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, minutes of interview between Minister 
of Native Affairs, and Chief Majozi and Mr Bhu1ose, 
6/7/1931. 
See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, minutes of interview between 
Minister of Native Affairs, and Majozi and Bhu1ose, 
6/7/1931; and undated and unsigned 'Draft Programme' 
for Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony (evidently 
submitted by Majozi circa December 1931). 
I1anga lase Natal, 22/5/1931 (Zulu language appeal), 
recurring in subsequent editions. 
I1anga lase Natal, 22/5/1931 (Zulu language editorial). 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/12/1931. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 10/7/1931 (Zulu language report). 
See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, printed circular from CNC to NCs 
in Zu1u1and, 10/2/1931; and numerous appended replies 
from respective NCs. 
See I1anga lase Natal's editions between February and 
July 1932, which consistently published lists of 
contributors to the Shaka Memorial Fund. It is interesting 
to note in this context, however, that in a few rural 
areas - mainly in Zu1u1and - the Shaka Memorial project 
was popularly associated with the possibility of an 
impending Zulu rebellion. See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, NC 
Me1moth to CNC, 20/5/1932 and 8/6/1932; Acting NC Ixopo 




















See Ilanga lase Natal, February-July 1932, lists of 
contributors to the Shaka Memorial Fund. 
See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, NC r.1elmoth to CNC, 12/2/1931; 
and Acting NC Nongama to CNC, 19/3/1931 (for favourable 
responses); and NC Nqutu to CNC, 21/2/1931. Other NCs' 
reports are stored in the same file. 
The Durban municipality had initially resolved not to 
support the project. See La Hausse, "Struggle for the 
City", pp. 275-276. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 3/6/1932. 
For the roles of Oscroft, Armstrong and Nicholls see 
MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, KCM 3353 (a), Solomon ka Dinuzulu 
to G. Heaton Nicholls, 13/5/1932; L. E. Oscroft to 
Mr Nicholls, 14/5/1932; and EGJ 140, Solomon ka Dinuzulu 
to G. Heaton Nicholls, 28/5/1932; unsigned handwritten 
memorandum entitled 'Solomon ka Dinuzulu' reo arrangements 
for unveiling ceremony (evidently written by E. G. Jansen), 
28/5/1932; and CNC PMB 72, 57/29, G. Heaton Nicholls 
to Minister of Native Affairs, 8/6/1932; Rev. L. E. 
Oscroft to NC Nongoma, 7/12/1932. 
See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 9/4/1932; and EGJ 
140, unsigned handwritten memorandum entitled 'Solomon 
ka Dinuzulu' reo arrangements for unveiling ceremony, 
28/5/1932. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to organising secretary, Shaka 
Memorial Fund, 17/5/1932. 
For Majozi's fundraising efforts in the Transvaal, see 
!lan~lase Natal, 24/6/1932; 1/7/1932; 15/7/1932; and 
for Hajozi's death and the outstanding debts, see CNC 
PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 18/7/1932. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 29/7/1932 (Zulu language report). 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, unaddressed handwritten memorandum, 
signed W. R. B. L?J, 8/10/1932, referring to Dube's 
correspondence with Solomon kaDinuzulu, 6/10/1932. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 11/11/1932 (Zulu language report). 
Ibid. 
See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading "Economic crisis 
and social stratification among the zulu". 
MS NIC 2.08.4, File 19, KCM 3833, G. Heaton Nicholls, 
"The Old Zululand Constituency" (undated manuscript) , 
p. 23. 
See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Shaw and Co. (solic~tors 
representing Dove Bros, Monumental Masons) to Chief 
Mathole, 15/6/1933; Shaw and Co. to CNC, 4/7/1933; 
CNC to Shaw and Co., 6/7/1933; CNC to SNA, 24/10/1936 
(the source of the quotation); and James Crankshaw Ltd 
(inheritor of Dove Bros) to CNC, 28/4/1938. 
CNC PMB 72, 57/29, 'Commission for the Preservation of 
Natural and Historical Monuments, Relics and Antiques' 
to CNC, 7/9/1937; and CNC's reply, 7/10/1937. 
See below. 
See AWGC Box 1: 1.1, Champion, "Time is Longer than Rope 
in the Life of Every Man", p. 5; and MS CHAM A 922/A, 
J. W. Van Aardt (director, Clermont Township (Pty) Ltd, 





















M. W. Swanson, "The Rise of Clermont" (presented to the 
workshop on African life in Durban, University of Natal, 
Durban, 1983), pp. 12ff. ., . . 
For the 'self-help' and impl1c1tly segregat1on1st 
inclinations of Institute of Race Relations, church and 
Joint Council opinion, see Ch. 5 above under the ~ub-. " 
heading 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconst1tut10n • 
Swanson "The Rise of Clermont", pp. 6-9. 
MS CHAM'A922/A, A. W. G. Champion, general secretary 
of the ICU yase Natal, to J. W. Van Aardt, 25/10/1929. 
SWanson, "The Rise of Clermont", pp. 13-14. 
Re. the company's arrangements for Solomon's attendance 
at the Johannesburg meeting, see MS CHAM A 922/A, J. W. 
Van Aardt to A. W. G. Champion, 20/11/1931. 
Quotations taken from Zulu language advertisements in 
Ilanga lase Natal, 27/11/1931 and 1/4/1932 respectively. 
See also Swanson, "The Rise of Clermont", pp. 14-15. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 1/1/1932. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 11/11/1932 (Zulu language advertisement). 
For an outline of 'the subsequent history of -Clermont, 
see Swanson, "The Rise of Clermont" • 
. NEC Box 7, evidence of Chief Solomon Zulu, Pietermaritzburg, 
8/4/1931, pp. 6545ff. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, untitled handwritten memorandum reo 
Solomon kaDinuzulu, 1927-1932, n.d., entry for 8/4/1931. 
See Natal Witness, 8/9/1931; and 9/9/1931. 
See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Nongoma to CNC, 27/5/1931; and 
records of the criminal case, Melm~th, 14/7/1931. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, memoranda by police officers, Melmoth, 
reo Solomon's intoxication, 3/2/1931; and Deputy 
Commissioner, SAP, Natal Division, to CNC, 6/2/1931. 
See, for example, Natal Witness, 15/9/1931; and Ilanga 
lase Natal, 18/9/1931; and 25/9/193l. 
For further details on Bhengu, see Ch. 4 above; on 
Vilakazi, see Ch. 2 above; and on Maling, see Chs. 4 and 
5 above. These individuals' activities, together with 
those of Blackhurst and Pretorius, between 1931 and 1933, 
are recorded principally in the extensive official 
correspondence reo Solomon's financial disorders in 
CNC PMB 82, 58/7/4; 58/7/5; and CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4. 
See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Detective L. Van Vuuren, tID 
Vryheid, to NC Vryheid, 24/6/1932; NC Nongoma to CNC, 
15/6/1932t· and CNC PMB 82, 58/7/5, Master of the South 
African Supreme Court to CNC, 8/1/1935, providing details 
reo Solomon's insolvent estate and comments reo Solomon's 
financial arrangements. 
See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'Economic crisis and 
social stratification among the Zulu'. 
The key documents concerning Blackhurst and the 'royal 
cattie collections' are CNC PMB 82, 58/7/5, NC Melmoth 
to CNC, 8/4/1931 and 15/4/1931; NC Nongoma to CNC, 15/6/1931; 
A. S. Blackhurst to CNC, 13/6/1931; NC Nongoma to CNC, 
20/6/1931; 'Report of Round Table Conference on the 
representations of Mr A. S. Blackhurst', Nongoma magistrate's 


















CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Nongoma to CNC, 6/8/1932, reporting 
the evidence of a 'native headman' reo Blackhurst's 
representations at a Mahashini meeting in early 1932. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, NC Nongma to CNC, 24/11/1931 and 
27/11/193l. 
It was impossible ·to quantify the extent to which 
Blackhurst assisted Solomon, since the corruption and 
duplicity in royal circles was so pervasive that no-one's 
testimony could be regarded as reliable. And 'authoritative' 
official reports were based on the testimonies of 
necessarily partly-informed or prejudiced informants. 
CNC PMB 82, 58/7/5, 'List of cattle offered to Chief 
Solomon ka Dinuzulu', enclosed in Solomon ka Dinuzulu 
to NC Nongoma, 10/11/1932. 
CNC PMB 82, 5.8/7/5, NC Nkandla to CNC, 31/1/1933. 
CNC PMB 8~, 58/7/4, A. S. Blackhurst to NC Nongoma, 
23/5/1931. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, NC Nongoma to CNC, 29/6/1931. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, NC Nongoma to CNC, 24/11/1931. 
See below reo Solomon's new car, for example, for which 
he was legally obliged to begin paying instalments in 
February 1932. Although the car's purchase price was 
£825, the legal costs and penalties incurred when 
Solomon did not honour the hire-purchase agreement caused 
this single debt to accumulate to well over £1000 by 
December 1932, vide CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, C. F. Adams to 
NC Nongoma, 29/12/1932. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, NC Nongoma to CNC,7/7/1932. 
See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, which contains wads of unpaid 
royal bills. 
See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, Solomon kaDinuzulu NC Nongoma, 
10/7/1931; NC Nongoma to CNC, 24/11/1931 (re. Solomon's 
general complaints about fraud); NC Nongoma to CNC, 
15/10/1931 (re. Ncapayi); NC Nongoma to CNC, 2/12/1931 
(re. Bhengu); and Ilanga lase Natal, 13/11/1931 (re. 
Solomon's evidence at Maling's trial for fraud). 
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 2/6/1931. See also Ilanga 
lase Natal, 17/7/1931 (Zulu language report) , which 
remarks that comparatively few chiefs were present at 
the Inkatha executive committee meeting of July 1931, 
although all were invited. 
See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'Economic crisis 
and social stratification among the Zulu'. 
See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, extensive official correspondence 
reo NAD policy towards Solomon's financial difficulties 
and cattle collections, 1931-1932. 
CNC PMB 82, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 13/5/1931; NC Nongoma to 
CNC, 15/6/1931; and Acting CNC to SNA, 22/6/1931. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, Solomon kaDinuzulu to CNC, 10/7/1931; 
and CNC to SNA, 18/9/1931. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, NC Nongoma to CNC, 15/10/1931, reo 
Solomon's representations; NC Nongoma to CNC, 24/10/1931; 
SNA to CNC, 14/12/1931; and CNC to SNA, 24/12/1931, reo 

















EGJ 140, G. Heaton Nicholls to E. G. Jansen, 19/12/1931, 
petitioning the Minister of Native Affairs to assist 
Solomon; and CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to NC Nongoma 
(telegram - the source of the quotation), 5/1/1932, 
transmitting substance of Minister of Native Affairs' 
telegrammed instructions to NAD. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC (telegram), 5/2/1932; 
and report of meeting between Solomon kaDinuzulu and 
Usuthu Tribe, Mahashini, 13/12/1932, reo repayment of 
government loan. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, Solomon kaDinuzulu to CNC, 7/1/1932. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 26/2/1932. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, Solomon kaDinuzulu to CNC, 19/2/1932. 
See also Additional NC Durban to CNC, 13/2/1932, enclosing 
copy of Solomon's hire purchase agreement with 'Colonial 
Motors Ltd', 8/1/1932; 'Wynne and Wynne' (solicitors 
representing 'Colonial Motors Ltd') to CNC, 18/2/1932; 
and NC Nongoma to CNC, 18/3/1932. 
See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 27/1/1932, reo 
urgency of implementing the government conditions; Rev. 
L. E. Oscroft to NC Nongoma, 17/2/1932, accepting the post 
of Solomon's official financial adviser; minutes of meeting 
between CNC and Chief Solomon and the Usuthu Tribe, 
Nongoma, 12/4/1932; NC Nongoma to CNC, 7/7/1932 and 
15/7/1932; CNC to NC Nongoma O, 20/7/1932; NC Nongoma to 
CNC, 14/2/1933; and CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 
26/2/1932, reo Solomon's failure to abide by the government 
conditions. 
See Report of the Controller and Auditor-General for the 
financial year 1931-1932, UG29-'32, p. 279; 1932-1933, 
UG26-'33, p. 275; 1933-1934, p. 296; 1934-1935, UG39-'35, 
p. 29 3 ; 193 5 -19 3 6, U G 44 - , 3 6, p. 3 2 3; 193 6 -19 3 7, U G 4 6 - , 3 7 , 
p. 340. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, C. F. Adams to CNC, 30/9/1932 (two 
letters of the same date, one marked 'Private'); and CNC 
to C. F. Adams, 5/10/1932. Re. Adams' assisting the royal 
cattle collections, see C. F. Adams to NC Nongoma, 16/5/1932 
and NC Nongoma to CNC, 25/5/1932. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 24/3/1932. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, minutes of meeting between CNC and 
Chief Solomon and the Usuthu Tribe, Nongoma, 12/4/1932. 
See Ch. 4 above, under the subheading 'Inkatha through 
official eyes, 1921-1925'; and Faye's notes about Solomon, 
written in about 1922, in Faye, Zulu Interpreters. 
See Ch. 1 above, under the subheading 'The transition to 
Union: administrative arrangements'; and various ref-
erences throughout Ch. 2. 
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, handwritten memorandum entitled 
'Observations on minute addressed to CNC by NC Nongoma, 
23/9/1932', by C. Faye, 5/10/1932. 
See below, under the subheading 'Zulu nationalism and 
state segregationism after 1930'. 
See EGJ 140, handwritten memorandum and accompanying 
fragments of notes (7pp) entitled 'Mr Adams', n. d., 
clearly being minutes of interview between Adams and 
545 
E. G. Jansen. These documents significantly indicate 
that Adams was acting as Solomon's 'ambassador' to the 
Minister of Native Affairs: Adams represented that 
Solomon desired"administrative guidance", regretted his 
past "mistakes"; would do anything to assist the 
government; and, while he felt comfortable with the new 
CNC J. M. Young, he disliked the new NC at Nongoma 
E. N. Braatvedt. Adams himself requested that the 
government make a further loan to Solomon for the 
repayment of new debts (Adams made the same request to 
the CNC in September 1932); and that "I be allowed to 
privately advise Solomon to interview the N.C. Lat 
NongomaJ to whom he will make overtures Land reques~ 
to be allowed to discuss with the chiefs of .Zululand the 
establishment of the Zulu National Council. •• "~ 
224 See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, handwritten memorandum entitled 
'Observations on minute addressed to CNC by NC Nongoma, 
23/9/1932' by C. Faye, 5/10/1932. The minute from the 
NC Nongoma to the CNC to which Faye refers appears to be 
missing from the sources, but Faye's memorandum itself, 
by allusion, outlines the main substance of this minute. 
225 CNC PMB 82, 58/7/4, So l omon kaDinuzulu to CNC, 12/10/1932 
(NAD translation), delivered by hand at Solomon's inter-
view with the CNC of the same date. See also CNC PMB 84, 
58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 24/10/1932, commenting on his inter-
view with Solomon on 12/10/1932. 
226 See EGJ 140, unsigned handwritten minutes of meeting 
between Minister of Native Affairs, SNA, CNC and NC 
Nongoma, 24/8/1932, reo Solomon's status. See also below, 
under the subheading 'Zulu nationalism and state segregation· 
ism after 1930'. 
227 For details of the descent of these individuals, see 
Ch. 2 above, under the subheadings 'Dinuzulu's funeral 
procession'l 'Tribal divisions within the Zulu'; and 
'The traditional context and the ihlambo (the washing of 
the spears)'. 
228 Solomon also went on to appeal for improved educational 
and medical facilities for the Zulu, and request that his 
full stipend - which had been halved following the indaba 
debacle of 1930 - be restored to him. The CNC explained 
that Solomon's full stipend had already been restored, 
but half was being retained to payoff his loan from the 
government. See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, minutes of meeting 
between Minister of Native Affairs, SNA, CNC, NC Nongoma, 
and Chief Solomon, Mnyaiza, Gilbert, Franz and Zinyo 
Mdlalose, 13/12/1932, at the Union Buildings, Pretoria 
(with Carl Faye interpreting). 
229 See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, unsigned 'Suggested Memorandum' 
entitled 'Position of Solomon kaDinuzulu', 7/11/1932, 
being the NAD-prepared draft address to Solomon; CNC to 
SNA, 9/11/1932 and SNA to CNC, 2/12/1932 (telegram), 
arranging the interview; and CNC PMB, 58/7/4, minutes of 
meeting between Minister of Native Affairs, SNA, CNC, 
NC No~goma, and Chief Solomon, Mnyaiza, Gilbert, Franz, 
and Zlnyo Mdlalose, 13/12/1932, at the Union Buildings, 
Pretoria (with Carl Faye interpreting), reo the actual 


















EGJ 140, Solomon kaDinuzuluto G. Heaton Nicholls, 28/5/1932. 
Ilanga lase Natal, 10/3/1933 and 17/3/1933 (Zulu language 
reports). For further commentaries on Solomon's death 
and funeral ceremony, see The Net, June 1933, pp. 4-9; 
Reyher, Zulu Woman; and Pers. Camm., Ndesheni, part 
II, pp. 5ff. 
CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 17/7/1928 (Confidential). 
See Ch. 5 above, under the subheadings 'The reconstitution 
of Inkatha, 1928', pp. 29lff; and 'The broader purpose 
of Inkatha's reconstitution', pp. 32~ff. 
The existence of such a 'tribal outlook' was made 
particularly manifest during the 1906 rebellion, and, 
subsequently, in the rumours that periodically circulated 
among the Zulu associating the Zuly royal family with an 
impending revolt against white rule. 
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unsigned and incomplete handwritten memorandum, n.d. 
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L. Ruper, An African Bourgeoisie (London, 1965). 
The negotiations between Dube and Nicholls in this context 
were strictly private and confidential, and it can be 
assumed that the only evidence regarding their negotiations 
would be contained in their private correspondence. 
Dube's private records, however, appear not to have 
survived. (In this regard, see Haines, "Opposition to 
Hertzog's Segregation Bills", p. 4.). Nicholls' private 
papers, stored in the RCAL, are moreover far from complete. 
The records of the earliest correspondence between Dube 
and Nicholls reo Union 'native policy' are dated early 
February 1931; and their content indicates that considerable 
interchange had already taken place between Dube and 
Nicholls. See MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, 
RCM 3350 (c), J. L. Dube to G. Heaton Nicholls, 6/2/1931; 
and G. Heaton Nicholls to Rev. John Dube, 11/2/1931. 
See above, under the subheading 'The decline of Solomon 
and Inkatha'. 
MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, RCM 3350 (c), J. L. 
Dube to G. Heaton Nicholls, 6/2/1931 (Private and 
Confidential) • 
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signature from this document may be ascribed to the current 
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assistance is indicated by the way in which the proposals 
were expressed, and by certain inconsistencies. For example, 
the document incorrectly maintained that the adaptationist 
policy proposals included the establishment of a'Union 
Native Council' to advise the government on 'native 
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did so by mistake); D. J. Mackenzie, "Dube and the land 
issue, 1913-1936" (unpublished B.Soc.Sci. Hons. diss., 
University of Natal, 19·80), pp. 8, 25ff; Marks, "Ambiguities 
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the subheading 'Economic crisis and social stratification 
among the Zulu', p. 237. 
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See EGJ 140, J. Y. Gibson to E. G. Jansen, 29/8/1932, 
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undated,unsigned transcript of Dube's address at Solomon's 
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Footnotes to the Overview 
1 For Zulu socio-economic change and class formation, see 
in particular Ch. 2 'The social context of Solomon's 
succession: land tenure' and 'The social context of 
Solomon's succession: cattle and 'social disintegration' '; 
and Ch. 5 'Economic crisis and social stratification 
among the Zulu'. 
2 For petty bourgeois attitudes towards land tenure, 
education and 'civilisation' in the earlier period, see 
Ch. 2 'The social context of Solomon's succession: land 
tenure', pp. 43-49, and 'Influences on Solomon's early 
life', pp. 75-78; for the subsequent development of 
petty bourgeois ideology, see Ch. 3 'The Zulu royal family 
and African politics, 1917-1920', pp. 130-131; Ch. 4 'The 
formation of Inkatha' and 'The indaba with the Prince of 
Wales, 1925', pp. 202-203; and Ch. 5 'The reconstitution 
of Inkatha, 1928' and 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's 
reconstitution'. 
3 Rank-and-file and urban worker militancy is covered mainly 
in Ch. 5 'Political development among the Zulu and Natal 
African rank-and-file' and 'Popular consciousness and the 
ironic courtships: ICU leaders approach Solomon'. Isolated 
references occur in Ch. 4 'The fissures beneath the 
populist facade: Inkatha, 1925-1927'· and Ch. 6 'The 
frustration of Zulu 'self-government 1: Solomon's drunken 
confrontation with the Governor-General, 1930'. 
4 For the Natal planter/farmer alliance and white inter-
vention in Inkatha, see Ch. 5 'The reconstitution of 
Inkatha, 1928' and 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's 
reconstitution'. . 
5 Lacey's Boroko, for example, explicitly characterises the 
NAD as a whole in this way, and in so doing it expresses 
the conventional view. 
6 References to the role of the NAD and the Natal NAD in 
particular are contained in Ch. 1 'From self-governing 
colony to province of the Union: official postures and the 
Zulu royal family'; Ch. 2 'The traditional context and the 
ihlambo (the washing of the spears)'; the whole of Ch. 3; 
Ch. 4 'Inkatha through official eyes, 1921-1925'; and, for 
the later period, Ch. 5 'Popular consciousness and the 
ironic courtships' ICU leaders approach Solomon' and 'The 
reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928'; and the whole of Ch. 6, 
with the exception of 'Zulu nationalism and state segreg-
ationism after 1930'. 
7 For the political interests and role of the Zulu tribal 
elite, see especially Ch. 4 'Tribal politics: Solomon, 
'royal culture' and Zulu unity' and Ch. 5 'Economic crisis 
and social stratification among the Zuiu'; see also Ch. 2 
'The social context of Solomon's succession: cattle and 
'social disintegration' " pp. 58-61; and various references 
in Ch. 4 'The formation of Inkatha'. 
8 See Time, 19/2/1973, quoted in Guy, Destruction of the Zulu 
Kingdom~ p. 246 (for the reference to the 1973 Durban 
strikes); and R. Southall, "Buthe1ezi, Inkatha and the 
politics of compromise", African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 321, 
October 1981 (for the refereonce to King Goodwill Zwe1i thini). 
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DZ/S/2c. Minutes of meetings of Diocesan Synods, 
1914-1929. 
DZ/S/4b. Minutes of Native Missionary Conference, 
1933. 
(b) Documentation Centre for African Studies, 
University of South Africa, Pretoria 
1. A. W. G. Champion Collection 
AWGC Box 1. Miscellaneous records, including 
incomplete manuscript autobiography, "Time is 
longer than Rope in the Life of Every Man", 
dated 1974 at Durban; manuscript entitled 'zulu 
Paramount Chief History', evidently written by 
Champion, n. d.; and transcript of interview 
between Prof. M. W. Swanson and Champion, n. d. 
AWGC Box 2. Miscellaneous records, including 
pamphlet entitled 'Mehlomadala', evidently 
written by Champion, n.d. 
AWGC Box 3. Records reo (Durban) African Workers' 
Club, and Natal Workers' Club. 
AWGC Boxes 23, 25. Miscellaneous records and 
press cuttings, circa 1920-1970. 
AWGC Box 27. Records reo Champion's banishment 
from Natal, 1930, and life in the Transvaal, 
1930-1933. 
AWGC Box 28. Correspondence between Champion and 
S. I. J. Bhengu, 1947-1963. 
(c) Department of Historical and Literary Papers, 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
1. Buthelezi Speeches, 1972-1976 
Ref. A 1045. Speeches mainly reo the 'revival' 
of Inkatha. 
2. Champion Papers 
MS CHAM Ref. A 922/A. Documents mainly reo 
Champion's activ ities while in exile in the 
Transvaal, 1930-1933. 
3. Inkatha Records 
Ref. A957F. Information reo the 'revived' Inkatha 
compiled by the South African Institute of Race 
Relations: Natal Region, 1977; including copy of 
the 1928 Inkatha constitution. 
" • 
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(d) Department of zulu Language and Literature, 
University of Natal, Durban 
1. Collection of Zulu Praise Poems (Izibongo) 
Single container. Recorded by James Stuart, and 
translated by D. McK. Malcolm and A. T. Cope. 
(Particularly useful were the izibongo of 
Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, Solomon kaDinuzulu, okaNtuzwa 
LSolomon's mothe~, Mnyaiza kaNdabuko, and 
the European Railway Train; internal evidence 
indicates that th~se izib6hgo were recorded 
before approximately 1922.) 
(e) Institute of Contemporary History, University 
of the Orange Free State, Bloemfontein 
\, 
1. E. G. Jansen Collection (classification PV 94) 
EGJ 140. Confidential correspondence reo Solomon 
kaDinuzulu, 11/8/1930 - 13/9/1932. 
(f) Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban 
1. E. N. Braatvedt Collection 
I 
MS BRA 1.091. Single file. Contains account of 
Solomon's ihlambo" 1934, by E. N. Braatvedt. 
2. Sir Marshall Campbell Collection 
MS CAMP Files 4, 10.' Miscellaneous correspondence 
and records, mainly 1908-1916. 
3. Harriette Colenso Collection 
Several unnumQer~d files. (Not very useful.) 
4. Carl Faye Papers 
MS FAYE 1.04. Single file. (Not very useful.) 
5. H. C. Lugg Colledtion 
6. 
MS LUG 1.09. Single file. Miscellaneous 
histor~cal notes. 
" ./ 
B. W. Martin Collection 
MS MAR(T) 3.09. Single file. Contains informative 





7. J. S. Marwick Papers 
MS MAR 2.08.1, File 1. Contains J. S. Marwick, 
'A lecture on the Natives in the Larger Towns', 
Durban, 191B. 
MS MAR 2.0B.4, File 6. Testimonials and noteform 
biographies, circa 191B-1930. 
MS MAR 2.0B.5, File 7. Biographical notes and 
manuscripts. 
MS MAR, Files 19-21. Miscellaneous records 
and correspondence. 
MS MAR, File 35. Correspondence reo murder trial 
of Mkandumba kaMnyamana Buthelezi, 1910. 
~. 
MS MAR, File 50. Committee of Inquiry into Zulu 
Chieftainship Dispute, 1945, Evidence. 
MS MAR, File 66. Collection of twelve articles 
by G. Heaton Nicholls reo Natal devolution and 
native affairs, circa 1935. 
MS MAR, Files 73, 74. Miscellaneous records and 
correspondence reo native affairs, circa 1920-1930. 
B. George Heaton Nich011s Collection 
MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs Files 2-5. 
Private correspondence and transcripts of speeches 
and memoranda reo native affairs, mainly 1927-1935. 
MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 9. Miscellaneous 
records and ne·~scuttings. 
" 
MS NIC 2.0B.3, ~ Files 17, 19. Papers reo the 
Zululand twhit~constituency, including manuscript 
'The Old Zululand Constituency', n. d. 
MS Nrc 2.08.32, File 59. Miscellaneous records 
and newscuttings. 
9. F. R. 'M~tabele' Thompson Papers 
Several / files. (Not very useful.) 
10. Zulu Society Collection 
Refs. 16656-16672, 'Bantu Drawers'. Several folders. 
Records of the Zulu Society: andizibongo and 
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historical narratives transcribed by the Zulu 
Society. (The account of' Maphelu kaMkosana -
original zulu typescript, circa 1940, Ref. 
16665 - was particularly useful.) 
(g) Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg 
1. H. E. Colenso Collection 
Box 76. Letters despatched, 1911-1920. 
Box 77. Letters despatched, 1921-1932. 
2. Carl Faye Papers 
Box 9/19. Contains draft of speech to be given 
at Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony, dated 
24/6/1932. ... 
Box 12/29. Contains account of the Governor-
General's visit to Zululand, July 1923. 
3. Zulu Society Collection, 1936-1948 
• 
File IV/5/6. Miscellaneous records and transcripts, 
including fragments of Zulu royal family 
genealogy (of limited precision, n. d.). 
File IV/5/7. Transcripts of izibongo . 
File IV/7. Newscuttings. 
B. Printed 
(i) Official 
(a) Pre-Union .. ,~ 
1. Colonial Office Confidential Print (Africa South) 
(microfilm). Series C0879/4l (Natal, responsible 
government: Zululand administration); C0879/l04, 
C0879/114, C0879/116 {Union, coloured and native 
race questions). 
2. Report 9f the South African Native Affairs 
Commiss10n, 1903-1905. Cape Town, 1905. 
3. RepQr~ of the Native Affairs Commission, Natal, 
1906-1907. BPP, Cd. 3889. 
(b) Year Books 
Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa, 
No. 13, 1930-1931. 
No. 14, 1931-1932. 
! 
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(c) House of Assembly 
Debates of the House of Assembly, 24/1/1913-16/6/191: 
30/1/1914-7/7/1914. 
26/2/1915-21/4/191: 
Votes, Proceedings and Annexures of the House of 
Assembly, 26/2/1915-21/4/1915. 
19/11/1915-17/6/1916. 
(The debates of the House of Assembly were not 
officially published between 1916 and 1924. 
Comprehensive Cape Times parliamentary reports, 
covering the period 19/11/1915 - 19/7/1922, are 
bound in seven volumes in Natal University Library.) 
Debates of the House of Assembly, 
Vol. 1, 25/1/1924-10/4/1924. 
Vol. 2, 25/7/~924-6/9/1925. 
Vol. 3, 13/2/1925-15/4/1925. 
Vol. 4, 16/4/1925-11/6/1925. 
Vol. 5, 12/6/1925-25/7/1925. 
Vol. 6, 22/1/1926-29/3/1926. 
Vol. 7, 30/3/1926-8/6/1926. 















(d) Both Houses of Parliament 
Joint Sitting of both Houses of Parliament: 
Representation of Natives Bills (JSI-'36) and 
(JS 2-'36), 13/2/1936-7/4/1936. 
(e) Select ~nd Joint Select Committees 
Report "of the Select Committee on 
Na~ive Affairs, SC6A-'17 LNative Administration 
Bil17. 
Native Affairs, SCI0A-'20 !Native Affairs Bil17. 
Native Affairs, SC3-'23 ~atives (Urban Areas) 
Bil17. 
Native Affairs, SC6B-'25 ~ative Lands (Natal 
and Transvaal) Release Bil17. 
. " 
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the Subject of the Prevention of Disorders Bill, 
SC14-'26. 
the Subject of the Urban Native Council Bill, 
Coloured Persons' Rights Bill, Representation 
of Natives in Parliament Bill, and ~atives Land 
(Amendment) Bill, SClO-'27. 
the Subject of the Union Native Council Bill, 
Coloured Persons' Rights Bill, Representation 
of Natives in Parliament Bill, and Natives 
Land (Amendment) Bill, SC19-'27. 
the Subject of the Natives' Service Contract 
Bill, SC7-'3l. 
'Reports and Proceedings of the Joint Select 
Committees on Native and Coloured Persons, 1930-
1934 (supplement to JSl-'35). 
(f) Conunissions 
Report of the Commission to make recommendations 
for the re-organisation of the Departments of 
the Public Service, UG22-'12. 
Report of the Natives' Land Commission, Vol. I, 
UG19-'16. 




Report of the Local Nat1ves' Land Committee (Natal 
Province), UG3 4-', IS • 
Natal Natives' Land Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 
UG35-'lS. 
Report of the' Native Churches Commission, 
,\ 
UG39-'25. 
Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1924, 
UG40-'25. 
Report of the Economic and Wage Commission, 
1924, UG14-'26. 
Report 9f the Native Affairs Commission, 1925-
1926, 17-'27. 
Repqr~' of the Native Economic Commission, 1930-
1932, UG22-32. 
Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1932-
1933, UG3-'34 • 
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Report of the Native Aff~irs Commission, 1935-
1936, UG41-'37. . 
(g) Departments of State 
1. Report of the Controller 






















2. Annual Report of the Department of Justice for the 
Calendar Year 
1914, UG28-'15. 
1918, UG36-'19. ' 
1919, UG35-'20. 
1928, UG21-'29. 
3. Department of .~ines and Industries, Annual Report, 
1913, UG21-'14. 
1917, UG37 ~ '18. 
1932, UG13-'33. 








Webb, C. de B., and Wright, J. B., The James Stuart 
Archive, Vol. I, Pietermaritzburg, 1976. 
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Webb, C. de B., and Wright, J. B., The James Stuart 
Archive, Vol. Ii, Pietermaritzburg, 1979. 
(b) Microfilm 
Carter/Karis Collection of South African Political 
Materials. CK Reels 9A, l3A-15A. Biographical 
outlines of African political leaders, and 
documents, press cuttings and transcripts of 
interviews pertaining to them. 
(c) Newspapers and Periodicals 
1. Examined thoroughly between years shown 
Cape Times (1915-1922; parliamentary reports only). 
Ilanga lase Natal (1929-19)3). 
The Net (1907-1935). 
The South African Outlook (1927-1933). 
The South African Sugar Journal (1917-1934). 
Zululand Diocesan Magazine (1911-1922). 
Zululand Mission Report (1911-1932). 
2. Examined for smaller periods, or for reports of 
specific occurrences 
Izindaba Zabantu. 
The Natal Advertizer. 
The Natal Mercury. 
The Natal Witness. 
The Zululand Times. 
3. Collections of Newspaper Cuttings, Killie C~pbell 
Africana Library, Durban. 
Killie Campbell's Newscutting Books, 
No. 10, K. C. 19701; 
No. 30, K. C. 22160; 
No. 33, K. C. 19436; 
No. 36, K. C. 20438. 
(Circa 1935-1955). 
H. E. Colenso's Newscutting Books, Vol. II, Ref. 
20026; Vol. III, Ref. 20027 (Circa 1910-1930). 
I 
Mrs Mary Tyler Gray's Collection of Press Cuttings, 
BOO~)~ Ref. 19958 (Circa 1925-1940). 
Marwick Papers, Newscutting Books located in Files 
38, 40, 73; and one separately referenced as 
KCM 3196 (Circa 1910-1940). 
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A. Interviews conducted under the auspices of the Oral History 
Project, University of Natal, Durban, 1981-1982. The original 
recordings and translated transcripts are now stored in the 
Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban. 
Mahaye, Zephaniah. Born 1913, Emtonjaneni district, 
Zululand. Zulu oral historian, sometime adviser 
in the Zulu royal house - particularly during the 
1940s - and currently a ' storekeeper. Interviewed 
at his store, near Hluh~uwe, 11/11/1981. 
Zulu, Magogo Sibile Mantithl 'Constance. Born approx. 
1899, Zululand, died 1984. Daughter of Dinuzulu 
and Solomon's full sister. Started Solomon's 
'royal kindergarten' before being married to 
Chief Mathole Buthelezi in the mid-1920s. Chief 
Gatsha Buthelezi's mother. Interviewed at her 
home, Kwaphindangene, near Ulundi, 6/1/1982. 
Zulu, Mkandandhlovu Fundukutholwa Minah. Born 1913, 
Zululand. Daughter of Dinuzulu, evidently born 
shortly after Dinuzulu's death. Lived at the 
royal homesteads throughout Solomon's chieftainship. 
Interviewed at her home, Nongoma district, 15/12/1981. 
Zulu, Ndesheni Ernest. Born 1907, Zululand. Son of 
Mnyaiza. Educated at the ZNTI. In 1939 he took up 
employment as induna at the Nongoma magistrate's 
court. Nde~heni acted as adviser to Cyprian 
Bhekuzulu ~solomon, and acts as adviser to and 
representative of the present king, Goodwill 
Zwelethini kaCyprian. He is also consulted on 
historical matters by Inkatha, and serves on the 
'Ondini Restoration Committee' (Cetshwayo's Ondini 
homestead was burnt by the British in 1879). Inter-
viewed at his home, Nongoma district, 10/11/1981. 
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Zulu, Thandayiphi Absolom. Born 1925, Zu1u1and. 
Principal son of Solomon's marriage to okaMbu1awa, 
a high-ranking woman of the Buthe1ezi. In the 
late 1930s Thandayiphi was declared to be Solomon's 
successor • • Following a succession dispute, a 
government Board of Inquiry in 1945 set aside his 
claim in favour of Cyprian - against the wishes 
of the Zulu regent, Mshiyeni Arthur kaDinuzu1u. 
Interviewed outside a liquor store, Nongoma 
district, 10/11/1981. 
B. Other interviews 
Kanyi,£Zl. Private secretary to Cyprian Bhekuzu1u 
kaSo1omon during the 1960s. Interviewed at his 
home, Nongoma, 15/12/1981. 
Krige, Professor,E. J. Attended Solomon's ih1ambo 
ceremony in 1934 as an academic observer. Author 
of The Social System of the Zulus (London, 1936). 
Interviewed at her home, Durban, 6/10/1981. 
Mbutho, C. Zulu oral historian, specialist in the 
history of Cato Manor, and the Oral History Project's 
principal consultant for the social history of 
(African) Durban. Interviewed at the University 
of Natal, Durban, 20/10/1981. , 
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